\^!^ 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY 
IN THE WAR 



A REPORT 

OF THE 

" WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD 



By BERNARD M. BARUCH 

CnAUJMA.N 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1921 



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL. 

March 3, 1921. 
The President, 

Washington^ D. C. 
Sir : I have the honor to submit to you the more detailed exposition 
of the work of the War Industries Board which was promised in 
my report of December 24, 1919. 

In closing this undertaking, new as it was in many of its aspects 
to our institutions of government, I w^ant to thank you in behalf of 
myself and the members of my staff for the opportunity which you 
vouchsafed to us thus to serve our country. 
Respectfully submitted, • 

Bernard M. Baruch. 



GIF 



1 

" The highest and hesi form of efficiency is the spontaneous cooperation 
of a free people." — Woodroto Wilson. 



45669:i 



ADDITIONAL COPIES 

OF THIS PUBLICATION MAT BE PROCURED FROM 

THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

AT 

35 CENTS PER COPY 



PREFACE. 

This report is an analysis and narrative of the »^'-if- °f ^^^^^^/^ 

Indnstries Board, whose function it was so to supervise the indu.tr es 

otrn erica that the energies of each should, as far as practicab e, 

upp™n en Urose of all oU.ers, and that all should contribute to he 

Umit of their combined ability to one common purpose-the wmmng 

"'xhe vohunc has been written in pursuance of a pronuse contained 
in tlie following brief report to tlie President : 

Washington, D. C, 

December 2.'i, IH9. 
Mv DE.K MK. PKESiDENx: I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the 

and of achievements their support mtule possible. 

irv the importance of ..-- — 

The mobilization of America's industrial forces and 



/ements ineir sui'iJ"!'. ww.^.v,. i..-- 

;;::,averr /;... ,«ace an. <<,..,.nK.n.,„ t";va,. ana cle...c ,on wa a 

which were essential to the war's development. , . v ,<t -nul cnmulex 

The problem confronting -the War Industries ^^^--^ --;;;^^; '^l^ ; ! ^^ .^ 
antl the difficulties were added to in that it was not poss.ble to set a pn . 



6 PREFACE, 

of fixed limitations which could be worked up to, and. hnvinj^ been achieved, 
the task completed. The needs of the Army and Nnvy and tlie other war 
agencies of our country and our associates changed and expanded over night. 
It was no part of our work to make the program ; our duty was to lielp exe- 
cute it by supplying the materials that made success attainable. To be able 
to do tliis; to know what we had to d<> and then to plan to do it; to coordi- 
nate and synchronize the multiplicity of national and international eiforts and 
make them elTective in supplying the war demands so that our armies and 
navies could discharge their duty of fighting and winning, the War Industries 
Board evolved a general formula, Avhich is hereAvith appended because it con- 
tains its theory, organization, and policy of p?*ocedure — because it show.s what 
the Board was and what it tried to do. It read : 

" Wars are fought and won — or lost — on the land, on the water, in the aii", 
and on those battle lines behind the front where the civilian forces stand. 

"It is not enough to mobilize tlie Nation's military strength. There must be 
a mobilization of her full economic resources — ^industrial, agricultural and finan- 
cial. These must be organized, coordinated, and directed with the same strategy 
that governs the operations of the purely military arms of service. 

" The prodigious strain upon the world's productive capacity must be met and 
balanced to provide the means of warfare and to maintain the civilian popula- 
tion as well as to preserve the economic fabric. 

" America to-day is the chief source of strength to the forces engaged in the 
conflict against German world domination. That strength is expressed in 
terms of man power and material — the one military, and the second industi'ial. 

" To control and regulate industry in all its direct and indirect relations to 
the war and to the Nation, the President has created the War Industries Board 
and placed the responsibility for its operation in the hands of the chairman. 
The letter of March 4, 1918, addressed to Bernard M. Baruch, and the procla- 
mation of May 28, 1918, delegating executive powers, follow: 

" The War Industries Board is charged with the duty of procuring an ade- 
quate flow of materials for the two great war-making agencies of the Govern- 
ment — the War and Navy Deiiartments— and for the two agencies in immediate 
affiliation with these military arms — the Emergency Fleet Corporation and 
the Railroad Administration. 

" Also, the board provides supplies necessary to the military needs of our 
associations in the war, and Uiose commodities required by neutrals in exchange 
for materials essential to us. 

" Finally, and of paramount importance, the board, in alliauce with the Food, 
^lel, and Labor Administrations, provides for the country's civilian needs, the 
protection of which is a particular duty of the organization. 

•• It is not only thenjuty of the War Industries Board to stimulate an ' .- 
pand production in those industries making war essentials, it is equally the 
board's duty to protect, as far as may be, those industries not immediately 
essential to the war program. 

" It is the policy of the board, where retrenchment and curtailment are neces- 
sary, to keep alive, even though it be necessary to skeletonize, the enterprises 
in this group, and not to destroy them. 

" Whenever possible, conversion of industries from a uonwar production to an 
essential output is effected. 

" The War Industries Board is a method of control devised by the President 
to equalize the strain placed upon the American industrial structure by the 
war. 

•• It stimulates and expands the production of those materials essential to the 
war program and at the same time it depresses and curtails the production of 



rnKiwcK. 7 

tlHist' thiii.iis in>t of ;i necessitous nature. This is done by re^iuiatiou, in t-onso- 
iiance with other executive brandies, of the basic economic elements: (o) Facili- 
ties, (b) mntenals, (c) fuel, (d) transportation, (c) hibor, and if) capital. 
~~'" The metliod of control is thro\if,'h a preference list, on which are placed 
those industnes whose output is essential to the war's progress. The priority -■ 
indicated by tlie preference list is the master key to the six elements named. _ 

*' Further, the board reyiilates all and controls certain otUar industries of 
tirst-rate war importance, it fixes prices through the price-ffxTug conrmittee, it 
creates new and converts old facilities, it clears the national business require- 
ments, and it leads to conservation, which is needed to bridge the gap between 
tlie extraordinary demand and the available supply — a gap which exists in 
almost all the great commercial staples. 

" The War Industries Board embraces all and each of the Nation, b^ood and 
luel are separately administered, but with every other article of military need 
and of ordinary life the board has a direct connection, and it has a basic rela- 
tionship with food and fuel, too, for both requii'e in production and distribution 
the materials that the War Industries Board provides. Its strength lies in the 
full and patriotic cooperation that American business, including both the 
employers and the eniployees, gives in working out tlie problems common to 
us all. 

" The abnormal conditions of the war demand sacritices. It is the price of 
victory. 

" Only actual needs, not fancied wants, should and can be satisfied. 

'• To save heavy and long privation, temporary deprivation must be the rule. 

" America's willingness to accept these conditions marks her ability to quicken 
the end of the conflict." 

It is not within the province of the writer to render juugment upon the 
success achieved by the organization of which lie was the head, but it is not 
amiss for him to say not one default was recorded on any demand made by 
the military establishments. They were given all they asked in measure so 
full and so quick as to be noteworthy, especially when it is remembered that 
most of the years of our existence had been given over to life and thought of 
peace with small inclination or opportunity to familiarize ourselves with the 
arts and needs of war. If the love of country shows itself in tlie readiness of 
men to fight it is equally proven in the willingness of capital and labor — of 
the men and women workers — to serve. 

It is with great pride I inform you that there was not a slacker to be found 
among the industries. Not one had to be coerced. They governed themselves 
by the an.sw^er to a single question, namely : " Do the continuation of our 
er*^-^ ^ijses help or hurt the war program?" Vi*! 

Tl _ choice was unanimous for service ratlier than profit — for national need 
instead of individual expediency. In every way they thoroughly responded 
to thf- test. Not a single business from the greatest business organization to 
the smallest merchant but was affected by the war; but was called upon to 
make some sacrifice. Because of tlieni — their brains, their workers, and their 
money — added to tlie indomitable spirit of our soldiers and sailors, and to the 
general public's readiness for sacrifice, America was not found wanting; 
because of them America was able to supply the men and materials without 
which victory, at the time it came, could not have been won. 

It is impossible to estimate the value of America's industrial elTorts in terms 
of dollars, but it is safe to say the total ran into the billions. 

In my a.ssociates. chosen from the whole Nation because of their ability. I 
found my .support to come as quickly from the Republicans as from the Demo- 
crats; from the man of German exti'action as from the one whose antecedents 



II 



8 PREFACE. 

were English. In the spirit of service becaiise of the world crisis and the 
national emergency, there were fused all differences of politics, of ancestry, of 
religion; all were Americans and as such soldiers of the common good. To 
these men on the Board, and to the American employer and employee, goe& 
such praise as the organization may have earned. 

With them beside him he was able to render service; without their support 
he could not have succeeded. 

Because every member of the War Industries Board from the top to the 
bottom is deserving of the attention of yourself and their fellow citizens, I will 
append a complete roster of those devoted men and women who discharged 
their duty to their country by earnest service in this vital organization. To 
them I again express my thanks and for them I express the gratitude we all 
of us feel in having been vouchsafed this great opportunity to which we sought,. 
as best we could, greatly to rise. 

There will be submitted later a detailed exposition and study of the Board* s- 
origin, function, and organization. Further, there also will follow the reports- 
of the members of the Board and the divisional chiefs in whose hands fell the 
authority you delegated to me, decentralized according to an attached chart. 
Finally, in addition to general comments, I am submitting certain conclusions 
as to the lessons taught us by the war, expressed in the form of recommenda- 
tions which, if translated into practice, will bring us a greater readiness for 
the worst that the future may hold and which can be enacted without violence 
to our traditional predisposition to peace and the pursuits thereof. 

Between the time of the signing of the armistice and the discontinuance of 
the War Industries Board the problem was faced of reversing the Board's 
machinery in order to demobilize industry from war service and assist it back 
to its normal channels. The German collapse had been spectacular in its sud- 
denness. When fighting ceased war production in the United States was reach- 
ing its peak^ Every unit of the vast machinery was keyed up to high speed. 
There is no doubt but that knowledge of this fact contributed materially to 
Germany's sudden realization of the hopelessness of her position. The Board 
did'^all that was possible to prevent any injury to industry as it was put back 
on a peace basis. The price fixing committee of the Board determined as a 
general policy that price agreements should continue for the period originally 
fixed. The President directed the various departments of the Government not 
to market, in competition with private producers, materials in which there was 
no shortage and which were not of a perishable nature. The Board, through 
recommendations and advice, aided in cancellation of contracts so as to stabilize 
as far as possible the flow of materials, labor, and plant facilities back to peace 
channels. It was arranged with all of the war-making agencies of the 'Gov- 
ernment that the Board should be advised of revisions and adjustments of all 
Government contracts in excess of $100,000. The Board's facilities 'section, for 
a brief time, remained as the clearing house for all information relating to 
contract adjustment. Contact also was maintained with the Labor Depart- 
ment so that as labor was released from war work, it was distributed to peace- 
time industries needing it. If the proper authority had been at hand, it would 
have been possible for the War Industries Board to have continued its func- 
tions during the period of readjustment. Much good could have been accom- 
plished. But with the signing of the armistice, the purchases by the Allies and 
our own great departments coming to an end, the power of the Board, without 
further additional legislative authority, ceased and it was possible to do only 
what was done — to wind up its work as quickly as possible. 

It would be impossible in any statement of the activities of the War Industries 
Board, or any story of the mobilization of the industries of the country, not to 



PREFACE. 9 

conclude with definite recommendations based upon the lessons learned. A 
similar emergency may arise in the future and it can more easily be coped with 
f the experiences of the hist two years are profited by. The writer believes:, 

First . There should be created a peace-time slieleton organization based on tliel 
experience of^tEe^ar-making agencies. It should be headed by a chairman^ | 
ivho, when the emergency arises, should be granted the powers necessary to | 
■oordinate and synchronize the economic resources of the country. With him J 
should be associated tlie representatives of the Army and the Navy or any other 
iepartment vitally interested, as the Shipping Board, who should have cen- 
;ralizod under them the various purchasing branches of their departments, 
rherc also should be in the skeletonized organization a vice chairnum, a sec- 
retary, a counsel, and members in charge of raw materials, finished products, 
"acilities, prices, labor, planning and statistics (during peace under the Depart- 
uent of Conmierce) , priority and conservation. Under these there should be also 
he various section or commodity heads. The peace-time organization would 
neet at least once a year to discuss and outline plans and to keep in touch with 
he general world situation and with one another. Each sectional head would 
lame committees in each industry in order that, in the event of an impending 
;risis, it would be possible within a few days to create an organization which 
mmediately would mobilize all of the industries of the nation and quickly make 
ivailable for the Government all of its resources. These men, with the exception 
)f the Secretary, who would keep the records, would serve without compcnsa- 
:ion and the actual expense of maintaining such an organization would be small. 
: would recommend that all priorities, including those of shipping, should be 
centralized in the chairman. 

Second . Through a sy.stem of stimulation by a protective tariff, a bonus, an" 
Jxempfion'Ti^ui taxation for a limited period, licensing, or any other effective 
ueans. every possible effort should be made to develop protluction of manganese. 
jirom e, tungsten, djestuff, by-products of coal, and all such raw juaterials 
isually imported but which can be produced in quantity in this country. Above 
ill, immediate and persistent effort must be made to develop production of \ 
litrogeJUT-ml. its. substitutes, not alone for war but for agricultural purposes. ^ 

ThirU ,. Under the sui^ervision of the proper departments of the Government" 
ome industries must be given encouragement to maintain a skeleton organiza- 
ion through which can be developed tjjfi j'api d manufacture of guns, munitionSj 
lirplanes, etc. Some facilities already developed might be kept alive through^ 
>utri,i:hf purchase or by small orders for munitions and airplanes while at alT 
imes there must be kept on hand the necessary dies, jigs, fixtures, etc., needed 
or the manufacture of munitions. The expert personnel of the War and 
savy Departments in addition to keeping abreast of the times in new war-mak- 
ng agencies should keep the industries of the Nation attuned in a skeleton form 
meet immediately that enlarged demand which would come tlirough war. 
Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) BEnxARi) IVI. P.ARrcH. 

Hon. WooDROw Wilson, 

Presiflevt of the United States, 

The M'hitc House, Washington, 1). C. 

In the report which follows, attention is directed to the things ac- 
omplished rather than to the individuals who did them. The world 
vill desire to judge the quality of these men by an untinseled rec- 
rd of their work rather than by their biographies, and such a record 
3 here set down. It is known to all that every loyal American citi- 



10 PREFACE, 

y-eii contributed whole-heartedly to the comiuon end, and it was this 
unfaltering spirit of patriotism that finally crowned the war effort 
with success. There is no calculus by which the value of each man's 
activities, even within such a group as the War Industries Board 
and its staff, can be rated, and no such attempt has here been made. 

This record has been made bj^ no one man. Each member of the 
board prepared an account of his work. Each director of a division 
and each chief of a section reported the conditions and problems 
which he found in his industry and the manner in which such prob- 
lems were handled. All of these reports have been worked over and 
condensed, duplications and repetitions eliminated, and an endeavor 
has been made to weave the story into a consecutive whole. 

The compilation is the work of Edwin B. Parker and Frank Fritts. 
It is with regret that I found that there could not be placed in this 
volume a fuller and more detailed report of the work of each division 
And section head — their difficulties and their successful accom- 
plishments. 

It is believed that a condensed yet comprehensive record of the 
activities of the Board, with explanations of the principles and poli- 
cies by which it functioned, together with a discussion of the place 
in the great World War occupied by the leading industries of America, 
is worth preserving for the information, and it may be for the guid- 
ance, of this and future generations. 

Bernard M. Baruch, 
Chairman. War Ind'>ist7nes Board. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I. 

TfrE War Industriks ISoaro. 

Cliaptcr. Page. 

1. Ori.Lclii and purpose 17 

2. Tlie prosrniii of requirements ."lO 

a. The study of resources 38 

4. Priorities 47 

5. Conservation G1 

6. Price-tixiiii;- 70 

7. Labor problems SI 

?. Tlie foi-eign mission 02 

). Conclusion DO 

PART II. 

Commodity Skctions. 
Chapter. 

1. Introductory-- 103 

2. Iron and steel 110 

3. Copper and brass 130 

Copper 130 

Zinc 137 

Brass 139 

4. Other metals - 142 

Ferroalloys 142 

Manganese 142 

Vanadium 144 

Tungsten 144 

Zirconium 14r> 

Ferrosilicon 145 

Chromite 145 

Tin 146 

Aluminum 148 

Lead 150 

Nickel 152 

Quicksilver 153 

Antimony 153 

Platinum 154 

5. Chemicals for munitions 157 

Nitrate of soda 157 

Sulphur and pyrites 101 

Acids and heavy chemicals 1<>3 

Sulphuric acid 103 

Nitric acid 1(35 

11 



12 CONTENTS. 

Chapter. 

5. Chemicals for munitions — Continued. Fage. 



Alkali and chlorine- 
Caustic soda 



166 
166 



167 



Soda ash 

Potash 1^8 

Chlorine 169' 

171 

_ 172 



Ethyl alcohol _ 
Cotton linters- 



Explosives ^'^'^ 



6. Industrial chemicals. 



181 



Artificial dyes and intermediates ISl 

Industrial gas and gas products 184 

Toluol 184 

Saccharine 185 

Acetylene 185 

Oxygen 185 

Creosote 185 

Tanning materials and natural dyes 186 

Paints and pigments 188 

Wood chemicals 15)0 

Miscellaneous chemicals 192 

Technical and consulting staff 194 

7. Auxiliary mineral products 196 

Refractories 196 

Ceramics 197 

Electrodes and abrasives 198 

Electrodes 198 

Abrasives 199- 

Chemical glass and stoneware IQS' 

Glass carboys 19&^ 

Chemical stoneware 200 

Laboratory glass __ 200 

Asbestos and magnesia 200 

Mica 201 

8. Medical supplies 204 

9. Tobacco 208 

10. Forestry products and building materials 211 

Lumber 211 

P.uilding materials 219 

Wood products 221 

Pulp and paper 222 

11. Textiles 228 

Cotton goods 228 

Wool 231 

Knit goods 236 

Felt 238 

Silk 241 

Flax products 242 

Jute, hemp, and cordage 243 

12. Leather and rubber 247 

Hides, leather, and leather goods 247 

Hides and skins 248 

Sole and belting leather 2.50 



Ik 



CONTENTS. 



la 



Chapter. 

12. Leather and rubber— Continued. 

Hides, leather, and leather goods— Continued. rage. 

Upper leather -"^^ 

Harness, bag, and strap leather — -*_'- 

Sheepskin and glove leather -^- 

Boots and shoes -^*'- 

Harness and personal equipment -^-l 



Beltinj 



2o4 



Gloves and leather clothing 254 

Rubber and rubber goods -^^ 



"4 

81 

^ I 13. Machinery and tools . SoO 

S^ I iMachine tools 259 

Forgings, ordnance, small arms and ammunition 2(52 

Hardware and hand tools 264 

Cranes -^'^ 

Chains -6" 

Military optical glass and instruments 208 

14.- Transportation and power 270 

Automotive products 270 

Railway equipment and supplies 273 

Locomotives 274 

Freight cars 275 

Stored materials 277 

Fire prevention 277 

Power 27S 

Electrical and power equipment 2S0 

Electrical apparatus and supplies 280 

Steam turbines 282 

Boilers, condensers, and similar equipment 2S3 

APPENDICES. 

Appendix. 

I. Army appropriation act. Aug. 29, 191G, sec. 2 287 

II. War service committees 28S 

III. The Overman Act 290 

IV. Tersonnel of the War Industries Board 291 

V. Clearance List, Feb. 25. 1018 3K5 

VL Clearance List, June 24. 1918 319 

VII. Requirements Division 320 

VIII. W. I. B. Price Bulletins Nos. 1-57 324 

IX. Priorities Circulars Nos. 1 and 2 325 

X. Priorities Circular No. 4 330 

XI. (1) General classification of purposes demanding preference 

treatment 339 

(2) Preference List No. 1 340 

XII. Preference Li.st No. 2 342 

XIII. Industrial Adjustments Committee — minutes 350 

XIV. President's Mediation Commission — report 354 

XV. Labor Conference Board — report 357 

XVI. Labor Priority Bulletin No. 1 3.58 

XVII, Report of Replogie on .steel 360 

XVIII. (1) Reply of Baruch to Hylan 303 

(2) Reply of Baruch to Calder resolution 305 



14 CONTEXTS. 

Appendix. ViVA" 

XIX. Fixed price scliedule— steel, Oct. 11, 1917 367 

XX. Fixed price scliedule — steel, Nov. 5, 1917 367 

XXI. Joint circuliir — Ptirlier and Replogle 36S 

XXII. (1) Priorities Circular No. 28 372 

XXII. (2) Priorities Circular No. 35 374 

XXIII. Nitrate of soda pool prices — ^tentative 377 

XXIV. Nitrate of soda pool prices — final 377 

XXV, Production of alcohol in United States 377 

XXVI. Production of dyestuffs in United States 37.S 

XXVIl. Ruling on dyewoods and dyes— Oct. 10, 1918 37,s 

XXVIII. Classitication of industries using acetic acid 370 

XXIX. Questionnaire to electrode consumers 379 

XXX. Drugs and pharmaceuticals for 1917 380 

XXXI. Production of tobacco in United States— 1913-1918 3S0 

XXXII. Exports of tobacco from United States— 1913-1918 381 

XXXIII. Lumber cut of United States— 1913-1918 381 

XXXIV. Priorities Circular No. 21 381 

XXXV. Production of paper in United States — 1917 383 

XXXVI. Fixed price schedule— cotton goods, July 8, 1918 383 

XXXVII. Regulations for handling wool clip of 1918 383- 

XXXVIII. Priorities Circular No. 10 387 

XXXIX. Rubber consumed in United States— 1917 388 

XL. Production of automobiles in United States— 1899-1918 389 

XLI. Production of locomotives in United States— 1911-1918 389 

XLII. Story of the nitrate problem 390 

XLIII. Priorities Circular No. 45 392 

XLIV. War service committees and members 39& 

Index 411 



PART I. 



THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD. 



15 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



A Report of the War Industries Board. 



Part I. 

THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD. 



Chapter 1. 
ORIGIN AND PURPOSE. 

For years to come the activities of the United States in meeting 
the many problems involved in its participation in the war will fur- 
nish a wealth of material for the economist, the political scientist, 
and all others interested in public affairs. During the period before 
this country became a party to the conflict, much of the attention of 
those who fostered preparation for the inevitable day was devoted 
to plans for producing a trained personnel. And that early work 
was of an importance which is easily underestimated. The speed 
with which our Army grew from 200,000 to 4,000,000 men and the 
success with which it was being moved to Europe at the rate of 
225,000 troops per month during the summer of 1918 were phe- 
nomena new to history and phenomena which amazed not only our 
enemies but our allies. 

'" The prime characteristic of this war, howeve r , was the extent t o 
which it involved the material r gsoiirces of the participating na ti ons. 
As attention was turned to immediate preparations, it was soon felt 
that the problem of supplies was going to involve difficulties of the 
most far reaching and important character. Private industry in 
this country was already making important contributions to the 
supply of the Allies, but without proper coordination in the supply 
of our own requirements and those of the Allies it could well have 
happened that our entering the war might have had the effect of 
impeding rather than stimulating the flow of supplies to Europe and 
thus actually hindering the progress toward victory. The strain on 
industrial resources which the war was causing in Europe was well 
known here, but it was exceedingly difficult to estimate the e.xtent 
to which our vast resources would have to be brought to bear on the 
undertaking. 

In casting organizations to meet the problem, we had the experi- 
ence of the Allies which was placed freely at our disposal. But the 
temper and habits of our people, the extent of our territory, and the 

10.5826—21 2 17 



18 3^MEF.IOA'2<r; INC/USTM' IN THE WAE. 

magnitude of our industrial wealth gave many hbav aspects to the sit- 
uation. There is a general theorj' deeply ingrained in our political 
habits to the effect that Government should not interfere with the 
processes of business any further than is necessary to preserve the 
principle of fair competition and to insure the observance of ordi- 
nary legal obligations. For development and progress, individual 
initiative is relied upon. The public welfare is to be served by the 
spontaneous common purpose of a free people. The sentiment of our 
people was at one in regard to the purposes of the war. Men in all 
parts of the country'', the owners and workers in every trade and in- 
dustry, were more than ready each to do his part. 

The common purpose was already in existence on April 6, 1917. 
The probl em wa s _to_^br^ig..aiiQut a cfiorchnation pf^effort. Our citi- 
zens iiad been reading for three years of the sacrifices and privations, 
of the regulations and restrictions, which the allied peoples had been 
undergoing for the war. There would be no hesitation anywhere in 
acquiescing in restrictions affecting fortunes or freedom. The only 
question was what restrictions were going to be necessary and how 
they ought to be applied. The people of the country were in a mood 
to make any system work well, and after all that is perhaps the 
onlj'^ condition under which the most cautiously built system of con- 
trol would work at all. Methods and organizations developed as 
problems came forward. Before the end it was found necessary to 
establish a very comprehensive scheme of control over the entire 
industrial life of the Nation, and indeed toward the end control was 
extending beyond our borders to every part of the world from which 
war supplies were drawn. This came gradually and it was founded 
always as the result of common council with those directly in- 
volved. It depended always in largest measure on the good 
will and sound purpose of the people: and it was operated with far 
less machinery of organization than that used in any other country 
engaged in the war. 

The harmony with which the greatest military program in our 
history was moving forward in the summer and fall of 1918 is proof 
enough that the plan which was developed would work, at least in 
such circumstances as then prevailed. Whether a card system of 
distribution, a priority and price-fixing system, or any other system 
would work unless supported by the complete confidence of the 
people is questionable. We can only know that in applying the 
procedure which was developed we found our people convinced that 
control was necessary and we found them always willing to ac- 
quiesce whether they considered certain particular rules wise and 
necessary or not. It is the purpose of this book to tell how and why 
the principal features of direction and control were inaugurated in 
respect to the great body of our industries. The story will make 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 19 

even' American proud of the ma^niitiule of the natui-al wealth of his 
country unci the skill of his fellow citizens in niakinn; that wealth 
minigter to human needs. It will make him prouder still of the un- 
sellish patriotism Avhich prompted ever}' individual to do or refrain 
from doing, according to his lot, for the accomplishment of tlm 
common purpose. 

Early thoughts on the question of supplies ]:)ointed to the fact that 
there would be"sTioi'tages in a number of fields, ^t would perliaps 
li;!ve been impossible to ha"ve anticipated these shortages and pro- 
vided against them beforehand because of the extreme difficult}' of 
defining military needs. The war was constantly developing new 
needs so that a comprehensive unclertaking ih~warliianuf acture, in- 
augurated five years before we entered the war, might have been 
largely wasted. The program of supplies had to be developed in 
closest harmony with the military program proper. At any rate, 
whether for better or for worse, few important steps in preparation 
of the supply service were taken before the war was actually 
upon us. 

Three official movements began in 1916. The Naval Consulting 
Board appointed a committee which made a comprehensive survey 
of some 18,000 industrial plants throughout the country. This so- 
called industrial inventory was an ambitious attempt to list, de,' 
scribe, and classify all of the industrial establishments of importance 
in the countr}'. It was made, however, at a time when the nature 
of the problem and the character of the data needed were not clearly 
determined, and does not appear to have been as useful in practice 
as might have been expected. 

Another survey of importance was made by the Kernan Board, 
appointed by the Secretary of War to investigate the country's 
munitions resources with a view to determining the advisability and 
practicability of the Government's manufacturing its arm.-, mu- 
nitions, and.^fv+her war equipment.^ 

The -tiKiction o-^j-eatest importance, however, was the })rovision in 
the gf^ Army apphriation act, approved Ajio^sL_i9, ISifi. for the 
ycUi'tabli'^hment o^ie Counci l of National Def ense." The council was 
but it was charged, among other things, 
industries and resources for the national 
security and welfU," und with the " creation of relations which will 
render possible iitime of need the immediate concentration and 
utilization of thekources of the Nation." The council was com- 
posed of the six Sectaries— of AVar, the Navy, the Interior, .Vgricul- 
ture. Commerce, ailLabor. 



r given advisory I'.J^ers only, 
/ with the " coord ation of i 



1 The report of this boji ^.gg publishod as Senate Document No. 044, 05th ConKresn, 
2d scss., dated Jan. 4, 19\ 

-See Appendix I for seA of the Aimy iipi.ropriation act, iippiovfd Aiis. 'JO. iniO. 



:20 AMERICAN IXDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

As a corollar}^ to the council proper, the act provided for the 
" advisor}' commission " of the council, to consist of seven persons 
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of that body. 
each of whom should be specially qualified for some particular 
line of endeavor which would make his services of peculiar value. 
The commissioners were to serve without compensation. 

Provision was made for a director and a secretary, and both the 
council and the advisory commission were permitted to enlist the 
services of such experts, advisors, and committees as they saw fit. 
Individual experts might be employed, but subordinate bodies were 
to serve without compensation. 

The two bodies were formally organized October 11, 1916. The 
Secretary of "War was designated as chairman of the council, 
Walter S. Gifford was appointed director, and Grosvenor B. Clark- 
son (later director) secretary of both bodies. The advisory commis- 
sion was composed of the following members : Daniel Willard, Hollis 
Godfrey, Howard E. Coffin, Dr. Franklin H. Martin, Bernard jNI. 
Baruch, Julius Rosenwald, and Samuel Gompers. Each of these 
commissioners took charge of a special field. One was assigned to 
transportation, one to engineering and education, one to munitions 
and manufacturing, one to medicine and surgery. o\ie to raAv ma- 
terials, one to supplies, and one to labor. For some months there 
occurred little more than conferences and dis-^ussions. A plan of 
organization and definition of purpose were evoh^ed through con- 
versations not only among the members, but with leaders of industry, 
and those who were in contact with procedure in Europe. A system 
of contacts through " committees of the industries " was worked out 
by the commissioner in charge of raw materials, and it was on March 
3, 1917, that the idea of a large organization was made effective. 

There was then attached a number of divisions, sections, and com- 
mittees, the memberships of which were largely composed of trained 
executives who placed their services at the disposal of the council 
without compensation. As time went on these vr^^us "&!s«j^bordinate 
bodies underwent constant change both in chara^r and pe^.-||pnnel. 
The broad idea of the council was to serve as a cter of contactVg|3e- 
tween the Government and the industrial life ot^ie Nation. Tl\ <^q 
purpose was to make available to the United Stas the best thought ^.^ 
and effort of American industrial and professifd life for the sue- . 
cessful prosecution of the war. The council h; no administratis 
power. It was only advisory. Its organizatioi^as large and loo' . 
many of its ablest men serving only part ofl^eir time. It C' 
sciously or unconsciously served as a great ])oratory devoted i 

discovering and making articulate the new adinistrative problem: ^ 
which the war was to involve. i 

Within the council, committees emerged i^response to needs a ^ 
they arose, and these committees developed t the most part bot 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAR. 21 

the personnel and the plan of organization of nearly all the special 
administrative organs which the exigencies of war made necessary. 
Thus in the course of development the committee on transportation 
became by act of Congress the Railroad Administration; the com- 
mittee on coal was the forerunner of the Fuel Administration: the 
Food Administration emerged from another committee; from others 
came the Shipping Board and War Trade Board; and through 
a series of developments, which we will outline more fully, emerged 
tlie War Industries Board, which played such an important role in 
directing the whole ramification of the country's industrial life to the 
purposes of the war. 

As early as February 28. 11)17, the council created a body known 
as the Munitions Standards Board. Frank A. Scott was made chair- 
man, and the board was composed of technically competent perscms 
serving without compensation to cooperate with the War and Navy 
Departments in establishing standards for the manufacture of m-^ni- 
tions of war. A month later the General Munitions Board was 
established, with the dut}- of coordinating the buying of munitions 
by the War and Xavy Departments and to assist those departments 
in acquiring raw materials and manufacturing plants to meet their 
recjuirements. This new and larger board had the same chairn an 
and included the civilian personnel of the Munitions Standards 
Board; but it had in addition in its membership representatives of 
the several supply bureaus of the War and Xavy Departments. It 
was the purpose of this board to exercise sufficient supervision o i'er 
the distribution of Government orders to prevent competition in 
buying between the two departments and among the several purchas- 
ing agencies of the War Department. 

Almost as soon as war buying commenced, shortages began to ap- 
pear or to be threatened in a number of trades. In fact, allied 
])urchasing had already produced shortages in some industries. 
Prices of particular commodities, whose use in unusual quantities 
was anticipated, began to rise rapidly and to fluctuate with gr.'at 
uncertainty. The advisory commission called rapidly into bein^' a 
large number of committees of producers and manufacturers deal- 
ing with commodities which would enter into war needs. The 
thought was that these committees could serve in an advisory capac- 
ity, acting as centers of contact from which the Government ]) 'r- 
chasing agencies could get full and authoritative information c> i- 
cerning both immediate and prospective sui)!^}' capacities and ine 
industries could get information showing immediate and projected 
(jovernment needs. The question of fair prices and suitable methods 
for making equitable distribution of (lovernment orders could be 
discussed by the advisory commission with these conmiittee members, 
who were for the most part the most influential and best informed 
men in their respective lines of business. Evidences of unparalleled 



22 AMERICAN TIS^DUSTRY liS^ THE WAR. 

good Avill in ever}^ quarter made this plan seem more feasible than 
experience proved. The unprecedented rapidity with which ex- 
pansion occurred on every hand was soon accompanied by confusion 
and overlapping of duties and jurisdiction. Dissatisfaction began 
to come to light on the part of firms not directly represented on the 
committees. The possible misconcepticm of the position of the com- 
mittees in appearing to represent, even in a vague sense, both the buy- 
ing and selling interests was very soon felt. 

The council took prompt action to cure these difficulties. On 
July 28, 1917, it created, " with the approval of the President,'' a 
new body, to which it gave the name War Industries Board. This 
board took over the duties of the Munitions Standards Board and 
the General Munitions Board, which bodies were abolished ; and 
it was further charged with the duty of reoiganizing the several 
committees advising on particular industries and materials so as to 
make those com^mittees in the first place subordinate to the Board, 
and in the second place composed of direct representatives of the 
Government who should have no financial interest, direct or indirect, 
in the industries concerning which they advised. Frank A. Scott 
was designated as chairman of tlie Board; Bernard M. Baruch," com- 
missioner of raw materials; Eobert S. Brookings, commissioner of 
finished products; Eobert S. Lovett, priorities commissioner; Hugh 
A. Frayne, labor commissioner; Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Palmer E. 
Pierce, Army representative; and Eear Admiral F. F. T?]etcher, 
Navy representative, being the other members. The resolution of 
the council, by which the War Industries Boaj :1 was created, defined 
its .duties in general terms as follows : 

The Board will act as a cleai-iiis Jiuuse lor the war iiidnstry needs of tlie 
Govoriuneiit:, deteruiine the most effective ways of mettin:? them and the hest 
means and methods of increasing production, including the creation or exten- 
sion of industries demanded by the emergency, the sequence and relative 
urgency of the needs of the different Government services, anti consider price 
factors, and in th^ first instance the industrial and labor aspects of the problems 
involved and the general questions affecting the purchase of commodities. 

The development from this step forward was along the line of 
the organization which was functioning when the armistice was 
signed. It should be noted, however, that there was a marked change, 
in the responsibility and powers of the Board upon its reorganization. 
March 4, 1918. 

By the end of July, 1917, the elements of the problem had become 
sufficiently defined to indicate the main features of the machinery 
which Avould be required to meet them. Of first importance, there was 
and would be an insurmountable current shortage in certain commodi- 
ties. To cause those commodities to flow in channels most conducive to 
the purposes of the war, the Government had either to outbid all others 

" Associated with him were L. L. Summers, Alex hegpe, Eugene Meyer, .Jr.. J. L. Rep- 
dogle, C. H. MacDoweil, M. F. Chase, O. F. Weber, E. A. Pierce, and Fred Allen. 



A.AIERICAN IXDLSTUY IX Till. WAI!. L'.S 

in the market, or to^take measures to contrel.. purchases and prices. 
T!ie most sif^nificant, and for lis the most novel, functions of the Hoard 
\Yere the solutions which it developed for these problems in tlie form 
of the priority systein^and the_price-fixing plan. Government price- 
fixing for all purchasers has been practiced from time to time as far 
back as the oldest known code of hiw.^ But the priority system, ap- 
plying to Government and private purchasers alike, represents so far 
as we know, a ncAv method of control over the products of industry. 

The other functions of the Board came to appear broadly as 
follows: (i) To analyze the needs of our Government, of the Allies, 
and of the civil population; (2) to study the extent to which the 
rt sources could meet these needs; (3) to provide moans and encour- 
agement for increasing production; and (4) to promulgate rules and 
suggestions for preventing waste and imnecessary use. Various sub-- 
divisions were shaped to forward these purposes, the duties of each 
supplementing those of the others. Legal and technical engineering 
problems of a general nature, arising in connection with various fea- 
tures of the work, required separate divisions in those fields. The 
cordial support of labor was essential to increased war production, 
and to assure this a Division of Labor was established. 

The several committees reorganized to handle the interests of the 
Board in respect to particular conunodities grew in importance. 
They were composed of men thoroughly trained and experienced in 
individual industries. As time went on it became more and more 
evident that the divisions exercising general functions would have 
to depend upon these commodity units first for the information on 
which they would base their policies and second for the direct ad- 
ministration of the policies themselves. There was a gradual growth 
in the number and strength of the commodity sections as the field 
of the Board's supervision widened. It was soon seen, however, 
that these commodity sections in turn were experiencing great dilR- 
culty in dealing directly with the very numerous individual com- 
petitive units of which most industries were composed. The? situa- 
tion required a series of groups who could represent before the 
commodity sections and the functional divisions of the Board the 
interests of all members of the respective trades to be affected by 
a war regulation. Such groups had begun to take shape from the 
early days of the council, particularly in the industries producing 
raw materials. Some trades already had national organizations ol" 
a sort: but none of these were authorized rejjresentatives of all units 
of a given industry. 

Beginning in the early fall of 1917, the Chamber of Conniierce 
of the United States supplemented the work already under way by 
lending its poAverful support to the task of organizing the remaining 
principal industries of the country in such a way that each should be 

»Soe code of Uarainmabi. IS.ihylonia, about 2250 B. C. 



24 AMERICAN IXDUSTEY IN THE WAE. 

represented by a war service committee to serve on behalf of the 
trade as a point of contact with the Government. Where a na- 
tional organization already existed, the chamber had it appoint 
a war service committee with authority to represent it, and where 
a trade was not organized, the chamber took steps to secure its 
organization and the appointment of such a committee. Special 
care was taken to see that the committees represented entire trades, 
small firms as well as large. The advantages of this scheme of organ- 
ization are set forth to greatest possible effect in a pamphlet pub- 
lished by the war service executive committee of the chamber 
February 28, 1918." The significance of these organizations for the 
future was pointed out by Harry A. Wheeler, president of the 
chamber in the following terms :^ 

Organization for war service is giving business tlie fountlation for tlie Idml 
ot cooperative effort tliat alone can make the United States economically effi- 
cient enougli to take its place witli tlie nations in world trade * * *. Creation 
of war service committees promises to furnish the basis for a truly national 
organization of industry whose proportions and opportunities are unlimited 
* * *. The integration of business, the expressed aim of the national chain- 
^r, is in sight. 

During the summer and fall of 1917, the Food, Fuel, and Eail- 
road Administrations, the Shipping Board, and the War Trade 
Board were established by acts of Congress. The War Industries 
Board remained a subordinate body to a council having advisory 
powers only. As necessities for its action arose, however, it de- 
veloped and acted, relying on the one hand upon the support of th 
President, the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and other legally 
established agencies, and on the other hand upon the voluntary 
support of the business men of the country. For the most part there 
was cooperation and cordial good will, but sometimes legally ro 
sponsible services of the Government would be doubtful about their 
obligation or their right to defer to the determinations of a body 
possessing only advisory powers. Priority rules were promulgated, 
prices were fixed, and projects for vast increases in production 
were inaugurated on voluntary agreements with the industries. 
Success depended upon the cooperation of other branches of the 
Government. Technically the Board had no administrative powers 
whatever at this time. It had no legal responsibilit}'. The agencies 
of the Government, however, on whom legal responsibility for mak- 
ing purchases rested, found themselves dependent upon it for many 
important determinations. 

As the spring of 1918 approached, it was felt that the scope and 
effectiveness of the Board's work would have to be materially in- 
creased with the increasing demands of the war in prospect. There 

* See appendix II for a quotation from tliis pamplilet. See also p. 103 and Appendix 
XLIV. 

6 In an article contributed to The Nation's Business for August, 19lS. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 25- 

was a widespread demand for the creation of a ministry of munitions 
with full administrative powers to take over and combine the wt)rk of 
the Board and the purchasing function of the War and Navy Depart- 
ments. It was decided to leave with the ^Yar and Navy Departments 
the work of determining what military and naval supplies were re- 
(juired and the actual placing of the purchase orders. But to cure the 
defective powers of the War Industries Board for exercising a more 
comprehensive control over the entire industrial fabric, the l*resident, 
under his general powers as Chief Executive and commander in 
chief of the armed forces, reconstituted the War Industries Board,, 
removing it from the jurisdiction of the Council of National De- 
fense and making it, with enlarged powers, an administrative 
agency directly responsible to himself. This reorganization was 
effected (1) by the President's letter, dated March 4, 1918, to Ber- 
nard M. Baruch, appointing him Chairman and setting forth specifi- 
cally the powers and duties of the Board; and (2) by a formal 
Executive order dated May 28, 1918, after the passage of the Over- 
man Act' 

The President's letter constituting tiie charter of the Board read 

'•^^^^^^^^^ ^ THK WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, March 4, lOlS. 

My Dkak Mr. Baktjch : I am writing to asli if you will not accept appoint- 
uu-nt as Cliairnian of the War Industries Board, and I am going to talce the 
Ubt-rty at the same time of outlining the functions, the constitution and action 
of the Board as I think they should now l)e established. 

The functions- of the Bo;ird should he : 

^ The creation of new facilities and the disclosing, if necessary, the open- 
ing up of new or additional sources of supply ; 

©I The conversion of existing facilities, where necessary, to new uses ; 

^ The studious conservation of resources and facilities by si'ientilic, com- 
mercial, and industrial economies; 

(3) Advice to the several purchasing agencies of the Gcvernnient with re- 
gai'd to the prices to be paid; 

(^ The determination, wherever necessary, of priorities of pro(hiction and 
(if delivery and of the proportions of any given article to be made immediately 
accessible to. the several purchasing agencies when the supply of that article 
is insulUcient, either temporarily or permanently; 

(2) The making of purchases for the Allies. 

The Board should be constituted as at present and shou'd retain, so far as 
necessary and so far as consistent with the character and purposes of the re- 
organization, its present advisory agencies; but the ultimate decision of all 
questions, except the determination of prices, should rest always with the 
Chairman, the other meml>ers acting in a cooperative and advisory capacity. 
The further organization of advice I will indicate below. 

In the determination of priorities of production, when it is not possible to 
have the full supply of any article that is nec'ded produced at once, the Chair- 
man should be assisted, and so far as practicable, guided by the present priori- 
ties organization or its equivalent. 

"See Appondix III for copy of the Overman Act, approved May 20, 1918, giving the 
President power to redistribute functions among the executive agencies. 



26 AMERICAN IIS^DUSTIIY IX THE WAR. 

In tlie determination of priorities of delivery, when rliey must l)e dctenniiuMl 
lie should be assisted when necessary, in addition to the present iulvlsni\ 
priorities organization, by the advice and cooperation of a committee cnn 
stituted for the purpose and consisting of official representatives of the F"<> i 
Administration, the Fuel Administration, the Railway Administration, the Sliip 
ping Board, and the War Trade Board, in order that v.-hen a priority of deliveiy 
has been determined there may be common, consistent, and concerted action i" 
carry it into effect. 

In tlie determination of prices the Chairman should be governed by the advirc 
of n connnittee consisting, besides Iiimself, of the members of the Board im- 
mediately charged with the study of raw materials and of manufactured prod- 
ucts, of the labor member of the Board, of the Chairn.an of the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, and th.e Fuel Adminis- 
trator. 

The Chairman should be constantly and systematically informed of all 
contracts, purchases, and deliveries, in order that he may have always before 
him a schematized analysis of the progress of business in the several supply 
divisions of the Government in all departments. 

The duties of the Chairman ar e: 

(T) To act for the joint and several benefit of all the supply departments of 
the Government. 

© To let alone what is being .successfully done and interfere as little as 
possible with the present normal processes of purchase and delivery in the 
several departments. 

^ To guide and assist wherever the need for guidance or assistance may 
be revealed ; for example, in the allocation of contracts, in obtaining access to 
materials in any way preempted, or in the disclosure of sources of supply. 

(^ To determine what is to be done when there is any competitive or other 
conflict of interest between departments in the matter of supplies ; for exam- 
ple, when there is not a sufhcient immediate supply for all and there must be 
a decision as to priority of need or delivery, or when there is conipetition for 
the same source of manufacture or supply, or when contracts have not been 
placed in such a way as to get advantage of the full productive capacity of 
the country. 

(^ To see that contracts and deliveries are followed up where such assist- 
ance as is indicated under (3) and (4) above has proved to be necessary. 

(^ To anticipate the prospective needs of the several supply departments 
of the Government and their feasible adjustment to the industry of the 
country as far in advance as possible, in order that as definite nn outlook 
and opportunity for planning as possible may be afforded the business men of 
the country. 

In brief, he should act as the general eye of all supply departments in the 
field of industry. 

Cordially and sincerely yours, Woodrow Wilson. 

Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, 

Washington, D. C. 

The Exe iitive order, like several other orders under the Over- 
man Act. simply ratified an existing status. It read in part as 
follows : 

I hereby establish the War Industries Board as a separate administrative 
agency to act for me and under my direction * * *. The functions, duties, 
and powers of the War Industries Board, as outlined in my letter of March 
4, 1918. to Bernard M. Baruch, Esq., its Chairman, shall be and hereby are 
<-ontinued in full force and effect. 



AMEIUCAX INDUSTRY JN THE WAR. 27 

The new chairman reappointed the personnel of the Board as it had 
hoen during the greater part of the Avinter just passed.^ The Board 
was composed of the following members: Bernard ^I. Baruch, Chair- 
man; Alex Legge, Vice Chairman ; Kear Admiral F. F. Fletcher, Navy 
representative; Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals, Army representative; 
Kobert S. Brookings, chairman price-fixing committee; Edwin B. 
i'arker, priorities commissioner; George N. Peek, commissioner of 
finished products; Hugh Frayne, labor representative; J. Leonard 
Keplogie, steel administrator; L. L. Summers, technical advisor; 
Albert C. Eitchie, general counsel; and H. P. Ingels, secretary. 
Herl'ert B. Swope was an associate member of the Board, and, to- 
gether with Harrison Williams and Clarence Dillon, was assistant 
to its Chairman. 

By direct act of the President, authority for all principal controls 
except price fixing had thus at last been centralized in the new Chair- 
man. He in turn took immediate steps to decentralize the execution 
of his powers, making each of his colleagues fully responsible for a 
particular field. Thus it was that there was created an organization 
which was able to mobilize tlie industrial resources of the country in 
order that the fighting forces could draw upon them with as little 
dislocation as possible in the industrial fabric and so as to avoid at 
the same time conflicts of demand. This was done, however, without 
taking away from any of the permaPxently established departments 
either the making of contracts or the power to determine the types 
and quantities of materials needed. 

Upon the reorganization, the Board entered with renewed energy 
and confidence into the work of exercising an enlarged control over 
the industries of the country as they affected, both direr^tly and indi- 
rectly, the plans for prosecuting the war. Further ( ommodity sec- 
tions were rapidly organized and the existing ones enlarged and 
strengthened. Representatives of Government purchasing bui-eaus 
interested in the commodity were placed in each, and the importnn e 
of these sections, as substantial administrative centers of the worlc 
of the Board, developed rapidly. 

Xo legislation was ever passed making specific provision for the 
establishment of the War Industries Board. Its power still de- 
pended in large measure upon its ability to demonstrate its effec- 
tiveness in accomplishing the common purpose and the willingness 
of other ageu' ies to be assisted by it, together with the voluntary 
support of the business interests of the country. Several times dur- 
ing the summer of 1918, bills giving tlie Board larger legal powers 
were prepared and discussed by committees of Congress, but the gen- 
eral conclusion was th.at the Board was accomplishing its purpose well 
enough without further legislative powers. The legal foundation 

' See Appendix IV for a catalogue of the Board and its staff as it stood on Nov. 10, 1918 : 
(1) arranged i>y divisions and sections, and (2) arranged alphabetically with liuslnoss 
addresses. 



28 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

of the priority power and the price-fixinfr power is discussed mort. 
fully in the chapters devoted to those subjects. 

An extraordinary feature of the organization from a legal point. 
of view was its detached nature through which it was able to main- 
tain an expansive view of the whole undertaking and to act in a 
quasi- judicial capacity in respect to the many conflicting elements. 
The Board has been criticized as an institution with tremendous- 
powers and no responsibilities ; that democrac}' created in it a tyrant 
with power to shatter the ordinary rules of business practice even 
to the extent of undoing contract obligations. A fuller study of 
what was actually done will modify this conception. That the 
powers of the Board were of a quality easily susceptible to abuse 
and of a kind which should be intrusted only to men of extraordi- 
narj- integrity and talent can not be denied. 

Tlie Chairman of the Board from his earliest connection with this 
work conceived it as his highest duty to surround himself with men 
peculiarly qualified in temperament, knowledge, and experience for 
the jDarticular tasks as thej^ developed. It was not his theory to make 
a large paper organization before the facts. Out of the very large 
number of men from all sources who were brought to Washington 
for advice and discussion and for service during the earlier and more 
confused months of the council's work a large part of the Board's 
personnel was chosen. There had been a study of men as well as a , 
study of the nature of the problems which were to emerge. With 
the right men almost any organization will work. In general the men 
selected for the important work of the Board were of the type who in 
private life had been managers rather than owners of large industrial 
undertakings. Upon appointment to the staff they ceased to engage 
in their private business affairs. 

The aim was to have men who possessed special knowledge each 
in his own field, but men with catholic and broad-gauged vision who 
could correlate the problems of their neighbors with their own. Con- 
stant conflicts were to be involved. Much of the work would have to 
be done by forcing or reaching agreements. These features required 
on the part of 100 or more of the men in key positions not only the 
qualities usually termed "executive ability," they also required tact 
in a high degree, patience, endurance, and buoyancy; enthusiasn^ 
which could inspire, and inspiration which could accomplish. 

Some of the men who came Avere of independent means ; for some 
the coming at a dollar a year or a very small salary meant a real 
sacrifice. Some were Democrats and some Republicans. Men worked 
side by side for many months without learning each other's poiiticsj 
for politics was adjourned in the War Industries Board. It was the 
purpose of the Chairman to support the members of his staff in every 
way consistent with duty, to make each man really responsible foi 
the work before him. The enthusiastic and cordial support, which he 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAR. 2\) 

in turn received from them, is the fouinlation ami measure of such 
success as the Board enjoyed. A task of this character wouM have 
failed completely if the men engaged in it had not i)een willing en- 
tirely to sacrifice personal interests, time, money, and sometimes even 
health for their work. The men were willing at all times to work 
long hours without holidays and witiiout pay, forgetting personal 
.anxieties and personal fortunes in the patriotic eifort each to do his 
part to win the war. This was an extraordinary examide of the natu- 
ral organizing power of the American people. 

It is difficult to give a summary conception of the organization and 
its work. The Board was inspired by a picture of our industry so 
mobilized, and with all conflicting efforts so synchronized, that the 
iighting forces of the world could tap it at will for such supplies as 
they needed. This ideal was perhaps never quite attained but it was 
■the guide. The Board set out to prevent competition among those 
buying for the war, and to regulate the use by the civil population of 
men, money, and materials in such a way that civilian 7iecds not 
jnerely civilian wants, should be satisfied; and to do all of this with 
the least possible dislocation and destruction of the essential features 
of our ordinary industrial life. 

Through application of the principle of priorities, the processes of 
manufacture and trade were made to move in response to a national 
purpose rather than in response to the wills of those who had money 
to buy. Through price-fixing, men Avere discouraged in an}- unwhole- 
some ambitions to make inordinate profits out of the war. Through 
the conservation work of the Board, many wasteful trade practices 
were reformed and millions of hours of human labor were made more 
fruitful. Before the war ended, the American method of industrial 
■control was coming to be applied, through the medium of interna- 
tional executives, to the several war materials whose sources were in 
•distant parts of the earth. 

The plan of the vast organization was simple enough in form. The 
President's authority was centralized in the chairman of the Board. 
The chairman delegated, so far as practicable, the poAver of final de- 
cision to the several members of the Board, each in his respective 
field. The machinery of the 60 commodity sections Avas used in carry- 
ing forward the part of the general purpose for which each Avas re- 
sponsible. Each of the commodity sections contained memi>ers from 
the Government purchasing agencies and each section came into con- 
tact with the industries for Avhich it Avas responsible through the 
medium of the war service committees of the several trades, (niid- 
ance for all hands in the general plans of the Avar came through the 
actiA'ities of the chairman aa'Iio sat in the Avar council and gave to his 
men, through the channels described above and through regular 
meetings for conference, such information as was necessary to keep 
the whole organization functioning harmoniously toward a conunon 
purpose. 



Chapter 2. 
THE PROGRAM OF REQUIREMENTS. 

The statement is frequently heard that a bill of requirements and 
specifications covering the military needs of the Governm^ent should 
have been prepared during the early spring of 1917 before "wp.r was 
declared. Had this been possible, it would unquestionably have 
saved millions of dollars and a vast amount of confusion. The im- 
possibility of such a performance, however, is only too evident to 
one who will stop to consider the ramifications involved in the pro- 
duction of a war element so simple and direct as a shell. Even 
direct military needs change from month to month with the chang- 
ing fortunes of war, and always these changes are accompanied by 
adjustments reaching deep into the industrial life. 

A shell is made jirincipall}^ of steel, brass, and copper. It is filled 
with an explosive and is fired by either a fixed or separate charge 
of propellent powder. The production of such a shell involves first 
the preparation of a plant or plants to forge, machine, and measure 
it, equip it with a firing mechanism and vrith a band to take tlie 
rifling of the gun. It requires another plant for loading, packing, 
and shipping. Each of these processes involves, directly or in- 
directl}'^, a vast group of industries turned to a new field. But the 
steel and copper used in the shell involve another set of forces as 
they are developed from the ore through the processes oi extraction 
and refinement to the forges. The blast furnaces have to be sup- 
plied with coke, Avith lime, and with manganese. They have to be 
lined with refractory brick. Coke involves mining bituminous coal 
and passing it through coke ovens. They all involve a large amount 
of railroad transportation, for the most favored spot on earth does 
not contain all the elements for a piece of steel. 

Turnhig to the explosive and propeilant for loading and firing the 
shell, tb.e nitric acid is made from nitrate of soda which has to be 
mined and refined in a desert part of Chile, carried to the coast on 
railroads whose rails, rolling stock, ties, and fuel have to be taken 
there from distant parts, and then it is carried 5,000 miles in vessel? 
to our shores ; the sulphuric acid required in great quantities is made 
from pyrites ore coming from Spain or brimstone from Texas, 
platinum from Russia being needed for the equipment of the acid- 
producing plants. From some cotton field of the South has to be 
collected a little of the fine lint sticking to the seed as it com.es from 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TUK WAR. 31 

'nc gill to form the basis of the propellent powder. And after all 
i!i'> preparation a shell on the front is fired in a few moments. One 
.liv its use is necessary, another day it is not, but its preparation 
has to go on and on until the conflict is over. 

Shells are but one small feature of the e(iuipment of an army. 
There must be guns and rifles, hand grenades and gas equipment, 
airplanes and motor cars, food supplies and uniforms, medicines 
and surgical dressings, sound ranging apparatus, telephone supplies, 
and optical instruments. Ships were required to carry the troops 
and supplies. When one realizes the extent to which an individual 
direct requirement of the Army involves the whole ramification of 
industry, it is not difficult to see how a large number of direct 
re(iuirements projected on a vast scale will bring in their train an 
overlapping and confusion in indirect requirements. The program 
of suppl}' had to grow Avith the growth of the military program 
on the one hand and the growing knowledge of the materials obtain- 
able on the other. 

For the purposes of supply our Army was organized to make 
purchases according to the use to wdiich the commodity would be 
put. The Ordnance Department bought guns and ammunition ; the 
Quartermaster, clothing, blankets, food, and trucks; the Signal 
Corps, telephone apparatus, field glasses, etc.; the Engineers, build- 
ing materials, railroad supplies, and implements; and so on. Each 
service had subunits charged with responsibility for particular 
groups of supplies. More tlian one service frequently bought quan- 
tities of the same commodity. It will be seen that the Army method 
of classifying supplies did not correspond to any extent with the 
classifications of ordinary business. Particularly did requirements 
by services, when translated into terms once removed from direct 
requirements, fit awkwardly into the classifications of business usage. 
From the beginning the Board felt tli^.t it wns advisable to develop 
its organization according to the classification of commodities used 
in business. Before the w^ar was over, the Army found it necessary 
to reorganize its purchasing system, gradually drawing it together 
under one control and revising its classifications. Outside of the 
War Department; the Navy, and later the Emergency Fleet and the 
Railroad Administration w^ere making (irovernment purchases. In 
addition to all, the principal Allies had purchasing missions in this 
country. 

All of these factors contributed to the difficulty of laying down 
a program of requirements. The separate units of the Array 
siipply bureaus could not compute their requirements until they 
•ofew the size of the particular part of the Army for which it was 
ir legal duty to provide. The size of the Army to be here and 
oad at any given time could not easily be computed without a 



S2 AMERICAN IXDUSTP.Y IX THE WAR. 

definite knowledge of the amount of shipping that would be avail- 
able both for men and for supplies. Frequently the kind of equip- 
ment could not be determined until it was known what materials 
could be found available. Sometimes types, designs, and specifica- 
tions were delayed in an effort to develop a more perfect product. It 
soon became clear that the comprehensive supply organization would 
have to be mobile enough to respond promptly to an ever-changing 
•demand. 

When the General Munitions Board was formed, the activities 
of all Government purchasing agencies consisted in energetically 
placing orders without any certainty of their being filled. The board 
received statements of immediate requirements onl}^ as they were 
brought before it, when it joined in the effort to supply them in the 
shortest possible time. When a request for assistance came, the board 
would consider whether the proposed order involved a conflict with 
other necessary orders and whether it required emergenc}^ acLion to 
provide material or determine prices, and then it attempted to a- -ist 
in discovering the best available source of supply. At first there was 
no system forcing all orders to be brought before the board even in 
lines where there was a laiown shortage. 

Action on such orders as were brought was advisory only, and 
there was no report back showing whether the advice had been 
followed. Many Government bureaus placed the bulk of their 
orders without reference to the board. Each sought those plants 
whose manufacturing facilities promised the best results as judged 
from experience in normal times. This procedure had a tendency 
to localize orders in the northeastern manufacturing district of the 
country and congestion soon began to appear, with inevitable slowing 
up of deliveries. 

By the fall of 1917 many plants had orders far beyond their avail- 
able capacit3^ Fuel and raw materials could not be transported in 
sufficient quantities to supply the plants. Each Government pur- 
chaser wanted his order filled first and each manufacturer wanted his 
coal and railroad service given preference on the ground that he 
was filling a Government order. There was competition in buying 
•even between different Government agencies, and the competition 
between Government contractors was increasing in intensity. Prices 
rose not only because of actual shortages, but because of options and 
inquiries made to cover bids on Government orders. 

Competition in buying among the Allies and between the Allies 
and the agencies of our own Government and our Government con- 
tractors was becoming more and more a source of confusion and hin- 
drance to the common purposes of the war. That the Allies ^[-jj^j^p^ 
be assisted rather than hindered in obtaining supplies here a^j^^^ 

abr 



AMERICAN INnUSTHY IN THE WAK. 33 

Isult of our f^oing into the war was a policy announced by the Presi- 
rlout as early as April, 1917. Questions involvinp; competition among 
iLhe different Allies and conflicts between their purchasing pro- 
iirrammes and ours began to arise in great numbers. A scheme of 
l?ontrol for our own purposes alone would have been much more 
[simple than with this added complication. The Allies were ex- 
tremely anxious (a) to borrow money from our Treasury to make 
{purchases here, and (h) to get priority in manufacture and delivery. 
Elence they readily agreed to place no orders and make no purchases 
?xcept through or with the approval of our Government. 

To handle the set of delicate and complicated problems involved, 
?n August 27, 1917, the United States, acting through the Treasury 
Department, arranged with the Governments of England, France. 
rt:ily, Belgium, Russia, and Serbia, that all purchases made by these 
Governments in the United States should be handled through oi 
i^-ith the consent of a commission to be called the Allied Purchasing 
Commission. Bernard M. Baruch, Robert S. Lovett and Robert 
Brookings were appointed to constitute the commission. Alex 
Legge was made business manager of it, being succeeded on May 1, 
L918, by James A. Carr. The war missions of the several Govern- 
bents would present to the Allied Purchasing Commission not only 
Droposed orders, but also statements of future requirements. It was 
1)0 jnirpose of the commission to assist the missions in obtaining the 
e-t prices, terms of delivery, priority preference, etc., that was prac- 
icable. But the commission did not prepare and sign contracts, 
upervise their execution, determine technical details, nor inspect 
laterials. The effort was to coordinate allied buying with our own 
jrovernment buying with a view to obtaining the same prices and 
erms for all. 

The business manager held frequent meetings attended by repre- 
entatives of the allied missions, the priorities committee, the United 
states Treasury, the War Trade Board, such commodity sections as 
vere interested in the problem of the day, and others. Conflicts of 
nterest between different Allies, or between an Ally and the Ignited 
states were discussed and composed. Minutes of these meetings are 
^reserved. Orders which the allied missions proposed to jjlace were 
lubmitted by the Allied Purchasing Commission to the clearance 
committee ^ in the same manner as other proposed orders and they 
ook the same course. The expenses of the commission w^ere shared 
)y the allied missions in proportion to the purchases of each in this 
•ountry. During the life of the Allied Purchasing Commission, all 
urchases, made in the United States by the Allies with money bor- 



er later the Clearance Office. 
105826—21 ^ 



34 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

I'owed from our Treasury, were approved through the commission. 
The total of all purchases, made with such funds, during tlie entire 
war period aggregated upward of $12,000,000,000. 

The first effort directed specifically to bringing system into the 
confusion of Government orders was the formation of the " clearance 
committee" as an administrative unit of the General Munitions 
Board, which became later the War Industries Board. The clearance 
committee was composed of a chairman, a secretary, and a repre- 
sentative from the Army General Staff, the Navy, several bureaus of 
the iVrmy, the Marine Corps, the more important sections of the 
Board, and later the Allied Purchasing Commission. This com- 
mittee prepared what is called a " Clearance List " ^ setting forth 
those materials in which a shortage was believed to exist. Govern- 
ment agencies were requested not to place orders for any materials 
on this list without first having those orders cleared by the committee. 
The committee considered requests for the clearance of orders with 
a view to preventing their being placed where there was congestion 
and where they would interfere with the fulfillment of other orders 
of equal importance, with a view to adjusting the relative impor- 
tance of deliveries and to preventing abnormal rises in price. The 
method was by discussion and agreement between the respective in- 
terests, each being represented. Each buying department read its 
proposed orders before the committee, and, if no objection developed, 
the orders were cleared. If objection was made by another depart- 
ment because of confiict Avith its program or by an agency of the 
Board because curtailment, substitution, or other plan of conservation 
was being hindered, the order was re-formed or clearance delayed 
until the matter could be adjusted. 

It Avas not many weeks before the clearance committee began to be 
overwhelmed with duties. Shortages showed themselves in one com- 
modity after another and the clearance list increased week by week. 
The function of deciding on the relative merits of tv;o or more con- 
flicting agencies who wanted delivery of the same thing and of rul- 
ing on which should be preferred in cases Avhere all could not be 
served, in other words, the priority function, presented increasing 
difficulties and appeared as increasingly important. In the summer 
of 1917 a new agency, the priorities committee, was formed to take 
over this function, which later, as we shall see. became such an im- 
portant feature of the work of the Board. It was found also, that 
the clearance process had little effect in the control of prices. This 
function also was early isolated and placed in the province of a price- 
fixing committee created to handle it. But the clearance function 
proper had not been developed in vain. It was evident by the sprinj 
of 1918 that one committee could not handle the volume of work 

" See Appendix V for a copy of the Clearance List as it stood Feb. 25, 1918. 



AMEHICAN INHrSTIlV IX TllK WAI:. 35 

which the administrntion of this function iinplictl. I-'iiithcrninn.'. 
its performance by a single body was not necessary. 

By July, 1918, the commodity sections, following the reorganiza- 
tion put into effect by the new Chairman, had developed such strength^ 
containing as they then did representatives from each of the supjjly 
bureaus interested in their respective commodities; that these sec- 
tions could take over the clearance function, and they did, the clear- 
ance committee being reorganized into a Clearance Oifice whose func- 
tion it was merelj'^ to receive requests for clearance, record them. and. 
transmit them to the proper commodity sections, the sections in turn 
reporting back through the Clearance Office. The first chairman of 
the clearance committee was Frank A. Scott. He was succeeded by 
Lieut. Col. C. C. Bolton, who in May, 1918, was succeeded by Kear 
Ailmiral F. F. Fletcher. 

During the winter of 1917 and 1918 the clearance schedule not only 
increased by reason of the addition of many new groups of commodi- 
ties, but the ruling was issued that all orders to be placed in the so- 
called congested district (outlined in the ruling) would have to be- 
cleared, and that all orders involving the creation of new or addi- 
tional facilities should be cleared.^ The clearance function, as de- 
veloped through the commodity sections, was the means by whicli 
the record was maintained, commodity by commodity, of standing 
orders, and it was the means used for so distributing the Government 
orders that their benefit or their burden might be equitably shared 
by all the interests of the respective trades. Clearance, however,, 
was never effective as a means for developing a program of re- 
quirements. Requests for clearance were statements of immediate 
requirements only. 

When, in the spring of 1918, it had become evident that an en- 
larged control of industry would be necessary, the need for a sys- 
tematic statement of requirements, projected far enough into the 
future to allow time to provide for their production, was keenly felt. 
In order "to anticipate the prospective needs of the several supi)ly 
departments of the Government and their feasible adjustment to the 
industries of the country," a Requirements Division was organized in 
Tune, wnth Alex Legge as chairman, and embracing in its membership 
autliorized representatives of each of the Government purchasing 
agencies (Army and Navy), the priorities commissioner, the commis- 
ioner of finished products, chiefs of divisions, section chiefs, man- 
ger of Allied Purchasing Commission, representatives of the Ftod, 
Puel, and Railroad Administrations, the Capital Issues Committee 
!ie Department of Commerce, the Red Cross, the Shipping Board, 
ml other departments and bureaus.* 



See Appendix VI for clearance schedulo ns it stood on .Tune 24, lUlR. 
'See Appendix VII for copy of circular ciiating the Requiremi Jts Division. 



36 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 

Each of the several Government departments was requested to 
submit a statement of its requirements projected as far in advance 
as practicable. These statements were received by the Requirements 
Division where they were discussed from the point of view of their 
general relations to other requirements and then handed on to the 
appropriate commodity sections where detailed studies were made 
and reports sent back to the source of the statements concerning the 
possibility and means for meeting such requirements. 

The division held a meeting every morning at 9 o'clock, at which 
the various requirements were discussed at length, modification of 
schedules being debated between the conflicting bureaus of the Gov- 
ernment. The scope involved made this procedure very difficult of 
application, but the principle was sound. For the first time during 
the war, and perhaps for the first time in Government operations 
generally, this organization providecr^;;stem^iti£^m^y^^ by which 
the various departni^ent buyers had the opportunity of learning one 
another's needs, and^f knowing at what points their respective efforts 
conflicted or overlapped. It gave Government bureaus and section 
chiefs alike a more comprehensive vision of the whole course of the 
undertaking. 

The procedure of the Board, as it developed with respect to these 
two functions was about as follows: The various Government pur- 
chasing units and the Allied Purchasing Commission were sending 
to the Requirements Division their best estimates of futuie require- 
ments projected for six months or a year in advance. The com- 
modity sections of the Board used these statements in their studies of 
curtailment and conservation programs, increased production pro- 
grams, and other plans necessary in looking forward to meeting the 
needs. They also used them for the instruction of the trade through 
the war-service committees, and in the consideration of problems 
arising in connection with priorities and price-fixing. These state- 
ments were in the nature of estimates and did not necessarily imply 
that orders would actually be placed. They meant at least that orders 
were contemplated. The changing nature of military plans will 
make obvious the fact that full and accurate statements of all re- 
quirements for a year or even a half year in advance are quite im- 
possible, however desirable they might be from the point of view of 
the officials responsible for mobilizing industry. 

But in addition to the general estimates of future requirements, 
on which the broader lines of regulation and control were based; 
before the end of the period the rule was established that all orders 
ready to be placed should first be sent to the Board for " clearance ". 
The commodity sections, on whom the burden of clearing rested. 
Avould act on these requests in one of six ways. (1) Clear without 



AMEinCAX INDUSTRY IX TIIK WAIt. 37 

comment, in Avhich cnse the purchaser was permitted to <^o into the 
market and order as he saw fit; (2) clear with restriction as to the 
area in which the order might be placed; (3) clear with restriction 
as to the electric power system on which the order would draw; 
(4) clear subject to restrictions as to certain named plants or witii 
restrictions inhibiting the creation of new facilities for the execution 
of the order; (5) clear with an actual allocation of the order to a 
particular named source of supply; (G) clear with advice as to 
^ultablc source of supply. The application of this system varied 
with the peculiar problems incident to different lines of trade. 
There was no attempt to make it rigid. A licensing system for 
civilian as well as Government purchases was used in several in- 
dustries, as will be observed in connection with the work of the , 
commodity sections discussed in Part II of this book. 

That much of the confusion experienced in collecting the sup- 
plies for this war could have been avoided by a more painstaking[ 
thorough, and comprehensive effort on the part of the Government 
supply bureaus to work out a program of requirements, even a 
program tentative in many of its details, there is little doubt. 
That such a program would have been exceedingly difficult to frame 
is quite certain. 

The experience of the Board in this respect suggests the thought 
that there should be established a large unit of specially qualified 
oificers of the War Department devoted in time of peace to studies 
of supply programs for supposititious military undertakings. As 
these programs would always have to be based upon the obtainability 
of the supplies outlined, the bureau should be required to go 
deeply into a study of the industrial resources and possibilities of 
the country as they relate to war needs. These studies are a mili- 
tary function, but they might have also, as a by-product, a healthy 
effect upon business. 



ClIAl'TEK 3. 

THE STUDY OF RESOURCES. 

A\'hile organizations Avere being developed with a view to evolving 
n i^rogram of requirements, several institutions were created whose 
function it was to aid in discovering or obtaining resources to fill 
the re(|uiiements. Xo statistical data existing at the beginning 
of the Avar was of any great value in this direction. The needs were ! 
immediate. Hence the efforts to discover resources and to develop 
and convert resources Avent forAvard hand in hand. 

The purchases of the Allies had given a war atmosphere to our 
industries before April, 1917. Many extensive developments liad 
taken place. The Du Pont Co. had increased its facilities for the 
production of military poAvder from 500,000 pounds per month to 
nearly 30,000,000 pounds per month. Our great steel plants and 
many others Avere engaged on verA' large Avar contracts. But it was 
important that the Allies should not be hindered by our entrance into 
the Avar. These facilities and more Avere going to be needed for tlie 
.allied supply programs. Our problem then was to provide for 
our OAvn needs Avithout interference Avith the allied program and 
with the least dislocation of industry. This would haA'e to be done in 
man}' instances by the creation of new facilities, but in most instances 
by the conA^ersion of existing facilities to new work. Factories mak- 
ing fine Avatch springs could manufacture time fuses ; plants making 
steel rails could forge shells; carpet looms could make ArniA^ duck; 
automobile factories could make airplanes. A thousand and one in- 
dustries could be conA'erted to making direct war necessities, some 
Avith great difficulty, some w^ith little difficulty. 

Many of the supplies required by the war Avere required in the 
same form in Avhich they are used in civilian life. In some fields the 
work iuA'olved no more than an increase of production. Most of the 
raAv materials entering into the implements of war were the same 
as the materials of peace. A few of peculiar importance had to be 
produced in quantity for war purposes for the first time, but in 
respect to most basic materials a great increase in quantity of pro- 
duction was required, because civilian needs and war needs OA^er- 
lapped. 

The first steps taken to discover the facilities of the country avail- 
able for war use haA^e already been referred to.^ Both the industrial 
inA-entory and the report of the Kernan Board were made during the 

1 See chap. 1, p. 19- 
38 



AMEmc:AN INDrSTltV IN TIIK w Ai;. 39 

winter of 191G-17. Those data \vrre in the liaiids ol" the ("ouncil at 
the hejjjinniiiji' of the Avar, and an Inchistrial Inventory Section was 
ea:ly formed to take them over and continue the line of investigation. 
lAs the work of the r)oard developed, this Held was expanded to in- 
clude the following divisions and sections: (1) Tlie Resources and 
Conversion Section, for discovering phuits suitable for conversion 
and suggesting and supervising the operation; (2) the Facilities Di- 
vision, for supervising the construction of new i)lants: (;5) the Ad- 
visory Committee on Plants and Munitions, with general duties in co- 
ordinating the work of various agencies in the field; and {\) the 
Division of Planning and Statistics. | 

The commodit}^ sections, of conrse, did very important and far- 
reaching Avork in connection with the discovery and conversion, as 
well as creation, of facilities. For the determination of raw ma- 
terial resources we had had some peace-time reports. The demand 
for facts by highly organized industries, like the iron, steel, copper, 
lead, coal, oil, and other industries, had resulted in compilations of 
periodical statistics by private enterprises, by the Census Bureau, 
and by the Bureau of Mines. The statistical work in these fields 
was carried forward almost entirely by the commodity sections. 

By May, 1918, the Industrial Inventory Section had not only ex- 
tended the inventory to include 28,000 separate plants but had reclassi- 
fied the plants according to a system better suited to the uses of the 
Government. The original inventories had been made up according 
to a form used in the 1914 census of numufactures. This show^ed 
the factories in terms of their capacity to produce definite finished 
articles. For the purpose of making a decision on the placing of most 
of the war contracts it was necessary to know the " processes " for 
which a given factory Avas equipped rather than the product which it 
normally turned out. With this reclassified inventory, the section 
was to become a valuable source of information for the commodity 
sections and the Government purchasing agencies. 

The work of re-forming and extending the industrial inventory was 
greatly assisted by a number of business organizations, among Iheni 
the Associated Fire UnderAvriters, Avhich furnished to the section 
duplicates of its active files. The United States Chamber of Com- 
merce also assisted by furnishing the section Avith a current record 
of all war service committee organizations. The commodity sections 
assisted also by the use of questionnaires. Several Government de- 
•partments maintained organizations for the study of ])lant facilities. 
These also sent out many questionnaires seeking jiarticidar items of 
information. 

By the spring and early summer of 191S, the nunilier of (|uesti(in- 
naires being sent out by A-arious Government organizations Avas be- 



40 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

coming so great that complaints were received from manufacturers 
to the effect that they were a positive hindrance to progress. To rem- 
edy this, the newly organized War Industries Board established a 
Questionnaire Section in the newly formed Division of Planning and 
Statistics, and an effort was made to have all Government question- 
naires harmonized through this section. Duplications could be 
avoided and forms could be suggested which would more adequately 
supply the information desired. 

As has already been pointed out, the spring of 1918 saw the great 
manufacturing center of the country north of the Potomac and 
east of the Alleghenies completely congested. At the same time 
the war program was expanding. Several other parts of the coun- 
try were not engaged in war work to any important extent and 
in many instances the peace-time business was declining. The 
clearance system has already been mentioned as one step taken to 
relieve this situation. Through clearance it Avas the purpose to 
spread the development of war industries into other parts of the 
country as much as practicable. This would naturally throw a 
greatly added burden on the Industrial Inventory Section. A more 
poAverful and extensive organization was required. 
"^ Resources and Conversion Section. — On May 27, 1918, the Board 
established the Resources and Conversion Section, which took over 
the records and the work of the Industrial Inventory Section and 
began to organize on an enlarged scale under Charles A. Otis as 
chief. An organization decentralized geographically and subjec- 
tively was determined upon. The work was too large to be effec- 
tively handled from one office. The country was divided into 21 
geographical areas, called " industrial regions," for each of which 
a regional advisor was appointed with an office in the principal 
center. Each regional advisor organized a regional committee, with 
a member representing each of the principal war industries opera- 
tive in the area, and having in addition special members to handle 
the priorities function, industrial stimulation, and statistics on 
plants, on power, and on raw materials. Each member of this re- 
gional committee became in turn chairman of a subcommittee of 
the region devoted to the particular subject matter which he repre- 
sented. The regional advisors were local business men of highest 
standing, chosen by the business organization or organizations of 
the respective regions. They served without pay and usually with- 
out expense money. Headquarters were established in Boston, 
Bridgeport, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Rochester, Cleve- 
land, Detroit, Chicago, Cincinnati, Baltimore, Atlanta, Birming- 
ham, Kansas City, St. Louis, St. Paul, Milwaukee, Dallas, San 
Francisco, Seattle, and Denver. 



AMEKir.VX INDUSTllY IX TIIK W MX. 41 

The Resources and Conversion Section had in its membership repre- 
sentatives of the Army, >s'avY, Marine Corps, Emergency Fleet, and 
the Department of Commerce. Two lines of work, each supplement- 
ing and assisting the other, were undertaken in the several districts. 
The general work of perfecting the industrial inventory was carried 
forward by having each region attempt to collect and send to AVash- 
ington the following list of information : 

(1) Existing facilities for producing direct and indirect war needs, 
both raw materials and finished products; (2) the extent to which 
these facilities were occupied wuth unfilled orders and the extent 
to which they could take on additional orders; (3) if a plant were 
overloaded, the feasibility and extent of expansion necessary for re- 
lief ; or, in the alternative, a suggestion for transferring a part of 
the load to other plants; (4) existing facilities not employed on war 
work but capable of undertaking it; (5) facilities whose production 
was about to be curtailed because of war conditions and the extent to 
Mhich they were susceptible of conversion for the production of war 
needs: and (6) the existence of available hibor, of new sources of 
supply of raw materials, of unused power facilities, of available 
transportation facilities, etc. 

The armistice came before this body of information was anything 
like complete, but particular items collected in this way had already 
begun to serve the purpose contemplated, particularly in the less 
congested areas of the country. 

In the carrying out of specific duties the regional organizations 
reached a more advanced stage of development. Requirement pro- 
grams and immediate needs known from requests for clearance were 
dispatched to the regional advisors and frequently valuable advice 
was received from them for determining the most available sources 
of supply. Many existing plants capable of conversion were dis- 
covered in this way. The several commodity sections used the 
regional committees as sources of information to supplement that ob- 
tained from the Avar service committees. There was another impor- 
tant function which the regional organizations performed. The 
headquarters of the divisions and sections of the Board in Washing- 
ton were constantly flooded Avith correspondence, not only from 
manufacturers who wanted to secure (lovernment contracts but from 
those who had taken contracts and had come upon knotty problems 
in fulfilling them. Complaints arrived concerning particular rulings 
of the Board. It was possible to refer much of this correspondence 
to the regional organizations, which were peculiarly qualified to 
handle it promptly and in a way calculated to satisfy the i)arties 
concerned. 

It would be difficult to isolate and list the work of the section, 
giving specific credit for particular accomplishments. It would re- 



42 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

quire many pages to enumerate all cases of plant conversions, a large 
percentage of which were carried out at the suggestion or under the 
supervision of the section. A few examples will illustrate the scope 
of the work and at the same time show how many plants, which might 
otherwise have found little work during the Avar, were kept in full 
activity. 

Plants for making gas holders were convei^ted into munitions 
plants; carpet plants began to make blankets and duck; automobile 
factories made airplanes; refrigerator plants Avere converted into 
plants for making Navy filing cases and field hospital tables ; furni- 
ture plants manufactured ammunition boxes ; horseshoe plants made 
trench picks; toy plants turned to making packing boxes; factories 
for ladies' waists became plants for making signal flags; electric 
vacuum plants made parts for Liberty motors ; factories for making 
fishing rods turned out staffs for the Signal Corps; shirt factories 
sewed mosquito nets; factories for rubber goods produced gas masks; 
l)eaceful stove plants turned to making hand grenades and trench 
bombs; corset factories labored on Medical Corj^s belts and fencing 
masks ; gear plants learned the art of making gun sights ; plants for 
pipe organs made mosquito nets, and so on. 

■^ Facilities IHvision. — By the fall of 1918 so many problems were 
arising in connection with the location and construction of new 
plants for war work tliat a Facilities Division Avas formed for the 
l)iirpose of harmonizing the activities. S. P. Bush Avas made director 
of the division. It had been organized only a short time when the 
armistice Avas signed. 

The functions of the division Avere outlined in the plans for its 
establishment as f oUoavs : (I) The division Avill make a compre- 
hensiA'e study of all aspects of neAv construction projects, advising 
in respect to proposed locations on the availability of transportation, 
poAver, fuel, Ifibor, building materials, raAv materials, etc.; (2) it Avill 
advise on the selection and specifications of materials of construc- 
tion so as to avoid long hnuls especially through the congested dis- 
tricts and so as to avoid conflicts Avith orders already placed; (3) it 
will look to the adoption of forms of contract such as Avill insure 
uniformity and consistency in all Government building activities: 
(4) it will compile and from time to time revise lists of responsible 
contractors and architects throughout the United States equipped to 
undertake construction Avork of various kinds, furnishing such lists 
to Government agencies upon request, and it Avill keep a record of 
existing Government contracts Avith a vicAv to preventing interference 
betAveen ncAv and old orders; (5) it Avill preA^ent the creation of ncAv 
facilities in localities Avhere the condition of existing facilities is 
such that ncAv ones AA-ould be inadvisable; (G) it Avill endeaA^or to co- 



AMiiincAN i.Nhr>Ti;v i.\ riiK WAi;. 43 

oiiliiKitL' the activities of all dei)ai-tine!its and aiienoies of the (lov- 
iinnient in construction work of every kind, except shipbuiMiii^; 
ami (7) it will study prospective dejiartniental needs and make plans 
lor the new facilities necessary to meet them. 
The procedure contemplated was that, after future re(iuiremeiits 
uild have been received by the Kequirement Division and passed 
J. on by the appropriate commodity sections, they should be passed 
.11 to the P'acilities Division, whose business it should be to deter- 
1 line what steps would be necessary to provide facilities for such 
iL(|uirements. When hiter on the schedule of orders should be re- 
ived, the Facilities Division would clear the orders subject to such 
trictions as it might impose and return them to the departments 
an Mhich they came with a schedule of available facilities attached. 
Idi'isorij Committee on Plants and Munitio)is. — This committee was 
: med May 28, 1918, to take over the work of the committee on 
xluction of the council. S. M. Vauclain, who had been chairman 
-t of the Munitions Standards Board, then of the committee on 
' »duction, became chairman of the advisory committee and took 
\\ ith him the records and most of the personnel of the earlier organ- 
ization. The committee worked in a general wa}' to stinudate pro- 
duction, to advise on plant extensions, etc. Particular attention 
T\-as given to the production of freight cars and locomotives for the 
Army. Work on standardization of types of cars and locomotives 
■vvas carried on. The committee was given a special assignment to 
iissist the Czecho-Slovak Government in securing supj^lies in this 
■country. The plan at the end was to have the work of this com- 
mittee absorbed by the Facilities Division on the one hand and the 
Railway Supply Section on the other. The chairman had arranged 
to go to France as manager of the Chateauroux tank plant. 

Division of Planning and Statistics. — In the early days of the 
council a Statistical Division w'as organized under Dr. Leonard \vres. 
This division devoted its principal energy to assembling stati.stics 
which would be of particular value to the General Staff of the Army 
in laying down a program of requirements. In April, 1918, Dr. 
Ayres and most of his staff were commissioned and he was asked 
to transfer his work to the War Department and to take the title 
of chief of the Statistical Division of the General Staff. This 
gaA-e the Army a central statistical organization for the first time 
and it left the War Industries Board without such an organization. 
Although most of the commodity sections were doing very im- 
portant statistical work, the need for a central bureau was definitely 
felt. Dean Edwin F. Gay, who was Director of the Division of 
Planning and Statistics of the Shipping Board and Chief of the 
Bureau of Research and Tabulation of Statistics of the War Trade 
Board, was asked to organize such a bureau. Tie became Director 



44 AMERICA^^ INDUSTKl IX THE WAR. 

of the Division of Planning and Statistics of the "War Industries 
Board, which was conducted under the immediate charge of Dr. 

- — ■ Henry E. Hatfield. The division operated through six sections. 

The Section on Price Statistics was put in charge of Prof. W. C. 
Mitchell. This section worked in close cooperation with the price- 
fixing committee, for which it prepared many special reports. It 
early began a study of war-time price movements, showing actual 
and relative prices of several hundred commodities and groups of 
commodities most affected by the war. Monthly price quotations 
for the period 1913 to 1918 were collected as a basis for the study. 
Immediately after the armistice the section was expanded, by trans- 
ferring personnel as it could be released from other sections, and 
this work was pressed speedily forward. The studies were pub- 
lished early in 1919 in a series of War Industries Board Bulletins, 
Nos. 1 to 57. The general title of the series is "History of Prices 
during the War," and each bulletin covers a particular group of 
commodities. The reasons for price fluctuations are discussed and 
graphs picturing relative prices as well as tables of monthly prices '\ 
for each of the principal war products are printed.- 
^ The ^Vap Contracts Section of the division, established under the 
early regime (Aug. 17, 1917) continued to collect information on 
war contracts and deliveries. This work never proceeded as satis- 
factorily as those engaged in it desired. Although the Secretary 
of War issued orders directing the five purchasing bureaus of the 
Army to furnish information to the section, regular and complete 
reports never came in from those sources. The section then tried 
a. sj^stem of circular letters sent to manufacturers asking for regular 
monthly reports on contracts and deliveries. But even with most 
vigorous work on the part of the office staff the returns on the vast 
number of contracts were insufficient to afford really satisfactory 
bases for statistical judgments. In February, 1918, however, the 
section began to issue bulletins based on partial returns, and even 
\ these proved of value. 

X ^ The division also formed a Section on War Industries Ahroad. 
" ■ This work consisted chiefly in searching foreign publications and 
foreign official documents for information of particular interest to 
the Board. It translated and prepared material of this kind for 
other divisions and sections of the Board. Arrangements were made 
toward the end of the period for transferring this section to the 
War Trade Board on the theory that its work was more closely re- 
lated to the work of that organization. 

A Questionnaire Section was organized during the summer. The 
division had taken up this work from the beginning, giving advice 

» See Appendix VIII for a list of the War Industries Board Price Bulletins, Nos. I to 57. 



AMERICAN INDUSTHV IN THE WAR. 45 

on the framing and handling of questionnaires with a view to 
i lessening duplications and to securing forms suited to the various 
purposes. With the multiplication of questionnaires by every Gov- 
ernment agency and the increasing complaint from manufacturers 
over the growing burden of answering them, more rigid action 
seemed necessary. An order was issued on August 12, 11) IS, that 
all questionnaires sent out by any l)ranch of the Board should first 
be submitted to the section. The section advised as to desirable 
forms and methods of tabulation and on request would undertake 
Mthe entire work of preparation, issue, and tabulation. A complete 
'■; indexed file of questionnaires sent out by the Board is preserved in 
"I the records of the section. 

It was the duty of the Editorial Section to make available to war 
agencies information on the status of the supply program and on 
changes in the industrial conditions affecting it. This was done by 
a series of bulletins. 

The relation of the division to the commodity sections in respect 
to their statistical work was of particular importance. Some of these 
sections had well-organized statistical subunits. All of them based 
their work on statistical information. 

It was the function of the C ommodity Statistics Section of tliis 

division to assist the commodity sections either (1) by tabulating, 

:■; charting, and preparing data secured from a section, or (2) by de- 

T tailing statistical clerks to work in the office of a section, or (3) by 

le : organizing and installing a complete statistical service in a section, 

;e;or (4) by cooperating in the establishment of joint statistical offices 

ii|i representing commodity sections of the Board and other war agencies. 

ir} As part of the work of this division. Dr. Gay undertook a special 

i\ mission which is perhaps of unusual interest. In the spring of 1918 

;ti; the President asked the chairman of the Board to prepare for the 

V i President's personal use a conspectus of progress in the accomplish- 

J ment of the supply program, to be brought up to date as promptly as 

ml possible and supplemented weekly. The purpose was to afford a more 

|. businesslike, comprehensive view of the entire undertaking, in order 

{ilthat when necessary adjustments might be made or steps taken to 

I,]) synchronize to the highest possible extent all elements involved. This 

[,3J purpose made necessary the collection of secret information from 

,rj many sources, unrelated excei:»t through the President as chief of all. 

A selected .staff was put to work in chaml)ers set aside for the purpose 

and Dr. Gay conducted the difficult undertaking with extraordinary 

skill. 

Further work of the division consisted in making special investi- 
gations at the request of various officers of the Board or of other 
Government agencies. A report on the purchase of watches for the 
American Expeditionary Forces was made at the request of the State 



46 AMERICAN INDITSTUY IX THE WAI: 

Dei^artment. Another on the "thrift" campaign at the request of 
the Treasury Department. Work was usually done under extreme 
pressure, a time limit being set in the application. The criterion of 
success in this work was the extent to which a satisfactory answer 
was given within the time limit. 

The activities of this division, as they took shape immediately 
after the armistice, Avere unusually important. The work on a " His- 
tory of Prices During the War " has already been referred to. An- 
other work of importance was the rapid preparation of a report for 
the peace conference. This was undertaken as a joint enterprise by 
the statistical offices of the Food Administration, the Fuel Adminis- 
tration, the Shipping Board, the War Trade Board, and the War 
Industries Board. The effort was to set forth an extended body of 
data on the economic situation of the world, particularly of the 
United States, in respect to 60 principal groups of commodities. Dr. 
Henry R. Hatfield was chairman of the joint committee; Dr. Ernest 
L. Bogart represented the War Trade Board; Dr. Frank M. Surface, 
the Food Administration; Mr. Finch, the Shipping Board; and Dr. 
Leo Wolman, the War Industries Board. The report was brought 
out in eight volumes and Avas delivered December 20, 1918, for trans- 
mission to Paris. 

A third line of post-war work was that of a study of labor con- 
ditions. The prospect of the cancellation of contracts and of the de- 
mobilization of the Army pointed to the importance of this work, 
particularly in the larger industrial centers. In cooperation with 
the Department of Labor, the division began issuing November 30, 
1918, weekly reports on labor conditions based on telegraphic re- 
ports from the various offices of the United States Employment Serv- 
ice. This work was continued into 1919 by transferring the section 
which was handling it to the War Trade Board. 

The experience of the Board in respect to the part of its work 
discussed in this chapter would point to the desirability, in case of a 
future analogous situation, of forming immediately a decentralized 
organization with one unit of tlie I^oard, like the Resources and Con- 
version Section or the Division of Planning and Statistics, in the 
form of a staff organization at AVashington, whose function it would 
be to supervise the field organizations and harmonize the statistical 
Avork of the commodity sections. 

There could perhaps be no more valuable measure of "prepared- 
ness " than the establishment in peace time of a bureau of planning 
and statistics (a fact-finding body), organized into about 60 com- 
modity sections, whose function it would be to maintain current data 
on the productive capacity of the country. This organization could 
probably be established successfully as a bureau of the Department of 
Commerce. 



C'liAi-n.i! 4. 
PRIORITIES. 

Neitlier the function of dra^vin"; uji proiiranis of i-('(|nirrmoMt-. 
synthosi/.inir them, and throwinrj thorn into {'(MiipMi iM)n v,i(h ciu. 
logiies of resomci'S, nor the effort to provide for action to a connnon 
purpo-e in the supply process throuuh clearance lists and the inetliMii 
of clearing orders, ever got at the root of the confusion. A d^—- 
method of control Avas to he invented here, a method by which one 
body of officials would sit in judfj;ment to determine the sequence in 
which materials should be numufactmed and orders filled. What 
came to be known as the priority system was destined to become thr: 
most characteristic feature of the whole scheme of w^ar time super- 
vision over the industrial forces. 

^^'hen it once became clear that the (Government had machinery 
which could turn out definite rulings on the order in which demands 
might be sui)plied, when he who came with the largest purse could 
not necessarily obtain his materials first, the importance of abnormal 
demands in affecting prices immediately began to dimini.-h. The 
priority sj'stem was, perhaps, as important as any other single factor 
in stabilizing prices. It w^as also of profound importance as a corol- 
hiry to price-fixing. When prices are fixed under circumstances in 
which demand far exceeds supply, the right to buy can not safely be 
left to the forces of chance and personal favoritism. The flow of 
materials had to be directed, to every extent possible, from one cen- 
tral authority whose eye was everywhere. With priority control es- 
tablished, conservation programs could be enforced, rationing pro- 
grams and curtailment programs could be made effective, necessary 
new undertakings could be materially encouraged; the regulations of 
the Hoard became enfoiceabk'. and that small minority, whose ten- 
dency to disobey rules which an overwdielming majority were ready to 
follow, could be brought into line without unreasonable delays. Yet 
this priority control was strictly American in its nature. The central 
authority w^as only the organism necessary to make arti(;nlate and 
definitive the desire of each man to do his part. The long list of rules 
and regulations was developed out of conferences and hearings trade 
by trade, Government and governed taking each other into fullest 
confidence. 

It required some months to discover the gravamen of the system and 
to realize its effectiveness, and even after this discovery there was 
always a feeling for the importance of caution in the exercise of 
such power. 

The first uncertain steps in the exercise of priority control extended 
back to the formation of a priority subcommittee of the General 

47 



48 AMEPJCAN" INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 

^lunitions Board on May 3, 1917. The director of the council at 
that time brie% defined the priority function by stating that the 
committee — 

shall exercise full power iu the determination of priority of delivery of mate- 
rials and finished products whenever there is a conflict in delivery in accordance 
with the general policy of the Government. It is further understood that at 
present the priority committee of the General Munitions Board has no power 
in regard to the determination of priority in regard to civilian needs in which 
the Army and Navy requirements are not involved. It is further understood 
that as between the needs of our allies and our civilian population, the priority 
<;ommittee of the General Munitions Board for the present has no authority 
ro act. In this connection, however, the priority committee should keep full 
information as to such cases or instances as come to its attention, iu order 
that plans may further be developed for properly handling the matter. 

This function was thrust upon the General Munitions Board by 
the fact that a multitude of manufacturers and contractors engaged 
in Government work were asking which orders they should fill first. 
Before midsummer the committee was receiving 50 to 75 inquiries 
or requests per day for preference policies; but this committee was 
only giving advice without binding effect, designed to assist indi- 
vidual concerns who had accepted more orders than they could hope 
to fill in laying down their production plans. The real work of 
control by priorities did not begin until early in the fall of 1917, 
after the formation of the War Industries Board, with Eobert S. 
Lovett as priorities commissioner. Edwin B. Parker wa^by Judge 
Lovett designated as chairman of the new priorities committee, and 
as such placed in active charge of it on August 23, 1917. When Judge 
Lovett retired to join the Railroad Administration as director of 
capital expenditures, Mr. Parker was appointed by the Chairman to 
succeed him as priorities commissioner and head of the rapidly devel- 
oping Priorities Division, upon the reorganization of the Board, 
March 4, 1918. The other members of the committee were Charles 
X. Foster, vice chairnian, Maj. Gen. J. B. Aleshire, George Armsby, 
H. H. Barbour, C. P. Howland, F. H. Macpherson, Rear Admiral 
X. E. Mason, Lieut. Col. C. A. McKenne}', Everett Morss, Lucius P. 
Ordwav, Thomas Xelson Perkins, T. C. Powell, and Rear Admiral 
A. V. Zane. 

During the fall of 1917, studies on behalf of the priorities commit- 
tee were being made in England and France by Thomas Xelson 
Perkins, a member of the committee. He observed the various con- 
trol systems in use there and prepared daily reports and comments 
for the committee. The machinery to be used, the purposes and 
possibilities of the system, were receiving the most studious con- 
sideration by the committee in Washington. Action began by the 
issuance of Priorities Circular No. 1 on September 21, 1917, the day 
on which the price of copper was fixed and a few days before steel 
prices were announced. The first formal priority certificate issued 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TIIK WAR. 49 

bore date of September 25. 1917. But the ^reiU possibilities of 
this system and its necessity as a cnre for the confusion of the day 
were not, perhaps, fully and generally appreciated, nor its full ap- 
plication believed to be authorized, until the reorganization of 
the Board on March 4, 1918, from which time forwarcl priority con- 
trol became a characteristic feature of the Avork. Priority rulings 
were given finality by the President's direct authority and they be- 
came most effective, because the Nation to a man was then in a 
inood to follow the leadership of its designated connnander in chief. 

The legal foundation of the right to issue priority rulings rests 
on a variety of statutes and principles. The committee, however, 
soon found itself in a position where it did not have to depend upon 
direct legal sanction for the enforcement of its regulations; the spirit 
of service exhibited by the people made such sanction perhaps un- 
necessarj'. But the President, the Secretary of War. the Secretary 
of the Xavy, the Chairman of the Shipping Board, the President of 
the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the Fuel Administrator, and the 
Director General of Eailroads determined to centralize in the chair- 
man of the Board, and through him the priorities commissioner, the 
exercise of such powers of priority as lay within their legal right, 
and unity of machinery brought effective results.. 

The national defense act of June 3, 1916, gave broad powers to the 
President to place orders for the manufacture of any supplies needed 
by the Government for war purposes, with any concern engaged in 
the manufacture of such supplies or whose plant was capable of 
being transformed so as to manufacture them, which orders should 
be mandatory and be given preference over all other orders. If 
satisfactory arrangements could not be made with the owner of such 
a plant, the Secretaiy of War was authorized to take over and oi:)er- 
ate it, paying just compensation. Section 120 of this act provided, 
in part, as follows : 

such possession to be taken where the owner or operator refuses to Rive pref- 
erence to Government orders or to manufacture or to furnisli arms. anununiti<»n 
or parts of ammunition or other supplies or eipiipnuMit at a rcasoiial)!!' price, as 
determined by the Secretary of War. 

The President is lierel\v authorized, in liis discrciiDii. to aiiitojnt a I'.oard on 
Mobilization of Industries Essential for Military I'reparedness, nonpartisan 
in character, and to take all necessary steps to provide for such clerical assist- 
ance as he may deem necessary to organize and coordinate the work lu-n'in- 
before described. 

The act of August 29, 1916, providing for the creation of the 
council, directed "the creation of relations which will render \)os- 
sible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization 
of the resources of the Nation." The resolution of Ajn-il 6. 1917. de- 
claring a state of war, read in part as follows: 

* * * and that the President be. and lie is hereby, authorized and directed 
to employ the entire naval and military fonos of the United Sliif»'s; and to 

1('5826— 21 4 



50 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country] 
are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States. 

Under the naval appropriation act of March 4, 1917, the Secre- 
tary of the Navy was given the same extraordinary powers in direct-] 
ing purchases as those possessed by the Secretary of War. The 
urgent deficiency act of June 15, 1917, conferred analogous powers I 
upon the President in respect to the placing of orders for ships and] 
shipbuilding materials. The food and fuel control act of August] 
10, 1917, authorized the President to commandeer foods and fuel, 
and gave him very exhaustive control over the distribution of coal 
and coke. 

Under the act of May 29, 1917, amending the interstate commerce 
act, power was given to the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
regulate and control the car service of interstate carriers, includ- 
ing the right, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative, 
to suspend the operation of any or all rules, regulations or practices 
established with respect to car service and to make such directions 
for the use of cars as in its judgment would best promote the pub- 
lic interest. But the act which finally placed the executive branch 
of the Government in a position to exercise priority power wasj 
the preferential shipments act of August 10, 1917, which read, in 
part, as follows: 

During the continuance of the war in which the United States is now 
engaged the President is authorized, if he finds it necessary for the national 
defense and security, to direct that such traflic or such shipments of commod- 
ities as, in his judgment, may be essential to the national defense and secur- 
ity, shall have preference or priority in transportation by any common carrier 
by railroad, water, or otherwise. He may give these directions at and for 
such times as he may determine, and may modify, change, suspend, or annul 
them, and for any such purpose he is hereby authorized to issue orders 
direct, or through such person or persons as he may designate for the 
purpose. * * * 

Thus it will be seen that, although Congress gave authority in 
so many words to issue priority orders having mandatory force 
only in the case of transportation ; the priorities committee, by 
drawing into one body through representation on it of each of 
the Government agencies interested in priorities and through direct 
authorization from the heads of these agencies, was able to muster 
adequate power to enforce compliance, if enforcement should be 
necessary, with any order or request that it might issue. The power 
to control the use of freight cars and the supply of fuel, and in the 
last resort to secure the commandeering of plants, was enough and 
more than enough. Legally, priority orders outside the sphere of 
transportation were, possibly, no more than requests; in fact, they 
usually were stated in the form of requests and their issuance was 
ordinarily in conformance with understandings reached through 



AMERICAN INl)rSTi;V IN THE WAU. 51 

nejrotiations with the trade involved: but actually they had all the 
force and vi^jor of orders, since every concern atl'ected knew that if it 
did not comply its supplj' of fuel mio;ht be cut otf, its materials and 
supplies mio^ht not be be received for transportation, or its establish- 
ment might be seized by the (iovernment. Throughout its history 
the Board found few occasions in which it was necessary to secure 
compliance with its " requests " by actual use of any particular 
enforcing powers. 

The manner in which priorit}' control brought a degree of system 
into the chaos of the conflicting and ambitious industrial forces of 
the day can be read from the record of the commodity sections in Part 
II of this volume. Its first important application, viz. to the vast 
problem of iron and steel, is fully described in chapter 2. The 
commandeering powers of the Army, the Navy, and the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation came into sharp conflict with each other in respect 
to the steel supply and the snpply of numerous other commodities. 
Each department was given full power and confusion was the result. 
The priority system brought concerted action by a scheme which 
made actual commandeering unnecessary. The Priorities Division 
was given control of the situation through a letter from the President 
to each department, ruling that no commandeering order could be 
issued without the approval of the chairman of the AVar Industries 
Board. 

The essential featu res of the mechanism of the system are readily 
uii derstooc T It was a system which would apply only under cir- 
cumstances in which extreme shortages were the order of the day. 
Its distinctive characteristic and the foundation of its eiVectiveness 
lay in the fact that the Priorities Division placed itself in a position 
where its acts took the form of assistance to the industries and to 
individual concerns. The division could bargain for pledges and ex- 
pect conformity to its regulations in return for assistance, which it had 
power to grant or withhold. As soon as the railroads began to 
follow priority rulings, and the distribution of fuel began to be 
based on them, the supply of the necessities of industry began to fall 
away from those not receiving the advantages of these rulings. The 
iron and steel industry, which is the foundation of such a consider- 
able share of all manufacture, was first placed under the committee's 
rulings,^ and in the circular of instructions issued to this trade were 
outlined the general directions as to priority and the method of ap- 
plying for priority assistance. 

These and subsequent circulars attempted to classify and rate 
orders in accordance Avith their relative importance for war and 
national purposes. Producers of iron and steel and their products 



I See Appendix IX for (1) Priorities Circiil;ir No. 1, dated Sept. 21, 1017; (2) Pri- 
orities Circular No. 2 of the snmo date. 



52 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR, 

were required to rate all their orders. In order to get the system 
satisfactorily started, all orders Avhich had been placed prior to 
September 21, 1917, by or on behalf of the War Department, the 
Xavy Department, or the Emergency Fleet Corporation, were auto- 
matically rated as class A-1 unless otherwise directed, and likewise 
all orders for military supplies and equipment pla(^ed by or for the 
Allies as class A-2. 

The classes of producers required to observe priority ratings in 
the fulfillment of their contract orders were extended gradually from 
that beginning until, on July 1, 1918, Priorities Circular No. 4^ was 
issued, providing that — 

(hu-ing the war in which the United States is now engaged, all individuals, firms, 
associations, and corporations engaged in the production of raw materials and 
manufactured products (save foods, feeds and fuels) are requested to observe 
regulations resi>ecting priority. 

From this time forward priority control was rapidly extended. 
The President's letter of March 4 had definitely centralized the pri- 
orities function in the chairman of the War Industries Board in the 
following language: 

The functions of the Board should i)e * * * (.">) the deterniination, when- 
ever necessary, of priorities of production and of delivery and of the proportions 
of any given article to be made immediately accessible to the several purchas- 
ing agencies, when the supply of that article is insutticient either temporarily or 
permanently. 

Sixt}' priorities circulars in all were issued between September 21, 
1917, and December 20, 1918, when No, 60 revoked, as of January 1, 
1919, all rules, regulations, and directions of every nature issued by 
the Priorities Division. 

Two concurrent and mutually supplementary methods of procedure 
were employed by the division in accomplishing its purposes. These 
will be studied separately. On the one hand, all orders were rated, 
either by the issuance of priority ^certificates to the persons placing 
the orders, or by a system of automatic ratings : and on the other hand, 
in order better to guide the forces of production into channels lead- 
ing to the possible fulfillment of all rated orders, there was issued a 
" Classification of Purposes Demanding Preferential Treatment," 
which was followed by a series of " Preference Lists." 

First must be understood the scheme of classifying orders by pri- 
ority certificates. 

All orders and work were divided into five general classes: Class 
AA, class A, class B, class C, and class D, with subdivisions of 
class AA, class A, and class B indicated by sufRx numbers, as, for 
example, classes AA-1, AA-2, etc., A-1, A-2, A-3, etc., B-1, B-2, etc. 
Orders and work in class AA took full precedence of orders and 

« See Appendix X for rriorities Circular No. 4, dated July 1, 1918. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. ' 53 

work of all other classes: those in class A took in-eceilence of those 
in classes B, C, and D; those in class H took precedence of those in 
classes C and D; and those in class C took precedence of those in 
chiss D; all irrespective of the dates the orders were placed or tliL* 
certificates issued. But the classification of an order meant that it 
should be jriven such precedence over orders of a lower classification 
as "was necessary — and only such as was necessary — to insure delivery 
on the date of delivery specified in the order. It did not mean that 
work should cease on orders of a lower classification, or tliat the 
order should be completed and delivery made in advance of all orders 
taking a lower classification, unless such procedure should be neces- 
sary in order to effect delivery within the time specified. 

The classification system was defined by the priorities committee as 
follows : 

Class AA comprises only euier^'ency war work of an exceptional and ur^'cnt 
nature. 

Class A comprises all other war work ; that is to say, orders and work 
necessary to carry on the war, such as arms, ammunitions, destroyers. sul>- 
niarines, battleships, transports, mercliant ships, and other water craft, air- 
planes, locomotives. 

Class B comprises ordei-s and work which, while not primarily desifrned for 
the prosecution of the war, yet are cf public interest and essential to the 
national welfare or otherwise of exceptional importance. 

Class C comprises all orders and woik not covered by priority certificates 
issued by the priorities committee or not taking an automatic rating, which 
orders and work are to be utilized in furtherance of one or more of the pur- 
poses embraced within the " General classification of purposes demanding pref- 
erence treatment" promulgated by the priorities board, or which orders and 
work are placed by or utilized in connection with an Industry or plant ap- 
pearing in Preference List Xo. 1. (No class C certiiicates were issued.) 

Class D comprises all orders and work not embraced in class AA. class A. 
class B, or class C (Xo class D certificates were i.ssued. ) 

The procedure for obtaining priority certificates on the part of 
any person having work to be done which fell within one of these 
classifications was simple enough. He w^ould make application to the 
priorities committee, following a form established by the com- 
mittee, blanks for which had been freely distributed. The applica- 
tion w as for an order running against a manufacturer or distributor 
and calling for delivery by a certain date. The priorities committee, 
after consideration and frequently after reference to the appropriate 
commodity section, if it Avere determined that the application should 
Be granted, would assign one or another of the above ratings to the 
order and issue a certificate. This certificate was issued directly 
to the applicant; that is, the person desiring to make a purchase or 
enter into a contract to have materials manufactured for him, unless 
otherwise requested, and not to the person against whom it ran. The 

» See in Appendix X. sees. 7, 8, 9 of Priority Circular No. 4. 



54 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

iipplicant then presented his certificate to the person against whom 
it ran and the latter arranged his production program so a.; to 
give delivery to that priority order in its relative turn with respect 
to other priority orders. 

The volume of work undertaken by the division in connection with 
the issuance of priority certificates can be appreciated from the fol- 
lowing figures: Between September 25, 1917, and November 11, 1918, 
211,430 applications were received; 191,966 priority certificates were 
issued, of which 8,448 were reissued certificates; and 27,912 appli- 
cations were denied or withdrawn. The highest number of applica- 
tions received and catalogued in one day was 1,901, on July 8, 1918. 
The highest number of certificates issued in one day was 2,121, on 
September 30, 1918. 

There was printed on the cover of practically every circular of 
instructions concerning rules of priority, the following significant 
statement : 

The test.— In requesting priority the petitioner sliould join with the com- 
mittee in applying the test : To what extent, if at all, will the granting of this 
application contribute, directly or indirectly, toward winning the war ; and if 
at all, how urgent is the need? 

As the system of granting priority certificates showed more and 
more success and one new industry after another was taken under 
this method of control, the administrative difficulties increased to 
the point where a large addition to the work involved danger of a 
breakdown, unless a compensating practice could be devised. By 
July 1, 1918, as already noted, the committee had decided to make all 
industries subject to the regulation. A way out of the administra- 
tive difficulty appeared in the fact that certain classes of orders so 
obviously deserved preference that priority ratings could be assigned 
to them automatically. 

A scheme of automatic classifications was set up accordingly on 
July 1, 1918,* the day on which control was extended to all industries. 

This plan made unnecessary any application for written priority 
certificates to cover certain classes of orders, no reference to the 
priorities committee being necessary for such cases. A person whose 
order fell within the automatic classification would simply attach to 
it an affidavit in prescribed form setting forth the facts essential to 
automatic rating and naming the war uses for which the materials 
were needed. The new procedure gave no automatic rating higher 
than A-4, thus leaving the ratings AA, AA-1, AA-2, etc., A-1, A-2, 
and A-3 to be given only by specific action of the priorities com- 
mittee. Orders of the War and Navy Departments and the Emer- 

* See sees. 7. 8, and of TiMorlties Circular No. 4, Appendix X, for rules of automatic 
tiriority ratings. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 55 

gency Fleet Corporation falling within class A were automatically 
rated A-5 upon proper signature to the following statement : / 

Unless rerated by express order in writiiiR by the priorities conmiitttH' of tne 
War Industries Board, this order is by autliority of said priorities coniniittee 
rated as class A-5, and its execution shall take precedence over all your orders 
and work of a lower classification to the extent necessary to Insure delivery 
according to the d:ite S)iecified herein, as prescribed by Circular No. 4, Issued 
by the priorities division of the War Industries Board, of date July 1, 11)18, and 
all amendments thereto. 

Priorities Circular No. 4 contained a list of purposes with their 
corresponding automatic ratings below A-4, by reference to which a 
person desiring to obtain a rating for one of his orders could prepare 
his affidavit, stating that the materials were to be used for such pur- 
pose, name his own rating, and proceed as if by a priority certificate. 

The priorities committee handled the certificates and the rides 
for the automatic rating of orders, and was the sole priorities agency 
of the Board until March 27, 1918. The President, in his letter of 
March 4, suggested the creation of a further agency to work with 
the one already in existeince in bringing about more concerted 
action respecting priority of delivery and in synchronizing priorities 
within the Government and industry. 

In pursuance of this suggestion, the priorities Board was created \^^ 
March 27, 1918; Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner, became 
chairman of the board, its other members being Bernard M. Baruch, 
chairman of the War Industries Board, ex officio member; Maj. Gen. 
George W. Goethals, Army representative; Rear Admiral F. F. 
Fletcher, Navy representative; Clarence M. Woolley," representing 
the War Trade Board; Edward Chambers, representing the Rail- 
road Administration; Charles R. Piez, representing the United 
States Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation; P. F. 
Noyes, representing the Fuel Administration; T. F. Whitmarsh. 
representing the Food Administration; Alex Legge, Vice Chair- 
man of the War Industries Board, also representing the Allied 
Purchasing Commission: and Felix Frankfurter. Chairman of the 
War Labor Policies Board. From this time forward the Priorities 
Division functioned through these two main units, authority for final 
decision on priority resting alwa3^s with the priorities commissioner 
to whom it was delegated by the chairman. 

The first act of the Priorities Board was to issue, on the day of 
its establishment, a General Classification of Purposes Demanding 
Preferential Treatment,'* a document designed to guide all govern- 
mental and other agencies in the production, supply, and distribu- 
tion of raw materials, finished products, electrical energy, fuel, and 

» See Appendix XI for copy of General Classification of Purposes DemuDding rroffitntlal . 
Treatment, issued Mar. '1~, 1018. 

•■ C. M. Woolley was also, by special appointment, coordinating memlM-r of Loth tin* 
War Industries Board and the War Trade Hoard. 



^ 



56 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

transpoi-tation. That list gave preference to the raw materi;ils 
going into or supplies necessary to the manufacture of ships, air- 
craft, munitions, military and naval supplies, fuel, food, and col- 
lateral industries, clothing, railroads, and public utilities. This 
classification, created as it was by the united action of all the pur- 
chasing agencies of the Government and the Allies, went a long 
way toward bringing about concerted action. 

By way of refinement and explanation of this idea, a list of 45 
industries, known as " Preference List No. 1," * was issued by the 
priorities board on April 6, 1918. These industries were announced 
as those whose operations were considered of exceptional importance 
during the war. The list was issued for the guidance and instruc- 
tion of all Government agencies in the supply and distribution of 
coal and coke, and in the use of transportation. The list Avas from 
time to time extended by the issuance of supplements until it finally 
covered 73 industries and was reissued with broadened scope as 
" Preference List No. 2," on September 3, 1918." 

This new list contained a classification for 73 industries and, in 
addition, a rating for about 7,000 separate plants, plants Avhose im- 
portance, for some special reason, was considered above or below 
the class to which their product was assigned on the principal list. 
A supplement to this list was issued on October 1, 1918. 

The purpose of this classification of industry was stated to be 
for the regulation of all Government agencies and others in the 
production and supply of fuel and electric energy and in the supply 
of transportation and of labor. All industries and individual plants 
on the list were divided, according to their relative importance, into 
four classes, viz. Class I, Class II, Class III, and Class IV. The 
issuance of this list was not intended to act as an embargo on all 
plants and industries not included on it, but the requirements of 
such plants were to be deferred until the needs of those on the 
preference lists could be satisfied. It was intended that the pref- 
erence lists should be interpreted in the same spirit as the priority 
rating of orders. Industries and plants in Class I were construed 
as of exceptional importance in the prosecution of the war and their 
requirements in respect to fuel, power, transportation, and labor 
were to be fully satisfied in preference to those of the three remaining 
classes. As between Classes II, III, and IV there was no complete 
or absolute preference, the ratings being designed only as a general 
guide to the relative importance in the composite picture. The 
supply of fuel, power, transportation, and labor to industries and 
plants not on the preference lists was considered, so far as it should 

8 See Appendix XII for copy of Preference List No. 2, dated Sept. 3, 1918, excluding 
the list of 7,000 individual plants. 
* See Appendix XI (2). 



a.mekk;an industry in thI': wai;. 57 

not be affected by special i'ulin<j:s of the priorities coniniittee, ns of 
minor importance for the purposes of the war. 

"Whenever a phmt not on the list took a war order, it was promptly 
placed thereon if its needs required this action. This situation ob- 
viously gave a renewed incentive to owners to convert their plants 
to war work. The general scheme of automatically directing the 
flow of certain fundamental industrial necessities into channels de- 
signed to forward the work of those producing for the war, to the 
detriment, if need be, of those engaged in efforts not materially 
necessary to the emergency, was of extraordinary importance in 
supplementing and completing the control obtained by priority cer- 
tificates and automatic priority ratings for individual orders. 

Toward the end of the war period further additions were made to • 
the organization of the Priorities Division. The problem of divert- 
ing labor, capital, and materials from building operations of a char- 
acter not essential to the purposes of the war became an especially 
serious one. High prices and shortages did not seem, even in the 
summer of 1918, to be automatically curtailing nonwar construction 
as rapidly as was believed to be necessary to the emergency ; for. 
through Government control, prices were declining and their levels 
were largely compensated bj^ widespread prosperity. A Xon-AVar 
Construction Section was formed in the division, with D. K. McLen- ^ 
nan as chief. This section worked largely through the State coun- 
cils of defense and the system of regional advisors described else- 
where in this book. Under the provisions of Priorities Circular 
Xo. 21, issued October 15, 1918, there was inaugurated a scheme 
for controlling large building operations not essential to the war by 
a permit system. Applications under oath were made first to local 
representatives of the Board, with appeal, in cases of refusal, to the 
Non-War Construction Section, and finally to the Priorities Commis- 
sioner. No building operation involving a considerable expenditure 
of capital or labor could be undertaken without the issuance of a permit 
from the section. Enforcement was had through use of the priority 
power in controlling the supply of materials and transportation. 

Several delicate cases arose in this connection. There was a 
strongly supported movement in Chicago for the construction of 
a large temporary memorial to the soldiers. A permit was refused 
and, after consideration of the explanation given, the application 
was withdrawn. Permits were refused for the building of Billy 
Sunday tabernacles and. in the light of the explanation furnished. 
^Tr. Sunday and his followers expressed their satisfaction in the 
ruling. A large public-school building project, involving $8,000,000, 
was likewise suspended in the city of New York.^" 

"> See Appendix XVIII for (1) Reply of Bnnich to Ilylan, and (2) Reply of Bnruch to 
the Calder resolution, both explaining the policy of the Board In respect to non-war con- 
struction. 



.58 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

The important relation between priority control and the regulation 
lof railroad transportation brought about the early formation of an 
ijlnland TraiRc Section of the Board. T. C. Powell, an experienced I 
railroad executive, took charge of the section, whose work, although it i 
was so successfully merged with that of the Priorities Division and I 
the Railroad Administration that it can not easily be described sepa- 
rately, was nevertheless of far-reaching significance. 
I The division also established a Labor Priorities Section, with A. W. 
Clapp as chief. The purpose of this section was to bring about a 
control over the ever diminishing supply of labor, by a system of 
priorities. Reference to this work is made in chapter T, below. The 
end came before it had gone very far. 

An obvious indirect effect of the processes of priorities was to 
curtail the production of nonwar industries and release labor, ma- 
terials, capital, and transportation for use in war industries. These 
processes were necessarily slow and uncertain, and as the war pro- 
gressed and greater and greater demands were made on war indus- 
tries, while at the same time the substantial increases in our Army 
w^ere making greater inroads in the labor supply, the necessity for 
direct action curtailing the production of less essential industries be- 

-. came more and more imperative. There was much discussion in Con- 
gress, in the several executive departments of the Government, in the 
I press, and elsewhere, of " nonessential industries " and the expediency 
I of suppressing them during the w^ar. The problem had the careful 
■consideration of the President, who appointed a committee com- 
posed of Vance C. McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board; 
Bernard M. Barucli. Chairman of the War Industries Board; Her- 
bert C. Hoover, Food Administrator, and Harry A. Garfield, Fuel 
Administrator, to investigate and report what industries were non- 
essential to the point that they should in the public interest retire 
from business during the war. This committee in turn formed a 
subcommittee, composed of Clarence M. Woolley, of the War Trade 
Board, as chairman; Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner; 
T. F. Whitmarsh, of the Food Administration ; Edward Chambers, 
of the Railroad Administration; Edwin F. Gay, of the Shipping 
Board; and P. B. Noyes, of the Fuel Administration, to which wore 
later added Felix Frankfurter, Chairman of the War Labor Policies 
Board, and George May, of the Treasury Department. 

, This committee, after careful and painstaking investigation and 

consideration, made its report under date of June 22, 1918," in 
substance recommending : 

1. That no industry should be absolutely prohibited and destroyed. 

2. That a plan of general curtailment could and should be devised, 

' A copy of this report, together with a copy of Mr. Hoover's letter of .Tiily ,S, 1018, 
transmitting same to the President, with the President's O. K. thereon, forming as it 
.does the charter of th/» industrial adjustments committee, Is embraced in Appendix XIII. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THH WAR. 59 

broad enough to leinove the conllk't between the necessities of 
war and nonwar industries in the matter of raw materials, fuel, 
transportation and labor. 
Particularly significant paragraphs from this report follow: 

We do not recoinnientl absolute pr()liil)iti()n because, granting the possiliilit.v 
-of selecting from all the products (if industry those items whicli could be ngreed 
upon as of relatively slight import:;,nce to the consuming public, the benetits to 
be derived for the war program bythe total and sudden prohibition of the in- 
dustries producing such commodities .would be trilling compared to the economic 
loss (Un-ing and after the war. 

A searching Mualysis of all our inciusli-ics rcvcahMl 25 wliidi might fairly 
be classitied as producers of nonwar \onnuodities, and thcreion' worthy of 
consideration for complete prohibition. We found that the aggregate capital 
•employed by this particular group of ind istries was .$733,000,(XK). The aggre- 
gate number of persons employed was 2S3,:,''18. The a.sgregate fuel consumption 
per annum was 1.701.000 tons. 

Contrasting the degree of relief afforded with the hardships neces.sarily im- 
posed upon a part of the community, your couunittie hay reached the conclu- 
sion that it would be inadvisable to adopt dir"ct industrial prohibition to ac- 
complish the desired end. It would not oPily result in inequalities and thus en- 
gender intense dissatisfaction on the part of tl ose affected but it would also 
• create grave api)rehension throughout the enti' ? industrial conununity. This 
might weaken the morale of the nation and, in the final analysis, cause actual 
harm rather than positive benefit. 

We also invite your attention to the fact tha a suddi>n dislocation through 
complete prohibition of any industry involve ^ the disintegration of entire 
organizations, including the workers, foremen, superintendents", and managers. 
Such organizations in most cases are the cumulative result of many years of 
constructive effort, and it is obvious that with the ending of the war the prohib- 
ited industries would be obliged to go through the itionrer process of re-creation. 
This woidd, in the opinion of your committee, augment the embarrassment of 
postwar industrial readjustments. 

Following this report, the industrial adjustment committee of the 
priorities board was formed, with the approval of the President, 
with a membership composed of the subcommittee above mentioned. 
Rhodes S. Baker, assistant priorities commissioner, took active '- 
f barge of the details of this work, participated with the committee in I 
its deliberations, and created an organization for the scientific study 
and the compilation of comprehensive data with respect to each 
separate industry. Ample notice of proposed curtailments of non- 
war industries was given and their representatives appeared before 
iip.d agreed with the committee on bases of curtailment. This enabled 
them so to reorganize their l)usinesses as to engage in the produc- 
tion of war necessities or reduce the volume of their output, or both. 
Xo industry was branded as nonessential, but every effort was made 
to preserve the organization of every unit in each in(lu.stry through 
the use of its facilities for war production or otherwise, to the end 
•^.hat it would be prci^tired to go promi)tly forward with its normal 



60 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TH^i WAR. 

j 

activities following the conclusion of peace), but at the same tinu'- 
men, materials, and capital were released a^id transportation was re- 
lieved for the more efficient prosecution of the war. 

As illustrating the methods pursued arKl the results accomplished 
by the industrial adjustments committq^'o, reference is made to the 
latter part of chapter 2, Part II of this volume, dealing with the 
rationing of iron and steel.^ I 

The results of the work of the Priorities Division can not be fully 
described nor well illustrated in th^ confines of a single chapter. 
This division functioned through, and with the systematic assistance 
of, not only the other agencies of the War Industries Board, but 
other departments and bureaus of the Government. Priority became 
a procedure, not alone an orgariization. The purposes and results 
of priority control Avill necessarily be illustrated in every chapter 
which follows. 

* See pp. 123 to 129, inclubive. / 



CiiAi>Ti:ij 5. 
CONSERVATION. 

riic woi'k of the Priorities Division avus intimately related to tiiat 
of another very important and very enerj^etic division of the Board — 
the Conservation Division. The President's letter of March 4, 1918, 
( harged the AVar Industries Board with the duty of promoting " the 
ronservation of resources and facilities by means of scientific, Indus-; 
trial, and commercial economies." But the work Avas at that time 
already well under way. and the establishment of the Conservation 
Division under the Board on May 8, 1918, represented only a transfer 
tiom the council, and a reorganization of the Commercial Economy 
Ijoard, which had been created as early as March 24, 1917. A. AV. 
>haw was chairman of both organizations in succession and took 
<i<tive charge of conservation work throughout the war period. 

I'he attention of the earlier organization was devoted principally 
t<^ conservation in distribution rather than in production. It was 
Iclt that economies could be effected so as to release men and equip- 
ment in the distributive trades with the least destruction to the essen- 
tial processes of industry, because on the whole they perhaps were 
more inclined to practices not wholly necessary. The aim was to 
!)ring about reductions in the use of men, capital, and materials in 
ways that would least disturb essential economic purposes. 

The section on foreign experience carried on studies of conserva- 
tion measures practiced in England, France, Italy, Germany, and 
Austria. Although our methods differed radically from those of 
Europe, because our circumstances differed radically, information 
concerning their raw-material shortages, manufacturing capacities, 
methods of substitution, of curtailment, etc., afforded many sug- 
gestions for the solution of qut own problems. This information 
came to the division largely through the activities of the Department 
of Commerce and of the War Trade Board. 

Besides general publicity through motion pictures, newsi)aper and 
magazine articles, advertisements, signs in stores, special pamphlets 
to women's organizations, proclamations by governors, and other 
means, setting forth information, suggestions, and arguments con- 
cerning desirable and workable economies, which, by the way, re- 
ceived a cordial and spontaneous response: the Board canvassed 
trade practice after trade practice witli !i view in fniding dcfnuMl 



62 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

methods for eliminating large blocks of waste. A few examples of 
the earlier work Avill tell the stor3\ 

It was an established trade custom among bakers to allow the 
retailers to return unsold bread and this bread was disposed of 
largely as waste. Calculations showed that the elimination of this 
practice would save bread enough to feed 200,000 people and would 
save about 4 per cent of the total man and equipment power devoted 
to handling bread between bakers, retailers, and consumers. The 
wealth and energy thus released would naturally turn to war effort. 
Agents were sent to many wholesale bakers, conferences were held in 
Washington with others, and a schedule of inquiries was circulated 
widely in the trade. Everybody seemed willing to discontinue the 
practice. A circular was issued on June 6, 1917. to all wholesale 
bakers, setting forth the general understanding and stating that it 
was the will of the Government that the return-of-unsold-bread 
privilege should be stopped on and after July 10, 1917. 

While this was going on, a study was being made of the use of 
the return-of-goods privilege by customers of retail stores. Data 
and opinions were gathered from about 500 retail grocery stores- 
and more than 1,000 retail dry goods and department stores in all 
parts of the country. An investigation was made of cooperative 
delivery systems in over 35 cities and towns by the National Whole- 
sale Grocers' Association. Based on this canvas of sentiments, all 
retail merchants of the United States were requested to restrict de- 
livery service to not more than one trip per day over each route, to- 
eliminate special deliveries, to restrict the return-of-goods privilege to- 
three days, and where possible to establish cooperative delivery sys- 
tems. For enforcement of these rules reliance was had principally 
upon the patriotic desire of everybody to assist the purposes of the 
Government. The State councils of defense. State officials, and many 
other war-service organizations were of greatest value in securing the 
adoption of these rules in various cities of the country. 

Eeports show that the merchants of more than 315 of our larger 
cities adopted the one-delivery-a-day rule, and that cooperative de- 
livery systems were inaugurated in 189 cities. Spread of the senti- 
ment that a package under the arm was a mark of patriotism was 
effective also in releasing man power. As a typical example, the 
report shows that 33 dry goods and department stores in one city, 
by restricting delivery service to one trip j)er day, operated Avith 545 
(lelixery employees where 848 had previously been employed. The 
number of automobiles needed was reduced from 324 to 195, and 17 
horse-drawn vehicles were discontinued. In another city four de- 
partment stores were able to save the services of 21 drivers, 14 -svagon 
boys, 29 horses, 2 stablemen, and 21 motors or delivery wagons, by a 
cooperative delivery s^^stem. In general, department stores reduced 



A.Mi:i;ic'A.\ iNDi'STitY i\ TiiK WAi;. OS- 

man power by about 25 per cent and retail grocery stores by 50 per 
cent throu<rli fewer deliveries; and cooperative delivery systems 
saved from 50 to 75 per cent in labor employed. 

Activities had been going on also in the direction of economies 
through reduction in the number of styles and types of a'ticles, but 
they had gone little further than studies, informal suggestions, and 
publicity prior to the organization of the Avork under tiie Board in 
May. 1918. With the new and more positive powers of the War 
Intlustries Board under its reestablishment, this division S'H about 
to accomplish more specific results and to extend its activities more 
intensively in the field of production. As the priority power began 
to show its effectiveness, there appeared a method of enforcing rules 
of conservation, and the possibility of genuine enforcement would 
make these rules fair alike to that vast majority which wished to do 
everything in its power for the cause and to those few Avho preferred 
their private gain. 

In addition, two new sets of organizations were now in the field 
to make definite and expeditious action possible. The commodity 
sections of the Board could study, bargain, and administer in behalf 
of the Government, and the war service committees of the national 
associations of the several trades could bargain and administer in 
behalf of their respective trades. The purpose of the division was 
to release man power, materials, manufacturing facilities, and capital 
by reducing the number of different types, patterns, and styles of 
articles manufactured, and by requiring the substitution of more 
plentiful for less plentiful materials. The method was by agree- 
ment with the respective industries organized so as to act as units. 
The aim of every measure w^as to forward the war program, and 
its contribution to that end was the test by which it was judged. But 
the method sought was always that one which would cause the least 
disturbance to the essential features of the normal course of in- 
dustry. The procedure of the division is succinctly described in a 
notice given to the public on July 24, 1918, about the conservation 
of tin. 

The Board calls inoetiiifis of represenlntivcs of I'acli imi)ortaiir trade using 
tin, states ;lie necessity for economy, asks for patriotic cooperation and seeks 
advice as to bow to get the results desired. Each industry is asked to ort,'anize, 
to consider the prohh^n and submit .s-pecitic reconunrndations. These recom- 
mendations are digested and sent to everyone in each trade concerned. Con- 
ferences are held with those who may not agree with the reconnnendations 
so as to get as complete unanimity as possible. A set of recommendations or 
regulations is then drawn up for eiu-h industry and these are enforce<l by 
the War Industries Board. 

The plan of conservation^ laid down by the division for the 
guidance of the'commocliiy 'sections and of its own agents was to 
undertake studies of industries, ])articularly those in which there 
were shortages of materials, facilities, or labor, witli a view to 



64 AMERICAN INDUSTEY IN THE WAR. 

formulating sets of regulations to acccmplish one or more of tiic 
following purposes : 

1. To secure all feasible reductions in the number of styles, varie- 
ties, sizes, colors, finishes, etc., of the several products of the in- 
dustry in question. This would accomplish economies in manufac- 
ture by reducing the number of operations, and the amount of reserve 
stock, raw and finished, which had to be carried ; it would speed up 
the turn-over, reduce the labor and expense of selling, and decrease 
the loss due to depreciation. 

2. To eliminate styles and varieties of articles which violated the 
jn-inciple of economy in the use of constituent materials ; for example, 
garments requiring unusual yardage could be eliminated. 

3. To eliminate features of adornment which added nothing to 
the usefulness of articles. 

4. To reduce the production and sale of such articles as were of 
lesser importance for the comfort and satisfaction of the population. 

5. To foster the substitution of articles and materials which were 
plentiful for those which were scarce and difficult to produce. 

6. To discourage the use for unimportant purposes of articles 
which were needed for more important purposes. 

7. To standardize sizes, lengths, widths, thicknesses, weights, 
gauges, etc., in such a way as to preserve sufficient strength and 
durability, but to effect economies in materials and labor. 

8. To reduce the waste of materials in manufacturing processes 
generally. 

9. To secure economies in the use of samples for selling purposes. 

10. To secure economy in containers by eliminating the smaller 
and odd sizes. 

11. To secure economy in packing by increasing the number of 
units per package. 

12. To secure economy in shipping space and packing materials 
by baling instead of boxing wherever this was practicable. 

The process of drawing up tentative schedules of regulations, 
based on the recommendations of the trade organizations them- 
seh-es, and sending them out to all parties directly interested for 
criticism and comment, that they might be revised before being 
issued as binding regulations, was designed to safeguard so far as 
possible against unfairness and injustice to any industry or firm. 
By canvassing conditions in their industries, by furnishing tech- 
nical information and advice, by their loyal readiness to cooperate 
with the Government in carrying out the plans, often for drastic 
changes in trade practices, the business men in industry made these 
conservation projects possible. When the need was explained, they 
were always found read}^ to take the necessary steps, often at heavy 
sacrifices. The thoughts of the men at the helms of their own in- 



AMERICAN INDUSTKY IX THE WAR. 65 

dustrial enterprises were linked with the thoughts of the men at 
the seat of government in the common purpose of winning the war. 

But there was an additional sanction for these regulations which 
gave confidence to each business man that all his fellows in trade 
would observe like practices with himself, and this last means of 
enforcement would have been of increasing importance had the war 
lasted over a long period. Whenever a schedule of conservation 
was issued, each manufacturer and dealer was required to give a 
pledge that he would observe it and do all in his power to see it 
observed on the part of those with whom he dealt. Most American 
business men will observe a pledge when once given and they need 
not be vigilated. 

But there was a further power to encourage the good will of those 
who were tempted to waver. By the summer of 1918, the priorities 
commissioner was in a position to exercise control not only over 
the distribution of iron and steel, copper, and numerous other ele- 
mental constituents of manufacture, but, through the cooperation 
of the Fuel and Railroad Administrations, he could also withhold, 
for the purpose of bringing recalcitrants into line, supplies of 
coal, coke, and oil, or the use of freight cars for transportation. 
With this sanction at the foundation of its efforts, the Conservation 
Division developed in rapid succession during the summer and fall 
of 1918 a series of " agreements," issued in the form of schedules 
of regulations to nearly a hundred different groups of producers — 
regulations which were already showing their effect in reducing 
the industrial activities of the country to a more efficient basis — when 
the end of the war made such undertaking no longer necessary. 

Curtailment plans were carried out not by agreement among the 
concerns of an industry but by agreement between the industry as 
a group, on the one hand, and the Government, on the otlier. Many 
new trade practices were inaugurated in the same way. In many 
instances curtailment was the negative result of positive action in 
some other direction. This problem has already been considered at 
some length in the chapter on priorities. The plans and results of 
the Board's activities in carrying forward the conservation pro- 
gram are explained at some length in Part II of this book, in con- 
nection with the work of the various commodity sections dealing 
with the particular industries affected. Reference, by way of illus- 
tration, to some of these will be of general interest. 

The conservation schedules for makers of men's and youth's cloth- 
ing limited the length of sack coats and the length and sweep of over- 
coats, reduced the size of samples, and restricted each manufactui-er 
to not more than 10 models of suits per season, resulting in a saving 
of 12 to 15 per cent in yardage. The number of tiiiiiks carried by 
10582&— 21 5 



66 AMERIUAI^ INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

traveling salesmen of dry goods houses underwent an average reduc- 
tion of 44 per cent. The schedule for the women's garment industry 
was calculated as capable of saving 20 to 25 per cent in yardage. 

The standardization of colors together with certain restrictions in 
styles of sweaters and analogous knitted articles released 33 per cent 
of the wool ordinarily used in that industry. A schedule providing 
that hosier}^, underwear, and other knit goods, with certain small 
exceptions, should be packed for shipment in paper covered bales 
instead of pasteboard boxes resulted in a large saving in shipping 
space, while at the same time it released pasteboard to be used as a 
substitute for tin plate in the manufacture of contjiiners for article^: 
for which tin plate had been forbidden. It was estimated that this 
schedule would have effected an annual saving of 17,312 carloads ol 
freight space, 141,000,000 cartons, and nearly a half million wooden 
packing cases. 

On the face of it, spools for thread would seem to be an industry 
not worth the time spent in restricting it. Yet investigation showed 
that thread manufacturers had reduced the yardage on spools from 
200 j-ards to 150 yards and were considering a further reduction to 
100 yards in order to avoid disturbing the unit retail selling price. 
The quantity was fixed by the division at 200 yards per spool, bring- 
ing about an economy of 25 per cent in lumber, labor, shipping space, 
wooden cases, cardboard boxes, and other shipping supplies, releas- 
ing, it was estimated, 600 freight cars per year. 

These conservation schedules were issued to the several trades, 
their separate features to become effective at future dates fixed by 
agreement between the Board and the respective trades. In some 
industries, where the period of production is an extended one, the 
date for becoming effective had to be placed some months in thej 
future. 

This was true of the shoe manufacturing industry. A very ex- 
haustive investigation was made here, far-reaching plans inaugu- 
rated, and schedules issued. But only a few features of the schedule 
had actually become effective by the time the armistice was signed. 
The schedule provided that shoe manufacturers should be restricted 
to three colors in leather — black, white, and one shade of tan. New 
lasts were forbidden ; heights of shoes were limited ; and certain other 
features requiring an unnecessary amount of leather were eliminated. 
Activity in this direction was first stimulated by the fact that in 
the midst of the war there developed a fashion requiring that women 
have shoes colored to match each gown, very high shoes for women 
being also a vogue ; and this in face of the fact that there was a pecu- 
liarh' difficult shortage in glazed kid leather of which the majority of 
Avomen's shoes are manufactured. This schedule would have effected 
savings in leather not only in stock carried by retail stores but in shoes 



AMERICAN INni'STHV IN TllK WATv. 07 

^'^" standing in the homes. It wouKl have saved capital, |)ackin<x boxes, 
'^'\ labor, and transportation in amounts very hirge. The savin<i;s back 
, i through the processes of manufacture, preparation, and tanning of 
^ hides, dyeing of leathers, etc., would also have been large. One tan- 
™ ner reduced his line from 81 colors to 3 colors. Most manufacturers 
"t reduced their styles by about two-thirds, and retail stores by greater 
^'' amounts. 

'*: The manufacturers of automobile tires agreed to a reduction from 
^', 287 styles and sizes of tires to 32, with a further reduction to I) within 
-*i two years. This had a tendency to release a large amount of rubber 
^\ and capital tied up in stocks everywhere. A schedule was issued also 
'"5; to the rubber clothing and the rubber footwear industries, the former 
^f| eliminating 272 styles and types and agreeing to bale their product 
'^M instead of shipping it in cartons. Even bathing caps were restricted 

to one style and one color for each manufacturer. 

Savings in the agricultural implement industry are among the 

most important effected. Implement manufacturers were able to 
'Hi simplify manufacturing operations and reduce their stocks of raw 
t(i materials: manufacturers, dealers, and jobbers found it possible to do 
ce.| business with smaller stocks of finished products ; the steel mills saved, 
1?- because every variation in size or shape had required a different set 
ee,, of rolls, and so on. Schedules were issued to manufacturers of port- 
as^ able grain elevators, plows and tillage implements, grain drills and 

seeders, harvesters, mowers, hay rakes, ensilage machinery, spring- 
es, tooth harrows, farm wagons and trucks, land rollers and pulverizers, 
'jj: and cream separators. The number of sizes and types of steel plows 
m; was reduced from 812 to 76; planters and drills from 784 to 29; disk 
if ( harrows from 589 to 38 ; buggy wheels from 232 to 4 ; spring-wagon 
ilif! wheels from 32 to 4; buggy axles from over 100 to 1; buggy springs 

from over 120 to 1 ; spring wagons from over 25 to 2 ; buggy shafts 

from 36 to 1; buggy bodies from over 20 to 1 style, two widths; 

spring-wagon bodies from 6 to 2. 

By making his line of farm wagons conform to this schedule, onf 
eij manufacturer reduced his variety of front and rear gears from 1.736 
[edi to 16. Yet the farmers were as Avell taken care of in the growing, 
er harve.sting, and marketing of their crops with this smaller variety of 
w; agricultural implements to draw ui)on as they had been with the Avide 
eij variety previously manufactured. The habits and prejudices of 
it I localities and individual farmers had made it necessary for manu fac- 
iei turers to make many more sizes and types of equipment than wore 
leii essential, for all of which parts had to be carried, and the number 
till of finished implements in the hands of manufacturers, jobbers, and 

retailers were unnecessarily large Ijocause of this multiplicity. 

Several schedules were issued to different branches of the electrical 

industr3\ particularly to manufacturers of heating appliaticcs-, fun 



68 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

motors, industrial lighting fixtures, panel boards, and switchboards. 
The preparation of many more schedules in this field was under way 
when the work was stopped. 

Work was likewise going forward with many branches of the 
hardware trade. To show the scope of this undertaking, one hard- 
ware wholesaler estimated that over 90,000 items would have been 
removed from his catalogue if the schedule had gone into effect as 
planned. 

The use of tin to give weight to silk dresses was eliminated. Tin 
using industries were taken up one after another and conservation 
schedules issued. It was found possible to reduce the tin content of I 
babbitt metal for many types of bearings without reducing appreci- 
ably the quality of the bearings. The tin content of several solders 
was changed. The users of tinfoil, collapsible tubes, and silver-plated 
ware came in for their share of abstinence in order to relieve the 
growing shortage of tin which had to be imported from distant 
sources. The Bureau of Standards worked out a valuable method of 
substituting cadmium for tin in solder. To save tin in the tin-plate 
industry, which is ordinarily the largest consumer of this metal, the 
division, in cooperation with the Food Administration, worked out 
plans for manj^ substitutions in the industries using tin-plate contain- 
ers, measures which would have effected an annual saving of 260.000 
tons of tin plate. Tin plate is 98 per cent steel, but 4,680 tons of pig 
tin is a saving of great importance, and the saving in steel was not 
unimportant. 

These examples should be sufficient to show that the work of the 
Conservation Division was effective. It would be wearisome to cata- 
logue at length all the schedules which were issued and all the sav- 
ings effected — the mere list of industries producing different varie- 
ties of hardware would fill a page of small type. Efforts at conser- 
vation were made and either put into operation or were about to be 
at the time of the armistice in such diverse and unrelated industries 
as road-making machinery, chains, bicycles, motor cycles, children's 
vehicles, clocks, pens, pencils, talking machines, motion-picture pro- 
jectors, burial goods, furniture, beds, vacuum cleaners, washing ma- 
chines, household wringers, refrigerators, stoves and ranges, fur- 
naces, enamel goods, galvanized ware, cameras, hand stamp and 
marking devices, adding machines, autographic registers, sales books, 
typewriters, cash registers, tabulating machines, time recorders, fire- 
prevention and fire-fighting apparatus, corsets, pocket cutlery, hosiery 
and underwear, hats, shoes, gloves, harness, trunks, overalls, bedding, 
nails, bolts, rivets, bottles, crockery, davenports, paint, and varnish. 

Many of these conservation schedules applied to Government as 
well as civilian purchases. The division continued the work which 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 09 

was begun early in the war to bring about greater uniformity in the 
specifications of the Army, Navy, and other Government agencies. 
• An interesting ilhistration of the way in which several lines of 
conservation effort would converge on one object is afforded by 
the automobile industry. Rubber is imported over a long route, and 
the shortage of shipping dictated restriction in its use. Automobile 
aj tires, consuming 70 per cent of it, furnished the most fruitful point 
of attack. From another angle the shortage in petroleum forced the 
Fuel Administration to ask for a general reduction in the use of gaso- 
line. From a third angle, the shortage in steel for direct and in- 
direct war work required curtailment in every practicable way. 
These three forces converged toward reducing to a minimum the 
manufacture of pleasure cars during the latter part of the war. The 
plans under which the automobile plants were to be kept alive in 
reduced condition are explained more full}^ in Part II. 

Although there was poAver to enforce conservation, the results of 
this division were achieved almost entirely by the voluntary coopera- 
tion of the industries to whom the needs of the Government were pre- 
sented and who worked out in cooperation with the Board the various 
mechanisms of execution. The industries themselves had caught the 
spirit of the hour and most remarkable exhibitions of unselfishness 
were seen on every side. 

The experience of the Conservation Division has clearly demon- 
strated that there are many practices in American industry which 
cost the ultimate consumers in the aggregate enormous sums without 
enriching the producers. These are often due to competitive de- 
mands, real or assumed. JNIany salesmen, in order to please the 
whims of particular customers, will insist upon the manufacture of 
new styles or new shapes of articles, requiring increased expense to 
the manufacturers and increased expense to both wholesalers 
and retailers in carrying more lines of stock; these in turn 
causing increased expense in maintaining salesmen and providing 
them with samples as well as in advertising. The consumer, the 
general public, is no better served by the satisfaction of these 
unreasonable demands, 1)ut the public idtimately pays the bill. We 
may well draw from this war experience a lesson to be applied to 
pence, by providing some simple machinery for eliminating wastefid 
trade practices which increase prices without in the remotest degi'ce 
contributing to the well-being of the people. There is enough natural 
wealth in this country, and there is enough labor and technical skill 
for converting that wealth into objects of human satisfaction to pro- 
vide abundantly for the elemental comforts of every person in the 
land. The problem before our Nation to-day is to bring about such 
adjustments of the industrial processes as lead toward that long- 
sought condition of life. 



Chapter 6. 
PRICE FIXING. 

The stabilizing effect of the priority system on market prices has 
already been the subject of comment. That the activities of the 
Conservation Division tended also in a large way, though indirectly, 
to head off runaway markets, is a conclusion not difficult to under- 
stand. But the 14 months from August, 1917, to November, 1918, 
will alwaj^s be a period of peculiar interest to students of political ^ 
economy, because it marked the first experiment in this country of 
direct Government control of prices of commodities for all con- 
sumers. The reason for inaugurating this pioneer effort, the author- 
ity under which it was undertaken, the method employed, and the 
principles applied warrant our special attention. 

An understanding of the market conditions which precipitated 
the action can be obtained by reading Part II of this book. The 
prime factors were the high level to which prices had climbed by the 
late summer of 1917, and the fear of a further rise. Prices were 
soaring out of all relation to the cost of production and were fluctu- 
ating Avith great uncertainty. This condition was having a more 
menacing effect than the mere extravagance of paying high prices 
on the part of the Government. The present generation of business 
men had been accustomed, for three decades preceding 1915, to con- 
duct their affairs under steady and sober market conditions, with 
extreme price fluctuations in staples only at rare and extraordinary 
intervals. The rapidity of the rise from 1915 to the early spring of 
1917 had already thrown great confusion and irregularity in the 
processes of trade. Commodities had begun to flow through unusual 
and ineffective channels, causing unbalanced and often retarded pro- 
duction. The final upward swing of prices during the spring and 
summer of 1917 enhanced these unhealthy tendencies. Capital was 
turning in great quantities toward speculation and manufacturers 
were uncertain in their purchases of raw materials. " Cost-plus- 
profits " contracts brought adventurers into the field of production, 
who flooded the country with options and inquiries to cover their 
bids, and prices were being forced further and further out of joint 
while actual work and production were halted by the confusion. 

American business could not make progress in the unaccustomed 

atmosphere and there was no relief in sight. Demand for goods was 

to increase rather than decline, and it would increase with ever more 

telling persistence. A war demand differs in its essential nature 

70 



AMERR'AX INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 71 

from the normal demands of peace. In ordinary times a rising price 
carries with it its own defeat. Purchasers will buy so long as they 
can make a profit or reap a satisfaction by doing so. This at least is 
true of everything except the most extraordinary luxuries. They 
will stop buying Avhen the price reaches a point outside the range 
where the commodity can be turned over at a prolit. The inflated 
[irice drops as a result. But war is economically the greatest and 
most scandalous of spendthrifts. No economic prolit comes from tiie 
expenditure of an instrument of war and no economic profit is con- 
sidered in connection with its purchase. The demand is absolute; 
the price is no deterrent. 

The monthly wholesale price quotations of 1,3GG separate commodi- 
ties were studied by the Price Section of the Board to cover the period 
1913-1918. "Weighted index numbers" were calculated to show 
average percentages of rise and fall in prices. A " weighted average " 
is obtained by taking the sum of a series of prices multiplied by 
quantities of goods sold at those prices, and dividing the result by 
the sum of the quantities. Using this method of computation, if the 
average weighted prices of the 1,366 commodities for June, 1913, be 
taken as 100 or normal, they had increased to only 104 by October, 
1915, but to 144 by December, 1916. By March, 1917, the threat of 
■war had brought this number up to 156. In one month from April 
6, 1917, it jumped 14 points. The prices of individual groups of 
commodities more directly related to the war rose high above these 
averages. By March, 1917, the average price of metals was 247 per 
cent of the average for 1913, and by Jul}'^ of the same year it had 
reached its peak at 333 per cent. Basic pig iron climbed from $32.25 
per ton in INIarch to $52.50 in July; steel plates from $4.33 per hun- 
dredweight to $9. Foods went from 142 per cent to 167 per cent dur- 
ing this period, wheat rising from $1.98 per bushel in March to 
$2.58 in July. Clothing went from 157 per cent to 187 per cent, and 
chemicals from 159 per cent to 180 per cent. 

In the face of these facts every condition pointed to further rises 
for the future unless a radical cure could be found. During the 
year ending June 30, 1914, Europe took raw materials, manufac- 
tures, and foods from this country valued at $1,471,266,488; dur- 
ing the year ending June 30, 1917, Europe bought goods here valued 
at $4,307,310,138. Our total exports of iron, steel and their prod- 
ucts, which were $251,488,677 in value for the year before Europe 
went to war, had jumped to $1,133,746,188 by 1917. The corre- 
sponding figures for copper were $146,222,556 for 1914, and $322,- 
535,344 for 1917. These data explain why metal prices in this 
country got out of hand until their record rise in July, 1917, com- 
pelled Government regulation. 



72 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

These are only a few specimens of the alarming facts which faced 
the Government in the summer of 1917. It was conceivable that 
the Government might pay these prices and take back much of the 
undue profits by excess profit taxes; but the question of costs, while 
perhaps the most serious, was not the only difficulty. The insta- 
bility of prices was in itself hampering production and driving 
business into confusion. 

Various committees of the Council of National Defense were 
struggling with the price question; suggestions and arguments were 
being exchanged everywhere. A few important special arrange- 
ments were made for Government purchases, but prices continued 
to rise. Finally, on July 12, 1917, the President announced that 
the Government was determined to make its purchases at reason- 
able costs and that prices would be fixed if it should be found nec- 
essary to do so. He added further that if it should be necessary 
to fix prices for Government purchases, the same prices ought to 
be made to apply also to civilian and allied purchases, because 
wherever there was a shortage, fixed prices for the Government 
would only make other prices higher than ever. Following this 
announcement prices began to decline, but the instability remained. 
The country had a very strong prejudice against Government price 
fixing. This was relieved somewhat by the knowledge that this 
method of control was being used successfully in England and 
France. Another factor which encouraged the step was the grow- 
ing discontent on the part of the public as they saw prices mount 
while men joined the ranks and family budgets were reduced. 

Price control was taken up piecemeal, commodity by commodity, 
as expediency dictated. Congress did not grant to the President, 
"^ nor to any other agency, blanket authority to work out a scheme of 
price regulations. The bases in law for different regulations were 
varied, and in some cases doubtful. For this reason the method, if 
not the extent, of price fixing was circumscribed. Nearly all of it 
was done by negotiation and agreement between the Government and 
the trades. 

The food and fuel control act, passed August 10, 1917, gave the 
President very broad powei-s of control, and when this had been 
added to the national defense act of June 3, 1916, the President, in 
response to the widely and keenly felt need, made himself virtually 
a minister of price controls. The President assumed to himself the 
final responsibility, in a literal sense undertaking to approve and 
sign a majority of all the regulations issued. 

A legal foundation for the inaguration of such regulations as 
were established can perhaps be spelled out. Certain it is that there 
were ample means at hand for enforcing such rules as it was believed 
wise to impose. The law clearly gave the President or the Secretary 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 73 

of War power to " requisition," and in <irantin<r this jiowor it niwe 
to the same officials, power to determine and pay " just compensation " 
or "reasonable prices." The food and fuel control act provided 
in section 10 : 

That the President is authori/A'd. from time to time, to requisition foods, 
feeds, fuels, and othei- supplies necessary to tlie support of tlie Army or tlie 
maintenance of tlie Navy, or any other public use connected with the common 
defense, and to requisition, or otherwise provide, storage facilities for such 
supplies; and he shall ascertain and pay a just compensation therefor} 

This act was undoubtedly intended by its authors to apply only 
to foods, fuels, and commodities directly related to them. But the 
national defense act, passed June 3, 191G. authorized the Secretary 
of War to place orders with any concern for such product or mate- 
rial as might be required and which was of the nature and kind 
usually produced or capable of being produced by such concern. It 
further gave him power to " determine reasonable prices " for such 
products ; and upon failure of compliance, gave the President power 
to take over any plant. Thus the Government could, by the pay- 
ment of just compensation, require or commandeer the whole output 
of a plant and itself determine the price to be paid for everything 
taken under the compulsory order. The possibilitj^ of compulsory 
order gave a very formidable legal weapon for compelling the ac- 
ceptance of price determinations on the part of the Government. 

The naval appropriations act of 1916 authorized the President to 
place an order with any person for ships or war material, if such 
ships or material were of the nature, Idnd, and quantity usually pro- 
duced or capable of being produced by such person. Upon refusal, 
the plant could be requisitioned. Under this act " war material " 
was made to include arms, armament, ammunition, stores, supplies, 
equipment for ships and aeroplanes, and everything required in con- 
nection with their production. Another paragraph provided for the 
modification or cancellation of any existing contract for the build- 
ing, production, or purchase of ships or war material. The so- 
called emergency shipping fund act of 1917 allowed the placing of 
an order with any person for such ships or material as the necessities 
of the Government, to be determined by the President, might re- 
quire during the period of the war, and which were of a nature, kind, 
and quantity usually produced or capable of being produced by such 
person; and power was given to the President to determine "just 
compensation " to be paid for such product. In case of refusal, there 
was power of requisition. 

There was ample legislation to give the President commandeering 
power over any type of commodity. Moreover, in that resolution of 
April 6, 1917, Congress had said to the President, "* * * and to 

» The italics are not In the original text. 



74 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of tl 
country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States 

Over and above all this, the President, as Commander in Chief c 
the Army and Navy, undoubtedly had vast control without legislatioi 
He had a right to take private property for public use upon pai 
ment of just compensation, even if such taking was not authorize 
specifically by Congress. But whether this right, or the right 
granted by the legislation mentioned above, were sufficient or not : 
perhaps of minor importance. The legal authority for establishin 
controlled prices for sales to private purchasers and to foreig 
Governments has never been, and perhaps never will be, adjudicate 
by the courts. As a matter of fact, public opinion acceded to th 
President, in this emergency, power commensurate with the peril an 
left to his discretion the determination of the degree of peril an 
the power necessary to meet it. 

Practically all schedules of fixed prices were reached by a proces 
of negotiation and agreement between the Government and the in 
dustry involved. Purchases based on such schedules were all mad 
after their announcement and, in a collective sense, prices were vol 
untary. The power to enforce adherence to the schedules wa 
abundant, though never direct. The requisitioning power placed th 
Government in a position to address producers virtually as follows 
" These are the prices to which the Government will agree ; if you ar 
willing to enter into a voluntary arrangement with us, you will be pai( 
these prices for your goods, but if you refuse to do so, we will b( 
compelled to ask the properly constituted authorities to commandee; 
your output or your plant and give you just compensation therefor 
as provided by statute, and these very prices are the 'just compen 
sation ' for which the statute provides." The commandeering acts 
it will be noted, provided that the Government should determim 
" just compensation." 

In addition to the use of the requisitioning power, the Govern 
ment had further weapons equally effective in the premises. Thos< 
who might be inclined to disobey a price regulation could be de 
prived of the assistance of the priorities division in obtaining sup 
plies, use of railroads, coal, and other things essential for the opera 
tion of their businesses, and, as war operations developed, this assist- 
ance could become more and more the sine qua non of continuing ir 
business. 

The earlier efforts at negotiated price fixing, which was later tc 
become the rule of the day, were halting and uncertain. An abor- 
tive effort was made in June, 1917, to fix the price of bituminous 
coal in this way. Some early work of the council in negotiating 
metal prices for Government purchases was a success. The food 
and fuel control act set a minimum price for wheat. The President 



AMKHUWX IMUSlltV IN TIIK \\ \\\. 75 

fixed the price of all bituminous coal on Aufru^t 21, r.»17. \\v lixf>l 
the price of copper on September *J1, and of iron and steel on Sep- 
tember '24 following. From this period forward the War Industries 
l Board, the Food Administration, and the Fuel Administration, each 
in its own held, went forward with the work of preparing {)rice 
regulations for the approval and ratification of the President, cover- 
ing commodity after commodity, as the needs of the time seemed to 
require. 

The chief aim of the control by the Food and Fuel Administra- 
tions was to assist the civilian population to obtain necessary articles 
of supply at reasonable rates, while, in the beginning, it was the 
primary puipose of the War Industries Board to assist the (rovern- 
ment in getting supplies at fair prices. The Board soon found, how- 
ever, that its assistance to the civilian population was of an im])or- 
tance at least equal to its work for the Government purchasing 
agencies, and its procedure was early adapted to that need. The 
distinguishing feature of price control in the food group was the 
scheme of fixing " margins of profit " only. Very few basic prices 
were determined by the Food Administration. The War Industries 
Board, on the other hand, and later the price-fixing committee, in 
the field in which they operated, found, for the most part, that the 
most satisfactory control could be accomplished by the fixing of the 
prices of basic materials. 

A question of principle which received cautious consideration 
when price fixing was being un<lcrtaken on the part of the Board 
was that of the meaning and ])roper construction to be given the 
term "just compensation," which lay at the foundation of the com- 
mandeering right and which the fifth amendment of the Constitution 
guarantees to every citizen from whom private property is taken by 
the Government for pu])lic use. A long line of decisions has used 
"market value" as a measure of " just compensation." Another set 
of cases shows that the fact that a given piece of property is to bo 
"condemned" should not be used to add to its condemnation value. 

In the war, market value was largely created by the Govern- 
ment's emergency, and hence it was not a fair test of just compen- 
sation. If an examination be made into the reasoning behind the 
proposition that market value is a sound measure of just compen- 
sation, it will be found that the princii)le is based on the economic 
doctrine prevailing when the rule was fir.st pronounced. This doc- 
trine taught that under the automatic working of the law of supply 
and demand, "market value" always tends to become equal to the 
"cost of production," and for this reason marki-t value is a mea-uie 
of " just compensation." 

Adam Smith taught that the iron law of nature wo(dd always 
bring about its balance — things will sell for what they aro worth, 



76 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

and they are worth what they will sell for — which, he said, was 
always in the long run what it cost^ to produce them; and he illus- 
trated by a series of examples taken from spheres of life where eco- 
nomic relations were A'cry simple. Whether this principle be gen- 
erally true or not, it was certainly not true under war conditions. 
When a demand in the nature of a war demand — absolute and una- 
bated by considerations of a return in value — enters the field, there is 
no force tending naturally to adjust the market value to cost of 
production. Hence, it was found necessary to go back to the more 
elemental principle and measure just compensation by its primary 
cause, viz. cost of production, including a reasonable profit. This 
was the principle adopted by the War Industries Board. 

The responsibility for negotiating fixed price schedules for such 
commodities as fell outside of the field of the Fuel and Food Ad- 
ministrations was assumed from the start until March 4, 1918, by 
the War Industries Board as _an instrument of the Council of Na- 
tional Defense. On March 14; 1918, the price-fixing committee was 
appointed by the President and continued the work, extending it to 
an ever-increasing number of trades. Practically all price schedvdes 
were ratified and promulgated by the President himself. A few 
special arrangements touching commodities of which the Govern- 
ment bought nearly the entire output were reached without refer- 
ence to this procedure, but they actually amounted to little more 
than Government purchasing agreements. 

The variety of purposes to be accomplished in respect to the 
separate industries, the variety of methods pursued, and the measure 
of success had in the exercise of price control, can be understood 
only by a reading of the record, commodity by commodity, as set 
forth in Part II of this book. A full description of the general 
method as it was worked out by the War Industries Board at the 
beginning, and which represents in outline the method prevailing 
throughout the period, is given in chapter 2 of Part II, in connec- 
tion with its application to the iron and steel industry. 

The Federal Trade Commission was found to be equipped with 
a very large and competent staff of cost accountants, statistical 
experts, and economists. As the exigencies of the day i)ointed to 
industry after industry as necessary fields for the exercise of price 
control, the Federal Trade Commission was invited to assign to 
each a corps of these experts to investigate and report on the costs 
of production. The studies usually extended to all producing plants, 
or where this was impracticable to a large number of typical plants, 
from the lowest to the highest cost producers, and their prosecution 
required usually from one to three or more months. 

In the meantime it usually happened that the Board, or an appro- 
priate section of the Board, was carrying on a series of hearings with 

' Including a reasonable profit. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 77 

the war service committee and other representatives of the particular 
trade concerned, and the trade itself was preparing its case in 
anticipation of a final hearing in which figures and facts should 
be presented on both sides; should be compared, discussed, and ad- 
justed, to result in a schedule of fixed maximum prices. The first 
schedule usually covered basic materials only and was followed a 
few weeks later with a system of differentials, making price control 
complete. IMost of these final meetings were prolonged affairs; often 
they extended over several days, and an ''agreement " would emerge 
only after most earnest and searching debate. 

The Board, and later the price-fixing committee, acted in a quasi- 
judicial capacity, the appropriate commodity section, representatives 
of the Federal Trade Commission, and other interested ollicials 
appearing on the part of the Government, and the war service com- 
mittee, with other representatives, appearing in behalf of the in- 
dustry. 

When an " agreement " upon a price schedule was finally reached, 
the decision of the Board (or later of the committee) would be trans- 
mitted forthwith to the President, and, in the event that it met with 
his approval, he would promulgate it to the country. The schedules 
always named the dates on which they were to become effective, 
which usually followed closely upon their adoption, varying accord- 
ing to the exigencies of particular trades. Most schedules were 
made effective for a period of three months only, and were subject 
to renewal, or modification upon presentation of facts showing that 
they were unjust, either as being too low or too high. Contracts 
made before the annoimcement of a schedule were not affected bj' the 
price regulations unless they in terms so provided; but contracts 
made after a price announcement, for delivery during the life of a 
schedule, were subject to the schedule, and contracts made after an 
announcement, for delivery after the expiration of the life of a 
schedule, were made subject to such prices as might be set in a new or 
modified schedule to cover that future period. 

The promulgation of a schedule of prices was usually accompanied 
by statements of certain corollary agreements reached in the price 
negotiations; such, for example, as that wages for labor should not 
be reduced in the plants of the industry affected, that production 
should not be diminished, and the like. 

All prices fixed were maximum prices, sales and purchases being 
freely allowed below such figures; but as these regulations were in 
nearly every instance inaugurated for the purpose of preventing 
runaway markets in commodities in which there was a marked 
shortage, and as they usually represented tlie minimum figures at 
which all concerns of a given trade could produce, they came, with 



78 AMEEICAX INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. I 

one or two exceptions, to be regarded by most dealers as standard 
prices, and the Government purchasers paid them without further 
negotiation. 

The price-fixing committee was not formed until March 14, 1918, 
following the separation of the War Industries Board from the 
jurisdiction of the council. The President made mention, in his 
letter of March 4 to Mr. Baruch, of his intention to appoint a 
price-fixing committee on which the chairman of the Board should 
sit as a member. It was the purpose of the President in choosing the 
committee to name on it no one having a personal, financial interest 
in any result of the committee's recommendations. The following 
members were appointed: Robert S. Brookings, chairman; Ber- 
nard M. Baruch, chairman of the War Industries Board ex 
officio; F. W. Taussig, chairman United States Tariff Commission; 
W. B. Colver, chairman Federal Trade Commission; H. A. Gar- 
field, United States Fuel Administrator; Hugh Frajme, labor rep- 
resentative of the War Industries Board; Comdr. John M. Han- 
cock, representing the Navj- Department; Lieut. Col. Robert H. 
Montgomery, representing the War Department; Henry C. Stuart, 
representing the interests of agriculture, and W. W. Phelps, secre- 
tary. 

The range of Government agencies represented on the committee 
makes this a noteworthy example of the characteristic practice of 
bringing about unified action through the device of an "interlock- 
ing directorate." Responsibility was placed in the committee as 
a body, the chairman being only presiding officer. 

Because the price-fixing function was, by this reorganization, de- 
tached from the Board proper, and placed in the hands of a committee 
Avhich reported directly to the President (only three of the nine mem- 
bers were on the War Industries Board) , the Board itself was enabled 
to retain and obtain more highly specialized talent from the business 
world for its own work without placing such men in a position where 
their integrity could be challenged. The new committee found prac- 
tically no occasions for reducing the prices which had been fixed by 
the earlier machinery. On the contrary, mounting costs and lessen- 
ing man power were in most instances shown to make slightly up- 
ward revisions necessary. 
■^ C The price-fixing committee took the attitude of a quasi-judicial 
body. It did not initiate steps looking to regulations, but upon the 
motion of the appropriate commodity section or other division of 
the War Industries Board, it heard case after case presented by 
the Board and other officials on behalf of the Government and by 
representatives of the industry on the part of the trade involved. 
After a full hearing and deliberation it presented its findings di- 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 79 



rectly to the President, who took final tu tion. The various aj^en- 
cies of the Board, with the assistance and supi)ort of other (iovern- 
ment organizations, undertook to administer and enforce all price 
regulations. This was done in a multitude of ways, depending 
upon the characteristic nature of the particular trade in question. 
The committee always issued its statements under the heading, 
"Price-fixing committee of the War Industries Board," and its 
work was always carried forward in closest harmony with the 
activities of the Board. 

While the different purchasing departments of the (iovernment 
were expected to fix prices for themselves on their current i)urchases 
where there were no special problems involving a lack of supply, the 
price-fixing committee stood ready, on application, to solve any spe- 
cial price-fixing problems the nature of which seemed to require its 
jurisdiction, and which Avere in scale with the time involved. 

In the light of the favorable effects of the earlier price controls; 
with the growing tendency on the part of business men to view the 
practice with little alarm; in fact, in many instances to favor it to 
the extent of asking for it ; and with the increasing number of trades 
being drawn into the war interests, with accompanying price fluctua- 
tions; the committee, through the summer and early autumn of 1918, 
found cases on its calendar for six days in the week and it turned 
out schedule after schedule until the armistice made the work no 
longer necessary. 

The tendency, particularly at the beginning, was to fix prices at 
llie_jource and trust largely to the other instrumentalities of the 
War Industries Board, so to control the avenues of trade that rea- 
sonable prices for finished articles at retail would result. This 
practice, however, as time went on, and a more comprehensive under- 
standing of the vast ramifications became possible, was gradually 
being supplemented toward the end of the period by action definitely 
establishing price control from the raw stocks, right through tlie 
processes of manufacture and trade, to the retail consumers. An 
' example of this is found in the action taken with reference to the 
shoe industry, more fully described in Part II of this book. 

It is impossible to make even a reasonable guess concerning tlic 
amount of money which was saved in the Government purchases and 
purchases by individuals as a result of the price-fixing policy. By 
the machinery used, prices of numerous commodities might" have 
been held to even lower levels and successful resistance could not 
have been maintained by the business men of the country, but cheap 
prices could not in wisdom have been the single or even primary uim 
of Government control. The outstanding purpose was to bring as 
nearly as possible to reality that ideal condition in which the country 
as one man would be bending its energies to the satisfaction of the 



80 AMERICAN IXDUSTEY IN THE WAR. 

all-impelling war needs. Production in many instances had to be 
stimulated b}' every conceivable device; and the business man of 
America is so imbued with the habit of reaping where he sows, that 
even admitting for him the highest and most unselfish quality of 
patriotism, no device is more stimulating to his latent energj^ than a 
vision of fair reward. The aim of the committee was to establish the 
figures where no honest man should have sound grounds for com- 
plaint that he did not receive "just compensation." measured in terms 
of cost of production for the commodity which he furnished ; and j^et 
so that, as far as was humanly possible, men should not use their 
country's distress for their own inordinate aggrandizement. The aim 
was to set for any given commodity the lowest price at which the pro- 
ducers could bring forward enough to meet the need. 

In respect to very few commodities did the Government contract 
to take the entire output. Wool, linters and wheat were bought in 
this way. But all of the great industries were required to hold their 
goods for the option of the Government without a guaranty that any 
specific quantity would be purchased. It was difficult to meet the 
argument of the producers who held their goods thus at the option 
of the Government that they should have a relatively higher price 
than those who, like the growers of wheat, were assured of a market 
both during and for a reasonable time after the war. 

Critics have asked why price fixing was not extended to more 
fields. The relatively short period during which the committee 
functioned is one explanation. Everything could not be done at 
once. Extensive studies in costs of production were going on simul- 
taneously in man}' fields. Several programs were about to go into 
effect when the armistice made them unnecessary. An important 
rule for determining the order in which industries should be taken 
up for price fixing was that the committee ought not to act in a given 
case unless Government purchases were causing a severe shortage. 
The price of cotton under this rule was not fixed. 

Price fixing, like other controls of the Board, could not have 
worked had it not been for the spirit of service manifested by all 
of the people and the contributing effect of the other features of 
the Board's regulations. When demand exceeds supply in normal 
times, rising prices cause production to be increased on the one hand 
and consumption to be curtailed on the other, and in the long run 
prices return automaticall}^ In war time the Government was 
able to make an effective appeal to the people both to increase pro- 
duction and curtail consumption, in order to assist the Government 
in accomplishing the purposes of the war. In addition to this sponta- 
neous response, the Board, through the exercise of priorities in labor, 
transportation, fuel, power, capital, etc., was able to bring about both 
•curtailments in demand and increases in production. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 81 

A by-product of price control which was not absent from the minds 
of those who were responsible for the inauguration of the policy, was 
its effect in preserving the business structure for the ordinary proc- 

les of peace. A glance at the economic history of the period fol- 
lowing our Civil War would bring this thought home to the reader. 

The task facing those who endeavored to fix prices for our (lovern- 
ment, the Allies and the civilian popidation was very difficult. First, 
there was no direct legislative authority like that under the Food and 
Fuel Act; second, as has been seen, before our entrance into the 
war, prices had mounted to extreme levels and those who hold, even 
if unsoundly, that "just compensation" was to be measured in terms 
of "market value," had strong arguments for very high prices; and, 
third, there was the difficulty that the Government did not contract 
far ahead for quantities of these materials, as it did watli wheat, but 
prices were fixed under conditions allowing the Government to take 
what it needed and providing for distribution of the rest under 
Government control. One is led to the thought that, in a similar 
emergency, there ought to be not alone a mobilization of man power, 
but of things and of dollars. 
105826—21 6 



Chapter 7. 
LABOR PROBLEMS. 

It will not be the purpose of this chapter to give a complete picture 
of the war administration of labor. That function happened in the 
large to fall outside of the War Industries Board. The Board, how- 
ever, did very important and energetic work in the field and such 
reference must be made as will throw the relationship into relief. 
That each of the various activities directed to the mobilization and 
control of industries — price fixing, priority, conservation, and the 
others — had its counterpart in the sphere of labor is too evident 
to warrant comment. The diversity of Government agencies created 
to deal with labor problems was perhaps necessary because of the 
diversified character of the problems. 

In general terms, the labor problem was to discover means for 
guiding the flow of labor from less essential to more essential in- 
dustries and to prevent the very wasteful rapid turnover which 
war conditions engendered. The labor turnover was unfortunately 
high throughout most of the period. It was not until nearly autumn 
of 1918 that devices were perfected which were bringing more set- 
tled conditions. 

Laborers naturally turned with favor toward war work, both 
because it Avas the patriotic thing to do and they liked the prestige 
and satisfaction of it, and because it paid unusually high wages. 
But the actual shortage in man power was in effect the most signifi- 
cant economic shortage in the war. There are perhaps 20,000,000 
men of working age in the United States. About one-fifth of these 
were removed from productive employment, while industry was 
asked at the same time to make important readjustments calling for 
skilled and unskilled workmen by the tens of thousands to enter new 
trades. The flow of one-half million immigrants per year, from 
which new industries had been in the habit of recruiting, was also sud- 
denly stopped. The new shipbuilding, ordnance, airplane, and other 
industries needed skilled workmen far in excess of our supply. All 
of these factors united to produce a condition out of which success 
could come only through the good will of the overwhelming majority. 

As was natural, the first war labor agency to be created was a 

labor committee of the Council of National Defense. The importance 

attached to it is witnessed by the appointment of Samuel Gompers 

as one of the six original members of the advisory commission of 

82 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAR. 83 

the Council. There is si<T:nific;ince in the steps by which he inau<,'u- 
latcd the unclerttiking which grew like other pioneer work of the 
C"(»uncil into a number of separate organizations, lie began by call- 
ing a series of conferences of organized labor for the purpose of 
securing a general agreement as to the attitude it would take toward 
the war and the problems of labor involved in it. The first meeting, 
called as early as February 28, 1917, was with representatives of a 
:; laige number of labor unions. 

;ii. This was followed by a meeting of more than 15U executive ollicers 
Ji of labor organizations, which culminated in a formal declaration 
(1) that union labor would give its unqualified support to the war, 
but (2) it demanded that the Government should curb profiteering, 
and (3) give labor adequate representation in all bodies dealing 
with industrial matters. Mr. Gompers next called a conference of 
representatives of both laborers and employers, including certain 
other prominent authorities on labor problems. The conference 
reached a general agreement that " neither employers nor employees 
shall endeavor to take advantage of the country's necessities to 
change existing standards." The Council issued a ^^tatement setting 
forth the agreement and explaining the principle involved, ad- 
dressing it to employers and employees of all industrial estal)lish- 
ments and transportation systems. 

In work of this kind the foundation was laid and attitudes were 
established. As the war industries developed, particular problems 
took the center of the stage. The rule was to organize special ma- 
chinery to handle particular difficulties as they came to view. There 
already existed in the Department of Labor three bureaus of peculiar 
importance to the war. The United States Board of Mediation 
and Conciliation had been designed to compose disputes arising in 
the transportation service; the Division of Conciliation, also called 
the " Mediation Service," to mediate labor disputes generally. - To 
handle another aspect of the work, the United States Employment 
Service had been expanded to include an extensive field force. There 
were 20 zone offices and 62 subbranches in 19 IG. and the Post Office 
Department was cooperating in such a way as to make each local 
post office a substation for bringing employers and em]-)loyees to- 
gether. These three organizations were important factoi-s, but they 
were not equipped to handle the greatly enlarged problems brought 
on by the war. 

The war had scarcely begun when the I. W. W., stimulated no 
doubt by the enemy, appeared as a menacing factor, particularly in 
the mountain regions and on the Pacific coast. To cope with this, the 
President decided to appoint a special commission whose purpose 
should be not only to take up particular disputes and try to settle 
them, but also to study the conditions which made such activities 



84 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 

possible. This commission, called the President's Mediation Com- 
mission, was headed by Secretary of Labor W. B. Wilson. It im- 
mediately entered with energy into its work, composed a series of 
disputes, and on January 9, 1918, rendered a report containing a 
most remarkable analysis of American labor conditions, with sug- 
gestions looking to their remedy.^ Among other needs, unified direc- 
tion of labor administration for the period of the war was recom- 
mended. The principles stated in this report, made effective through 
various agencies, represent in general the policy toward labor which 
was adopted by the administration for the war. 

Among the special agencies formed to standardize labor conditions 
should be mentioned the arsenals and navy yards wage commission, 
composed of representatives of the War, Navy, and Labor Depart- 
ments. Its function was to seek a method for equalizing wages and 
labor conditions in Government arsenals and navy yards in order 
to prevent the labor turnover incident to open competition in the 
face of a shortage. Another organization of this kind was the board 
of control for labor standards in Army clothing, whose duty it was 
to prescribe labor conditions to be observed by all contractors for the 
supply of uniforms. It should be noted further in this connection 
that the Shipping Board, the Fuel Administration, and the Rail- 
road Administration each had its Bureau of Labor devoted to the 
study and laying down of labor conditions, wages, etc., the adjust- 
ment of disputes and recruitment. 

By the beginning of 1918 a large number of Government agencies 
and war contractors competing against one another to attract la- 
borers, advertising more and more favorable conditions and more 
and more favorable wages, was causing a turnover and inefficiency 
which, in the face of a growing shortage, was a dangerous menace 
to the war program. 

The Council of National Defense, as a result of a series of con- 
ferences on this subject, recommended to the President a revised labor 
program calling for a unified administration with a labor admin- 
istrator at the head. The purposes to be accomplished by it were 
suggested as follows : 

1. A means of furnishing an adequate and stable supply of labor to war indus- 
tries. This will include: 

(a) A satisfactory system of labor exchanges. 

(b) A satisfactory method and administration of training of workers. 

(c) An agency for determining priorities of labor demand. 

(d) Agencies for dilution of slvilled labor as and when needed. 

2. Machinery which will provide for the immediate and equitable adjustment 
of disputes in accordance with principles to be agreed upon between labor and 
capital and without stoppage of work. Such machinery would deal with de- 
mands concerning wages, hours, shop conditions, etc. 

* See Appendix XIV for " Extract from report of President's Mediation CommlssloH." 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THK WAIt. 85 

3. Machinery for safeguarding conditions of labor in tlio produrtion of war 
essentials. Tliis to include industrial h.vKione. safety, wctnien and child labor, etc. 

4. Machinery for safeguarding conditions of living, including housing, trans- 
portation, etc. 

5. Fact-gathering body to assemble and present data collected throngli various 
existing governmental agencies or by independent research, to furnish the infor- 
mation necessary for effective executive action. 

6. Information and education divisit)n, which has the functions of developing 
sound public sentiment, securing an exchange of informal ion between depart- 
ments of labor administration, and promotion in industrial plants of local 
machinery helpful in carrying out the national labor program. 

The President's Mediation Commission also recommended central- 
ized control in labor administration and so did the Secretary of 
Labor. 

Acting on these suggestions, early in January, 1918. the President 
appointed Secretary Wilson as labor administrator, and the Secre- 
tary, in turn, appointed Felix Frankfurter, of the President's Medi- 
ation Commission, as his chief assistant to act as assistant labor 
administrator. On January 16, 1918, he appointed further an advi- 
sory council to the labor administrator, headed by John Lind, and 
composed of representatives of several aspects of the labor interest. 
The advisory council set out " to study all phases of the labor prob- 
lem, make recommendations and plans for additional machiner}-, and 
supervise their execution." 

The next step v^as an important one. In order to get for the labor 
administrator the united approval and support of employers and 
employees alike, Secretary Wilson, on January 28, 1918, provided 
for the creation of the v^-ar labor conference board. Its composition 
was described bj^ him as follows : ^ 

The national industrial conference board named five representatives of em- 
ployers to sit in this conference: L. F. Loree, a railway oflicial and coal op- 
erator; C. Edwin Michael, a builder of bridges; Loyall A. Osborne, a manu- 
facturer of electrical equipment; W. H. Van Dervoort, a structural engineer; 
and B. L. Worden, another bridge builder. These five men are among the 
largest employers of labor in the United States. Only one of them has ever 
dealt with labor unions in his private business. The American Federation 
of Labor named as its five representatives: Frank .7. Hayes, of the mine 
workers; William L. Hutcheson, of the carpenters; Thomas J. Savage, of the 
machinists; Victor Olander, of the seamen; and T. A. Ricket, of the garment 
workers. Each set of five representatives named another to represent the 
general public. The employers' representatives selected William Howard Taft, 
the former President of the United States. The labor repix^sentatives chose 
Prank P. Walsh, recently the chairman of the Industrial Relations Commission. 

This board was the forerunner of the " Taft- Walsh Board," tech- 
nically called the National War Labor Board. The conference board, 
after deliberation, made a statement of principles ' and a set of recom- 

»See article by Secretary W. B. Wilson in Saturday Evening: Post of June 22, 1918. 
•See Appendix XV for statement of "Principles to be observed," as contained In the 
report submitted Mar. 29, 1918, to the labor administrator by the conference board. 



86 AMERICAX INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. ',: 

mendations which were submitted to the labor administrator late; 
in March, 1918; and early in April the President, in accord with: 
these recommendations, created by proclamation the new board, 
giving to it the same personnel and defining its functions as follows : 

The powers, functions, and duties of the National War Labor Board shall be : 
To settle by mediation and conciliation controversies arising between employers 
and workers in fields of production necessary for the efficient conduct of the 
war, or in other fields of national activity, delays, and obstructions in which 
might, in the opinion of the national board, affect detrimentally such produc- 
tion ; to provide, by direct appointment or otherwise, for committees or boards ■ 
to sit in various parts of the country where controversies arise and secure set- 
tlement by local mediation and conciliation ; and to summon the parties to con- 
troversies for hearing and action by the national board in event of failure to 
secure settlement by mediation and conciliation. 

The principles to be ob.served and the methods to be followed by the national 
board in exercising such powers and functions and performing such duties 
shall be those ."specified in the said report of the War Labor Conference Board 
dated March 29, 1918, a complete copy of which is hereunto appended. 

The national board shall refuse to take cognizance of a controversy between 
employers and workers in any field of industrial or other activity where there is 
by agreement or Federal law a means of settlement which has not been invoked. 

The Taft- Walsh Board was a very active organization. W. Jett 
Lauck was made executive secretary. The board set out to settle 
labor disputes through informal mediation by sections and local com- 
mittees, and whenever such method failed the board itself would sit 
as an arbitration commission, making awards by unanimous decision. 
Cases in which unanimity could not be had were referred to an 
individual umpire, the umpire being selected from a panel of 10 
appointed by the President. In this way several hundred serious 
labor disputes were composed. 

The next agency to be established was of peculiar interest to the 
War Industries Board. The Taft-Walsh Board, while it announced 
a body of principles, was in essence an administrative organization 
and was devoted chiefly to mediating disputes. The need was felt for 
machinery aimed to bring the labor policies of the several war organi- 
zations into closer harmony and cooperation. In pursuance of this 
purpose, on May 17, 1918, a new body, the War Labor Policies Board, 
was created. Felix Frankfurter, assistant labor administrator, was 
made chairman; Stanley King represented the Secretary of War, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Navy Department: G. I. Christie, the De- 
partment of Agriculture ; Hugh Frayne, Director of the Labor Divi- 
sion of the War Industries Board and member of the price-fixing 
committee, represented the War Industries Board; John P. Wliite, 
the Fuel Administrator: R. P. Bass, the Shipping Board: Howard 
Coonley or Charles Piez, the Emergency Fleet; and representatives 
of the Food and Railroad Administrations were to be added. The 



AxMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 87 

theory of this board was that of an iiiterlockinf; directorate. It was 
composed of the olHcials principally charf^ed with labor problems in 
each of the major war agencies. It worked out and agreed upon 
labor policies, and they in turn were executed through the respective 
agencies themselves. 

The purposes of the board, as sot forth in the announcement of 
its establishment, were : 

The policies board will determine, directl.v for war industries and indirectly 
for uonwar industries, all questions involving the distribution of labor, waives, 
hours, and working conditions, and its decisions will be executed by the various 
j production departments of tlie Government, each represented in its membership. 
This execution will be direct for all industries engaged in war work. The de- 
cisions will be given effet-t in nonwar industries through the machinery of the 
War Industries Board, wliich controls the flow of raw materials for all in- 
dustries. 

* m m * * * * 

In the matter of wages it will not attempt to set a flat rate for any one craft 
or trade in the country as a whole. But it will fix standards to be determined 
for all industries in a given section of the counti'y after investigations disclos- 
ing the conditions of life, including the cost of living and the service rendered. 
The facts will be ascertained justly and comprehensively from information to 
be sought from the workers' own organizations, private employers and their 
organizations, Oovernmeut Imreaus, and wherever else exact knowledge may be 
secured. 

We must husband our labor supply so as to satisfy the war needs of the 
country to the fullest possible practical extent. It is necessary, therefore, that 
the sources of supply be wisely directed and employed. With respect to this 
phase of the industrial problem it will be the function of the War Policies 
Board to allocate the supply according to the productive needs of the country. 
Under decisions of the board on this score it will be impossible for one indus- 
try to draw the labor supply from another unless it has been regularly deter- 
mined that the first industry has a higher claim upon the supply on the basis 
of a more pressing Government need than the industry from which it would 
draw the workers. This question will, of course, be determined by the War 
Industries Board. But by the establishment of standardized wage conditions 
the incentive for workers to leave one industry and go to another will have 
oeen removed anyhow. 

In addition to controlling the labor supply by the methods just reviewed, 
the Policies Board will also regulate hours of labor in the various industries 
and determine the needs of industry with regard to housing, transportation 
facilities, etc. 

It should not be assumed that the policies board worked at cross 
purposes with the Taft- Walsh Board. The first act of the former 
board was a resolution adopting the general principles announced l)y 
the latter, and the two boards functioned througliout the jicriod in 
close harmony, the field of the policies board l)eing the broader and 
more ambitious. It attacked with energy the labor turnover question, 
it3 aim being to cure the cause. The laborers went from one job to 
another because wages and conditions were actually better or believed 



88 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAE. 

to be better. In the Official Bulletin of July 25, 1918, Mr. Frank- 
furter published the following comment on this phase of his work : 

For several days the War Labor Policies Board has been conferring with 
representatives of tfliion labor and with representatives of industrial manage- 
ment concerning the national standardization of wages. 

In seeking standardization the precedents of unionized industrj'' are being 
followed. Wages have, of course, long been standardized bj' tlie agreements' 
of employers and employees in many industries. 

The same kind of standards which the railroad brotherhoods and the rail- 
road managers established in the transportation systems, the same kind of ! 
standards which the organized coal miners and the coal operators set up in 
the well-developed coal fields, the same kind of standards which the carpenters, 
the blacksmiths, the plumbers, the organized tailors created by agreement with 
theif" employers, the War Labor Policies Board is also by mutual consent ' 
negotiating for the entire country. 

Wage standardization merely extends the familiar method of wage fixing to 
cover the entire Nation. What has been done in many industries the War 
Labor Policies Board is planning for the whole people. But, although wage 
standardization admittedly follows familiar precedent, it is solely a war 
measure. * * * 

Congress, through the taxes on excess profits, the War Industries Board, 
through its price fixing, the President, through the veto of $2.40 wheat, have 
prepared the way for standardization of wages. Additional methods of keeping 
down the cost of living are being investigated at-^;his time. 

All these measures, past and pending, have revealed the determination of 
the American people to let no one make money out of the war. What price 
fixing means for the manufacturer, wage standardization is to the workers of 
the country. 

That means plainly that just as the price-fixing committee takes into account 
the cost of production and proper profits, so wage standardization must be built 
upon an accurate knowledge of the cost of living and a just estimate of what 
makes up the right American standard. 

Upon these general grounds the War Labor Policies Board is advancing, as 
rapidly as the gravity of the problem permits, to the establishment of standard 
wages. 

The war was over before a satisfactory scheme for " wage fixing " 
was actually put into practice, but the necessity for it had become 
very evident and a practical line of attack seems to have been 
evolved. Thus price fixing had its analogue in the sphere of labor. 

In the same way we shall see how the principles of priority ap- 
plied to labor. In this phase the War Industries Board played a 
leading role, the United States Employment Service, being the es- 
sential instrument of administration. It was necessary to acquire 
such control over the labor supply that the priority principle could 
be applied in its distribution. To do this the labor administrator 
asked the President to make a public appeal, which he did on June 
17, 1918, solemnly urging " all employers engaged in war work to 
refrain after August 1, 1918, from recruiting unskilled labor in any 
manner except through the United States Employment Service." 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 89 

This appeal Avas followed immediately bj' two surveys on the jiart 
oi the Employment Service, one of the common labor requironients 
o1 Avar industries, the other of the common labor reserves in each 
J?tate. On July 15, 1918, and again on Aufrust 1^ the service sent 
out instructions to all employers enfjafjod in war work. They were 
I told (1) that they should not recruit labor by private means, except 
that employers might continue to hire workers applying at the plants, 
without solicitation direct or indirect; (2) that all advertising for 
unskilled labor, whether by card, poster, newspaper, handbill, or 
otherwise, should cease after August 1, 1918; (3) that the Federal 
director of employment in each State might grant special permission 
to recruit labor within the State through private agents; but (4) that 
permission to do this in another State should be given only by the 
Director General of the United States Employment Service; and (5) 
that no unskilled labor should be transported from one State to 
another except by such permission. 

The most important new agency created for administering the 
system was a scheme of local " community labor boards," composed 
of one representative each from the United States Employment Serv- 
ice, the local employers, and the local workers. 

In pro-rating labor where supply Avas less than demand, the Avhole 
scheme worked out by the Priorities Division of the War Industries 
Board was applied. The " preference list " was the guide to the 
degree of war importance in industries and individual plants. The 
classification of industries and all rules for automatic ratings Avhich 
the priorities commissioner was applying were adopted as rules for 
guiding the flow of labor. 

In the early fall of 1918, A. W. Clapp Avas appointed by the priori- 
ties commissioner as chief of the Labor Priorities Section. It Avas 
the function of this section to work out the special problems involved 
in applying the priorities principles to labor. The release of labor 
from less essential industries through rules resulting in curtailment 
of operations had been one of the aims of the Priorities Division from 
the start. More positive work could now be accomplished through 
the neAvly organized control OA-er labor supply. 

An idea of the manner in Avhich the Priorities Division was begin- 
ning to deal with labor problems in the later period of the Avar can 
: be obtained from Labor Priority Bulletin No. 1, issued September 
17, 1918." 

This document explained that a series of labor priority bulletins 
would be issued from time to time containing suggestions and rules 
for the guidance of the various units of the United States I^mploy- 
ment Service, and all industrial advisors Avho Avere engaged in as- 

*See Appendix XVI for copy of Labor Priority Bulletin No. 1. dated Sept. 17, 1018. 



90 AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

sisting the district draft boards in working out and applying prin- 
ciples of industrial deferment. It explained that attempt had not 
been made to include in the preference list all essential industries 
and plants, the chief aim in that list being to provide automatic 
flow of coal and railroad service to essential industries. The flow 
of labor required in some instances separate treatment. The bulle- 
tin further contained instructions constituting the first example 
of such special treatment. The lumber industry had been left off 
the preference list to foster the use of wood as a substitute for coal 
and to discourage distance shipments of lumber for civilian uses, 
shipments on Government orders being properly covered by a method 
not depending on the preference list. The ob^aous importance of 
many branches of the lumber industry in the war was emphasized, 
and attention was directed to the necessity for guarding its labor 
supply. As the war movement went forward it became increasingly 
necessary in drafting men for the lines to see to it that the recruits 
were taken from industries where they could best be spared and the 
program of war production would be least disturbed. Gen. Crow- 
der appealed to the Board for help, and when the armistice was 
signed, the Priorities Division was engaged in assisting Gen. Crowder 
in revising and expanding his " work or fight " regulations to make 
them apply both to a larger class of individuals and to better de- 
fined classes of industries. A circular had been drawn up after 
conference not only with Gen. Crowder's staff but with the labor 
administrator, the United States Employment Service, and the 
American Federation of Labor. Under it there would have been no 
more private chauffeurs, no more traveling salesmen, etc. 

]\Iore particular reference should be made to the work of the 
Labor Division of the War Industries Board. The division was 
created with Hugh Frayne as director, upon the formation of the 
Board, July 27, 1917. It continued through the reorganizaton of 
the spring of 1918 and until the end of the war. Mr. Frayne's work 
as a member of the War Labor Policies Board, in bringing the con- 
trol practices of the War Industries Board into coordination with 
the efforts of the Policies Board, in working out a system of control 
over labor, was one of the most significant phases of the division's 
activities. 

But it was by no means the only phase. The director was a mem- 
ber of the price fixing committee and served there to point out the 
effect of policies proposed from time to time upon labor conditions 
and labor's attitude. 

He was also chairman of the war industries badge board, which 
worked out a system for awarding badges to workers engaged in 
industries directly essential to the war. The purpose was to en- 



AIMERICAX INDUSTRY IX THK WAR. 91 

(Ullage a more persistent flow of labor to war work. The plan was 
^ uinplete but had not yet been put into operation when the enil ma<le 
it unnccessar}'. He was also a member of the Emergency Fleet pen- 
nant award committee. 

The Labor Division of the War Industries Board was very active 
on the problems of the training and dilution of labor. Mr. Frayne 
was a member of the Labor Policies Board committee on the relation 
of military to industrial man power, and was an important advisor 
to the housing committee and to the committee on comfort and 
welfare. 

Another significant phase of the Labor Division's work was in the 
organization of the War Prison Labor Section and the National Waste 
Reclamation Section. It assisted also in setting up the Conservation 
Division of the Army, which established machinery for repairing in- 
stead of discarding great quantities of worn clothing, shoes, and other 
equipment. ]\Iuch of this work was done by registrants unfit for 
combatant service, through physical disability or the fact that they 
were enemy aliens or conscientious objectors. The National Waste 
Reclamation Section was composed of representatives of principal 
departments of the Government, its purpose being to educate the 
public to save and to contribute their waste materials to useful pur- 
poses. For carrying out the program, 86 local cooperating coun- 
cils were organized in as many cities, and 200 more were in course 
of organization when the armistice came. The thought was to 
use both military and civil prison labor for converting into useful 
articles the waste materials collected by the service. By this service, 
for example, peach pits were collected for use in manufacturing an 
important ingredient for gas defense. After the close of the war. the 
Department of Commerce organized a new bureau called the Indiis- 
trial Cooperation Service, to take over and extend the work begun 
by the Prison Labor and the Waste Reclamati(m Sections. 

In a way less easil}' defined than all this, Mr. Frayne's presence 
and his work was of very great value to the Board. He had been 
for 3'ears an authorized and trusted representative of labor organiza- 
tions. He brought with him labor's point of view and he argued 
in favor of that point of view. But he did more than that — he 
caught the spirit of the time and felt very deeply that (he peril of 
his country called for a new quality of unselfishness. He preached 
this doctrine to labor in season and out of season, never missing 
an opportunity to drive home the truth that every laborer, as well 
as every employer, was an American first. 



Chapter 8. 
THE FOREIGN MISSION. 

In July, 1918, the War Industries Board sent to Europe a mission 
of 12 men, headed by L. L. Summers. This action grew out of the 
process by which the international nitrate executive in London had 
been formed earlier in the year^ and was designed to accomplish 
two main purposes — (1) to extend and make more effective the 
work of the War Industries Board as it related to those commodities 
whose principal sources lay outside of the United States and (2) to 
assist in coordinating the demands of all of the Allies in order that 
American priorities and price-fixing schedules might be more effec- 
tivelj^ and justh^ administered. If the war had continued, a system 
of international control of many of the i)rincipal war industries 
might have resulted. 

In addition to the nitrate executive, an international tin executive * 
had actually been formed before the close of hostilities, and several 
other international executives were in process of formation. Jute, 
rubber, manganese, tungsten, platinum, flax, leather, wool, and sev- 
eral other commodities were under consideration. These were aU 
commodities in respect to which the Allies were suffering from a 
world shortage, and whose principal sources of production were in 
outlying districts, so that concerted action on the part of at least 
the British and American Governments was necessary for an}^ effec- 
tive control. Prices were very high and production was insufficient. 
There existed British committees whose function it was to super- 
vise the flow of these commodities, but the committees were only 
semi-governmental. The foreign mission of the Board insisted that 
the committees be made governmental, and requested that an Ameri- 
can representative be placed on each committee. On account of 
the fact that America was the most abundant source of steel, the 
steel committee was given an American chairman. 

The mission was composed of experts in the respective fields in 
which the principal problems lay. L. L. Summers was chairman; 
George N. Armsby was in charge of tin; Albert M. Patterson, tex- 
tiles ; Paul Mackall, steel ; Henry W. Boyd, leather ; Lincoln Hutch- 
inson, nonferrous metals; Arthur D. Whiteside was in charge of 
statistics; E. A. Pierce was business manager; Chandler Anderson 

1 See p. 158 for an account of the nitrate executive. 

2 See p. 147 for an account of the tin executive. 

92 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 93 

was legal advisor; and Lucius P. Oidway, advisor on priorities and 
secretary. John Hughes was an assistant on tin. Alex Legge went 
over to join the mission just before the armistice was signed. 

In accordance with the practice in vogue during the war, the l:ead 
i)f the mission made direct contact with the British cabinet, dealing 
with the ministers in charge of the particuhir matters under discus- 
j sion without using the services of ordinary diplomatic channels. Mr. 
isioj "\/Vinston Churchill, who was then minister of munitions, entered 
vigorously into the work; and Mr. Austen Clumiberlain, who was 
then minister without portfolio, was appointed by the cabinet to 
supervise the activities of- the committees in behalf of the British 
Government. The committees were reconstituted as governmental 
'''t^ [agencies, and it was contemplated that from these committees should 
emerge whatever international executives should be determined upon 
as necessary. 

The problem in respect to each of the several commodities was 
ta -threefold: (1) to assist the Interallied Munitions Council in deter- 
mining the real needs of the respective allied and associated Govern- 
ments, and thus to see that priorities were given to best advantage ; 
(2) to obtain sufficient control of the sources of supply to insure 
fullest possible production; and (3) by eliminating competition in 
buying, to control prices at reasonable levels. 

Another important controversy fell largely in the hands of the 
mission. On most controlled commodities, the British Government 
had two schedules of fixed prices, (1) the military issues prices; and 
(2) the civil issues prices. In America, we had one schedule of 
prices on each commodity for all purchasers, Government, allied, and 
civilian. It was found that the British were loath to give to the 
American Army the advantage of the military issues prices, on the 
theory that these prices were actually below costs. The mission in- 
sisted that unless the American Army was allowed the military issues 
prices, it would be necessary for us to readjust some of the condi- 
tions under which the British were purchasing to such advantage in 
the United States, and the British Government finally acceded to the 
principle. 

The mission had no power to make purc-hascs for the United States, 
but it had extraordinary power of control over the conditions on 
which purchases might be made. The activities of the mission as 
they related to the particular commodities are referred to under the 
several commodity headings in Part II of this book, but some of 
the work was of such special interest that it warrants mention hero 
by way of illustration. 

During the drive of midsummer, 1918, the motor transport began 
to be ineffective on account of the destruction of roads, and our 
Army had pressing need of mules and horses. Both time and the 



94 AMEIUCAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

lack of bottoms stood in the way of furnishing mules from America 
Spain had them, but refused to sell them for gold because of interna] 
needs. Spain, however, had dire need of ammonium sulphate foi 
agricultural uses, and, through the activities of the mission and tin 
War Trade Board, consented to trade mules for ammonium sulphate 
All 230ssible ammonium sulphate was, of course, greatly needed foi 
the explosives program, but, because the War Industries Board ir 
AVashington could definitely determine through its foreign mission 
that the need for mules Avas the more immediate and pressing, priorit}? 
was given for the shipment of ammonium sulphate to Spain. I 

The mission had an important struggle with the British Govern-] 
ment on the question of jute. All the jute of the world comes from 
India, and the British Government urged that it could not control 
the price, because it was an affair of the Indian Government. Thel 
mission pointed out that our Government was supplying silver tO| 
the Indian Government through the mediation of the British Trea-] 
sury, and that if the British Government could not exercise control 
in India, our Government might find it necessary to withdraw from 
the arrangement for supplying silver, and, by thus causing a de- 
preciation of Indian currency, buy the jute at reasonable prices. 
Before hostilities ceased, the British had begun vigorously to work 
with us in obtaining a control over jute prices. Jute products are 
manufactured principally in Calcutta, but also in Aberdeen and 
Manchester, and the mills, both in India and in Britain, are con- 
trolled principally by British capital. 

In this connection it is but fair to say that in the series of matters 
taken up with the British they never failed to respond with full 
cooperation when the facts showing need of regulation or other 
joint action were brought fully to light. As showing this spirit of 
whole-hearted cooperation on their part it may be interesting to 
note that one of the particular things that the Foreign Mission of 
the War Industries Board set out to do was to make an examination 
of the use to which many of the things obtained from America at 
fixed prices was going. It had been suggested that perhaps some of 
the steel and such articles bought from America would replace steel 
that had been sold by some of our associates in the war for export. 
An explanation of the injustice of taking steel away from our com- 
mercial interests while they permitted their merchants to export 
steel immediately appealed to them. An international committee 
on steel, with Paul Mackall, an American, as chairman, undertook to 
vise the use of all steel. 

Immediately after the signing of the armistice, the members of the 
mission began to make a personal survey of the devastated regions. 
Thej^ had two ideas in mind: (1) To make a general estimate of the 
types and quantities of materials for which there would be an im- 



EXTENSION OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION. 95 

itilmediate demand as soon as reconstruction should bcfrin; and (2) to 
iii'isecure data on -which an estimate of the extent of the dama«]jes couKl 
k be calculated for use at the peace conference. Followinjj: this survey, 
tilt the President authorized the formation of an organization to estimate 
iit the dama<j^es done in the devastated re<;ions. (len. JMcKinstry was 
ft), appointed to take charjre of the work, and a member of the mission 
ill served with him in the preparation of a full and accurate body of 
ioj I information. 



i 



Chapter 9. 
CONCLUSION. 

This report is a record not alone of new methods of Government' 
control over business; it is also a record of many new practices on: 
the part of business itself. With purpose always defined, but method; 
to be discovered by a process of trial and error, through months of' 
unparalleled effort and devotion, at first by applying varying degrees i 
of the principle of " advice and encouragement," the Board finally i 
developed a scheme of positive "control" over the major portion 
of the industrial fabric, which, by the summer of 1918, was show- 
ing results of an extraordinarily satisfactory character. Success 
bred courage for more success, and trade after trade was taken 
under control with an increasing willingness on the part of the 
Jnterests affected. 
r '' The thoughtful reader will find here and there stojies which 
\ carry with them suggestions of problems relating to the industrial 
j practices of peace, and the same stories will also, perhaps, point 
/ toward peace-time solutions of some of these problems. Reference 

(has already been several times made to the evident value, as a 
measure of preparedness, of a comprehensive Government bureau 
devoted to industrial research and statistical information.^ 

Eecommendations which would follow as the fruit of the experi- 
ence of the Board might be classified in two groups: (1) Those relat- 
ing to peace-time preparation for a possible war emergency, and (2) 
those relating to the business practices of normal times. 

Three lines of industrial preparedness will be briefly suggested 
here as the most important direct war lessons to be derived from 
the work : 

First . There should be established a peace-time skeleton organiza- 
tion "following the lines of the War Industries Board. It should 
be headed ,by a chairman who should have associated with him the 
chiefs of the centralized purchasing bureaus of the Army, of the 
Navy, and of any other Government department which might be 
called upon to make large purchases in case of war. Other mem- 
bers of the board should be selected to take charge of (1) raw ma- 
terials, (2) finished products, (3) facilities, (4) price control, (5) 
labor, (6) priority, (7) conservation, and (8) planning and statis- 
tics. There should be a vice chairman, a general counsel, and a 
secretary. To function under the several principal divisions there 

1 Cf. the closing paragraphs of chaps. 2 and 3 of Part I. 



AMEIUCAN IXDUSTHY IX THE WAR. 97 

should be selected about 50 chiefs of commodity sections. Esich 
chief of a commodity section would name a committee to represent 
the industry under his charo^e. The committees of the ditferent in- 
j|dustries could meet separately as occasion required for the purpose 
of keeping acquainted Avith the general growth of the in(histry and 
the demands which a war would make upon it. The main organiza- 
}! tion should meet in general conference at least once a year to discuss 
i and outline plans, to keep in touch with the general nature of war 
j needs and to keep acquainted with one anotlier. The office of secre- 
,1 tary should be permanent and salaried, and the division of planning 
and statistics ought to be a moderately large permanent organiza- 
tion — a reservoir of information for all departments of the Govern- 
ment and the Congress. All other members and subordinates of the 
board should serve without compensation. 

Second . During the war the country was constantly threatened 
with a shortage in available supply of nitrogen, manganese, chrome, 
tun gsten, d yestuffs, coal-tar derivativeSj and several other essential 
materi als. These materials had always been imported into the 
United States and their production never developed, altliough 
j sources for most of them exist here. The Government should devise 
I some system for protecting and stimulating their internal produc- 
i tion. Among these, nitrogen is ol outstanding importance, not 
I only because it is indispensable for war, but also because it is almost 
I indispensable for agricultural purposes. There is only one natural 
I source in the world, and the fixation process, having been proven to be 
I practicable, should be developed to commercial proportions. 
[ Thii^d . Under the supervision of the proper departments of the 
! Qoyernjuent, certain war industries should be encouraged to main- 
I tain skeleton organizations through which they could develop, the 
i rapid manufacture of guns, munitions, airplanes, and other., dif'^ct 
I military equipment. This might be done in some cases through Gov- 
ernment purchases of factories, in others through the placing of 
sufficient orders to pei-mit the owners to keep the plants in existence. 
It is extremely important that our recent development of machine 
tools, in the nature of dies, jigs, etc., for the manufacture of muni- 
tions, should not be allowed to dissipate. At an expense bearing 
very little relation to the cost of building anew in time of emergency, 
present stocks could be carried forward and supplemented as uq\x de- 
signs replace the old in the development of war devices. 

These measures a re suggested as direct methoils of insuring against 

some of JJie. heavy Tosses and^ unfortunate delays which the country 

exper ien ced in the process of. converting its industries from a peace 

to a war basis. They involve very small current expenditures, but 

105826—21 7 



98 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAr.. | 

are capable of being instruments for saving many millions of dollars 
in an emergency. 

The experience of the Board in exercising control over American 
industry leads it to make a further suggestion, which has less to da 
with war than with the normal practices of business. 

During the past few decades, while the American business man, 
uniting his talents with those of the technical expert, has, throughi 
the control of great masses of capital, made such extraordinary 
strides in converting the natural wealth of this country into means 
for human comfort and satisfaction; the processes of trade have so 
changed their nature that the older and simpler relations of Govern- 
ment to business have been gradually forced to give way before cer- 
tain new principles of supervision. We have been gradually com- 
pelled to drift away from the old doctrine of Anglo-American law. 
that the sphere of Government should be limited to preventing 
breach of contract, fraud, physical injury and injury to property, 
and that the Government should exercise protection only over non- 
competent persons. _The_ modern industrial processes have been 
ren dering it increasingly necessary for the Government to reach out 
its arm to protect competent individuals against the discriminating 
_2ractices of mass industrial power. We have already evolved a 
system of Government control of no mean significance over our rail- 
roads and over our merchant fleet, but we continue to argue, and in 
a measure believe, that the principles of competition can be preserved 
in sufficient power in respect to all other industries to protect the in- 
terests of the public and insure efficiency and wholesome growth in 
the development of natural wealth. With this in view, the Sherman 
and Claj^ton Acts have forbidden combinations in restraint of trade,, 
monopolies, and manj^ other vices attendant upon group action by 
individuals controlling great masses of capital. This legislation,, 
while valuable for immediate purposes, represents little more than a 
moderately ambitious effort to reduce b}^ Government interference 
the processes of business so as to make them conform to the simpler 
principles sufficient for the conditions of a bygone day. 

The w^ar has introduced a new element into this situation. The 
individual units of corporations which had been dissolved under the 
Sherman Act have, in man}^ cases, grown during the war into corpora- 
tions many fold larger than the parent organization which before- 
the war the law construed as a menace. The conditions of war 
made this sort of thing necessary and in all respects desirable. The- 
war gave rise to a kind of demand unknown in time of peace — aa 
absolute demand, which was halted neither by prices nor difficulty 
of procurement. There followed an absolute shortage in some 
trades, and a time shortage in most of them. Group action, ii^ 
dustry by industry, accompanied by Government control of prices- 



'" AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 99. 

and distribution, was the natural and, so far as we know, the only so- 
lution which could be devised. 

In line with the principle of united action and cooperation, hun- 
dreds of trades were or»;anized for the first time into national asso- 
ciations, each responsible in a real sense for its nudtituile of com- 
ponent companies, and they were ori^anized on the suixjrestion and 
under the supervision of the Government. Practices looking to effi- 
ciency in production, price control, conservation, control in quantity 
of production, etc., were inaugurated everj'where. Many business 
f men have experienced during the war, for the first time in their ca- 
reers, the tremendous advantages, both to themselves and to the gen- 
eral public, of combination, of cooperation and common action, with 
their natural competitors. To drive them back through new legisla- 
tion, or through the more rigid and rapid enforcement of present 
j legislation, to the situation which immediateh' preceded the war will 
I be very difficult in many cases, though in a few it is already occurring 
spontaneously. To leave these combinations without further super- 
vision and attention by the Government than can be given by the At- 
torney General's Department, or by the Federal Trade Commission 
in its present form, will subject business men to such temptations as 
many of them will be unable to resist — temptations to conduct their 
businesses for private gain with little reference to general public 
welfare. 

These associations, as they stand, are capable of carijing out pur- 
poses of greatest public benefit. They can increase the amount of 
wealth available for the comfort of the people by inaugurating rules 
designed to eliminate wasteful practices attendant upon multiplicity 
of styles and types of articles in the various trades; they can assist 
in cultivating the public taste for rational types of commodities; 
by exchange of trade information, extravagant methods of produc- 
tion and distribution can be avoided through them, and production 
will tend to be localized in places best suited economically for it. 
By acting as centers of information, furnishing lists of sources to 
purchasers and lists of purchasers to producers, supply and demand 
can be more economically balanced. From the point of vantage 
which competent men have at the central bureau of an association. 
not only can new demands be cultivated, but new sources of unex- 
ploited wealth can be indicated. In case of a national emergency, 
the existence of these associations at the beginning would be of in- 
calculable aid to the supply organizations. Many of these considera- 
tions apply to large individual companies as well as to associations. 

These combinations are capable also — and very easily capable — 
of carrying out purposes of greatest public disadvantage. Thoy can 
so subtly influence production as to keep it always just short of cur- 



• 100 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

rent demand and thus keep prices ever high and going higher. They 
can encourage a common understanding on prices, and, without great 
difficulty, can hold price levels at abnormal positions. They can 
influence the favoring of one type of buyer over another. Nearly j 
every business man in the country has learned by the war that aj 
shortage in his product, if it be not too great, is distinctly to his! 
advantage. Trade associations with real power can, in respect to 
most of the staples, so influence production as to keep the margin 
of shortage at a point most favorable to high prices and rapid turn- 
overs. 

Tlie question, then, is what kind of Government organization can 
be devised to safeguard the public interest while these associations 
are preserved to carry on the good work of which they are capable. 
The country will quite properly demand the vigorous enforcement oi 
all proper measures for the suppression of unfair competition and 
unreasonable restraint of trade. But this essentially negative policy 
of curbing vicious practices should, in the public interest, be supple- 
mented by a positive program, and to this end the experience of the 
War Industries Board points to the desirability of investing some 
'^. Government agency, perhaps the Department of Commerce or the 
Federal Trade Commission, with constructive as well as inquisitorial 
powers — an agency whose duty it should be to encourage, under 
strict Government supervision, such cooperation and coordination in 
industry as should tend to increase production, eliminate waste, con- 
serve natural resources, improve the quality of products, promote 
efficiency in operation, and thus reduce costs to the ultimate consumer, 
Such a plan should provide a way of approaching industry, oi 
rather of inviting industry to approach the Government, in a friendly 
spirit, with a view to help and not to hinder. The purpose contem- 
plated is not that the Government should undertake any such far- 
reaching control over industry as was practiced during the war emer- 
gency by the War Industries Board ; but that the experiences of the 
war should be capitalized ; its heritage of dangerous practices should 
be fully realized that they might be avoided; and its heritage oi 
wholesome and useful practices should be accepted and studied with a 
view to adapting them to the problems of peace. It is recommended 
that such practices of cooperation and coordination in industry as 
have been found to be clearly of public benefit' should be stimulated 
and encouraged by a Government agency, which at the same time 
would be clothed with the power and charged with the responsibility 
of standing watch against and preventing abuses. 






PART II. 



COMMODITY SECTIONS. 



101 



Part II. 
COMMODITY SECTIONS. 



Chapter 1. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

The commodity sections of the War Industries Board were in an 

important sense the backbone of the whole structure. Through them 

the various so-called functional divisions — Conservation, Priorities, 

i Price-Fixing, Requirements, Labor, and Allied Purchasing — obtained 

i their expert information, made contact with the industries and with 

the purchasing agencies alike, received suggestions, requests, and 

■complaints, and directed the enforcement of regulations and control. 

Of indisf)ensable value in facilitating contact between the various 

sections and the branches of industry corresponding to them, was the 

series of war service committees, originally under the Council of 

National Defense and later transferred to the supervision of the 

United States Chamber of Commerce, each representing one line of 

business.^ A war service committee spoke and acted as agent and 

representative of an industry and not as agent of the Board. The 

I various units composing a particular industry would join in appoinf- 

j ing one of these committees to act as spokesman in negotiating with 

i the Government. The strongest men in the industry usually served 

on these committees. 

Thus, structurally, there was unified control from the individual 
plants and companies through the war service committees, the com- 
modity sections, and tlie functional divisions to the chairman of the 
Board, who took his powers directly from the President of the United 
States. And practically the organization was as centralized as the 
heterogeneous nature of the undertaking would permit. 

On the Government i)urchasing side harmonious action was pro- 
vided for by representation on each commodity section of an officer 
from each purchasing agency using tlie commodity. And further, 
each purchasing agency had a representative on each functional 
division. Final authority on questions of priority or other regulation 

*See Appendix XLVIV for Vist of War Service Commlttce« with meml)er«. 

103 



104 AMEEICAX II^DUSTRY IX THE WAR. 

was for administrative purposes vested in the respective members of 
the Board. The rule was laid down that an appeal from their dc ci- 
sions to the chairman of the Board could be taken only by the Secre- 
tary of War, the Secretary of the Xavy, the Chairman of the Ship 
ping Board, or other head of an independent department of the Gov- 
ernment. This rule eliminated much of the debate and delay incident 
to the right of appeal. It fostered prompt decisions and brought 
action in place of words. 

As has been pointed out, most of the various organs of the War 
Industries Board had their origin in the Council of National De- 
fense in the various subdivisions of the General Munitions Board, 
which was reorganized under the name War Industries Board, andi 
remained part of the council until March 4, 1918. The commodity 
sections for the most part grew out of the numerous subdivisions 
of the committee on supplies and the committee on raw materials, to 
which, as time went on and shortages or threatened shortages ap- 
peared in particular industries, experts were called to take oversight 
in the separate fields. These experts became the chiefs of the com- 
modity sections with enlarged powers and responsibilities under the 
reorganized Board. 

George X. Peek, as commissioner of finished products, had general 
oversight of the work of those sections devoted to manufactured 
articles; and L. L. Smnmers, as technical advisor, took general 
supervision of the sections dealing with unfabricated materials and 
chemicals. The work of these men was very important. 

As the Board stood on November 11, 1918, there were 57 com- 
modit}" sections, each with important and far-reaching responsibili- 
ties. The duties of one section often related to those of several 
others, and particularh^ to the work being carried on by the War 
Trade Board, the Shipping Board, and the Food and Fuel Adminis- 
trations, as well as the several agencies of the Government which 
were consuming the products under attention. Each section chief had 
one or more assistants and an organization which worked continu- 
ously with him, and he had in addition the advantage of daily con- 
ferences with a group consisting of one man assigned by each Gov- 
ernment agency which was buying materials in his field. There 
was also a general weekly conference of all chiefs of sections presided 
over by the chairman of the Board, who thus kept all hands informed 
about the war plans, the general purposes, and general needs. 
\ The chiefs of sections and their assistants brought to Washington 
an expert knoAvledge of their trades. Most of them had been, in 
private life, managers of large companies. 

Upon its formation a section would set to work to verify and 
.complete the body of facts necessary in dealing with its problems^ 



AMERICAN INDUSTHV IN TIIK WAH. 105 

I'iiis was. of course, the most ditliciilt, ^vhile it uas at the same thiie 
:he most vitally important part of the work. In some cases it was 
lext to impossible to g:et vital facts accurately compiled and to <];et 
;hem in time for greatest usefulness in understanding and solving the 
problem. It is in this feature of the work that a peace-time bureau, 
functioning continuously, watching with studious care the develop- 
ment and condition of each industry having a war value, could be of 
extraordinary significance if it should ever be necessary again to 
direct the industrial forces of the country to the support of a great 
war. 

Tn tb^ ^'^^^ V^'{f^f' then, it was the purpose of each commodity sec - 
tion to ser y^ ^^ n rlpnvinp- boimP for informn.t.inn j]^ j^pj )inp The 



Nation's demands for extraordinary production made it necessary in 
some industries to spread broadcast " trade secrets," which in normal 
times are cautiously guarded. It w-as only that quality of sentiment 
of devotion to the purposes of the war, wdiich transcended the desire 
for what we have always construed as legitimate gain, which could 
have brought these men to give up their sacred rights to their " trade 
secrets " to such an organization as the War Industries Board. The 
sections used questionnaires quite freely in the collection of informa- 
tion. Many of them established sj^stems of monthly reports from 
the various firms engaged in their w^ork. 

. The war servi ce committees were constant s ource s of information 
regarding the sentiments of the trades, their complaints, and their 
suggestions. AVhenever a section felt the approach of a critical 
situation, something involving unusual treatment, a conference of 
representatives of all firms to be afi'ected Avould be called together; 
views would be exchanged; the importance of the Government's re- 
quirements would be carefully explained; and suggestions for the 
solution of the problem would be received and discussed at length. 
Working agreements w-ere often reached at these conferences; agree- 
ments regarding priorities, agreements as to the form and handling 
of a licensing system of distribution, agreements as to price-fixing, 
and other methods of control. The results of these conferences would 
be taken before the appropriate functional division where the plans 
could be ratified and directions for putting them into effect issued to 
the section and to the trade. 

Information relating to the needs of the War Department, the 
Navy, the Emergency Fleet, etc., came to the commodity sections form- 
f ally through the Kequirements Division and Clearance Office, and 
j informally and continuously through the representatives of these 
: agencies in each section. Early in the work there appeared signs of 
strained relations bet%veen the commodity chiefs on the one hand and 
: delegates from the buying agencies on the other. 



106 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

The Chairman of the Board, following the President's example in 
creating it, at first delegated his authoritj' to chiefs of sections alone, 
instead of delegating it to the sections as a whole. The section' 
chiefs represented the Board's authority over supply, while members 
from the Government departments represented demand. The Gov- 
ernment departments were statutory organizations, vested with sole 
responsibility for filling their supply programs. So long as the 
chiefs had authority and the department representatives had none, 
the latter tended to avoid rather than seek contact with the sections. 
This difficulty was completely overcome by a delegation of au- 
thority to the sections as a whole with provision for carrying any 
dissent directly to the Chairman of the Board. When this was done, 
the i^urchasing departments immediately began to send more au- 
thoritative agents to represent them on the sections. These men 
brought to the sections all available information and received from 
them all the assistance within the power of the Board. They partici- 
pated in the control of the particular commodity in question and the 
sections became what they had been designed to be. The most 
significant purpose of the sections was the establishment of authori- 
tative centers of contact, and this was accomplished to a remarkable 
extent before the end came. As a principle of administration, the 
chairman always gave fullest support to the decisions of the section 
chiefs, and he is happy to say that he has never had cause for regret 
in the abuse or misuse of such power. 

It was never the policy of the War Industries Board to establish 
one set of rigid formulae for industty in general. This would, have 
played more havoc than the situation called for. Rather was its 
policy, acting largely on the initiative and suggestion of the respec- 
tive sections, to deal with each industry according to the peculiar 
conditions affecting it. The regulation of the steel industry, which 
was said to be controlled by 17 men who could be gathered into one 
room at Washington, required a different method from that applicable 
to the regulation of cotton textiles. 

There was no laying out of a program of control over every 
conceivable industry. In contrast the Board preferred, as the neces- 
sity to control an additional industry arose, to meet that industry 
separately and make individual agreements which seemed at the 
time most expedient. As section after section was formed in re- 
sponse to needs, the administrative activities of the various func- 
tional divisions had to be gradually decentralized and focused in 
the sections. The routine by which all requirements were received 
at a central point and distributed to the commodity chiefs is indica- 
tive of the policy behind the whole scheme. 

Various Government and allied representatives, who throughout 
Washington on the da}^ previous had made new estimates of re- 



AMERICAN INDUSTUV IN THE WAH. 107 

j.uirements, brought those estimates to the War Industries Board 
ach morning. They were there read aloud in the Requirements Di- 
ision and, as tlie representatives chose, discussed. The discussions 
urned not on -whether the future requirements should be allowed 
)r disallowed, but rather upon whether there was a shortage from 
my cause, and, if so, how the requirements should be met. The' 
•eijuirements, after the meeting, were sent forthwith to the com- 
nodity chiefs. It was the business of the commodity chief, with 
he advice of all his section members, to find ways to meet the 
requirements and later on to allocate them if necessary. The de- 
Dartment which originally submitted them was expected to keep 
iccount of it through the department representative in the com- 
nodity section to which the requirement had been referred. 

Under the system as it finally developed, the commodity chiefs 
vere asked to fill out a blank for the Requirements Division, upon 
eceipt of each requirement, stating in detail whether and how 
he industry could meet it. The sections were asked to consider 
narket conditions pertinent to the requirements, recommend plans 
'o the several purchasing departments, and, if it seemed necessary 
to control an industry in whole or in part by allotments, to determine, 
vith the advice of the priorities committee, the allocation of materials, 
commodities, and facilities to the several Government departments, 
;o the Allies, and to civilians. In respect to those industries in which 
:he Board adopted the policy of " allocating " each order to specific 
plants or regions, for the purpose of more suitably distributing the 
jurdon or fruit of Government patronage, the particular allocations i 
were worked out in the sections.^ 

In the same way it will appear how the work of the Clearance 
Division was almost entirely decentralized and the division gave way 
a Clearance Office which merely received all requests for clearances, 
-ecorded them, and distributed them promptly to the appropriate 
Commodity Sections. This became necessary because the numbers 
3f immediate requirements which needed clearance each morning 
?rew into the hundreds and made utterly hopeless any more than a 
more perfunctory reading of them at the clearance committee meet- 
ings. The increases in Government purchases gave the committee 
more work than it could do either with care or expedition. As each 
commodity section had competent purchasing department representa- 
tives on it, the most logical solution seemed to be that of having all 
immediate requirements cleared directly through the commodity 
chiefs, and thus the work of granting clearances of prospective 
orders became one of the most important functions of the sections. 
The importance of the check upon shortage of supplies, which this 



See chap. 2, Part I, for fuller explanation of the procedure referred to here. 



108 AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAE. 

clearance system gave to the War Industries Board, is discussed at 
length in Part I of this report, where will be found also an explana- 
tion of the "clearance list" and a reference to the articles con- 
tained in it.^ 

The relation of the sections to the work of the Priorities Division 
was somewhat different. Priorities control in a large way had to be 
exercised through one organ. The interdependence of commodities 
required this. It was, of course, physically impossible for one organ 
to examine each case as it arose. A system of automatic priority 
ratings was worked out, and the sections undertook the responsibility 
of administering the rules laid down. Each section at the same 
time carried on a study of the effect of these rules and the need for 
modifying them or making new ones, and brought its recommenda- 
tions and its problems before the priorities commissioner. Whenever 
hearings were to be held on request for special priorities, the appro- 
priate section would prepare the case for the Government. The sec- 
tions made recommendations regarding priority policies and the 
issuance of certificates to concerns of the industries with which they 
worked. 

The administration of curtailment programs was also committed 
to the commodity sections. Curtailment was only resorted to when 
a serious shortage threatened. The production of certain less essen- 
tial commodities was cut off or curtailed to make way for the pro- 
duction of war essentials. The priorities Division was, of course, the 
most effective instrument of curtailment, but a special industrial ad- 
justment committee was appointed to work also on this rather deli- 
cate problem. That committee, after permitting a hearing to the 
industry affected, would determine upon curtailment policies de- 
signed to effect equitable reductions Avithout unnecessarily crippling 
the industr}^ 

An important feature of the work of many of the commodity 
sections was along the line of conservation programs. After a study 
by the section witli its intimate contact and knowledge of the in- 
dustry involved, data would be brought before the Conservation 
Division, where a set of rules would be worked out. Before putting 
these rules into effect, however, authorized representatives from the 
entire industry would be brought together, technical advice would 
be asked from them, their voluntary consent to the rules invited, and 
their active cooperation in carrying them out would be cordially 
solicited. Once adopted, the administration of a conservation pro- 
gram was left to the appropriate commodity section. 

The relation of the sections to negotiations leading to price-fixing 
agreements and to the administration of fixed price schedules was 

8 See p. 34 et seq. 



is COD. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN Till-: WAR. 109 

quite analogous to their work in the other fiekls referred to. In 
clearing: an order or in allocating; an order, a section's action did not 
constitute approval of the price named in it unless there e.xisted 
in the rulinj^s of the price-fixings committee a fixed price for the ma- 
terials involved. 

In treating the work of the 57 commodity sections, as mentioned 
in the chapters which follow, an effort will be made to lay emphasis 
■only upon the unusual problems which arose in respect to the par- 
ticular industries. Besides illustrating the application of these gen- 
eral rules, in the solution of particular problems, reference will i)c 
made to the invention of particular methods for the solution of the 
problems peculiar to the individual industries. 



Chapter 2. 
IRON AND STEEL. 

The extent to which iron and steel enter into all phases of "war 
equipment made this industry one of the first to receive the atten- 
tion of the special agency of the Government appointed to advise in 
regard to the enlistment of production for war. The early estimates 
were that only about 17 per cent of our enormous steel output (35,- 
000,000 tons a year) would be required to supply all war needs. 
When this estimate is reviewed in the light of Government control 
during 1918 of 100 per cent of our steel, and in the light of the strug- 
gles to cover shortages which accompanied the control, one can realize 
the value which a peace-time bureau devoted to the collection of 
information might have had as a measure of preparedness. 

The Allies were purchasing steel in this country in terms of mil- 
lions of dollars before the United States declared war, and prices 
had been steadily climbing even more rapidly than production was 
increasing under the abnormal demand. The anticipations engen- 
dered b}'^ the events of February and March, 1917, stimulated a still 
more rapid rise. 

Thus it was that as soon as the advisory commission of the Council 
of National Defense was organized and B. M. Baruch was assigned 
to take charge of the committee on raw materials, he began to study 
the question of the steel supply and the extent to which Government 
control was going to be necessary to meet the purposes of the war. 
Early in March, 1917, he brought together the leading steel men of 
the country, and the problem before the Nation was discussed and 
debated at length with them. They finally consented, as did the pro- 
ducers of copper, lead, aluminum, and nickel, to offer to the Govern- 
ment whatever steel was needed for the preparedness campaign at 
prices in scale with prewar buying. But, as was pointed out in an 
earlier chapter, as soon as the Government needs began to appear 
so large, low Government prices only meant higher civilian prices 
unless control should extend to all, and this as has been seen was the 
ultimate solution. 

Most important and far-reaching principles of control had already 

been conceived and were ready to be applied when, on September 

15, 1917, in the course of the development of the organization, J. 

Leonard Replogle was appointed director of steel supply for the 

110 



AMERICAN INDUSrUY IN TUK WAR. HI 

War Industries Board. He became chief of the Steel Division and 
remained in that position throughout the war. 

As the work of the division develojuHl, a moderately largo or- 
ganization became necessary. Frank Purnell became assistant di- 
rector; Jay C. McLauchlan, chief of Pig-Iron Section; D. E. Sawyer, 
chief of Rail and Projectile Section; J. Searle Barclay, chief of Per- 
mit Section; Frank E. Thompson, chief of Finislied Steel Products 
i Section; Herbert H. Weaver, chief of Emergency Fleet Section; W. 
|| Vernon Phillips, chief of Scrap Section; while Paul Mackall was 

^jmado European representative, and Percy K. Withy was made 

^fstatistician. 

^^'i\ It will be the purpose here to give a continuous account of the con- 

'"'^^'trol over the iron and steel industry as it was centered first in the 
Council of National Defense and then in the War Industries Board. 
It will be understood that various studies, suggestions, and adminis- 

'•' trative functions Avere carried forward by the appropriate sections 

■ ■ under the general control of the division. 

In order that the reader may more easily understand the nature 
of some of the problems involved in this record, a few technical con- 
siderations will be briefly explained. To produce a ton of pig iron, 
the chief raw materials required are about 2 tons of iron ore, 1 ton 
of coke, and 1,000 or 1,200 pounds of limestone. There are two 
groups of iron-ore mines, the Lake Superior district, w^hich fur- 
nishes ore to the great pig iron producing centers in Pennsylvania 
and Ohio, and the Birmingham district, which is the center of the 
iron-making industry of the South. We import only 1 or 2 per 
cent of our ore, principally from Cuba. 

Of the 75,388,851 gross tons of iron ore mined in the United States 
in 1917, the Lake Superior district produced nearly 85 per cent and 
the Birmingham district 8 per cent. Ore which contains under .05 
per cent of phosphorus is available for the Bessemer steel-making 
process and is called Bessemer ore. The non-Bessemer ore, which 
contains a higher percentage of phosphorus, is made into steel by 
the basic, or open-hearth, process, which admits of the elimination of 
the phosphorus. During the war the production of open-hearth 
steel was about three times as great as the production of Bessemer 
steel. This is partly due to the fact that the open-hearth process 
admits the use of large quantities of relatively cheap grades of scrap. 
Scrap and basic pig iron are mixed about half and half for conver- 
sion into steel by this process. Basic pig iron is that produced froin 
the non-Bessemer ore. 

The cost of pig iron depends principally upon the cost of ore and 
of coke. Limestone, being quarried by the lu-ochiceis themselves near 
the blast furnaces, is only a small element. The piices for lake or? 
are ordinarily quoted as for delivery at lower Lake ports, and the 



112 AMERICAN IXDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 

prices include both the cost of mining and the charge for transporbi 
tion. The freight charge, which covers the haul by rail from (.'i- 
mines to the Lakes and the haul of several hundred miles by water t( 
the lower ports, is a most important item of expense. The large; 
part of the ore is mined by iron and steel producers for their owr 
furnaces, and is carried by transportation companies which are un^ 
der their control. The ore sold in the market is purchased by blast 
furnace men, who usually make contracts for their year's supplies 
before the Lake navigation opens, and the prices for pig iror 
throughout the year are ordinarily based on these contracts. 

The Connellsville district, in the southwestern part of Pennsyli 
vania, is by far the most important coke producing region. The 
chief elements of expense in coke production are (1) the cost oi; 
mining bituminous coal; (2) the freight charge to cover transporta-i 
tion to coke ovens; and (3) the labor at the coke ovens, which is the' 
smallest portion of the final price. 

The four most important grades of pig iron are basic, Bessemer 
foundry, and forge. The first is used for making steel by the open-, 
hearth process, and the second by the Bessemer process; the foundry 
is used in making iron castings ; the forge is used in the manufacture' 
of wrought-iron products. 

The operation of the rolling mills constitutes the third stage in 
the manufacture of iron and steel products. In this connection it 
is interesting to note the effect in reducing costs of production which 
the industrial integration, made possible by the merging of very large 
capital investments, has brought about in this country. The union 
of blast furnace, steel works, and rolling mills makes it possible for 
products to pass from one stage of manufacture to another without 
passing through the market, and indeed often without cooling the 
material. A very large proportion of the steel-making pig iron, for 
instance, is transferred by cranes in a molten condition to the steel 
works and is never marketed in the form of pig iron. The same thing 
is true of steel products during the initial stages of rolling, the ingots, 
blooms, and slabs being merely intermediate stages in the production 
of steel. 

The red-hot ingot, weighing several tons, is brought by an electric 
crane to the rolls, which grip it like a pair of wringers and by draw- 
ing it between them compress it into shapes before it has lost the heat 
acquired in producing the steel itself. This saving of heat and the 
use of automatic machinery in handling heavy rolled products keep 
down the fuel and labor costs. In the case of light-rolled products, 
such as wire rods and sheets, more rolling is required, with a cor- 
responding loss of heat and greater use of hand labor. 

Of the products of the rolling mills, one of the simplest forms 
which enters into the market is the billet. Large billets consist of 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 113 

long pieces of steel ^Yith a cross section of about 4 by 4 inches, suit- 
able for rollino: into such products as merchant bars, wire rods, 
and the lirrhter forms of structural sliapes. Small billets are used 
'primarily for further conversion into lirrht bands, hoops, and cotton 
^ties. Sheet bars are rolled into black sheets used for roofing and 
for making stove pipe, various receptacles, etc., and into black phito 
used for making tin plate. 

Structural shapes are used in the construction of buildings, 
[bridges, ships, cars, and the like. The beams and channels are the 
heavier shapes and the angle bars, T bars, and Z bars are the lighter 
shapes. The principal uses of steel plates are for ships, boilers, 
Itanks, steel cars, buildings, bridges, etc. The terra " merchant bars " 
is applied to a variety of sizes and shapes of iron and steel bars. 
Flats, rounds, squares, and ovals are carried by hardware stores, 
and large quantities are sold to manufacturers of agricultural imple- 
ments, vehicles, etc., some to be manufactured further into bolts, 
nuts, railroad spikes, and the like. 

Skelp consists of specially rolled plates of wrought iron or steel 
used in making welded pipe. Tin plate consists of black plate 
coated on both sides to prevent rusting, and is used in making cans 
and household utensils. About 2 pounds of pig tin is required to 
every 100 pounds of tin plate. The wire industry turns out a variety 
Df products in addition to drawn wire, such, for example, as gal- 
vanized wire, woven wire goods, and wire nails. For all of these, 
wire rods are the fundamental material. The rods, being in reality 
3oils of unfinished wire, are drawn through dies of successively 
diminishing gauge until the size required is reached. 

In order to understand the problem which was faced in bringing 
the steel industry to the full support of the Government in the war, 
it is necessary to bear in mind some of the outstanding features of 
its development during the years immediately preceding the spring 
li 1917. The iron and steel markets reflected the general industrial 
depression of 1914. Both production and prices fell steadily 
through 1913 and 1914, and it was not until the autumn of 1915 
that they were back to the normal of the decade preceding. The 
recovery, which the trade expected through an expansion of exports 
when the war broke out in Europe, was retarded by the lack of 
shipping facilities and the derangement of world finance. Instead 
^f bringing prosperity to this industry, the war at first increased 
the depression. When prosperity finally came, it was due to orders 
from the belligerents themselves. 

By the fall of 1915, contracts running to hundreds of millions of 
dollars were being placed for shrapnel, steel bars for shrapnel shells, 
machine tools for ordnance work, barbed wire for entanglements. 
These orders gave a stimulus to domestic demands. Steel was 
10582&— 21 8 



114 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

required for machinery and for the construction of new manufac- 
turing plants. Steel producers themselves required steel in order 
to enlarge their own works. During 1915 and 1916 the production 
of pig iron increased 70 per cent, that of steel ingots 83 per centJ 
and a large share of these ingots was used directly or indirectly 
for the production of war materials. Conversion of plants also 
took place during this period. As early as 1915 rail mills had 
been converted to the production of shrapnel bars. During this 
same period the steady rise in prices, without a significant setback; 
was phenomenal. By the end of 1916 the average " weighted " 
price of iron and steel products was 240 per cent of prewar normalj 

The events of February and March, 1917, stimulated the most 
rapid rise which the history of the industry has ever experienced, 
until an unprecedented peak was reached in July, 1917, when the 
average weighted price was 370 per cent of normal. A few examples 
will show what a runaway market it was. The open-market price of 
Connellsville coke jumped from $1.67 per ton in September, 1915. 
to $12.25 in Juh^, 1917, with but two setbacks. In June, 1915, basic; 
pig iron was selling for $12.59 per ton and it climbed steadily to: 
$52.50 per ton in July, 1917. Bessemer steel billets advanced in a, 
straight line from $19.50 per ton in May, 1915, to $95 per ton during 
June and July, 1917. Structural steel shapes rose from $1.20 per 
hundredweight in December, 1914, to $6.20 per hundredweight in 
July, 1917. Steel tank plates jumped from $1.22 per hundredweight 
in July, 1915, to $12 per hundredweight in July, 1917.^ 

On the whole the price of iron ore rose less rapidly than that of 
pig iron, pig iron less rapidly than that of steel, and steel less 
rapidly than that of finished steel products. This was, of course, due 
to the immediate and pressing demand for the finished product to 
be used by an agency which had no measure of value for its use- 
fulness. 

In January, 1917, Secretary Baker received the report of a special 
board, which he had appointed " for the purpose of investigating 
and reporting upon the feasibility, desirability, and practicability 
of the Government manufacturing arms, munitions, and equipment." 
The conclusion of the board advised a reliance upon private industry. 
By June, 1917, it was becoming clear that this principle of reliance 
upon private industry, unguided and uncontrolled, was not going 
to insure steel at reasonable prices to the Government and the Allies. 

There were two features which deranged the ordinary process of 
business. In the first place, demand exceeded supply by a margin 
so great that competition between producers was practically elimi- 
nated. In the second place, the demand was absolute ; there was no 

1 These prices are " open-market prices " as quoted in the Iron Age and other papers. 
The long-time contract prices, of course, underwent less violent fluctuations. 



A.MEKR'AX lXl»rSTi;V IN THK WAlt. 115 



iize 



postponing of it. Buyers of steol in tinu's of |)o;uo oxpoct to icnli 
a profit on their investment. Steel that «j:oes into l)uildin<;s and 
llbridges must be bought at prices ^vhi(•h will make possible satisfac- 
tory returns. Whenever these buyers believe prices aie likely to de- 
I'line in the near futnre. they withdraw from the market. Their 
ittitude serves as an elfective check on buying when prices ha\e 
icMclied what is considered an abnormal level. 

riie attitude of the Government toward its war-tirae purchases, 
liowever, differed fundamentally from this. It bonght with no ex- 
|)iMiation of earning a profit. The possibility of lower prices in the 
future did not check its buying. This absence of the investor's atti- 
iide in Government buying effectively removed the customary upper 
limit to price fluctuations. Some remedy was imperative, and it 
kv;is thus, by the 1st of July, 1917, that the discussions of Gov- 
■iimient control of steel supply began to be taken seriously every- 
where. Price control, with its corollary control over distribu- 
ion. was the most popular proposal, though the commandeering 
)f mines, furnaces, and mills was seriously contemplatetl. The 
l*resident made an emphatic declaration on July 12, 1917, touch- 
u'j war industries wdth particular reference to steel, warning that 
lii'-e "who do not respond in the spirit of those who have gone to 
ji\ e their lives for us on bloody fields far away may safely be left 
<) I'c dealt with by opinion and the law, for the law must, of course, 
•(•inniand these things." He added more pointedly that "the Gov- 
■I imient is about to attempt to determine the prices at which it will 
isl'C you henceforth to furnish various supplies which are necessary 
for the prosecution of the war, and various materials which will be 
icoded in the industries by which the Avar must be sustained. "We 
^hall. of course, try to determine them justly and to the best advan- 
aiic of the Nation as a whole." 

'J he Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the chair- 
11,111 of the Shipping Board, as well as the Senate Committee on In- 
(M>late Commerce, all made statements rebuking the forces which 
A (Mc responsible for the rapid rise in prices, and declaring themselves 
n favor of a control of iron and steel, which would insure reasonable 
»ri'cs to the Government, These announcements were having their 
■thct on the market and on the attitude of the industry. 

liy the end of July prices began to show a sharp drop, and the 
nore conservative factions of the steel industry saw only peril ahead 
nilcss the Government brought stabilization to the market. By late 
•^( 1 4 ember virtually the whole industry was dispo.sed to recommend 
lilt formal regulation begin. One of their principal trade journals, 
lie Iron Age, began predicting regulation in late June, and was 
riukly advocating it in the issue of August 30. Thus, before con- 
i"l was actually put into effect, the Government and the industry 



116 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

were in a state of mind to sit aroimd the same table and determine 
together what kind of control they wanted and how it should be 
exercised. 

Discussions and investigations continued through the summer. 
On the War Industries Board fell the responsibility of drawing 
matters together, establishing and promulgating the principles of 
control, and of carrying out their administration. Though by mid- 
summer both the Government and the industr}^ were agreed that 
control was necessary, the Government had still to learn both the 
technique of control and the general policies which should underlie 
it, for this was one of the first commodities over which an ambi- 
tious program was undertaken. But the Government agencies had 
definitely in mind at the outset that, in determining upon reasonable 
prices, they must stimulate rather than hamper the production of 
steel. 

Large numbers of inquiries and suggestions required the Board 
to consider seriously and to reach conclusions on such questions as 
whether any prices, fixed for Government purchases, should be 
made applicable to purchases by nationals; whether Government 
prices should be extended to the Allies; whether the fixed prices 
should be determined through a flat rate or a flexible cost-plus-profit 
scale; whether the proposed fixed price schedule would or would 
not abrogate outstanding contract price agreements; whether the 
Government, in determining upon prices, should take cognizance 
of the incidental labor, fuel, and transportation problems; and 
whether control over the producers would take proper account of 
the middlemen. 

That controlled prices should extend to civilian purchasers and 
to purchases by the allied Governments was determined in the af- 
firmative in accordance with the opinion of the President, as ex- 
pressed in his announcement of July 12, 1917. The President's 
striking words on this point set the fashion not only for steel but 
for most of the other commodities whose prices the Board found it 
necessary to control. " We must make the prices to the public the 
same as prices to the Government. Prices mean the same every- 
where now ; they mean the efficiency of the Nation, whether it is the 
Government that pays them or not; they mean victory or defeat." 

The Board, in announcing the policy that the Allies should be 
charged no more than our own Government, stated two important 
limitations, first, that the policy must be reciprocal; second, that 
the arrangement must be limited to war materials in order to pro- 
tect our own industry. " We must not allow raw materials, sold 
by our own producers at prices patriotically conceded to our own 
Government and its Allies for war purposes, to be diverted to in- 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 117 

niipjidustrv and trade abroad, Mhicli may come in competition with our 
iijljown manufacturers and producers." The foreiijn mission of tlie 
Board worked later in bringing about adjustments in accord with 
these principles. 

The tlat rate versus " cost-plus-proHt " argument received ex- 
tended and cautious consideration at Washington. The investiga- 
tions of the Federal Trade Commission showed beyond doubt that 
there was no uniformity in the costs of various producers. It was 
brought out that there were varying costs not only as between four 
distinct classes of producers, classes based upon the degree of in- 
tegration of their plants, but also varying costs within each cla^^s. 
Companies who owned their own ore, transportation, blast fur- 
naces, rolling mills, and works for the manufacture of finished 

.products could produce more cheaply than those who bought their 
ore and coke, but controlled the further stages of production. Those 
who purchased pig iron, but carried the manufacturing process 
through steel to the finished article, produced more cheaply than 
those who bought steel ingots and billets, and rolled plates, shapes, 
and other products. 

The principle that no measure should be taken which would re- 
duce the maximum possible production dominated. It was, there- 
fore, finally determined to fix the maximum prices at a flat rate 
and at a point high enough to keep substantialy in full operation 
every mill and blast furnace which contributed appreciably to the 
country's supply. It w^as left for the excess-profit tax to take care 
of low-cost producers and the arrangement served in place of a 

(subsidy for high-cost producers. This was considered more satis- 

I factory than a pooling arrangement, which had been given serious 
consideration, and under which the profits of low-cost producers 
would have been turned over to cover losses of high-cost producers, 
for the latter plan would inevitably have reduced production. 

\ Another problem, which arose first in connection with steel but 
which had to be determined later for many more commodities, 
was whether prices written in active contracts should be abrogated 
when the fixed price schedule went into effect. The concern was 
^l not alone over the legal right of the Government to abrogate those 
contracts, but the arguments turned also upon the practical advan- 
tages which would accrue to buyers who had not contracted ahead 
and could, under the fixed price schedule, buy steel more cheaply 
than had their competitors a month or two earlier under contract 
agreements. The adjustments which took place during the period 
between the determination to fix prices and the actual issue of 
schedules tended to relieve 1)oth aspects of this problem. It was 
finally determined that the prices fixed by the Government should 
not apply to past contracts. 



118 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. I 

The fuel, transportation, and labor problems were puzzling this 
and other industries during this confused period. What should be^ 
the relation of the control of prices and distribution to these prob- 
lems? Time answered the question. The Government's control 
over the distribution of fuel and transportation proved to be thei 
most important means it had for enforcing the rules and regula- 
tions which it found necessary to impose upon the industries. Thet 
full spirit and intention of the control could not have been enforced 
without the good will of the leaders of trade. But it was in noi 
'-mall measure the necessity on the part of industry of seeking thei 
privilege of priority in fuel and transportation which placed thei 
War Industries Board in the position of power which made it pos- 
sible for the Board to bargain with the industries as an equal. 
The benefits and advantages flowing from Government recog- 
nition brought the industries voluntarily to seek to place them- 
selves on the preference list, willingly assuming its obligations in 
order to obtain its benefits. The industries became plaintiffs ; pledges 
could be required in return for privileges granted. 

The place of middlemen in price fixing and the extent to which 
the various practices of different trades in respect to them should be 
recognized was also the subject of studious consideration. The con- 
centration of iron and steel production in the hands of relatively few 
producers made it simpler to control prices at the source than it was 
in some other trades. If a price is fixed for a producer and the 
product passes through a jobber to the ultimate consumer, the job- 
ber's interest in the fixed price is that of purchaser and not that of 
seller. Abnormal demands will simply give him abnormal profits. 

When Mr. Replogle came to Washington about the middle of Sep- 
tember, 1917, numerous conferences had been held and both sides of 
the case were more than ready for action. Action was soon to fol- 
low. In a report on the iron and steel situation, which he rendered 
to the Board on September 14,^ he urged that the steel men be called 
at once to Washington for a conference that immediate steps might 
be taken to alleviate the chaotic steel situation. He outlined in some 
detail the condition peculiarly demanding the maximum produc- 
tion of coke, pig iron, sheared plates, shell steel, billets, and rounds. 
And he recommended furthermore that there be fixed on these items 
maximum prices to take effect at the earliest possible date. 

Four days later the War Industries Board called the committee 
representing the steel industry to a special meeting, and asked for 
views on the proper method to be followed in fixing the price of 
steel. The committee said that an examination of the cost figures, 
furnished by the Federal Trade Commission, showed that they really 
reflected in general the prevailing condition of a year previous, 

' See Appendix XVII for the text of the report. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX TlIK WAR. ]19 



[because the materials used during the first half of 1917 had been 
contracted for in the fall of 1916. A special committee of the IJoard 
recommended that the question of price fixing could be best ap- 
proached — 

" by considering the individual processes or siaiii's comprising the niiinnfnclurc of 
lli the finished product. Each of these practically constitutes an independi-nt in- 
dustry. Many of the operators are engauod in only one of the processes, while 
a fiw of the larger companies cover all operations from the raw material to the 
finished product. As each industry nuist he allowed a profit to support that 
particular industry, the integrated conipaiiies who cover all proces.ses from 
raw materials to highly finished products nnist necessarily receive a profit on 
eacli of the processes. 

Conditions prevailing in the steel trade for a considerahle period made it 
necessary for all lines of industry using steel products to order their supplies 
further in advance than would be necessary under normal conditions, and as 
a consequence these industries have on hand substantial stocks of steel acquired 
at prices very much higher than any we could reconnnend as being fair or 
equitable. To partially meet this situation and avoid demoralizing the many 
industries that are largely dependent upon steel products, we reconnnend the 
■establishment of what might be termed an intermediate scale of prices for a 
period of three months with the expectation of a further reduction at the end 
of that period. 

With that purpose in mind we submit the attached schedule of proposed 
prices on the raw materials and various products, also showing the approximate 
market prices at the present time and the amount of the reduction from such 
prices. 

Tliis scale of prices is recommended on the basis of offering a premium on ship's 
plates and shell steel with the object of stimulating production, as the present 
capacity is inadequate to meet the requirements. 

It is evident that to be effective any price regulations must be rigidly enforced. 
Serious consideration should be given to the question of abrogating contracts 
which were entered into prior to establishing this suggested schedule of prices. 

We have asked the Federal Trade Commission to advise the War Industries 
Board further in regard to these contracts, which must be considered an im- 
portant factor in the situation, as some furnaces have entered into contracts 
without regard to the price established on coal. 

The Board agreed on the same day that prices should be fixed 
separately on ore, coal, coke, pig iron, and on transportation, for the 
purpose of building up a fair price for steel. It was likewise agreed 
that should the steel interests not be willing to give their full coop- 
€ration to the price-fixing program, the Board would take steps 
necessary to assume control over the steel jilants. 

The iron and steel industry of the country, as represented by 05 
executives, met the War Industries Board at Washington at 10 o'clock 
on the morning of September 21. The steel men were told that the 
President had requested the Board to call them together and ask tlicir 
opinions on proper prices to be fixed. A prolonged discu.ssion fol- 
lowed. Each side had its case fully prepared, and there was vigorouf 
conflict with regard to the facts as well as the principles to be applied 



120 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, 



The Board finalW stated to the industry the theory which it believed 
was a sound one for computing the price schedule and the representa- 
tives of the industry disagreed and retired. At the request of E. H. 
Gary, the meeting reconvened, and he, speaking for the steel industry^ 
explained to the Board that the trade, in its desire to meet the Board'& 
views as far as possible, had appointed committees covering ore, coke, 
and pig iron, and that these committees would make and explain 
separate recommendations. The schedules were prepared, and after 
long debate and many revisions by the Board they were finally agreed 
to by the steel interests subject to the approval of the President, 

Thus, on September 24, 1917, the President made formal an- 
nouncement of the prices which had been fixed by negotiated agree- 
ment on the basic raw materials of the iron and steel group. These- 
prices served as the basis for all price fixing within that group. 
They were announced as effective immediately and subject to re- 
vision January 1, 1918, as follows : 



Commodity. 


Basis. 


Price. 


Iron ore 


Lower Lake ports 


S5.05 per gross ton. 




Connellsville 


Pig iron 




333 per gross ton. 
$2.90 per 100 pounds. 




i'ittsburgli-Chicago 

do 




$3 per 100 pounds. 
S3. 25 per ino pounds. 


Plates 


do 









As part and parcel of the announcement and the agreement,, 
three principles of policy were stated: First, that there should be 
no reduction in the present rate of wages; second, that the prices 
above named should be made to the public and to the Allies as well 
as to the Government; and, third that the steel men had pledged 
themselves to exert every effort necessary to keep up the production. 
to the maximum of the past, so long as the war should last. At the 
same time the President directed the War Industries Board to take 
such measures of control over distribution as would be required as a. 
corollary to price control. 

Coke was reduced from $12.75 to $6; pig iron from $60 to $33; 
steel bars from $5 to $2.90 ; shapes from $6 to $3 ; and plates from $12 
to $3.25. It will be remembered that many contract prices prevailing 
in September were much lower than the open-market prices quoted 
here, and others were materially higher, plates having sold as high as 
$15 per 100 pounds. It was quite as much the object of the Govern- 
ment to stabilize the market at a point which would effect a maximum 
of production as to scale down prices from higher levels. 'While the 
fixed prices averaged considerably above prewar normal, they were 
not above the average advance in the prices of commodities and they 
were far below the prices paid by the Allies and by industries before- 
we entered the war. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TllK WAi:. 121 

This agreement between the War Industries Board and the steel 
[iianufacturers resulted in an enormous saving in the war program, 
which some authorities estimate in excotcs of a thousand million 
Jdllars a year. 

Following the same general procedure, on Octolxn- 11, I'.MT. prices 
wrre fixed on intermediate products — blooms, billets, slabs, sheet 
iar<. wire rods, shell bars, and skelp. In the meantime an important 
icorganization took place in respect to the committees through whom 
[ho Government control was to be administered. The old iron and 
-trt 1 committee of the Council of National Defense was succeeded by 
:hi' American Iron and Steel Institute, which became the formal auvi 
uithoritative spokesman of the industry, representing the interests of 
th.e industry and not the Government in all cases of negotiation and 
igroement. The steel manufacturers formed committees under the 
Iron and Steel Institute for the purpose of furnishing information to 
[he AVar Industries Board, and for the purpose of negotiating with 
the Board in behalf of the industry-, these committees not representing 
aor acting for the Government in any capacity, although working 
n close cooperation in helping to meet the demands as given through 
:hu director of steel supply. 

The prices for intermediate steel products were worked out by 
the two parties to the case conferring among themselves and with 
?ach other, and thus the agreement of October 11, was reached.* On 
N'ovember 5, 1917, maximum prices were fixed on finished steel 
products.^ It will be noted that these prices were for basic products 
jnly. 

In order to control fully the prices in this industry, a very large 
^cliedule of differentials, or prices for products which vary from 
lie basic types, had to be worked out. The problem of calculating 
;hese was assigned to the industry itself, and the work was accom- 
plished by a committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 
These differentials were promulgated by the committee directly to the 
11 lustry, but when once announced they were given the same appli- 
ation in all policies as those prices fixed specifically by the President 
hiough the War Industries Board or later through the price-fiixing 
■oiiimittee. It should be noted that the great bulk of the basic price 
i.xing of iron and steel during the war was done by the War Indus- 
lies Board before the price-fixing committee got started in March. 
li'lS. While several revisions were later made, relatively few changes 
)i significance were necessary. The original prices were renewed 
every three months after considerable diseussion between the Gov- 
arnment and the industry. 



* See Appendix XIX for prices of Intormediate steel products as fixed Oct. 11, 1917. 

* See Appendix XX for the schedule of prices on finished steel products fixed Nov 
, 1917. 



122 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Production during 1918, under fixed prices, fell a little below pro 
duction in 1917. But it can hardly be said that price fixing was ; 
significant cause. The iron and steel induetr}^, in common with al 
industries, suffered during the winter from the transportation tie-up 
The decline of 4^ per cent in the output of pig iron can be traced 
to the interruption in the movement of ore and coke. Steel ingot( 
increased about 2 per cent over the previous year. This was accom: 
plished through the use of more scrap and the closer paring dowr 
of pig-iron stocks usually carried over. 

The transportation difficulties were having such an adverse effen* 
on the operations of war industries, that tkey were the subject oj 
many conferences between the Railroad Administration and the Waii 
Industries Board. The director of steel supply finally, to eliminattj 
cross-hauls, rearranged many contl'acts, some of which had beer! 
placed directly with the steel manufacturers at varying prices on s] 
strictly competitive basis by the nations at war and naturally placed! 
without regard to the transportation factor. To illustrate : A Buffalo 
steel manufacturer was making an enormous tonnage of projectile 
steel to be shipped in bar form to a Cincinnati forge plant to be 
forged into projectile forgings, which were in turn to be shipped 
back to Buffalo for machining into the finished projectile. A steel 
plant within 50 miles of Cincinnati was making projectile bars which 
were being sent to Buffalo for forging and machining. The differ- 
ential in price of the several contracts was very great, but after a 
number of conferences which the director of steel supply had with 
the various manufacturers involved, arrangements were made to have 
the steel bars rolled in Buffalo shipped to a near-by plant and 
machine shop for finishing, and in turn the Cincinnati forge man 
was supplied by the steel mills in his district. 

There were hundreds of changes of this character, which, while 
difficult of solution, were fully justified by the transportation situa- 
tion, which had become a very important factor in our war program. 
Many millions of ton-miles and an enormous amount of money and 
time were saved by these transfers. 

The natural corollary of price fixing, where demand exceeds sup- 
ply and the price fixing is resorted to chiefly to prevent high prices, 
is control over distribution. When demand greatly exceeds supply 
and purchasers are not able by paying higher prices than their com- 
petitors to buy the right to have their orders filled first, because 
maximum prices are fixed, the result is a reversal of the ordinary 
processes of salesmanship and distribution, and a confusion results 
in which personal elements and ambitions are likely to play an 
important part. Unified direction is necessary if anything like 
efficiency is to characterize the processes of distribution and pro- 
duction. 



AMKJUOAN IXDUSTKV IN THK \V.\K. 123 

f»| The earlier War Industries Board made its iirst attempt to control 
3i| distribution by the process of priorities on September 21, l'.>17, when 
si I it issued (1) priorities circular No. 1, directin*^ the se(pience in which 
Iff orders for iron and steel and their products should be filled, and (2) 
tl priorities circular Xo, 2, explainin*; the method of obtaining; and 
«l usinpf priority certificates for expeditin^r manufarturc on war orders. 
n The problems of assisting in securin*^ transportation an<l fuel and in 
k\ relievinc: special situations as they arose, together with continuous 
studies of possible further control, which might be necessary to meet 
a I the situation as it developed, engaged the attention of the director 
»| of steel and his staff during the winter. By July of 1918 it had 
i'i become clear that A'ery rigid and far-reaching control over the dis- 
iti [ tribution of steel Avas necessary. 

a I The meaning and use of priorities and j^riority certificates, ae 
III explained elsewhere,*"' not only as applied to the iron and steel indus- 
t\ try, but to all industries in wdiich there was a real or threatened 
4[ shortage, had become current by this time. But the far-reaching and 
il(| complex nature of the civilian needs and the indirect war needs for 
1(1 iron and steel, combined with the increasing sliortage due to the 
increasing war program, brought on a situation requiring further 
control than the first application of the priority principle could 
aj accomplish. 

It became a question either of eliminating industries from the bot- 
tom of the list until enough material could be turned to the satisfac- 
tion of the war need, or of rationing so as to preserve all industries 
at least in skeleton form. The rationing principle was adopted, and 
on July 22, 1918, to carry out the policy of the Board, the priorities 
commissioner issued circular No. 5, which summed up the situation 
i and completed the system of regulations which made the iron and 
ili i steel trade in effect a Government-controlled industry. 
ii ! Priorities Circular No. 4, issued July 1, 1918, restated all rules and 
I i regulations governing priority in production and superseded all 
Kj previous regulations on the subject, except outstanding priority 
I i certificates. The system of ratings to be used in the priority certifi- 
I cates was set forth and each class defined. Then a list of automatic 
) classifications was set forth and explained. Such a system was 
; found necessary in order to relieve the Board of the work involved 
i in issuing an impossible number of priority certificates. The form 
t and effect of the priority certificate was explained, and an applica- 
i tion blank, as well as a blank form of the certificate, was printed in 
the circular. 

The meaning of the priority classification of an order was ex- 
i plained to the effect that a manufacturer should give to an ortler 

• See chap. 4, Part I, for a general account of the priorities Bystem. 



124 AMERICAX IXDUSTRY IX THE WAE. 

marked AA only such precedence oA'er orders of a lower classification 
as might be necessary to insure deliveiy on the date specified in the 
order; that it did not mean that work should cease on orders of a 
lower classification or that the order should be completed and de- 
livery made in advance of orders taking a lower classification if this 
was not necessary to effect delivery within the time specified. " Th& 
one to whom a priority certificate is directed or with whom the order 
taking an automatic classification is placed should make his own pro- 
duction plans, so as to get the maximum of efficiency out of his 
operations, making all deliveries at the times contracted for, if 
possible, and where this is not possible, giving precedence to th& 
orders taking the higher classification." When two orders have the 
same priority classification, the date of delivery contracted for will 
control, unless this should operate to delay the delivery required by 
an earlier order of the same class, in which event the earlier order 
will have precedence in delivery. The dates of the orders and not 
the dates of the certificates are controlling. 

On July 3, 1918, a joint circular^ was issued to the steel industry 
by the priorities commissioner and the director of steel supply, set- 
ting forth instructions for administering a resolution passed by the 
War Industries Board on June 6, 1918. This resolution confirmed 
an agreement which had been reached as a result of several confer- 
ences between the Steel Division and the American Iron and Steel 
Institute. That agreement provided that no pig iron or steel man- 
ufactured products should be shipped or delivered except (1) oi> 
priority certificates, or (2) after orders, covered by priority certifi- 
cates, should have been taken care of, producers might utilize their 
facilities to fill orders of their customers not covered by certificates, 
provided such orders were embraced within the classification of 
purposes entitled to preference treatment, as determined by the Pri- 
orities Board,^ and further that, after orders of these two classes had 
been taken care of, producers might ship other orders to other cus- 
tomers " subject to the approval in writing of the director of steel 
supply first had and obtained." 

The joint circular provided a method of applying for the approval 
in writing of the director of steel supply. It explained that it was 
not the purpose of the resolution of June 6 to completely postpone 
all orders under " classification of purposes " to all priority orders, but 
that they might be given such place as would not interfere with the 
fflling of priority orders. Priority certificates were issued at this 
time in classes AA, A, and B. Orders falling within the " classifica- 
tion of purposes " clause were now designated as class C, and could be 

' See Appendix XXI for copy of joint circular signed by Parker and Replogle. 
' See Appendix XI for this classification of purposes, which is explained more fully 
In chap. 4, Pt. 1. 



AMERICAN IXDUSTKY IX TUK WAR. 125 

lilled without a certificate of ratinjj:. All other orders were desig- 
nated b}' this circular as class 1), and required the written npprovnl 
i)f the director of steel supply. 

In line with what has been said above, it was not the purpose of 
the Board to cut off all orders fallinfr in class D. This would have 
been equivalent to elimination of certain industries for the rest of the 
war period. Instead it was decided to ration these industries, but the 
lesolution of June 6 placed all such industries in the position of 
plaintiff before the Board. They would have been automatically 
iiiinod without the help of the Board, for there was not steel onoujrh 
to ffo around. 

In order that the director of steel supply mifrht not be burdened 
with more application's than he could give attention to, this circidar 
Liave automatic approval in class C of all orders not exceeding; 5 
tons, requiring, however, that manufacturers filling such orders 
should certify- to him once a month that they believed that it was in 
the public interest that such orders should be filled. For all other 
orders in ©lass D, the manufacturer was required to file an applica- 
tion in duplicate to the director of steel supply on blanks which he 
furnished. The director would indorse on the bottom of the applica- 
tion the word " Granted " or " Declined," and return one copy to the 
applicant. If granted, the manufacturer was allowed to ship on such 
terms and under such conditions as might be imposed by the di- 
rector of steel supply. 

The circular also provided rules for the jobbers. Orders from job- 
i bers were rated as class B-4, and a pledge was exacted from each 
jobber, upon his placing an order with the manufacturer, to the effect 
that he was not hoarding the stocks, and further that the stocks, 
which this order was to replace, had been sold for essential uses, as 
defined by the Priorities Division.® 

Priorities Circular No. 5, July 22, 1918, set forth the program 
for rationing iron and steel to those less essential industries whose 
existence depended upon their getting at least a portion of their nor- 
mal supply of this commodity. The nature of the plan is best ex- 
plained in the words of the circular itself: 

Sec. IV. Rationing industries. — As It is obviously liiipossil)le to supply nil 
industries utilizing iron and steel in their activities with thoir normal supply, 
the War Industries Board, tliroujrh its Priorities Division, cooperating witli the 
commodity section dealing with the particular industry or pro<luct involved, 
with the Conservation Division and representatives of other interested (Jov- 
ernment agencies, has inaugurated a system of industrial hearings in which 
committees representing the entire industry appear and present, (a) the normal 
requirements, of such industry for Iron and steel, (b) their reasonable requlre- 



• See Appendix XXI for the rules applying to the purchases of jobbers, as contulned 
in the joint circular of July 3, 1918. 



126 AMEEICAX INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, 

ments under war conditions, (c) tlae stoclvs now on liand in each plant, and 
(d) the fuel consumed, and all other pertinent facts. 

A portion at least of the product of nearlj- every industry may be prop- 
erly classed as a direct or indirect war requirement or essential to the civilian 
population, but in many the percentage of nonessentiality predominates. On 
the other hand, nearly every industry, including so-called war industries, has 
a percentage of nonessentiality in its production. 

It is the policy of the War Industries Board, through the hearings mentioned^ 
to take counsel with each industry, determine the extent to which it can and 
should as a war measure curtail its production — and particularly curtail its 
consumption of iron and steel — limiting its output to essential uses as far as 
practicable, but without destroying or unnecessarily injuring any industry or 
legitimate business. On these hearings the chairman of the Conservation Divi- 
sion or his representatives give the industry the benefit of their expert knowl- 
edge and research into methods of standardization and substitution, and co- 
operate with the industry in (a) reducing needless lines, varieties, and sizes of 
products, thereby securing economy in manufacture and reducing the volume- 
of stocks which the manufacturer, wholesaler, and dealer are required to carry, 
(b) through the elimination of wasteful styles, models, and methods, greatly 
conserving materials, and (c) through the substitution of products or materials- 
not needed for those that are needed for war work, conserving the latter without 
unnecessarily reducing the output of the industry. 

When the maximum conservation of materials and products has been attained 
through these processes of standardization, substitution, and curtailment, the 
representatives of the War Industries Board participating in these conferences 
indicate to the industry their views as to the maximum consumption by the 
industries of the materials and products in question, treating the industry as a 
unit where such a course is practicable. 

The chief of the commodity section dealing with the particular industry then 
prepares a schedule apportioning such indicated maximum of materials or 
products to each plant on a basis which will enable each member of the in- 
dustry to procure the same per cent of his normal production as all other 
mfmbers, taking into account the existing stocks of each. When this has been 
done each plant places its orders for the amount apportioned to it with its 
regular sources of supply, and such orders take a cla.ss C rating. 

The war-service committees of those industries which have not as yet par- 
ticipated in such hearings will be given an appointment on application to the 
priorities commissioner or to the chief of the appropriate commodity section of 
the War Industries Board. 

Following this announcement, and pursuant to its terms, a series 
of prolonged conferences was held with each industry of the less 
essential class requiring iron and steel in important amounts. The 
industries were usually represented by their war service committees, 
but any individual member was privileged to appear, and f recjuently 
did appear in person. The hearings were conducted by Edwin B. 
Parker, priorities commissoner, or by Rhodes S. Baker, assistant 
priorities commissioner. At these hearings appeared also the chair- 
man of the Conservation Division, the chief of the Labor Section, the 
chief or chiefs of such commodity sections as were interested, and 
other representatives of the Government as their interests appeared. 
After the facts had been fully developed at one of these hearings and 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX Till'. WAI!. 127 

from such otlior sources as was necessary, and after a tentative 
iiigreenient had been reached with the representatives of the trade, 
la brief memorandum of the essential facts and of the reconunenchi- 
tions was presented in conference to the industrial adjustment com- 
Imittee of the Priorities Board. Messrs. Parker and Baker were 
members of this committee. The representatives of the inchistry 
were asked to remain in Washington until the committee should 
act, in order that they might give their approval to the regulations 
bet\)re the circular of instructions, embodying the regulations, was 
issued to the trade. 

The industrial adjustments committee was composed of one mem- 
i'cr each from the War Trade Board, the Food Administration, the 
Kailroad Administration, the Fuel Administration, the Shipping 
lioard, the War Labor Policies Board, and the Treasury War Loan 
Staff, together with the priorities commissioner.^" As soon as this 
committee ratified a program of curtailment or rationing, the 
chief of the appropriate commodity section would prepare, under 
the direction of the Priorities Division, a circular addressed to all 
firms engaged in the trade, embodying the regulations which had been 
agreed upon. It was then the duty of such section to see to it that 
the regulations were carried into effect. These regulations repre- 
sented, in form at least, an agreement between the Government and 
tlu' industry. 

As has been pointed out, the Government was coming to have a 
stronger position in the negotiation of a bargain. With the distri- 
i);in()n of fuel, transportation, and iron and steel definitely in the 
hands of the Government, few factories could function except by the 
grace of the Government. Thus it was that, in return for the privi- 
lege of securing steel, fuel, and transportation, any industry or indi- 
Aidual firm would readily agree to abide by such regulations as the 
(idvernment saw fit to impose. 

Under this procedure rationing and curtailment, involving sub- 
stantial savings of iron or steel, was instituted during the summer 
and fall of 1918, over such industries as passenger automobiles, 
])ianos, cutlery, stoves, enameled ware, refrigerators, clothes wringers, 
(•(.isets, metal beds, boilers, radiators, baby carriages, gas stoves and 
ajipliances, tin plate, talking machines, agricultural implements. 
farm tractors, bicycles, electric heating apparatus, oil stoves, watches, 
watch cases, sewing machines, metal stamps, electric fans, safes and 
vaults, lawn mowers, pottery, padlocks, builders hardware, scales and 
li.ilances, sporting arms, cash registers, rat and animal traps, talking 

riie minutes of this committee give a very concise and satisfactory record of the 
i^iMi. s of resolutions, by which a large number of Industries were rationed or curtailed. 
Tiny are contained in the flies of the War Industries Board, but have not been published. 



128 AMERICAN IIv^DUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

machine needles, ice cream freezers, vacuum cleaners, road making 
machinery, cast iron boilers and radiators. 

The makers of passenger automobiles had unbalanced stocks inij 
their factories and could not go forward with their production with-J 
out aid in filling them out. On August 14, they were put on a rafl 
tioning schedule for the six months ending December 31, 1918, whic^ 
provided for a production not exceeding 25 per cent of production i 
during the calendar year 1917. The manufacturers pledged them^ 
selves to limit their purchases of supplies to such as were absolutely! 
necessary to match up their stocks on hand ; they pledged themselves,! 
also, to release, on request of the War Industries Board, to other ( 
manufacturers such surpluses of particular stocks as were not nee- 
essary for production as limited or for war work. Sworn reports of 
stocks had been rendered before the meeting, and further sworn re- 
ports were provided for in the agreement. These reports were used 
as a basis for calculating the savings and for determining particular 
cases of distribution, when such determination should be necessary 
on the part of the Steel Division. 

On September 17, following the report by the priorities commis- 
sioner that a tentative agreement had been reached in conference 
with the manufacturer's of farm implements and tractors, the fol- 
lowing resolution was passed by the industrial adjustments com- 
mittee : 

Be it resolved, that effective October 1, 1918, on a 12-months schedule, the 
agricultural implement and farm tractor manufacturers be curtailed in their 
use of iron and steel to 75 per cent of their consumption for the calendar 
year ending September 30, 1918. 

These are typical examples of the action of the industrial adjust- 
ments committee with regard to the long list of commodities men- 
tioned above. The first step in the administration of such resolutions 
was the issuance of circular after circular to all the members of each 
trade. These circulars, after reciting that an agreement had been 
reached with the representatives of the particular industry, to which 
each was addressed, would set forth the conditions under which 
prioritj^ certificates would be issued to any manufacturer to aid him 
in obtaining the raw materials necessarj^ to accomplish the limited 
production which had been agreed to. They were signed by the 
priorities commissioner.^^ 

Some 30 circulars of this character were issued to manufacturers 
of commodities whose chief constituent materials were iron and 
steel. In many cases these industries became problems of sufficient 
importance to require separate commodity sections in the "War Indus- 

" See Appendix XXII for (1) copy of Circular No. 28, addressed to manufacturers of 
metal beds, cots, etc., and (2) copy of Circular No. 35, addressed to the agricultural 
Implement and farm operating equipment industry. These are typical circulars. All 
circulars were printed and copies may be found in the files of the War Industries Board. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAR. 129 

tries Board to supervise their activities. In such cases, there will be 
further comment in this report in the chapters dealing with those 
. i'ctions. 

The iron and steel industry was, on the whole, one of the most im- 
portant centers of approach to the control over the vast number of 
manufacturing industries which the progress of the war was making 
necessary. The difficulty and complexity of the undertaking was 
realized by no one more fully than by those who were engaged in 
it. It is possible that mistakes might have been made. But it is 
. believed that central control, involving as it did an almost impossible 
) amount and quality of work on the part of those at the apex, resulted 
i in advantages of far greater importance than the individual cases of 
{loss and distress which might have accompanied it. 
105S26— 21 9 



Chapter 3. 
COPPER AND BRASS. 

COPPER. 

Second onlj'^ to steel in its importance, as a basic metal required 
for war, is copper. And in the spring of 1917 the copper market 
pointed just as unerringly as that of steel to the necessity for some 
kind of Government control. Electrolytic copper sold around 16 
cents a pound before 1914. It was selling at 35.74 cent's in March, 
1917. The rise had been steady except during the short period in 
1916 when an early peace seemed probable. 

This country controls the bulk of the copper in the world. De- 
mand, due to war requirements of the Allies, was far outrunning 
supply for two years before we entered the conflict. And it was evi- 
dent that the situation would grow steadily worse as our participa- 
tion in the war was enlarged. Maximum production was of extreme 
importance. Thus it was that copper became one of the first prob- 
lems to engage the attention of Mr. Baruch when he came to Wash- 
ington early in March, 1917, to take charge of raw materials as a 
member of the advisory commission of the Council of National 
Defense. 

There were two schools of thought touching the question. The one 
argued that, as increase of production was the essential factor, the 
rise in prices should not be interfered with, but the accumulation of 
undue profits should be taken care of through excess profit taxes; 
the other, which included Messrs. Summers, Meyer, and Baruch, be- 
lieved that there was a limit to which high prices would be effective 
in stimulating production, and that, if advances in this and other 
commodities were allowed to take their course, not only Avould the 
readjustments incident to peace bring catastrophe with them, but it 
would also be next to impossible to finance the war. They believed 
that control over prices and excess profit taxes were both necessary. 

Their first action was an appeal to the large producing and smelt- 
ing interests direct. This appeal resulted, on March 20, 1917, in an 
understanding by which the Army and Navy were enabled to pur- 
chase their requirements, estimated at that time to be 45,510,000 
pounds, to be delivered quarterly for a year, at 16.6739 cents a pound. 
This represented the actual average selling price obtained by the 
United Metals Selling Co. over a period of 10 years, 1907 to 1916. 
The market quotations for that date were 35.74 cents per pountl, and 
sales were being made as high as 37 cents. The copper industry was 
130 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAR. 131 

(ho tirst one to come forwanl with its ollVr in tlic iiuhi-lrial prepaivd- 
!H<> campaign. This early otfer of tlie copper trade, followed rap- 
idly as it was by several other trades, to sell to their own (iovernment 
11.-- war needs at prewar prices had an important psychological effect 
ii[u»n prices generally. Eugene Meyer, jr., originally proposed the 
arrangement, and it was Daniel Guggenheim and John D. Ryan who 
l)rought about the agreement on the side of the copper trade. Mar- 
ket prices began to decline from this date, but tliey did not fall 
lapidly. 

Meanwhile, war broke out and the increasing copper requirements 
(omul the market with scarcely enough copper to meet contract needs, 
It by calling reserve stocks into use, watching supplies, and care- 
,>,i!y conserving every pound. The necessity for stimulating in- 
■irased production seemed paramount. The Federal Trade Com- 
iui.<sion was asked to examine into the current costs of production. 

Another order for 60,000,000 pounds was placed on June 27 by the 
War Department for earh' delivery, with the open market standing 
It the time at 32.o7 cents. After much discussion the price deter- 
mination was left until the Federal Trade Commission should report 
)n losts. Shortly afterward the Secretary of the Navy announced 
hat he would pay down for Navy copper 75 per cent of "25 cents a 
x'und, leaving the other 25 per cent for adjustment when the cost of 
Mu(hiction should have been determined. 

The announcement of this policy, which was interpreted in some 
[uarters as the price the Government intended to fix, gave concern 
the markets. Strikes or threatened strikes at the mines in Arizona 
Pointed to serious curtailment of production. The miners were being 
paid on a sliding wage scale, adjusted to the price of copper.^ 
rheir wages were based on 27-cent copper at this time. They 
hicatened to strike if these wages should be reduced, and did strike 
vhcrever they were reduced. 

The producers continued to supply copper to the Government, but 
-efused to bill it at 18J cents. The indebtedness of the Government 
o ])roducers soon ran into millions of dollai'S. Refineries were short 
)!" Mister and were running at only 60 to 75 per cent capacity, but 
lie curtailment was not due to the delayed payments. 

In the meantime the War Industries Board, upon which were 
tpresentatives of the Army and Navy, had been created and in its 

1 These sliding scales provide for the minimum wages of $.3.50 per day of eljrlit hours 

nr miners and men employed rinderground, and $4.50 for mechanics, with many higher 

-^ificaUons where skilled labor Is necessary; the minimum to apply when copper sells 

15 cents per pound, and 25 cents additional per day to every man employed to 

:<1 for each 2-cents advance in the price of copper above 15 cents. The result had 

.- that for over a year wages were based on a price of copper at 27 cents and above, 

o that miners were receiving $5 to $5.25 per day, and all mechanics $0.2.'* to $0.50 

er day. 



132 AMEPJCAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAE. 

examination of price problems became convinced that 18f cents winikl 
curtail production. The Board agreed to advance 22i cents to the 
producers and to leave the difference between 22^ cents and 25 cents 
to the findings of the Federal Trade Commission. 

The demands of the Allies were an equally important considera- 
tion at this time. During 1916 England and France had purchased 
over 660,000,000 pounds of copper in the United States in blocks so 
large as to be featured in the trade news. In September, 1916, 
448,000,000 pounds were purchased at 27 cents. This had reduced 
stocks everywhere to lowest level and caused a highly speculative' 
market. While their purchases in the spring of 1917 were in less 
dramatic quantities, they still continued to take such copper as they 
could secure. 

In August, while the discussion of prices and production was at 
its height, it was officially made known to the War Industries Board 
that the French and British were in the market for 60,000.000 
pounds. The Board decided to call the producers into conference and, 
bearing in mind their firm offer to the Government of copper for 25 
cents per pound, make them a tentative offer of 20 cents for this 
quantity. This offer was made at a meeting on August 7, but it was 
agreed that the price should be subject to revision, upward or down- 
ward, later.2 After the representatives of the trade withdrew from 
the meeting, it was moved that if the copper producers refused to 
enter into this agreement the Government would proceed to com- 
mandeer the necessary supply. When the joint meeting was re- 
sumed it appeared that the opposition of the industry to the 20 
cents, and indeed to sales at a memorandum price at all, was very 
determined, and the arguments in support of the opposition seemed 
worthy of most serious consideration. On August 8 the Board passed 
the following resolution : 

That as the copper emergency requires immediate action necessary to secure 
a supply for our Government and our allies, the Board endeavor to secure from 
the copper interests the needs of ourselves and our allies at a price to be fixed 
when we shall see the report of the Federal Trade Commission as to the costs 
and for purposes of payment on account of deliveries, a tentative price of 221 
cents to be fixed with the understanding that this price shall in no way be 
taken into consideration when the final price is to be determined. 

The result of the controversy was that on August 16, 1917, the 
copper interests agreed to deliver 77,000,000 pounds to the Allies 
on a memorandum, no price to be paid pending the final fixing of 
a price after an investigation. 

By September 5, 1917, the Federal Trade Commission had made 
its report on costs of producing copper, the War Industries Board 

•See War Industries Board Minute Booli. Aug. 7. 1017. 



AMERK!AN INl>rSTKV IX TllK WAlt. 183 

had stiulird it. nnd at a iiieotiiijj,- that day rcaclicHl a ionclusion (o lix 
the price of electrolytic copper at 2:2 cents per pound. 

In order to acquaint the copper interests with the jtosition of 
the Board, to try to reach an agreement with them, and to secure 
their cooperation, their representatives were called to Washington on 
September 11. The representatives were told that the l^oard believed 
that 22 cents per pound f. o. b. New York for refined electrolytic 
copper, 99.93 per cent pure, was a fair price and would allow the 
producers a reasonable profit. They were told that the price should 
hold for a certain period only, and could then be revised upward 
or downward; further, that it was to be applicable alike to the 
Government, the Allies, and the public, and that wages to labor 
should remain the same notwithstanding the sliding scale agreement. 

The industry objected. Their position was presented orally at the 
meeting, and three days later by a long memorandum. They de- 
clared flatly that the copper interests could not control the price 
to the public at a point much below 25 cents, and that, if the Gov- 
ernment fixed 22 cents as the price, the small high-cost producers 
would not voluntarily cooperate in selling at the fixed price. They 
pointed out that acute labor troubles would result should the sliding 
scale of rates be disturbed. The}' showed how^ impracticable it 
would be for the Government to commandeer the numerous small 
high-cost mines. Tliey gave evidence to show that if 22 cents were 
finally fixed it would be impossible to obtain the cooperation of the 
majority of mine owners. The difficulty was not with the large 
producers, in whose hands, of course, the bulk of the business is 
concentrated, but the copper industry also embraces a large number 
of smaller high-cost producers, whose product was also needed in 
the extraordinary emergency. Everybod}" agreed that the consider- 
able output of the small high-cost producers was indispensable. 

The copper interests pointed out with particular care the important 
bearing of wages on copper prices. It is true that there are few raw 
mateiials of which so large a percentage of the cost of production 
goes to pay wages. They pointed out that the average wages of all 
men in the copper industry had been advanced oO per cent over those 
of 1915, and that they could not be lowered without serious conse- 
quences. Labor shoi-tage and labor unrest might easily make it nec- 
essary to raise them. If wages were to be maintained, tlie small 
plants could not keep open on a selling price of less than 25 cents. 
Their memorandum contained the following proposal : 

While some of the low-cost producers will show a larpe proht at -") cents, 
some of the largest and practicall.v all of the small producers can not show more 
than the usual peace-time profit at that price, and if dt'ph'tion of mines Is con- 
sidered, their profit would pnihahly be loss than in normal Umcs at averace 



134 AMERICAIs^ INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

prices. We believe tliat it would be to tbe interest of the Government to ])ay 
25 cents per pound and to take all of the production of all of the mines of the 
country at that price, retaining all the copper which is needed for this Govern- 
ment and for its Allies, and selling the balance at the same price, or approxi- 
mately the same price, to the public. 

Following the conference in Washington of September 11 the lead- 
ing copper producers met in New York on September 14 and voted 
to propose to the War Industries Board a compromise price of 23^ 
cents. In their communication they said : 

With one exception those present agreed that if your committee would 
unanimously recommend a price of 23i cents * * * we would still be able 
to get the practical i-esult that we are aiming for, that is, pretty nearly maxi- 
mum production ; therefore, 1 would say that if your committee would agree to 
23^ cents we can pledge the copper industry almost as a whole to use every 
possible means to secure a maximum production and to maintain the present 
scale of wages, and I am satisfied we can succeed. 

On September 21, 1917, the price of 23| cents was definitely fixed 
in the form of an agreement between the Government and the pro- 
ducers. It was approved by the President, subject to revision after 
four months; the short period being established for the purpose of 
allowing any producer, consumer, or other interested party to appear 
and present reasons, if any, for increasing or decreasing the price. 
It is interesting in this connection to note that while many producers 
appeared with arguments urging increases, no consumer, public or 
private, nor official of our own or other Government, appeared to 
object to the prices as too high. The fact is the fixed price of copper 
represented a smaller advance over prewar normal than that of per- 
haps any other commodity. This was the first negotiated price- 
fixing arrangement ever established by the United States Govern- 
ment. As part of the agreement the producers pledged themselves 
not to reduce wages; to sell their products to the Allies and the gen- 
eral public at the same price as that to be paid by the Government; 
to exert every effort to maintain maximum production during the 
war; and to take the necessary measures to prevent copper from 
falling into the hands of speculators. The Army, Navy, and other 
Government agencies interested in the purchase of copper partici- 
pated in the negotiations. 

The industry, though dissatisfied, had finally acceded. They be- 
lieved that at least it gave them a definite program and would bring 
stabilitj^ But within a week many questions began to arise as to how 
the new scheme was to be administered. This was a new kind of 
undertaking both for the Government and the industry.^ 

» The Wall Street Journal of Sept. 27, 1917. said in this connection : " Both producers 
and consumers are ' up in the air ' due to lack of details in connection with carrying 
out of the proposed plans for handling the copper market, and this condition will con- 
tinue until Washington furnishes more detailed advices as to what can be done and what 
should not bo attempted under the new order of things." 



A.MElUl'AX l.\MU STIIV IN TlIK WAI!. 135 

I A letter of inquiry was addressed to the Board October 10, TJIT, 
and its prompt answer contained the (lOvernnient's sohition ol' several 
of the most important problems. 

(1) That all outstanding bona fide contracts between producers 
and consumers might be consummated at contract prices. Some of 
these were at 2T cents a pound. But under the priority agreement 
our Government had first call and the Allies second, and as tiiese two 
purchasers consumed nearly all the supply, few high-priced orders 
could be filled. 

(2) The rule was laid down that all contract sales made for de- 
livery after the expiration of the present fixed price (Jan. 21, 1918) 
should be made at a price subject to any revision which the Board 
might see fit later to make. 

(3) In answer to the complaint that outside dealers and brokers 
were trading and quoting at 28, 29, and 30 cents for copper, a control 
committee or selling agency was established, which by buying and 
selling at the fixed price was designed to crowd the speculators from 
the market. 

(4) It was ur^ed that differentials be established for modifications 
from electrolytic copper, and particularly that prices for scrap be 
fixed. But it was ruled that no other prices would be fixed. 

The price of 23} cents was continued until July 2, 1918, when it 
was increased to 26 cents and remained at that figure until control 
ceased. By the spring of 1918, many complaints of hardship were 
coming to the Board from the numerous small high-cost producers. 
The Government was requiring about 93 per cent of the output at 
this time, 49 per cent being consumed by the United States and 44 
per cent by the Allies. 

Maximum production was absolutely required and the Government 
could afford to take no risk of causing a reduction. The price- 
fixing committee voted on May 22, 1918, to continue the 23J cents 
until August 15. But a few days later, when evidence had been 
shown them of advances in freight rates and increases and prospec- 
tive increases in costs of labor, which were making the smaller pro- 
ducers run at such great loss that they would have to close down ; the 
committee voted that the price should be raised to 26 cents on July 2.* 
A committee, formed to represent 15 of the smaller companies, pre- 
sented the case at Washington. 

The fixing of copper prices, as was the case of steel, brought with 
it the necessity of control in other directions. Control over the 
distribution of copper was far less difficult than that of steel. While 
civilian uses of copper are very numerous and very important, they 

*The cost sheets of the smoUlng and roflnlng companies show<'cl lossos. One nn«l a 
half cents of the advance went to smelters and refiners, one cent to producers. 



136 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

are not nearly so indispensable, particularly for a short period, asj 
are those of iron and steel. The war required over 90 per cent ol 
the copper which we could produce. This simply meant that ci-{ 
vilian use had to be practically suspended, and this was accomplished 
not so much by priority control in the sense in which that process 
was used on steel ; but it was accomplished through the purchase 
by the War Department of a high percentage of the copper and its' 
distribution to the manufacturers of armaments as they needed it. 

The principal responsibility of the Board, after the market had 
once been stabilized, was to watch over production and take care^ 
that it was not diminished; to guard against speculation; and to 
keep the small producers encouraged to continue their furnaces. 
The copper producers' committee, at the direction of the Board, 
allocated the various orders. 

In October, 1917, Eugene Meyer, jr., was placed in charge of the 
Board's section on nonferrous metals. He gave particular attention 
to the problem of maintaining adequate production and the proper' 
distribution of copper, but did not take part in the price fixing. He 
remained in this position until March, 1918, when he became a 
director in the War Finance Corporation, and Pope Yeatman suc- 
ceeded him and remained chief until the end. 

A word of explanation of the copper producing industry may 
make this story more clear. In the first stages of production copper- 
bearing ores are smelted, the metals being reduced and segregated 
from the nonmetals in a product known as "blister copper." Fre- 
quently associated with the copper are gold, silver, nickel, plati- 
num, selenium, and other metals. They all occur in the blister. The 
electrical conductivity of copper is diminished by the presence of 
other metals. Therefore, in order to purify the blister and ta 
recover the gold, silver, and nickel the crude or blister copper is re- 
fined by the electrolytic process, and the product is the electrolytic 
copper of commerce which runs 99.93 per cent pure. When, how- 
ever, the blister copper carries a negligible quantity of the more 
precious metals, it is usuall}^ refined by the furnace method, and this 
less pure product is known as casting copper, and is sold a little below 
the pure grades. Pig coppei is produced in one smelting operation 
from ores which are free from precious metals. " Lake copper " 
is a product which comes from the Lake Superior districts where 
native metallic copper occurs almost free from other elements. It 
is crushed and refined by the furnace method. 

The production of copper in the United States increased about 51 
per cent between 1913 and the end of the war. In 1917 it was 2,428,- 
000,000 pounds of new copper. Lake producers increased their out- 
put. A number of new deposits were discovered, but the most im- 
portant cause of increase was expansion and improvement in equip- 
ment and processes at established properties. Several new smelting^ 



AMEinCAN INDUSTUY IN TllK WAK. 137 

!' aijjplants, concentrating plants, and refineries were put intd operation, 
tofjivhile many more were remodeletl for the purjxjse of in>(alliiii: nt-wly 
cii leveloped proceSvSes and eqnipment. 

lieiili There was a 100 per cent increase in the production of recovered 
cesl|?opper, the 1918 output beini; a half billion pounds. This metal is 
lasclerived by remelting- and refining furnace ashes and cinders, scrap 
itjL-om posed of clippings, punchings, borings, etc., and from discarded I 
t. ijirticles. Recovered copper can be refined electrolytically and made 
ladjjqual to the virgin product. Copper alloys, like brass, when recov- 
iire:|?red. need not be reduced to the separate metals, but can be brought 
tfliap to specifications by a suitable admixture of new metals in the 
;es, process of refining. 
rdjj Despite many hardships and obstacles, the American copper pro- 

ij:lucers played their part and contributed to the successful prosc- 
liepution of the war in a waj^ second to no other industry. There are 
ODJimple grounds for the belief that the prices fixed by the Government 
lerkorked hardship on many operators; and to add to the distress, the 
{ei-:igning of the armistice on November 11 left them, like producers of 
a 3ther raAv materials, with very large stocks on hand, produced at the 
e- highest costs in the history of the trade, and Avith no large orders 

Decked. 

ZINC. 

Zinc, commonly known in the trade as spelter, was never a serious 
<J problem for the War Industries Board. It has two important war 
uses. Sheet zinc is used for lining the boxes in which all explosives 
are packed, and zinc enters about 33 per cent in the manufacture of 
brass, which was so important in the shipbuilding program, and to> 
a lesser extent in the manufacture of munitions. In normal times the 
galvanizing industry uses 60 per cent of our total consumption. 

Zinc was one of the metals which the commissioner of raw ma- 
terials took up in March, 1917, as part of the general preparation 
carried on just before war was declared. An agreement was ob- 
tained from Edgar Palmer, president of the New Jersey Zinc Co., 
to supply such quantities as the Government might need at 12 cents 
per pound for sheet zinc, the prevailing market price being about 
20 cents. 

During the war the Conservation Division of the Board relieved tlie 
industry of some of its surplus production by suggesting substitu- 
tions of zinc for tin, lead, aluminum, and nickel, when shortages ap- 
peared in the latter metals. Zinc was substituted for lead and cop- 
per in the coffin industry — quite a large item. Zinc ca^^tings sup- 
planted brass in some instances. 

Domestic production, constituting about one-third of the woi-hl's 
output, is more than adequate for our needs. Belgimn, (Jermany, 
Australia, Austria, and Great Biitain are the other produrcrs. Wlien 



138 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

the war broke out in Europe and Germany, Belgium, and Austri 
were eliminated, large foreign markets were opened for America! 
spelter. In July, 1914, our exports were 157 tons ; in September tlie_ 
were 19,045 tons. Considering our total annual production of 700,00 
tons, this sudden demand from abroad was reflected extraordinaril; 
in prices. Starting in November, 1914, and culminating in June 
1915, prices rose from 5.08 cents per pound to 22.50 cents, or approxi 
mately 350 per cent. 

One of the largest low-cost producers closed just as the expor 
demand began, and by the beginning of 1915 the home market wa 
being stimulated by the buying of munitions manufacturers wh« 
were getting lucrative contracts from the Allies, and for whom tin 
price of spelter represented such a small percentage that it was o 
little moment. Galvanizers were almost put out of business. Dur 
ing this period smelters were expanding, extinct coal burning plant 
were being resurrected, and new works constructed. An over-pro 
duction soon brought a depression of prices, but they went back t( 
21 cents again in March, 1916. From this time prices began to fall' 
and with one exception, about the beginning of 1917, continued t( 
fall throughout the war period. 

The vacillations of this industry are largely accounted for bj 
the fact that in the Joplin (Mo.) district, where about 35 per ceni 
of our output is produced, the ore is readily accessible and easily 
concentrated, so that the miner needs little or no capital. Whik 
the larger mines of Montana, Idaho, Colorado, and Utah have wel 
equipped works, the whole industry is affected by the simplicity oJ 
the operations at Joplin. The refining plants are easily expandec 
by erecting additional batteries of retorts, and are easily dis- 
mantled. During the war the expansion and contraction of smelt- 
ing capacity was remarkable. They expanded early with rumors ol 
huge requirements, and contracted in 1917 and 1918 when demand 
did not meet expectation. 

Perhaps the most important work of the section was that oi 
studying the uses for zinc which would conserve other metals more 
difficult to obtain, and to keep the industry encouraged to maintair 
high production in anticipation of a time when their product woulc 
be more needed. With this second point in mind, and for the pur- 
pose of insuring a sufficient quantity of the high-grade product 
needed for war purposes, in the face of a disintegrated and dis 
couraged industry, price fixing was resorted to. There are foui 
grades of zinc, based on the content of cadmium, iron, and lead 
The grades range from the purest, grade A or " high grade," througl: 
B or "intermediate," and C or "brass special," to D or " prim( 
western." The high grade is used in making the best quality of brass 



AMKRICAX INinSTlIV IN Till. NNAK. 139 

;'l and for rolling sheet zinc; i'or <:!ilviini/,iii«2:..(he i)rinie western, which 

is by far the most abnndant, is used. 

"'5 The Navy has ahvays required for its brass cartridiro cases a 

^ grade A zinc, containing 0.07 per cent of cadmium or less. Cad- 

fil mium can not be removed by the ordinary distilling process. Only 

fl'two companies could produce zinc of this specification, the New 

"s Jersey Zinc Co. from a pure ore and the Anaconda Copper Mining 

Co. by the electrolytic process. These two companies could not pro- 

w|duce enough for the cartridge cases required by the Navy and the 

Army together. The section studied the problem with the Army, and 

specifications allowing up to one-half of 1 per cent cadmium were 

til adopted for the spelter used in the brass of Army cartridge cases. 

This spelter came to be known as xVrmy grade A. 

On February 13, 1918, a maximum price of 12 cents per pound 
f. o. b. East St. Louis, w^as set for grade A zinc. This, with the 
new Army specifications, made it possible for the various companies 
to produce enough zinc for all cartridge cases required. Plate zinc 
was fixed at the same time at 14 cents, and sheet zinc at 15 cents. 
After prices had been fixed on sheet and plate zinc, a problem in 
allocations arose. It was deemed important to keep as many as 
possible of the mines of the Joplin district running. Through the 
mediation of the section, the zinc rolling mills agreed to pay the 
miners sTo a ton base on 60 per cent zinc concentrates, and the mills 
agreed to distribute their buying proportionately among the mines 
of the district wdiich produced this grade. The miners formed an 
association and the section appointed an allocating committee of the 
association to receive the requirements of the rolling mills and allo- 
cate them in due proportion. 

It is interesting to note the rise and fall of total annual produc- 
tion of spelter in the United States during the years most affected 
by the war. It was 542,000 tons in 1915; 718,OOo"^in 1916; 700,000 in 
1917; and 545,000 in 1918. Domestic consumption was 65 per cent 
in 1918, 32 per cent entering into war consumption by the United 
States and 23 per cent by the Allies. 



As brass is a mixture of varying ratios of copper and zinc, to- 
gether with small quantities of lead, tin, nickel, or other metals, our 
problem of producing enough of it for the war depended largely on 
the production of the two metals which have just been studied. 

About 70 per cent of the brass industry of the country is concen- 
trated in the Naugatufk Valley of Connecticut, which was part of the 
congested district during the war. But the equipment and skill re- 
quired in brass works made it impracticable for the war-time de- 
velopment to take place outside of this district. The number of mix- 



140 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

tures used in the composition of brass is very great, but the com- 
monest forms are "high brass," which takes about 67 per cent cop- 
per and 33 per cent spelter ; " low brass," 80 per cent copper and 2C 
per cent spelter ; and " commercial bronze," 90 per cent copper and 
10 per cent spelter. " Muntz " metal is 60 per cent copper and 40 
per cent spelter. " Nickel silver," called German silver before the 
war, takes copper 72 per cent, spelter 10 per cent, and nickel 18 per 
cent, though the percentage of nickel varies with the purpose. 
" Cupro nickel " is a mixture of 85 per cent copper and 15 per cent 
nickel. This last-named metal is used for the jacket of bullets for 
small arms ammunition. We produced a maximum of 4,000.000 
pounds a month of all types during the war. 

The most important use of brass for war is in the manufacture of 
cartridge cases of all sizes up to 4.7 inches, the product coming from 
the brass mills in the form of disks. Demands for this purpose, in- 
cluding those of our Allies, were estimated in August, 1918, at 885,000 
pounds per day. The small arms cartridge program called for 
1,235,000 pounds of brass per day, although production never reached 
beyond one-half of the program. 

Brass tubing for condensers for steam engines, both stationary and 
those used on ships, made heavy demands on the industry. Brass rod 
was needed in great quantities for the manufacture of time fuses and 
high explosive fuses for shells. Fine, flexible brass wire was required 
in great quantities by the Signal Corps for outpost wire. Brass 
wire is an absolute essential in the paper making industry, where it 
is used in the form of wire netting, which wears out rapidly. 

In September, 1918, the Signal Corps asked for 1,500,000 pounds 
of outpost wire per month. The supply of this was still a subject 
of concern when the armistice came. Brass rod for fuses was pro- 
duced in this country for the Allies in great quantity, and our pro- 
ductive capacitj^ had been so increased that no shortage was felt 
until July 1, 1918, when our increased military program was an- 
nounced, and France at the same time asked for new orders to be 
delivered at the rate of 6,000,000 pounds per month. Plans for 
meeting this situation were making satisfactory progress when the 
end came. 

The Brass Section of the War Industries Board was formed on 
April 6, 1918, with Everett Morss as chief. At that time the only 
imj)ortant shortage was in tubing, both brass and copper. The sec- 
tion first set to work to make supply of this product meet war needs,. 
Semi-monthly reports on tubing were obtained from each manufac- 
turer on blanks furnished by the section. These reports showed 
orders received, shipments made, and orders on hand for eight 
groups of brass tubing and six groups of copper tubing. They 
showed the distribution of all these orders between the Army, Navy, 



AMERICAN INDUSTllV IX TilK WAIl. 141 

Emer^^ency Fleet, and others. They showed, also, the priority class 
of each order. These figures were posted to ledger accounts for 

oJ«ach company, and a general summary was also made for all com- 

)m panics. This record made it possible for the section, when a source 
of supply had to be found for any kind of tubing, to determine 

tl) quickly what company could probably take the order witli the least 
embarrassment and with the least interference with other orders of 

I5J importance. 

The shortage became so acute that on June 26, 1918, notice was 
issued to the mills to make no shipments of tubing after July 10, 

«)( except on such orders as were covered by priority certificates or 
by permits issued by the section. The demands for tubing by the 
Aircraft Production Bureau, while not large in tonnage, weie very 
difficult to handle because the specifications were constantly chang- 
ing. The bureau placed the problem in the hands of one man, who, 
by constant reference to the section for general information, car- 
ried it through successfully by dealing directly with the mills. It 
Ava^ not until later in the summer of 1918 that concern began to be 
felt over shortages in brass production other than tubing. 

On August 29 representatives of all the brass manufacturers met 
the section in Washington, and a war service committee for brass 
manufacturers was appointed to replace the earlier tube com- 
mittee. Owing to the complications due to the variety of products 
and the large number of mills, the section did not arrange for de- 
tailed reports similar to those on tubing, but instead it had daily or 
•weekly reports from several of the large producers, pending the 
■development of a general scheme of reports which would give the 
necessar}- information. 

On September 24, an order was issued to all mills to make the 
acceptance of new orders subject to a permit from the section, and 
the mills were requested not to ship after November 30 without a 
permit even on orders taken before September 24. On November 
1, the Army was asked to make a new survey of its requirements 
■with the idea in mind of making all possible substitutions for brass, 
but this plan did not need to be carried out. 

The brass facilities of the country increased during tiie war be- 
tween 50 and 75 per cent. The total production in 1917 was 
1,072,000,000 pounds. Formal price fixing was not resorted to. The 
price of brass normally varies with the price of copper and spelter, 
and it was felt that control in the prices of these two ai-ticles would 
be sufficient for the regulation of brass, and this in a broad way 
proved true, although the shortages in the latter part of 1918 were 
being definitely reflected in advancing prices which would have made 
price-fixing necessary if the war had not ended. 



Chapter 4. 

OTHER METALS. 

. In the course of the war period several other metal industries pro- 
ducing war necessities had to be encouraged or controlled to a greater 
or less extent in order that their activities might be shaped to the war 
program. Separate sections were formed to study and supervise the 
Ferroalloys,^ Tin, Aluminum, Lead, Nickel, Quicksilver, Antimony, 
and Platinum. 

FERROALLOYS. 

Considerable work had been carried on in this field by Mr. Sum- 
mers and Mr. Replogle before the section was formed in March, 1918, 
with Hugh W. Sanford as chief. Contact with the industry was 
maintained through the ferroalloys committee of the American Iron 
and Steel Institute. The principal commodities which presented 
themselves as problems to the section were manganese, vanadium, 
tungsten, zirconium, ferrosilicon, and chromite. 

Manganese. — Manganese in some form is essential in the steel in- 
dustry. It is the purifying element used for deoxidizing and elimi- 
nating the dissolved oxygen, from 15 to 20 pounds to the ton of steel 
being required. It can be used in any one of three forms, corre- 
sponding to t3'pes of manganese ores as they occur. 

(1) Ferromanganese, containing 80 per cent^ manganese and 
about 10 per cent iron, is produced from ores containing 40 to 50 per 
cent manganese and the iron. 

(2) Spiegeleisen, containing about 35 per cent manganese and 5 
to 40 per cent iron. 

(3) Manganese pig iron, produced from iron ore, bearing small 
percentages of manganese. 

The ores occur in a continuous series, containing decreasing quan- 
tities of manganese with increasing quantities of iron. Varying 
quantities of silica are also frequently present and detract from the 
value. 

1 The Ferroalloys Section functioned as part of the Chemical Division, but its work -will 
be accounted for in this chapter because it relates so definitely to the steel industry. 

' In May. 1018. the American standard was reduced to 70 per cent to increase the use of 
the domestic product. 
142 



AMERICAN INDUSTltV IX TJIE WAR. 143 

I Low-grade ores are found in great quantities in the United States, 
|)ut the higher grades occur in Brazil, the Caucasus, and India. Spie- 
releisen can be used for the Bessemer steel process, but the high- 
Trade ferroinanganese is required for the open-hearth process. Be- 
fore the war our steel producers got most of their high-grade ferro- 
nanganese from England, where the ores had been brought from 
[ndia and the Near East. This country produced only 2,000 tons 
)f high-grade ore in 1914. The shipping situation made the pre- 
war practice impossible, and the growing use of the open-hearth 
process in our expanding steel industry brought about a serious 

i» situation. Eelief was sought in two directions, chiefly by stimu- 

frating domestic production, but to some extent by assisting importa- 

ai ;ion from Brazil. 

'k\ Everything possible was done to aid domestic production. Pri- 

iprity was given on machinery, on labor, and on railroad transporta- 
ttion. Prices had been allowed to take their own course on the 
theory that it would stimulate production. Still it was clear by 
May, 1918, that heavy shortages were threatening. Although it 
involved a hardship on the steel trade, the problem was relieved by 

iii reducing the standard of purity from 80 per cent to 70 per cent, and 

as; -his made available several hundred thousand tons of American ore 

uJDf a type which had not been in use. 

ell About the same time the American Iron and Steel Institute made 
|m agreement with the American ore producers to increase prices 
land stabilize them over a period of one year. They were fixed at 
!$1 per unit, which was three times the price in 1915. American 

i. mines produced about 310,000 tons of high-grade ore and 050,000 
jtons of low-grade ore in 1918. 

Imports of ore from Brazil were encouraged, but imports of ferro- 
manganese from England were forbidden, in order to save the ship- 
Iping from India to England. During May coal ran short in Brazil 
find the railroad bringing the ore to the seaboard was shut down. 
About the same time the Government ship Cyclops, en route to this 
country with a cargo of ore, was sunk. 

Through the efforts of the section, a special license was obtained 
for 12,000 tons from England to meet the demand, and the Ship- 
ping Board consented to send coal to Brazil and made possible a 
3ontinuation of that source. The price of high-grade forromanga- 
« was $37.50 per ton in 1914. It went as high as $400 in June 
md July, 1917, but was stabilized, chiefly through the efforts of the 
American Iron and Steel Institute, at $250 a ton during the later 
half of 1917 and during 1918. The shortage of shipping and the 
ever increasing submarine menace made it necessary to pay this 
rice in order to get American production. 



144 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Manganese ore is used also in the fabrication of dry batterie 
but the dominating- problem throughout the war period was to secui 
enough of the high-grade product to supply the steel industry. 

F errovanadium. — Ferrovanadium is used in small quantities in th 
production of high-speed and cutting-tool steels, automobile steel: 
and other castings designed to withstand heavy and repeated dynamij 
stresses. It is a rare metal, worth in normal times about $2.20 | 
pound, the price rising during the war to $5.50. The principal sourc 
is Peru, whence the ore concentrates are brought to this country by th 
American Vanadium Co. The ore is packed to the seacoast on llama 
from mines which are at a very high altitude and inaccessible. Th 
American Vanadium Co. has considered the construction of auto 
mobile roads, and at one time during the "war they considered th 
practicability of using airplanes for the transportation of the ore 

A small quantity is produced in this country as a 2 or 3 per cen 
by-product of carnotite ore, which is mined for the uranium o: 
radium which it contains. A small percentage comes also fron 
roscoelite ore of Colorado. But the world's chief source of supph 
is Peru and is owned by one company. Shipments from Peru have 
been very irregular, and there was a great shortage both in Eng 
land and in this country during the war. In 1914 imports of 14,50( 
metric tons of 30 per cent ore concentrates were reported, and ir 
1915, 3,145 metric tons. 

The shortage made it necessary for the section to control the dis- 
tribution of vanadium, and none was allowed except for war re- 
quirements either here or abroad. England was supplied with 5( 
tons a month, although she asked for 100 tons. Stocks were de- 
clining rapidly in 1918, consumption exceeding production by about 
30 per cent. Nothing could be done to increase domestic produc- 
tion except at forbidding costs. Every effort was made to increase 
production in Peru, and it is believed that if the war had continued 
a satisfactory solution would have been found. The situation witli 
respect to this commodity would warrant the attention of the Gov- 
ernment in peace times as a measure of preparedness for war. 

Tungsten. — Tungsten was used in \h^ war (1) chiefly in high-speed 
tool steels; (2) in magnet steels; (3) in valve steels for airplane en- 
gines; (4) in hacksaw and low-tungsten steels; and (5) in the form 
of ductile tungsten for (a) incandescent lamps, (b) Rontgen or X-ray 
tubes, (c) for electric contacts, and other chemical work. The high- 
speed steel for machine tools not only involved the greatest tonnage, 
but was the most essential, for no satisfactory- substitute could be 
found. 

Tungsten is produced in quantity in the United States, but is also 
imported from the Far East and the west coast of South America. 



AMKUUAX IXI>rsruV IX TlIK WAK. 145 

^^ The price of tuno-ston is moasurod in terms of units of 20 pounds 
^^of 60 per cent WOa concentrates. In January, 19U>, the price was 
$7.50 per unit. In April, 191(). it reachetl its niaxiniuni at $80 per 
unit. The advance was due to the enormous demand for lu<?h-speed 
tool steels needed in meeting contracts for making shells and guns 
for the Allies. The scarcity of domestic metal was relieved hy im- 
■'^Iporting more ores, but greater relief came from an economy in the 
'"•I use of tungsten steels in making tools which was discovered. It was 
'T^ found that a weld could be made between a tungsten steel and ordi- 
'J?' I nary steel so that only the cutting edge need be made from the 
special alloy. Under these influences prices gradually dropped and 
"'^ remained close to $25 per unit from the middle of 1917 to the close 
of the war.* Practically the entire output of the United States was 
consumed in direct or indirect war work. 
'^^° About the time the war ended, a world shortage of about 4,000 
tons per year seemed to be approaching. Efforts were made to en- 
courage increased production everywhere, and an international pool- 
ing arrangement for its distribution was being considered in Lon- 
don. 

Zirconium. — In the spring of 1918 a piece of light armor plate was 
brought to the Board. It was identified as a zirconium steel alloy. 
Mr. Summers took it up with the Carborundum Co., and they became 
interested. In July, 1918, the Ford Motor Co. presented the results 
of an experiment in the use of zirconium as a steel alloy for the 
armor plate of light tanks. The section investigated the deposits of 
zirconium in the United States and in Brazil. The Ordnance De- 
partment entered into contract for the purchase from Brazil of 1,200 
tons of monosite sands from which the metal is extracted. These 
plans were just reaching fruition when the war closed. 

Feirosilicon. — The section found it necessary to intervene in behalf 
of the manufactures of ferrosilicon in securing power at Niagara 
Falls. This commodity has two important war uses. The high 
grade, 80 to 85 per cent pure, is used for making hydrogen gas for 
balloons; and the second grade, 50 per cent pure, is used for making 
steel. There is plenty of the ore in the United States, and the only 
difficulty expressed by the producers was in securing cheap power. 

Chromite. — Chromite is the ore mineral from which chromium or 
chrome metal is obtained. It has a number of uses which were 
essential to the w^ar. Tliousands of tons entered as an alloy into 
chrome steels for armor plate and for high-speed tools. Chrome 
brick is widely used as a refractory material in steel furnaces. 
Chrome salts, such as the bicromates of soda and potash, are used 
for tanning leather and also in the textile industries. Before the 
10582&— 21 10 



146 AMERICAN i:^DUSTKY IN THP: WAR. 

war the bulk of the American supply came from Australia, Ne\i' 
Caledonia, and South Africa. In 1914 the United States produced 
only 591 tons. But, in order to save the long haul, production was 
increased in 1918 to 60,000 tons,*" imports being limited to about 
90,000 tons. Every assistance was given to the industry by way of 
priority on machinery, labor, and transportation to encourage suffi- 
cient production in this country, and every possible restriction was 
placed on its use. In normal times, however, domestic production 
would not pay. 



The Tin section of the Board was organized March 6, 1918, when 
George Armsby was appointed chief in charge of tin. The feature 
work of the section was the organization of the interallied tin 
executive in London, August 28, 1918. But the section was in control 
of the distribution, as well as the acquisition, of the country's sup- 
ply of tin when the war ended. 

The United States consumes more than 50 per cent of the world's 
production of tin, but less than 10 per cent of this is mined here. 
The principal ore deposits are in the Federated Malay States, 
whence we get " straights " pig tin. Other sources are Bolivia, Dutch 
East Indies, Southern China, Nigeria, CornM'all, Australia, and 
South Africa. The Malay deposits are past the peak of their pro- 
duction, and there is concern about the future of the world's supply. 

The American Smelting & Refining Co. arranged in 1915 to make 
large importations of the Bolivian concentrates which had formerly 
gone to Germany. Thej^ built a plant at Perth Amboy for refining 
them and turned out more than 20,000,000 pounds in 1918. The 
Alaska mines for that year produced only 120,000 pounds. We 
imported 142,000,000 pounds of pig tin that year. The National 
Lead Co. also imports very large quantities of Bolivian concentrates. 

The chief use for tin is in the manufacture of tin plate for con- 
tainers of various kinds, tin being used as a protective covering for 
iron and steel sheet to prevent rust. Thirty thousand tons went into 
plate in this country in 1917. Tin plate was a war essential for pack- 
ing food for shipment abroad as well as preservation in this country. 
Second in importance is its use in solder. Large quantities of tin are 
used in making babbitt and other bearing metals. Tin goes into brass 
and bronze. Collapsible tubes use 2,000 tons per year, and tinfoil 
uses 4,000 tons. Tin oxide is required in the manufacture of glass, 
rubber, and in enamel. Tin tetrachloride is used in dying silks and 
to give them weight. Tin was used also in the war in the production 
of smoke screens for infantry attacks. 

" Calculated on the basis of 50 per cent chromic oxide content. 



AMEKK'AN IXDUSTKV IX TlIK WAR. 147 

Tin aiul tin products were praetionlly exeliuled from exfxjrt dur- 
ing the war. but the problem of securing sudicient importation and 
suitable distribution was the serious one. In December. 1917, the 
W:ir Trade Board appointed the American Iron and Steel Institute 
solo consignee for all pig tin, tin ore, and tin chloride imported into 
this country, and the tin was to be released to importers ui)on their 
t giving such guaranties or agreements as the War Trade Board might 
; Tequire. The activities of Mr. Sununers were imi)()itant in obtain- 
I |ing this ruling. 

It was designed to eliminate speculators from tlie n::irket and to 
direct the flow of tin into most needed channels. It did not, how- 
ever, break the rise in prices. The uncertainty with which supplies 
reached the United States, on account of the uncertainty of shipping, 
( :iused prices to fluctuate with the arrival of each cargo. The high 
record of $1.10 a pound was reached in May, 1918. Tlie normal pre- 
war price was about 38 cents a pound. 

During May, 1918, the War Industries Board, having taken over 
the control of tin from the Food Administration and the AVar Trade 
I'liiird. started negotiations, through the British Embassy in AVash- 
.1 gton, looking to the formation of an interallied agreement to pro- 
\ ide for the control and distribution of tin to meet the rcc{uirements 
of the Avar. At the end of July the section chief and three members, 
who had engaged in these negotiations, joined the AVar Industries 
lioard foreign mission and sailed for London. Negotiations were 
continued there, culminating on August 28, 1918, in an agreement 
by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy to establish 
an interallied tin executive in London. George Armsby and Lin- 
i.ihi Hutchinson were appointed American members. Sir Leonard 
Ll( welyn, K. B. E., was made chairman. 

Under the agreement the tin executive controlled and directed all 
imichases of pig tin for the participating countries. It appointed its 
inlying agents in the several producing countries, and our import 
li'enses were granted only for tin purchased by the tin executive. 
I lie agreement provided that the allocation of pig tin to the partici- 
I'uting countries should be on the basis of the following estimated 
ual requirements: 

Gross tons. 

Uuited States 80,000 

Great Britain 25,000 

France 13.000 

Italy 4.rK)0 

On the basis of this allocation the activities of the International 
Tin Executive would have meant a saving in our war i)urchases for 
1919 aggregating not less than $75,000,000. 

In September the AVar Industries Board requested the American 
Iron and Steel Institute to assume charge of the importation, financ- 



148 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

ing, and distribution of the imports of pig tin under its supervision; 
and the United States Steel Products Co. -was made a medium 
through which the work was carried out. The company agreed to 
receive and pay at the source for the tin allocated to the United States 
under the international agreement, and to distribute this tin at cost 
to all consumers, jobbers, and dealers in the United States who had 
first received purchasing licenses from the chief in charge of tin 
of the War Industries Board. The War Trade Board issued rulino 
No. 307, restricting importations to this company as consignee. 

Applications for licenses to purchase were conditioned upon the 
filing on the part of the applicant of complete reports on stocks 
consumption, etc. The applications were required to state the 
quantity and brand of tin, the use to which it was to be put, and the 
time during which the metal would be consumed. Each applicant 
had to pledge not to sell without express permission of the Board. 
The buyer was required first to present his application to the sup- 
plier, who would indicate the terms under which he would furnishi 
the tin. He would then return it to the section chief for approval 
No licenses were required for purchases of less than 5 gross tons. 

By the 1st of December, 1918, the tin executive had allocated a lot 
of 10,169 gross tons of tin to the United States. This consignment 
was handled by the United States Steel Products Co., being dis- 
tributed to consumers, jobbers, and dealers in the United States hold- 
ing licenses at the tentative price 72| cents a pound ex dock, New 
York. On the final settlement the pric^ was calculated at 69.46876 
cents a pound. 

Another important phase of the work of the section was that oJ 
encouraging and directing economies in the use of tin and in the 
recovery of scrap. To accomplish this the Tin Section suggested tc 
the various principal trades using tin that each form a war service 
committee to represent them. About 12 committees of this kind die 
very important conservation work. 

ALUMINUM. 

In 1885, 23 pounds of aluminum were produced in the Unitec 
States; in 1896, 1,000,000 pounds; and in 1918, 130,000,000 pounds 
The industry in the United States is in the hands of one concern 
the Aluminum Co. of America, which owns numerous plants in th( 
United States and one in Quebec, Canada. It is the sole producer o: 
virgin metal and it controls properties covering practically everj^ stej' 
and process in the industry from the mining of bauxite ore througl 
the finished castings and utensils. It controls several hydroelectri< 
f)0wer companies and electric transmission companies supplyin<. 
power to the aluminum smelting plants. Power was the limiting 
factor in increasing production for the war. 



AMERICAN IXDrSTHY IN THK \V.\i;. \4\) 

The chief Avar use for aluininiini was in the inanufactiire of 
aiiinional, whieli is a mixture of ahnninum dust and ainnu)niuni 
nitrate, used in the manufacture of munitions. Other military uses 
were for fuses, Hayers, castings for engines, personal equipment, mess 
t(|iiipment. and as a deoxidizer in steel manufacturing. Its pcace- 
liiue uses include cooking utensils, castings for engines, automobile 
bodies and mud guards, electrical transmission lines, paints, and 
ornaments. 

Not enough aluminum could be produced to supply the war neeils 
ourselves and the Allies and at the same time supply normal 
'lian requirements. Hence the control to be exercised by the 
iMiard had to be directed chiefly to two problems: Control of distri- 
i'ution and control of prices. The Board also assisted the Aluminum 
I'.), of America in securing power for increased production and 
mcouraged the recovery of secondary metal from scrap. 

The normal prewar price of aluminum is about 20 cents per pound. 
^\'hen this country entered the w^ar open-market prices were about 
Ci> cents, while contract j^rices ranged around 38 cents.^ 
The war requirements for aluminum were being studied by the 
1 1 commissioner of raw materials of the Council of National Defense 
q in March, 1917, and on April 25, 1917. with the market at CO cents, 
■i ! Mr. Davis, president of the Aluminum Co. of America, offered to 
J 'provide the United States Government with whatever it wanted for 
H its preparedness campaign at whatever price the Government should 
i\ put upon it. This offer was accepted for 2,000,000 pounds of alumi- 
il| num ingots at 27| cents a pound, and a few days later enlarged to 
\\ 8,000,000 pounds, to be delivered before August of that year. In Sep- 
tember, 1917, the company agreed with the War Industries Board 
"to accept direct and indirect orders at the prevailing contract 
prices" (38 cents), and to refund to the Government any difference 
which might exist between this contract price and any fixed price 
which might be decided upon at a later date. 

Meanwhile the Federal Trade Commission had been studying the 
costs of production of the Aluminum Co. of America with a view 
to furnishing data for price fixing. The data were received by the 
; War Industries Board early in 1918, and a price of 32 cents per 
: pound was recommended on February 28, and approved by the 
j President on March 2. On May 9, the question of renewal of the 
; fixed price was brought before the price-fixing committee. The pro- 
I ducers presented facts to show that they had been compelled to 
: enlarge their plants to meet the increasing war needs, and that the 
! large cost involved would warrant an advance of 3 cents per pound 
; to the price schedules which expired on June 1 ; they showed in par- 

r * In normal times the bulk of tbc aluminum output Ir nold through contrortR wlilcli are 
I usuallr made earlv in the vear and cover doliverios for the entire ve«r. 



150 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

ticular that the Allies were paying much higher prices from otlier 
sources. A compromise was reached at 33 cents, and this was con- 
tinued until March 1, 1919. 

The control over the distribution of aluminum was secured through 
priority certificates and by a working agreement between the Board 
and the Aluminiun Co. of America, whereby the latter exercised 
certain discretion in the classification of priorities. All purchases 
were made directly from the Aluminum Co. at the fixed prices. 
There was never any real shortage for war requirements during the 
period, though there were occasional delays in delivery due to rail- 
road congestion and lack of power at the smelting plants. Very, 
close control, however, had to be exercised over the distribution of I 
the output, and many restrictions were imposed on its use for non- 
essential purposes. Aluminum was handled by the Board in the Non- 
ferrous Metals Division by Pope Yeatman and his assistants. 



Lead was one of the commodities taken up in the days just before 
we entered the war by the raw-materials committee and the General 
Munitions Board of the council. The producers, under the leadcrsliip 
of Mr. Crane of the St. Joseph Lead Co., came forward and offered 
to sell to the Government such quantities as were needed at a price 
to be set by the Government. 

On the face of things lead should not have been a serious 
problem. In 1913 the United States produced 32.4 per cent of the 
world's output. The process of production is simple and inex- 
pensive and supply is normally very responsive to demand. But 
July 1, 1917, saw lead quoted at 11.17 cents per pound — 160 per cent 
above average prewar prices. This situation was caused by the com- 
bined circumstances of a European demand, which was never prop- 
erly calculated or announced in such a way as to produce a steady 
flow of the material, together with strike trouble, transportation 
trouble anvi indefinite guessing on the part of the tfade as to the 
quantities which the United States would demand for the war. Im- 
portant reductions, during our period in the war, in the use of 
shrapnel affected very materially the demand for lead. 

In May, 1917, the General Munitions Board considered the ques- 
tion of commandeering supplies for the Government. Discussions 
with the trade, however, brought about a contract on June 18, 1917, 
for 8,000 tons, July delivery, and 25.000 tons each for August, Septem- 
ber, and October deliveries, at 8 cents a pound. Immediately prices 
began to fall and reached 6.71 cents in September. Price fixing was 
suggested in October, but was not found necessary, for by that time 
there was a large supply of lead in the market and there was little 
probability of a new inflation of prices. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TlIK WAR. 151 

It seemed desirable, however, to devise a workinji!; proj^rani l)y 
which the Government should not be paying higher than market 
prices for its lead. The method adopted amounted to a series of 
four-month agreements between the Government and the various 
lead producers, arranged through the section and the lead producers 
committee for war service representing the trade, in terms of which 
the Government agreed to purchase at average current monthly 
prices as they appeared in the Engineering and Mining Journal, and 
the producers agreed to supply at these prices from a minimum of 
6.000 to a maximum of 12,000 tons each month. 

On the 15th of each month the lead producers committee was in- 
formed, through the section, of the approximate amounts re(iuirod 
by each Government purchasing department for the ensuing month. 
The last four-month agreement expired November 30, 1918. The 
price never exceeded 7.75 cents per pound East St. Louis or 8.05 cents 
New York. The total direct purchases by the Government from 
July, 1917, to November, 1918, amounted to 150,400 tons. 

It was believed in October, 1917, that the definition of Government 
requirements and method of reaching prices would stabilize the 
market and insure a steady supply to meet all needs, but the freight 
congestion of early 191 S upset calculations, and in the spring the 
increased military program l>oth increased and made speculative the 
demand. A strike tied up the second largest producer during the 
greater part of March and April, and labor had become so scarce 
that it seemed impossible to increase the output during tlie summer. 

The only solution seemed to be to ration lead to all consumers on 
the basis of their essential needs. The problem was worked out by 
the Lead Section, with Irwin H. Cornell as chief, acting under the 
Nonferrous Metals Division, in connection with the lead producers 
committee for war service, representing the industry. The com- 
mittee handled directly the control over distribution, subject to 
the section's supervision and occasional alteration. No priority 
certificates were used. The committee was warned tliat the in- 
dustry must keep prices below excessive levels or price fixing would 
be resorted to. 

On June 14 the committee agreed to sell no pig lead higher tiian 
7.75 cents per pound I^ast St. Louis, or 8.05 cents New York, and 
the Engineering and Mining Journal consented to consider no sales 
made at a higher figure in computing its monthly average price 
at St. Louis. Under this arrangement prices remained unchanged 
until the end. 

Sheet-load production increased from 15,000 tons in 1914 to .'>.'i.000 
tons in 1918, due to the building and expansion of acid plants work- 
ins" in the manufacture of exnlosivp<i 



152 AMERICAN IXDUSTEY IN THE WAB. 

NICKEL. 

About 75 per cent of the nickel consumed in the United States is 
used in the manufacture of nickel steel. Nickel steel is used in armor 
plate, ordnance of all sorts, structural work, bridges, railroad rails, 
steel castings, engine forgings, shafting, and axles where a steel 
capable of withstanding repeated and alternating strains is neces- 
saiy. German silver uses another 10 or 12 per cent of our consump- 
tion. This alloy is used as a base for silver-plated ware. Monel 
metal, an alloy containing 67 per cent nickel, 28 per cent copper, and 
6 per cent iron and cobalt, has been found to resist successfully the 
corrosive effect of salt water, and is used extensively for propellers 
and propeller shafts of warships and for valve stems and other small 
metal parts underwater. 

The war required directly or indirectly nearly 90 per cent of our 
nickel supply, but the problem of controlling the price and distribu- 
tion was a very simple one, because the country's f)roduction is prac- 
tically all in the hands of one company, the International Nickel Co. 
This company brings the raw material, in the form of " matte " and 
ore, from the Sudbury deposits, Ontario, Canada, and refines them 
at Bayonne, N. J. A small quantity of matte comes also from New 
Caledonia and from Tasmania. Perhaps 1 per cent comes as a by- 
product in the electrolytic refining of copper. 

The only severe shortage felt by the Government during the war 
was in electrolytic nickel, required for the fabrication of cupro- 
nickel for bullet jackets. The war demands were met largely by 
radically curtailing nonessential consumption. The International 
Nickel Co. was required to submit to the War Industries Board all 
orders which were not reallj'' required for war work. The company 
frequently declined orders, which they knew would be disapproved^ 
without even submitting them. The companj?^ also, under the direc- 
tions of the priorities commissioner, administered priority of de- 
liveries, and except in a few cases priority certificates were not used. 

No formal price fixing was resorted to, because on August 15. 1917,. 
the International Nickel Co. arranged to supply the Government 
requirement at 40 cents a pound, which was 20 per cent below market 
quotations and slightly lower than the prewar average. The cost of 
production was studied during the winter, and on January 8, 1918, 
the company made an agreement with the War Industries Board ta 
supply the United States and the Allies at the rate of 35 cents per 
pound for ingot or pig nickel, 38 cents for shot, and 40 cents for elec- 
trolytic, f. o. b. Bayonne. These prices remained throughout the 
war. No. prices were fixed to the public, but sales for nonwar con- 
sumption were very small. The total output for 1917 is estimated 
at 63,000,000 pounds. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TllK WAlt. 153 

QUICJCSII-MCU. 

The most important use for quicksilver, or mercurv. in the war 
vas in the production of the chemical salt known as fulminate of 
nercury. used as the detonatinjif afjent in cartrid«res, shells, and 
p-enades. Another larce use, which was developed late in the war, 
,vas in the manufacture of cellulose acetate, or "dope," wi(h which 
lirplane Avinf;:s were painted. 

Mercury is marketed in 75-pound flasks. Domestic production 
ncreased in the United States from 20,000 flasks in 1918, when it 
(vas about 16 per cent of the world's output, to about 36,000 flasks 
in 1917 and 1918. We imported over 5,000 flasks in 1917 and more 
''' in 1918. The domestic market in peace time consumes about 20,000 
Basks. The war requirement was estimated for 1919 at 81,000 flasks. 
Prices of quicksilver fluctuated considerably during the war period. 
In fact, they were eight times prewar normal at one time in 1916, but 
tjiey had receded to normal by the spring of 1917. During 1917 
prices rose and were irregular. Price fixing was considered, but 
"'' because the war program was absorbing less than 40 per cent of the 
supply and there was no real shortage, formal price fixing was not 
resorted to. Stabilitj- was obtained wlien, in April, 1918, the Board, 
through ]SIr. Yeatman, called together the producers, and they agi-eed 
to sell mercury to the Government at $105 per flask, ]Mare Island, 
Calif., and $105.75 Brooklyn, and they further agreed informally 
not to let the outside market go beyond $125 to $180 per flask. The 
Board, through Mr. Yeatman, met the importers a few days later 
and reached the same agreement Avith them. The average price in 
New York for the year 1918 was $38.85 per flask. 

The importers agreed to supply 40 per cent of their product, and 

the producers contracted for definite amounts, with specified monthly 

deliveries approximating 40 per cent of the 1917 production. All 

supplies were taken over by the Government through the Navy 

I Department. No further control over distribution was needed. 

ANXriMONY. 

Antimony is used as an alloy to give hardness to other metals. 
About 70 per cent of the available supply was used in the military 
program, principally to harden the lead of shrapnel bullets. Its 

' I principal civilian use is in the form of antimonial lead, used a?: type 
metal. Antimony-tin-copper and antimony-tin-lead alloys are fa- 
miliar as bearing metals. Only a small quantity has ever been pro- 

' duced in this country, because it is cheaper to import it from Europe 

' and China. During the war most of our supply came from the Far 

t East in Japanese bottoms. 



154 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

We produced 2,441 tons and imported 11,286 tons in 1917. Ther 
Avas no shortaj^e during the Avar, though the stocks in Avarehouse 
decreased. Prices fluctuated considerably during the period, reach 
ing their peak at 34.66 cents a pound in April, 1917. PreAvar nor 
mal AA'as about 6.36 cents per pound. From July, 1917, ouAA^ard th 
trend of the market Avas steadily cToAvnAvard. The military demand 
Avere not as great as had been expected, there Avere abundant sup 
plies, and keen competition of importers for GoA-ernment busines 
kept prices low. Very little Avas sold to the public during th 
period. 

PLATINUM. 

When Mr. Baruch and Mr. Summers began their iiiA^estigations anc 
discussions in February, 1917, about raAV materials essential to thi 
Avar, vrhose supply Avas likely to be a problem, platinum Avas amon^ 
the commodities Avhich Avere giA'en serious consideration. 

There are only about eight or ten million ounces of recovere( 
platinum in the Avorld, and Russia is the chief source of supply 
Platinum is an essential in the contact process of making concen 
trated sulphuric and nitric acids. It was going to be needed in th 
new nitrogen-fixation plants Avhich were contemplated. Platinun 
is essential for contact points of magnetos used in airplanes, trucks 
tractors, automobiles, and gas engines generally. In making bi< 
guns exact heats haA^e to be maintained at certain stages of th( 
process, and it has been found that platinum wire in the thermo 
couple is the only substance yet discovered which can stand up sub 
stantially under the scA'ere heat. The metal is irreplaceable in th< 
chemical laboratory. 

American dentistry normally consumes about 30,000 ounces an 
nually, and the jewelry trade in prosperous times will consume al 
that it can get. 

The 1913 production in Russia Avas 250,000 ounces and in Colombia 
15,000 ounces. Other places produced a few hundred ounces. Ba 
1916 the Russian output had decreased to 63,000 ounces, and that o: 
Columbia increased to 25,000 ounces. Other production was negligi 
ble. The production of platinum in the United States from scrap ma 
terial increased under the efforts of the War Industries Board fron 
40,000 ounces in 1914 to 59,000 ounces in 1917. This result was ob 
tained chiefly by conditioning in many instances the release of plati 
num upon the ability to furnish scrap in exchange. 

The prospect of a failure of the Russian supply early in the wa 
pointed to the necessity of Government control OA^er a large part o 
the platinum already in the country. Through the efforts of Mr 
Summers, supported by the Secretary of Commerce, F. W. Drapei 
brought in 21,000 ounces of platinum from Russia in December, 1917 



AMERICAN INOUSTKY IX TlIK WAK. 155 

It hud been collected -with the aiil of other American engineers and 
the Eussian-Enalish Bank of Petrograd. 

The exact military and other essential requirements were not 
definitely known in the earlier period of the war. But it was the 
ubject of the Boaril not only to meet all demands, but gradually to 
build up an available reserve in case the war should last several years. 
This importation was an encouraging aid. The stocks were bought 
by the Government. It was decided in the winter of 1917 and 1918 
that requisitions would be required to meet the steady increasing de- 
mands of the war. The first requisition order was issued to 14 firms 
on February 23, 1918. 

Platinum was handled by Mr. Summers until ^larch, 1918, when 
it was turned over to the Platinum Section with C. H. Conner in 
1 large. The first requisition order did not seem to be affording suffi- 
itiit control of the situation, and on May 1, 1918, order No. 104, 
addressed to 947 firms, was issued. In this order iridium and pal- 
ladium were included. The very rare metals, iridium and palladium, 
■are used in small quantities as alloys with platinum to give hardness. 
These two requisition orders brought 59,G90 ounces of platinum under 
control by June 30. On July 1, 1918, another requisition order, No. 
"42. was issued to 1.555 firms, supposed to be 90 per cent of all firms 
')ing business in platinum. 

The supplies, through the requisition orders, were gradually con- 
' titrated in the United States assay office in New York and in the 
inds of the large refiners. The stocks in the assay office were allo- 
tted for direct Government work with little formality. But in 
oriler to distribute intelligently to essential industries tlie rest of the 
supply, printed forms of application for release and a system of 
questionnaires were drawn up. Releases were issued on the infor- 
mation contained in these sworn statements. Each application was 
carefully examined to determine the purpose for which the metals 
wore to be used, and there was further investigation of the facts 
wherever it was thought necessary. In this way unessential uses 
\vere eliminated and economy in essential uses was enforced. 

-Vs a further safeguard to the supply of platinum, a licensing sys- 
tem was set up under the explosives act of October G, 1917, as 
amended July 1, 1918. The rules and regidations of this system, 
designed to limit further the sales, possession, and use of the metal, 
became effective on October 1, 1918. All persons or firms who used 
any appreciable amount of plantinum in their business were required 
to take out a license, and an inventory of stocks was required to 
accompany the application for, a license. It was estimated that 
between 150,000 and 200.000 licenses would be taken out and that this 
system would give a very complete survey of the metal in the country, 
placing it in a status more or less available for Government use when 



156 AMEEICAX IXDUSTEY IK THE WAR. 

necessary. Only about 3,000 licenses, however, were issued befoK 
the armistice was signed. 

The section devoted no little attention to the question of conserva 
tion of platinum. The use of any platiniun, iridium, or palladiuir 
m the manufacture, alteration, or repair of any article of jewelry oi 
ornament was prohibited, although no jewelry was ever requisitioned 
Releases Avere refused for the use of platinum in contact points foi 
magnetos for pleasure cars, for electric bells, for various kinds ol 
clocks, electric signs, and other devices. The use of pure platinuir 
in the dental profession was eliminated, as was the use of alloys 
containing more than 40 per cent. The substitution of perchloric 
acid for platinum chloride in the determination of potassium salts 
was urged. The chemical industry was also requested to substitute 
a palladium-gold alloy for platinum crucibles and dishes in manj 
instances where the substitute would work. It is estimated that in 
the summer of 1918 these conservations were enough to offset 50 pei 
cent of the essential requirements. 

The normal prewar price of refined platinum was $43.86 per troj 
ounce. By the spring of 1918 it was selling at $108, and had beer 
over $100 since the beginning of 1917. The rise had been more oi 
less steady since the end of 1915. On May 1, 1918, after a series oi 
conferences with the trade, the following maximum prices wert 
fixed: Platinum, $105 per troy ounce; palladium, $135; iridium, $175 
Payments for the requisitioned metals were made through the Ord- 
nance Department. Price fixing expired December 1, 1918. The 
rapid rise in prices, even before the United States entered the war, 
was due to two principal causes: The supply from Russia became 
more and more uncertain and domestic consumption was considerably 
increased both on account of the construction of new sulphuric and 
nitric acid plants for the manufacture of explosives for the Allies 
and because the increasing prosperity of the country w^as greatly 
stimulating the demand for platinum jewelry. An international 
platinum executive was in process of being formed in London when 
the war came to an end. 



C IIAITKU 5. 

CHEMICALS FOR MUNITIONS. 



As early as April, 1917. a chemicals coiniuittee. with L. L. 

I Summers at the head, was former to serve untler the Raw Materials 

I ■ Division of the council. In November, 1917, Charles II. MacDowcll, 

.1 a member of the chemicals committee, was requested to handle 

J nitrates and other chemicals for explosives, and a subdivision was 

[organized called the Chemicals and Explosives Section. During the 

[•early winter the Chemicals and Explosives Section formed, with the 

War and Navy Departments, the "joint office on chemical statistics" 

for the purpose of eliminating duplication in questionnaires nn-l 

I compilation of statistical data. The membership of the section was 

gradually increased during the winter as new problems arose. In 

■ the spring the section Avas reorganized into the Chemicals Division 

eel . *■ " c-> 

with numerous subordinate sections in charge of particular chemi- 
if -cals. Charles H. MacDowell was made Director of Chemicals, and 
the Director of Chemicals was made a member of the Conservation 
Division as well as the Requirements Division. 

As the work undertaken by this division covers a wide and impor- 
tant field, it will be convenient for the purposes of this report to 
divide the account into three chapters. One will refer to those 
•chemicals more nearly related to the production of powder and 
explosives, the other two to such additional chemical industries 
as had to be brought under control for the purposes of the war. 

For chemicals used in explosives the following sections were 
formed: Nitrate of Soda. Sulphur and Pyrites, Acids and Heavy 
Chemicals, Alkali and Chlorine. Ethyl Alcohol, and Explosives. The 
work of the Section on Cotton Linters will also be presented in this 
•chapter, because of its close relation to the other subjects. 

NITRATK OF SOOA. 

The world's supply of nitrate of soda comes from deposits in 
Chile. In normal times about GO per cent of our importations is 
devoted to the production of fertilizers. In 191:^ we brought in 
625,000 tons. But orders of the Allies with American munitions 
manufacturers had brought this figure up to 1,21 8,42.'^ tons in 19 IG. 
For our country and the Allies, Chilean nitrate was practically the 
only source during the war for the nitric acid essential to all powders 
and explosives. Germany produced nitric acid by nitrogen-fixation 
processes, without which she perhaps could not have carried on the 

r.: 



158 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAi.. 

war. America started three fixation plants, but none of them were 
completed before the armistice. 

The problem of nitrate of soda had two aspects, (1) shipping and 
(2) purchasing in Chile.^ The Chilean market is small and cen- 
tralized, and thus with the various Allies and the American import- 
ers buying for the Government and private consumption alike, each 
bidding against the other, prices rose rapidly. They were 57 per 
cent above the normal in the spring of 1917; by September they 
had become more than twice the average for 1913. It was clearly 
necessary to eliminate this haphazard competitive system of buying. 

Before the war Germany took about one-third of Chile's output 
for fertilizer purposes. The German oficinas" in Chile were oper- 
ating on a much reduced scale when we entered the war. During the 
summer of 1917 an effort was made, through the American importers, 
to have the Chilean Government seize these plants and reopen them 
in order to supply the ever-increasing demand. This was not effected. 
Some of the German oficinas continued to operate, but their produc- 
tion was limited by their inability to secure necessary supplies. Some 
of the stocks produced by the German oficinas were secured by 
authorized American importers for shipment to the United States.. 
But even with this added supply the increasing competition among 
the buyers, together with the shortage of fuel, of sacks, and of rail 
transportation from the refineries to the coast, kept Chilean prices 
continuously increasing. 

In October, 1917, negotiations began between the United States, 
England, France, and Italy to pool all allied bujdng, and purchases 
in Chile were curtailed during the remaining months of the year 
while the buying pool was being perfected. Prices for 1917 reached 
their maximum in October. Buying under the pool began in Janu- 
ary, 1918, and continued through the war. The pool took the form 
of an appointment of a nitrate executive in London, headed by Her- 
bert Gibbs, of Antony Gibbs & Co. Eobert P. Skinner, United States 
consul general in London, was appointed American representative 
on the executive. 

The first thought was to have the nitrate executive do all of the 
buying in Chile with an arrangement for reselling to each partici- 
pating country. This plan gave way, however, so far as our country 
was concerned, to one according to which each of our importers 
bought, under the sole direction of the Nitrate Executive, a designated 
share of the total purchases allocated to the United States by the 
executive, and all prices were pooled. This kept the regular Ameri- 

' See Appendix XLII for a more exhaustive account of the solution of the nitrate 
problem. 

" An ofieina is a plant in which the raw nitrate of soda, as it is taken from the ground. 
Is refined by dissolving it in warm water and allowing recrystalization as the water ia 
evaporated off. 



I AMERICAN INOUSTRV IX THE WAR. 159 

'^^lian buyers in the nuuket during the life of the pool. The four 

"iiicipal importers of the country were designated as sole pur- 

ing agents of the nitrate executive for its operations in behalf 

. the United States, and it was arranged that each should handle 

lio following percentages of the total allocated to us: Du Pont 

;;ite Co., 33^ per cent; W. R. Grace & Co., 3G3 per cent; Wessel, 

\A & Co., 11^ per cent; and Anthony Gibbs & Co., through H. J. 

;;i!cor & Bro., agents, I85 per cent. 

In order to coordinate the work of the American importers, cal- 
". iiilnte prices, allocate shipping, etc., the nitrate committee of the 
pi: United States was established in New York with H. Ray Paige, 
'?; ;^epresentative of the War Industries Board, as manager. The com- 
ttf Inittee was composed of two representatives from each of the four 
''i importers in addition to Mr. Paige.^ After the War Industries Board 
iz Iwas dissolved, January 1, 1919, Mr. Paige remained to liquidate the 
K jiffairs of the committee, functioning as a member of the War Trade 
1 JBoard. 

In Washington, Charles H. MacDowell was in charge of nitrate 
for the War Industries Board throughout the war. He remained 
!i bhief of the Nitrate Section even after he became director of the 
Chemicals Division. As early as April, 1917, the raw materials viivi- 
3 |sion made an important move to relieve the nitrate situation, and 
!;:jit will be seen that this importing arrangement was only a con- 
; [.summation of the early plan. The division announced to all manu- 
;, !facturers about to talce contracts for munitions with the United States 
? ;that they need not cover their nitrates by option or by inquiry, but 
t ithat the Government would guarantee a sufficient supply at 4| cents 
i [per pound. This was for the purpose of quieting the market, though 
• a way for making good on it had not yet been worked out. There 
iKvas, however, a definite nitrate differential for each kind of powder 
■ "and explosive, so that should the United States have to \)ny more 
i I than 4] cents it would be only a matter of accounting in the price 
ijof powder. As a matter of fact, the Government settled all of these 
I contracts in December with a price of 4i cents, having lowered the 
I Chilean prices. 

j Under the pooling arrangement the four importers agreed to buy 
in Chile such quantities of nitrate of soda as were allocated to each, 
'ship it to the United States, and deliver as directed by the War 
1 Industries Board (1) to the Government at actual cost i)lus out-of- 
pocket expenses and (2) to other consumers at landed co.st plus a 
I gro.ss commission of 2J per cent. Arrangements were nuide whereby 
I the cost of the nitrate was averaged over each month of purchase. 

•The membership of the committee was F. O. Fischer and II. J. RoIr. of W. R. Grace 
& Co. ; .T. B. D, Edge and W. A. Murphy, of Du Pont Nitrate Co. ; G. L. Duviil and 
P. W. Alexander, of Wossel, Duval & Co. ; L. B. Chandler, of Antony GIbbs & Co. ; F. M. 
Smith, of II. .7. Baker & Bro.; and H. Hay I'aij,'e, of the War Industries Board. 



160 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

The contract and arrangement with the importers covered the audit- 
ing of their accounts from time to time to verify costs and other con- 
ditions surrounding importation. 

The nitrate executive in London calculated monthly prices in 
Chile, all purchases being averaged each month. The nitrate com- 
mittee in New York calculated monthly prices delivered at American 
ports and warehouses. The Shipping Board established uniform 
shipping rates from Chile to the United States, which simplified the 
calculations somewhat. Computation of American prices Avas very 
difficult and involved. It was impossible to reach final figures within 
a reasonable time for the importers to bill their sales. During the 
first four months of 1918 bills were rendered, some at the tentative 
monthly price of 4.25 cents per pound, others at 4.35 cents. From 
May forward a tentative monthly price was fixed by the committee.^ 
It was the understanding that refunds would be made, so as to 
adjust those prices to actual costs, as stated above. Final United 
States landed pool prices were calculated by the committee and 
announced from time to time, the work being concluded in the spring 
of 1919.* 

Purchases made by the American importers in 1917 for delivery in 
Chile in 1918 were placed in the pool as to quantity, but not as to 
price. All purchases made during 1918 were made under the pool. 
In October, 1917, as a preliminary to the formation of the pool, 
arrangements were made by which the Department of Agriculture 
was to get, through the Du Pont Co., 109,000 long tons of nitrate of 
soda for distribution to the farmers during the spring of 1918. Only 
67,000 tons of this was delivered in the spring, the rest being post- 
poned until fall. Because of the serious shortage of ships during the 
late winter and spring of 1918, and the shortage of nitrate in France 
on account of sinkings and other difficulties, some of this agricultural 
nitrate, as well as other Government nitrate (61,000 tons in all), was 
diverted to France. Our war stocks became very low at this time; 
there was only about a 6-weeks' supply on May 1, 1918. 

Early in the summer of 1918 a shortage of coal, fuel oil, bags, and 
railroad equipment began to be felt in the nitrate fields of Chile. 
This region is arid and produces none of these supplies. The 
Chilean Government approached the United States Government with 
a special contract providing for the sale of 680,000 gross tons of 
nitrate of soda on condition that certain of these supplies would be 
furnished in return. The Nitrate Section made arrangements 
through the London executive, the American importers, and the 

«See Appendix XXIII for table of tentative United States landed pool prices for 
nitrate of soda. 

* See Appendix XXIV for table of final United States landed pool prices for nitrate 
of soda. 



AMERICAN IXDUSTKV IN TllK WAR. IGI 

riorities commissioner of tlio Ijoaid io uccvpt this contract ami haw 
s terms carried out. 

The Nitrate Section of the Board lvei)t in close touch with the nitrate 
ommittee in New York and the nitrate executive in London, <4i\ in;^ 
urrent advices to the nitrate executive on the condition of stocks iu 
le United States: requirements, shipments, stocks on luind, consumj)- 
iou, etc. When the shipping control committee would allocate ves- 
pIs for the trade, Mr. Paige in New York would arrange to have the 
essels assigned to the four importers according to their tonnage 
equirements for the account of the Army, the Navy, or the importer's 
wn account. 

Distribution to munitions plants and to acid plants producing for 
aunitions was carefully watched to see that they were never short, 
ven if private industries had to be curtailed. The section brought 
efore the priorities commissioner the question of securing priority 
ertificates for fuel, machinery, and railroad supplies for the nitrate 
elds. 

The principal war use of nitrate of soda is for the production of 
itric acid, which is used in a mixture of 30 per cent nitric acid and 
per cent sulphuric acid for the nitrating process in the manufac 
ure of powder and explosives. Bleached cotton linters are nitrated 
vith this mixed acid to produce nitrocellulose powder, which is the 
hief propellant. Toluol is nitrated to produce T. N. T., phenol to 
)roduce picric acid, and so on. Nitrate of soda is also required for 
;he manufacture of sulphuric acid by the chamber process, 98,000 
ons being consumed in this country in 1917 for this purpose. About 
97,000 tons were used in 1917 for the production of nitric acid. The 
arger powder companies make their own sulphuric and nitric acid at 
heir respective powder and exjjlosives plants. 

SULPHUR AND PYRITES. 

The sulphuric acid requirement of the United States for 1918 
neasured in terms of 50° Baume acid was estimated at 9,000,000 tons. 
This was more than double normal consumption. But the adjust- 

ent in the industry, which the situation required, was even more 
ignificant, for prior to 1917 about 60 per cent of the sulphuric acid 
onsumed in the United States was made from pyrites ore imported 
Tom Spain, and these importations had to be largely cut off to save 
hipping. Pyrites ore from Canada continued to come in during the 
var, in fact its importation was greatly increased. 

The main sources of sulphur for this country' are (1) imported 
ipanish j^yrites ore, (2) pure brimstone from Louisiana and Texas, 
3) Canadian pyrites ore, (4) domestic i)y rites ore, (5) waste gases 
t copper and zinc smelters. With the increasing re(iuiri'nient and 
10582&— 21 11 



162 AMERICAN IXDUSTIIY IN THE WAR. 

the decreasing Spanish supply, the problem of the Board was tu 
develop the other sources. Canadian imports were increased con-' 
siderably, and the production of domestic pyrites Avas increased; but 
the real solution lay in the limitless resources of pure brimstone in 
Texas and in Louisiana. The attention of the board was turned 
chiefly to these sources. There are large deposits of pyrites in Cali- 
fornia and Colorado, but the sulphuric acid plants of the country are 
chiefly in the East, and shortage of transportation made a large de-j 
Aelopment of these properties inadvisable. 

Prior to the organization of tlie Chemicals and Explosives Section, 
a subcommittee of the chemicals committee of the council handled the 
distribution of foreign pyrites ore. This committee also, in May, 
1917, arranged Avith the sulphur producers for the shipment of sul- 
phur to fertilizer plants, on approval of the fertilizer subcommittee, 
at a price of $22 per long ton at mines. No shipments were made to 
plants having pyrites on hand but, as fast as stocks were used up, 
sulphur was substituted. The chemicals committee issued a pamphlet 
showing how to turn pyrites burners to sulphur burning at a mini- 
mum of expense and time. When the chemicals committee was dis- 
continued, the Chemical Alliance (Inc.), which followed it, continued 
to distribute sulphur under this agreement. With the reorganization 
of the Board in the spring of 1918, the Sulphur and Pyrites Section 
Avas organized under the direction of William G. Woolfolk. 

The section undertook to make a careful survey of the situation 
Avith a vicAV to further control if necessary. The question of com- 
mandeering the stocks and plants of the Union Sulphur Co. and the 
Freeport Sulphur Co. was considered and abandoned. Instead of 
this, a plan was worked out in a series of meetings, conducted by the 
section Avith a committee of the Chemical Alliance (Inc.), and repre- 
sentatives of the Kailroad Administration and Shipping Board, 
under which the production and distribution of sulphur materials 
should be definitely controlled by the section in conjunction Avith the 
committee. A program of shipments to the various acid plants of the 
country, shoAving tonnage month by month for the remainder of 1918, 
was Avorked out and published August 1. 

No prices Avere fixed formally, but the price of $22 per long ton 
for Government purchases Avas continued throughout the year, and 
the control of supplies and their allocation to essential consumers 
only had the effect of establishing " contract" prices, though market 
quotations throughout the year stood around $35 per ton. The nor- 
mal preAvar price of crude sulphur Avas $22 per long ton, and it re- 
mained at that figure until the beginning of 1916. 

In exercising its control over sulphur, the section had in mind (1) 
to conserve and use to the best advantage Avater and rail transporta- 
tion facilities by requiring materials of the highest sulphur content; 



AMEIJICAN INDlSTItV IN TilK WAlt. 1C3 

■(2) to cons^crve tran-portatii)!! thr()ii«^li the use of siilpliiif mntcM-ials 
availahie at points nearest points ol" consumption; (H) to im-rease 
j)n>tliJction of properties where it was practicable; (4) to inciease the 
stocks at important (lovernment and private consumers' phints be- 
fore winter weather slioukl interfere with transportation; (.">) to 
stabilize prices; and (6) to cooperate with the War Trade Boartl in 
controllin<r exports. At the time of the armistice there were heavy 
stocks at most of the consumers' plants and there was no serious 
problem on the dockets. 

ACIDS AND HEAVY CHEMICALS. 

The work of this section was devoted to the question of the pro- 
duction of sulphuric and nitric acids. Statistics were had on muri- 
atic acid, but no control was found necessary. Prices were fixed on 
both of these acids, and the section made exhaustive studies in this 
connection. But perhaps the most valuable part of the work con- 
sisted of the studies and recommendations made in connection with 
the development of the sulphuric acid plants of the country. The 
production of nitric acid was always limited by the supply of 
nitrate of soda and sulphuric acid, 100 pounds of each being re- 
quired for every 95 pounds of nitric acid. 

The section was formed T\nth A. E. Brunker as chief in April, 
10 IS. E. S. Hubbard was assistant chief. Before that time the acid 
problems Avere handled for the Board by the Chemicals and Explo- 
sives Section in cooperation with the committee on acids of the Chem- 
ical Alliance (Inc.). The earliest action was devoted chiefly to 
economizing in tank cars by ordering acid shipments from the near- 
est plants irrespective of contracts calling for cross hauls. 

The consumption of sulphuric acid in industry in this country, as 
e-timated in the summer of 1918, was as follows: (1) Explosives 
(directly or indirectly), including phenol and nitric acid, 35 per cent; 
(2) feitilizers, 27.8 per cent; (3) oil refineries, 11.2 per cent; (-1) 
drugs and chemicals, including hydrochloric acid, nitric acid for 
purposes other than explosives, and ammonium sulphate, 9.0 per 
cent; (5) steel pickling and galvanizing, 9.1 per cent; (6) miscel- 
laneous, 7.3 per cent. It is estimated that 1,640,000 tons (calculated 
as 100 per cent II.SO4) were consumed in military explosives in 
1918. 

The question of the location of new suli)huric acid plants was 
important. It was much more expensive and troublesome to trans- 
port the acid than to transport the raw materials for its manufac- 
ture. Hence, the cost of a new acid plant had to be constantly 
weighed against the importance of having one near an explosives 
plant. During the first nine months of 1918 additions were made 



164 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, 

to acid plants at the various works of the Du Pont Co., the Hercules 
Co., the Atlas Co., the General Chemical Co., and various small pro- 
ducers. The Government built acid plants in connection with the 
smokeless-powder plants at Nashville, Tenn., and Nitro, W. Va. 

The total plant capacity of the country increased from 427,000 
tons per month (measured as 100 per cent H^SO^) on January 1, 
1918, to 501,000 tons per month on November 1, 1918, The capacity 
at Government plants was 55,000 tons, and the remainder, 388,000 
tons per month, was in the hands of commercial manufacturers. 
Plants were under construction for an aggregate further capacity 
of 37,G50 tons per month at Emporium, Pa. ; Mount Union, Pa. ; 
Brunswick, Ga, ; Little Rock, Ark, ; and several other places, princi- 
psilly in connection with the production of picric acid. Plans for ac- 
commodating the country's plant capacity to the country's need were 
very much facilitated by a survej^ made through personal visits to all 
plants east of the Mississippi River by A, E. Wells, metallurgist of 
the Bureau of Mines, who was a member of the section. 

Sulphuric acid is manufactured chiefly in three different strengths : 
W° Baume acid, 6G° Baume acid, and 20 per cent oleum. The 60° 
Baume acid is produced by the chamber process. Oleum is produced 
by the contact process. The 66° Baume acid is produced the more eco- 
nomically in the contact process by simple dilution of the stronger 
acid, but it can also be manufactured from the weaker acid by the 
expensive process of concentration by heat or b}' passing the Aveak 
chamber acid through a contact acid plant. 

Powder and explosives require the stronger acids, so that every 
effort had to be directed to increasing the production of oleum and 
66° Baume, A large tonnage of 60° Baume acid had to be concen- 
trated. Thus when it came to price fixing, the price of 66° Baume 
acid had to be placed high enough to warrant the production of this 
type from the weaker acid by the heat concentration process or by 
passing it through the contact process plants. 

The price-fixing committee did not act on sulphuric acid until 
June, 1918, but late in 1917, after consultation with the War Indus- 
tries Board, the War and Navy Departments entered into an agree- 
ment with the acid manufacturers under which prices to the Gov- 
ernment were fixed for the first and second quarters of 1918 as 
follows : 

Per ton. 

nO° Biiiim^ $18 

€6° Bniim^ 30 

20 per cent oleum 35 

These prices applied to direct purchases by the Government only. 

During the winter the Federal Trade Commission conducted an 

investigation of costs of production at a number of representative 



'Clll« 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 1G5 






plants throuf:!;hout tlie country, botli chanibor and contact process. 
It was quite evident that the productive capacity of the country woukl 
have to be stimuhited in every possible way, throu<j:li pushin^: exist- 
ing capacity to its utmost limit, buildino^ additions to existin«r [dants, 
and erecting ncAv ones. It was further felt necessary to establish 
fair and full prices to encourage produi tion, provide for the heavy 
depreciation of plants wdien pushed to the extent required, and to 
obtain the fullest output of even the highest cost pro(hicers. 

There was a great divergence of conditions and costs at the dilfer- 
ent plants, due both to the process and to the raw materials used. 
The older plants used the chamber process, with higher cost; in fact, 
much higher cost for the stronger acids. But these plants consti- 
tuted by far the larger share of the country's capacity. Those using 
the modern contact process would make large profits under a price 
arrangement which would permit the other plants to function. Some 
small amount was produced as a by-product from the smelting of 
zinc and copper ores, but the cost varied also at these plants. 

In June, 1918, the price-fixing committee established the follow- 
ing prices for all purchasers : 

Pel- ton. 

60° Bauni§ sulphuric acid $18 

66° Baum§ sulphuric acid 28 

20 per cent oleuui 32 

These were reduced in September, 1918, to be effective until Decem- 
ber 31, to- 
per ton. 

60° Baunig sulphuric acid .$16 

66° Bauni6 sulphuric acid 25 

20 per cent oleuui 28 

These reductions were the result of studies and recommendation by 
the section. The section felt, indeed, that even the new prices were 
perhaps higher than necessary in view of the possibility of curtailing 
the use of acid in many less essential industries, and in view of the 
coming into production of numerous new Government plants. 

The work of this section in connection with the production of 
nitric acid was never so important as in the case of sulijluuic A 
much smaller tonnage was recpiired for the exjilosives program, and 
the production was always limited by the available supply of nitrate 
of soda and sulphuric acid, the nitrate of soda being the really limit- 
ing factor. 

For the first half of 1918 a price of 7i cents per pound for (iovern- 
ment purchases of 42° Baume nitric acid had been arranged between 
the War and Navy Departments and the producers. This was con- 
siderably lower than the prevailing market price. The situation was 
studied by the section, and a price of 8^ cents per pound was recom- 



166 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

mended to the price-fixing committee and became effective July 1, 
1918, and was continued to the end. The section calculated the cost 
of a pound of nitric acid as follows : 

To produce 95 pounds, the raw materials required are — 

100 pounds nitrate of soda .$4. 2.5 

100 pounds sulphuric acid 1.35 

Average manufacturing cost (including oveilmad) 1.18 

Total cost of 95 pounds C. Ts 

Cost of 1 pound .0714 

It was felt that 8| cents joer pound would allow a fair profit and 
stimulate production. 

It would probably have been necessary in the early part of 1919, 
had the war continued, to curtail heavily the use of nitric acid in 
several of the nonwar industries, particularly celluloid, aniline oil, 
and others. A careful study of these industries was made, and it 
was thought that the celluloid industry could be curtailed 50 per cent. 
This uses 10,000 tons per annum, measured as 100 per cent acid. 

The production of nitric acid in the United States increased from 
78,000 tons in 1914 to 602,000 tons in 1917. 

ALKALI AND CIILOKINE. 

The Alkali and Chlorine Section was made a separate unit of the 
Chemicals Division April 15, 1918, wlieii H. G. Carroll was appointed 
chief. Prior to this time these commodities were handled by Mr. 
MacDowell in conjunction with J. D. Pennock, chairman of the 
alkali section of the Chemical Alliance (Inc.). Mr. Pennock con- 
tinued to cooperate throughout the period, and his services were very 
valuable in maintaining contact between the section and the various 
firms of the industry. 

On most of these commodities price agreements for Government 
purchases had been arranged with groups of manufacturers before 
the section took up the work, and Mr. Pennock was handling the 
allocation of Govcrnmont orders within each group and he continued 
to do this. The most important commodities handled by the section 
were caustic soda (sodium hydroxide), soda ash (sodium carbonate), 
potash, and chlorine and its compounds. 

Caustic soda. — Caustic soda is made either by the electrolytic cf 
Solvay process from salt, ammonia, and limestone. Its production 
depends principally on plant capacity and labor, for there is no great 
scarcity of the raw materials. Its chief war uses were (1) in the 
manufacture of phenol for picric acid; (2) in bleaching cotton linters 
and textiles ; (3) in drugs and dyes ; and (4) in soap and glycerin. It 
has an extensive civilian consumption in the manufacture of soap, 



AIMEKKAN INDl'STUV IX rilK WAI!. 167 

ye, tlyos, various ilnijis, in the purilicat ion of miiuTal oils aiwl 
ottonseed oil, in rcvlainiino; rubber, and many other iiuhistiies. 
joap used 23.1 per cent, oil 10.7 per cent, and textile trades T.O per 
ent of the 1917 output. Tlie (lovernnient bou^dit lM.5 per cent i'or 
irect war uses. 

No shortage was i'elt until the spring of 1918. In fact, exports to 
apan, Canada, and South American countries, on the basis of 
00,000 tons per j'ear, were allowed until this time. But the increase 
n the military program in the spring, particularly the decision to 
louble the country's output of picric acid, raising the annual pro- 
luction from 185,000,000 pounds to 270,000,000 pounds, pointed 
oward important shortages in caustic soda. 

The section made a careful study of production and rcciuirements. 
The figures obtained led the section to believe that it was necessary to 
urtail both exports and less essential consumi)tion until plants could 
)C expanded or new ones constructed to meet the added requirements. 
Two new privately owned electrolytic plants, as well as a new Gov- 
irnment plant, were started in the spring and were beginning to get 
nto operation in November, 1918. Exports were curtailed by the 
War Trade Board, between 3,000 and 4,000 tons per month being 
illowed. Soap manufacturers were curtailed 20 per cent; cotton 
inishers 40 per cent ; and lye manufacturers 30 per cent. Agreements 
,0 put these reductions into effect were reached by direct negotiations 
svith the industries. 

The total production of caustic soda for 1918 was estimated at 
457,000 short tons. The price for Government i)urchases, was ar- 
ranged by agreement at $3.50 per 100 pounds for 7C per cent caustic 
soda, f. o. b. cars sellers' plants. Though this price was considerably 
below the quoted market and below current contract prices, it re- 
mained until the end. Some of the smaller high-cost producers 
complained that, due to increase in cost of labor and materials they 
wre losing money on that part of their product which they were 
required to sell to the Government. The section held a meeting with 
the 17 manufacturers who were supplying their allotted shares on the 
(lOvernnicnt requirements; the question of prices was carefully con- 
sidred: and the meeting agreed that the simplest solution was to 
relieve the four or five high-cost producers from their obligation to 
.sell to the Government, and to redistribute tiie rcfiuii-emcnts to the 
others. And this was done. 

Soda ash. — Less than 5 per cent of the country's total production of 
soda ash was needed for direct military purposes. Tiiough the in- 
dustry was greatly stimulated by tlie war, principally through in- 
direct requirements, and though market prices reached a figure four 
or five times prewar normal, production, increasing from 935,01)0 short 
tons in 1914 to 1,854,000 short tons in 1!)!s. was always siifliricut to 



168 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

meet all requirements of the Government, and no curtailment or con- 
trol over distribution was necessary. 

Early in 1918, an agreement was reached with the producers 
lixing the Government purchase price at $1.57 per 100 pounds for 58 
|)er cent soda ash in bags f. o. b. sellers' plants. This price wag 
maintained throughout the war, though the market in 1918 was more 
tlian $1 per hundredAveight above it. The Government's purchases 
were allocated to the various producers through Mr. Pennock. 

Potash. — This country consumed very little potash for war pur- 
poses, and only a small percentage of normal for fertilizers and other 
chemicals during the war period. Our supply has always come from 
Germany. Prewar prices were about 3.7 cents per pound for potas- 
sium hydroxide, 88-92 per cent. In March, 1918, the price was 81 
cents per pound. 

The work of the section consisted chiefly in considering requests 
for Government aid in the development of potash properties or proc- 
esses, and in replying to inquiries relating to the Government's polic}; 
toward potash production. A numb(ir of projects with considerable 
promise were submitted. It has beer the Government policy to en- 
courage with technical advice and experimentation the development 
of domestic sources. 

Substantial progress was made in production in several parts oi 
the country, though Ave have not, even at this writing, any firm hopt 
that our plants will be able to compete successfully with tfie Germar 
potash syndicate, which has 200 rich mines fully equipped, and with 
France, Avhich has several mines in operation. Our largest war-timt 
development Avas in the production of a 25 per cent potash from 
certain alkaline lakes in western Nebraska by an evaporation process 
The high cost of fuel and transportation handicaps this undertaking 
The Solva}^ Process Co. is producing a ;'0 to 5") per cent potash from 
salt beds in Utah. This Avork is deA^eloping. Both the Solvay Co 
and the Trona Corporation are producing potash in quantity from 
brines deposited in a defunct lake in the MojaA^e Desert, in California, 
This project has had to combat the presence in the brine of borax, 
Avhich is injurious to crops. A process has noAv been disco A^ered 
hoAveA'er, by Avhich thej'^ are producing a low-grade potash Avith nc 
more borax than is contained in the German product of commerce. 

A plant producing pure sulphate of potash Avas opened in Utah in 
the fall of 1915 b}^ Charles H. MacDoAvell. It was from the product 
made by this plant that the first technically pure carbonate of potash 
Avas secured for the making of optical glass and the first potassium 
permanganate for gas masks. A semicommercial plant Avas built in 
connection with this Utah undertaking by the Armour Fertilizer 
Works during the latter months of the war to fix nitrogen in the 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 1()9 

alumina by-product obtained in the manufactuiv of iK)tash. The 
work was started at the request of the (lovernment and is now bein<; 
extended to commercial size. The product is known as aluminum 
nitride. 

Potash is recovered as a by-product from cement dust, supar waste. 
and other similar manufacturing processes. The attempt to produce 
it from the Pacific coast seaweed has not yet been successful. Tlie 
(Tovernment has an experimental plant working on this process and 
success may come. 

The northern Georgia shales contain Sh per cent of insoluble 
[)otash. Research is still going on with a view to finding a way to 
make this source commercially valuable. The " green sands " of 
the New Jersey coast contain potash, and a large plant, which will use 
the by-product for making a certain type of brick, is now being 
built and promises a source of some abundance. A heavy vein of 

; the green sands runs through New Jersey, Maryland, and part of 

oIkJI Virginia. 

nilf! Chlorine. — The four chief war u.ses of chlorine in its various forms 
were for the manufacture of (1) toxic gases. (2) various chemicals 
for smoke screens, (3) " dope " for airplanes, and (4) textile bleaching 
powder. The Chemical Warfare Service was the principal Govern- 
ment consumer and its requirements were not well defined before the 

V, : early summer of 1918. Guesses as to Government requirements before 
this time had caused some confusion, particularly in the bleaching 
! owder industry. Studies of the section in June, 1918, brought out 
i!ie fact that a high percentage of the country's output was going 
to be needed for the war. In addition to the domestic requirements, 
flie French Government had, during 1918, a standing order with 
American producers for 300 tons per month. 

The four forms of chlorine. Avhich were handled l)y the section, 

, wore liquid chlorine, bleaching powder, carbon tetrachloride, and 
sulphur monochloride. By the 1st of July studies had disclosed the 
fact that there was a shortage of at least 20 per cent in liijuid 
chlorine. The section undertook, through constant conferences witii 
the 12 chief producers, to inaugurate a program of curtailment 
in use on the one hand, and increase of production on the other, to 
make up this deficit. This scheme kept the deficit about constant 
I throughout the summer, increasing demands beinir made up by in- 
creasing production. Practically no liquid chlorine was used foi 
nonwar purposes, except for the purification of driid<ing water. 
Orders were prepared in October to commandeer the industry, but 
they were not issued. Much difficulty was experienced in obtaining 

""[ containers for the chlorine. The situation was met by the War 

'! Department which inauirunited the inaMufacture of l-tou containers. 



1 70 A.MKKK'AN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Early in 1918, the price was fixed by agreement, for all Govern- 
ment purchases at 7^ cents per pound, in Government-owned con- 
tainers, f. o. b. makers' plants. The quantity of liquid chlorine pro- 
duced in the United States in 1917 is estimated at 18,000 tons, and an 
estimate in July, 1918, indicates a production for that year of 22,000 
tons. 

Early in the war the Government's requirements for bleaching 
])owder Avere estimated at 300 tons per day. This w^as later cut down 
to a Avorking order Avith the manufacturers for 42,000 tons. This 
order Avas canceled in the early spring of 1918, and only about 6,000 
tons had been bought before July 1. AVar demands then began to 
become definite and insistent, and requirements Avere estimated in 
the summer at 4.000 tons per month, which is 50 per cent of the 
country's productive capacity. A program of curtailment was put 
into effect. Its burden fell almost entirely on the pulp and paper 
industry and the textile industry. Representatives of these tAvo 
trades were called together and an agreement was reached for cur- 
tailments which saved about 50 per cent of the bleach ordinarily 
consumed by them. Compulsory orders Avere issued by the Govern- 
ment to the producers during the summer. Prices on Government 
purchases had been previously fixed by agreement at 2.35 cents per 
pound, basis 35 per cent chlorine, f. o. b. makers' plants. This price 
was used for practically all of the orders, though the War Depart- 
ment Board of Appraisers had at one time reduced it to 2 cents. The 
producers claimed that it cost betAveen 2.35 and 2.50 cents per pound 
to manufacture the poAvder. The estimated production of bleaching 
powder in the United States in 1917 was 100,000 short tons. 

Carbon tetrachloride is ordinarily used for fire extinguishers and 
as a cleaning fluid. The French used it in the manufacture of mus- 
tard gas and the British for smoke screens. July, 1918, developed a 
very severe shortage and commandeering orders were issued to the 
entire industry, the firms of which gave their cordial support in 
carrj'ing out the orders. Civilian use was completely suspended. 
Prices were fixed, as in the other chlorines, at 15 cents per pound foi 
carbon tetrachloride and 17 cents for fire-extinguisher fluid. 

Sulphur monochloride caused some confusion. The Chemical 
AVarfare Service had placed contracts for sulphur monochloride in 
a number of plants where the chlorine was greatly needed for other 
products, such as liquid chlorine, bleaching powder, and mono- 
chlorbenzol. After a careful examination of the facts and a con- 
sultation betAveen the section and the Chemical Warfare Service, 
contracts for sulphur monochloride were placed at 20 pulp mills, 
where machinery was converted for its production. The price was 
fixed bv the Chemical Warfare Service itself. 



A.MKIUCAX IXIU'STllV IN TllF. WAi;. 171 



ETHYL Al.COlIOI,. 

The Ethyl Alcohol Section of the I'oard wns or<;;ini/.e(l in April. 
ins, with William (J. AVoolfolk as chief. Ethyl alcohol was ix'in^r 
ised in very hir<re quantities in the explosives pro<;rani as a solvent 
n the manufacture of smokeless powder and in the refininjr of 
r. N. T. : it was used also in the manufacture of toxic «rases, in air- 
plane " dope," and the like. The Erench Government was fjettinj; a 
arge supply here. Alcohol is the principal raw material from which 
ither, chloroform, acetic ether, nitrous ether, and many other suh- 
tances are made. 

The custom of taxing such alcohol as is usable for beverajies has led 
o the practice of " denaturizinfr " alcohol for use in the industrial 
irts. Denatured alcohol is manufactured and sold free of tax. The 
•' comidetely denatured" alcohol is produced by addinjr 10 irallons 
;)f wood alcohol and half a <rallon of benzine (or 2 jjallons of wood 
filcohol and half a fjallon of jjyridine bases) to 100 <rallons of ethyl 
ir fjrain alcohol. Eor special uses many other formula? are permitted 
foi- iiroducinir '* specially denatured " alcohol. 

It was considered important to make a careful survey of the coun- 
try's plant capacity and sources of raw material to determine whether 
control would be necessary in case of a loni^ war. Ethyl alcohol is 
produced throufrhout the country in three types of jilants, first, those 
iisino; ffrain as the princijial raw material: second, tho-e usinir by- 
product molasses: and. third, plants ori^rinally constructed for the 
production of whisky and later converted. The first two groups of 
plants were well organized, but many of the third were in pro ess of 
beinjx dismantled rather than converted. The section asked the 
owners not to dismantle the plants, but hold them ready for ronver- 
sion in case additional cajiacity should be needed. As a i-esult of 
studies of the section an improvement in the process of manufacture 
was brought about which increased the capacity of many plants as 
much as 20 per cent without increasing labor and equipment. Xo 
curtailment in use nor increase in fficilities was found neces-ary. 

The ca]>ac:ty of the plants using molasses was calculated at 
oO.OOO.OOO pounds per month, those using grain at 88,000,000 pounds 
per month. Our total war requirements at the time of the armistice 
were set at 47,000,000 pounds per month. Production from molas.ses 
increased threefold during the war while production from grain de- 
creased.^ The price was never fixed by the Government, but after 
the cessation of manufacture for beverage purposes in September, 
1917. prices declined to a point where they remained steady through- 
out 1918. Grain alcohol. 190 proof, sold at 61 to G2 cents per gallon 
and denatured alcohol at about 68 cents per gallon throughout the 
year. 



•See Appendix XXV for table of production of alcohol in the United States. 19U-1918. 



172 AMERICAN IXDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

COTTON LINTERS. 

Cotton linters are used as the base of nitrocellulose or smokeless 
powder. AA^hile they are not a chemical and the section did not 
function as part of the Chemicals Division, their important relation 
to the explosives program will justify placing the account of them 
in this chapter. 

" Cotton linters " is the name given to the fine cotton fiber which 
sticks to the rough surface of cotton seed as it comes from the gin. 
The lint is removed by an arrangement of revolving saws at the 
cotton seed crushing plants. In normal times it is used chiefly for 
stuffing mattresses, pads, horse collars, etc., in making celluloid, felts. 
absorbent cotton, and other products where a long fiber is not needed 
Mattresses require a better quality of linters than munitions. 

The section was formed April 4. 1918, with George R. James as 
chief. Studies were directed toward the question v/hether the supply 
of linters would be sufficient for the rapidly developing smokeless- 
powder facilities, and it appeared that the average annual produc- 
tion for the past five years had been less than one-half of the re- 
quirements estimated for the year 1919. It was estimated further 
that moderately small stocks would be carried OA^er at the end of the 
cotton year, July 31, 19.18. 

A series of questionnaires brought out the fact that substituti^ 
materials could be found for all of the industries using cotton linteii 
for other than explosives purposes, and the Ordnance Department 
began experiments in the use of cotton hull fiber and wood pulp as 
substitutes for cotton linters in the manufacture of nitrocellulose 
powder. The next step was to arrange not only to stimulate pi'oduc- 
tion of cotton linters but to turn all linters into the production of 
munitions. On April 12, 1918, the section called a meeting of repre- 
sentatives of the cottonseed crushing industry with representatives 
of the War and Navy Departments. An agreement was reached 
that after May 2, 1918, all crushing mills would cut nothing but 
" munitions " linters, producing not less than 145 pounds of linters 
per ton of seed crushed, and that the Government would take the 
entire output at $4.67 per hundredweight, f. o. b. points of produc- 
tion, for a period ending July 31, 1919. 

For the purpose of carrying this arrangement into effect, there 
was formed what was known as the Cotton Linter Pool, effective 
August 1, 1918, to July 31, 1919. The participating members of the 
pool were (1) the Ordnance Department, through which other agen- 
cies of the Government, including the Navy, should receive their 
supplies; (2) the Canadian Government, acting through the Impe- 
rial Munitions Board; (3) the French Government, acting through 
the French Powder Mission; (4) tlie British Government, acting 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 173 

lirough the British War Mission; (5) the Italian Government, act- 
ng through the Italian Military Mission; (G) the Belgian (Jovern- 
lent, acting through the Belgian Commission; (7) American nianu- 
acturers having CJovernment contracts for smokeless powder or 
yro cotton; and (8) manufacturers of absorbent cotton or other 
upplies using linters, having Government or Red Cross contracts. 

The Ordnance Department undertook to finance the entire project. 
The Du Pont American Industries (Inc.) was appointed purchasing 
gent for the Ordnance Department at a fee of 20 cents for each 
lale (500 pounds) of linters purchased. The linters had to be pur- 
hased at several thousand plants. A set of rules for the operation 
f the pool was formulated, covering detailed arrangements by 
vhich the participating members would secure their supplies at a 
miform price, including freight charges. The respective functions 
if the Ordnance Department and the Cotton Linters Section in rela- 
ion to the pool were defined to avoid duplication of effort. The 
Ordnance Department handled questions relating to (1) production 
jid stimulation of production of linters; (2) requisitioning and 
;ommandeering of stocks: (3) all financing; (4) the appointment 
>f the Du Pont American Industries (Inc) ; and (5) any disputes 
irising between the purcliasing agency and the producers. The Cot- 
on Linters Section handled (1) all allocations to consumers: (2) 
itorage of such stocks as might be })urchased during the height of 
he crushing season in excess of storage capacity at powder i)hints; 
'3) the formulation of specifications for cutting and baling to con- 
'orm to the requirements of all purchasers: (4) a series of periodic 
•eports from producers showing stocks, current production, and esti- 
nates: and (5) all records of stocks, production, requirements, and 
llocations. 

Over 500,000 bales of linters were purchased by the pool before the 
rmistice. When the war was over and the question of liquidating 
he pool and satisfying the claims of the producers arose, a series of 
meetings, lasting over a month, was held l)y the section, ropresenta- 
ives of the participating members, and the producers. Numerous 
plans were proposed and discussed, but the burden and responsi- 
bility of liquidating the pool and satisfying the claims of the pro- 
ducers were finally taken by the Ordnance Department. 

Through the instrumentality of the pool, the maximum cotton 
linters capacity of the country was turned directly to war use, l)ut 
still there would not have been enough cellulose material for tlie 
powder programs of ourselves and the Allies. The experiments in 
the use of hull fiber and wood pulp as substitutes or dilutents 
promised a large measure of success. In the largest Du Pont jilant 
'at Hopewell, Va.) and in the Government plants at Nitro and 



174 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAi'. 

Nashville, machinery was installed for the use of a combination o 
cotton linters and hull fiber or wood puljj. The Picatinny Ar^ena 
used old cotton rags successfully. These combined plans would hav( 
made possible the full smokeless powder program laid down for 1019 

In addition to the pool discussed above, a " Mattress Linter Pool * 
was also formed by the Ordnance Department with the Du Poul 
American Industries (Inc.) as purchasing agent. The purpose oi 
this pool was to buy in a few thousand bales of mattress linters 
which had been cut prior to May 2, 1918, and were still in stocl> 
in various parts of the country. These linters were needed for Army 
and Red Cross mattresses. 

Prices were set as follows: Grade A, 10 cents per pound; grade B, 
7 cents; grade C. 5| cents; f. o. b. points of location. All holders 
were asked to make voluntary sales to the purchasing agent at these 
prices. In this way 9,888 bales of mattress linters were purchased, 
perhaps 75 per cent of existing stocks. No commandeering orders 
were issued. The section made allocations of these to Government 
consumers. 

The section made a study of the industry engaged in bleaching or 
purifying cotton linters for the powder makers. On July 8, 1918, 
the price-fixing committee established a maximum price of $6.33 
per 100 pounds of bleached material for this service. As it happened 
the production of linters never reached a rate which strained the 
bleaching capacity of the country. 

During the summer the press-cloth industry appealed to the section 
for help. Press cloth is essential for the cottonseed crushers and the 
section was interested in supplying them with anything which would 
stimulate their operations. Its manufacture had been seriouslj 
affected b}' the suspension of importations of horse, camel, and 
human hair. Several meetings were held, experiments were made in 
using flax as a substitute for the hair, but they were not successful. 
Relief was had through a limited number of import licenses. 

EXPLOSIVES. 

The purpose of control and regulation of these several chemicals 
and of cotton linters was to insure at fair prices an adequate supply 
of powder and explosives not only for our own Government but for 
the Allies as well. For after all is said and done, more than haH 
of the burden of supplying the allied line with explosives and propel- 
lants fell throughout the entire war on American industry. The raw 
materials were principally on this side of the water, and the weight 
of finished articles varied from one-tenth to one-twentieth of that 
of their constituent parts. Shipping conditions dictated that maun- 



A.MKKU'AX INnrSTItV IX Till. WAI!. 175 



fncturin<; should ho done here, even thoiiL^i our \A:\\\{ facilities were 
*ii ne<rli^ihle when Eurc)i)e went to war. 

While the real responsibility for foi luulaliui: and (level()|)iiiL' the 
explosives pro<rrani fell with perhaps more i)ecnliar direetuess on 
the Ordnance Department of the Army than did that of nuiny other 
commodities, yet the very significant part which allied purchases 
had in it and the general governmental problems which it involved 
made the relations of the "War Industries Board unusually imj)ortant. 
Exhaustive attention was given to it from the early days of the 
council onward. L. L. Summers was technical adviser to d. P. 
Morgan & Co. on British and French purchases of explosives during 
I" the years preceding our entrance into the war. He was familiar 
with the powder facilities which had been developed in this country. 
He and Charles H. MacDowell, acting first under the council and 
'''Stlthen under the Board, were very significant factors in working out 
our Nation's program. In the sunmier of 1917, Mr. Sunuuers.,Gen. 
Pierce, and Admiral Fletcher were appointed a special connnittee 
to draw comprehensive plans for the whole undertaking. Their 
report was made the basis of the Government program. 

During the winter of 1917 and 1918 the Chemicals and Explosives 
Division remained a single unit. M. F. Chase worked with Mr. 
i™ Jackling in the erection of the powder plant at Nitro, W. Va. In 
July, 1918, he returned to the Board to become director of explosives, 
and the Explosives Division was made a separate unit. Control of 
tlie industry was assumed from the start, though formal price 
fixing was never resorted to. But in exercising this control it was 
exceeding!}' important to take care that w-e should be a help and not 
a hindrance to the Allies, who had been depending to such large ex- 
tent upon our nationals for these supplies before we entered the war. 

Constant studies of requirements, not only of the United States, 
but of England, France. Italy, and Belgium, were carried on, while 
constant studies of existing facilities and plans for extensions and 
new construction were directed to a comparison of recjuirements with 
capacities and of capacities with possible production of raw materials 
necessary to keep the plants running. A broad view to guide and 
minute studies to check were necessary at all times. The explosives 
industry in the United States jumped from a $50,()()(),()00 output in 
1913 to a $500,000,000 output in 1917, which in turn had nearly 
doubled by Xovember, 1918, and the year 1919 would have seen it 
more than doubled. 

Commercial explosives, which constituted nearly all of our output 
before the war, remained nearly constant throughout the period, 
increasinir a little in 1917 and 1918 because of the increased activities 



176 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

in mining. Our annual production of commercial high explosives 
has been about 430,000,000 pounds, and of black powder about 
400,000,000 pounds. 

Our . development of military smokeless powder and military ex- 
plosives during this period is unparalleled in history. In 1914 our 
smokeless j)Owder capacity was 450,000 pounds per month. On 
November 10, 1918, we had facilities in operation producing nearly 
2,500,000 pounds per day, and plants were nearly completed sufficient 
for 3,500,000 pounds per day. The developments in the production 
of ammonium nitrate, picric acid, and T. N. T., while not quite so 
great, followed an analogous course. We made a few thousand 
pounds of each of them before the war. 

The problem before our (lovernment was to provide for the Ameri- 
can program without robbing the allied program here. In fact 
increasing difficulties in shipping were making it necessary for the 
Allies to close down some of their plants at home and depend upon 
America for increasing requirements. The vast plant facilities in 
this country in the spring of 1917, while they were owned by our 
nationals, had been built at the expense of the allied Governments. 
AVhile our Government had a legal right to commandeer their output 
and use it for the American forces, such action Avould have been 
hostile to the common purpose. At the very beginning the President 
announced the policy that Ave Avould assist the xVllies in taking full 
advantage of the properties which they had amortized here. 

Prices had been from 100 to 300 per cent above normal during 
1916, but had come back almost to a prewar basis by the time we 
-entered the conflict. When $1 per pound was being paid for smoke- 
less powder by the British and French, nearly half of the figure Avas 
an amortization charge to co\'er ncAV facilities. The companies could 
not afford to invest capital in jjlants, the demand for whose product 
miglit come to an end at any moment, except on conditions Avhich 
would i^ractically pay for the plant out of the first contract. By 1917 
rencAval contracts Avere being placed by the Allies at about 50 per 
cent of this figure. Our operators had gained considerably in techni- 
cal knoAvledge, and increased capacities allowed for the introduction 
of plant economies. 

If the Allies were to be protected in their use of the facilities 
which they had caused to be created, our country had either to amor- 
tize further neAv plants or to build them at Government expense. 
The latter course was adopted, and $300,000,000 or $400,000,000 was 
spent in this work. Under this arrangement the price of poAvder and 
explosiA^es continued to decline, all parties purchasing at about the 
same figures. 



A.MEUIC'AN IMUSritV IN IIIK UAH. 177 



For iiitrocelJuloso powder, holli tli(> Dii Pont mikI (he Hercules 
:)mpiuiies enlar<iXHl their plants, ami the (ioverninent Imilt two new 
lants of trenieiulous size. One at Nashville, Tenn.,' construeted hy 
le Dii Pont Co. as a<2:ent, was desijined for a capacity of 1,0()(),()()0 
oiinds ])er day and cost about $0(),()()0,()0(). It was completely 
quipped Avith its own acid plants and other facilities for inte<:;rating 
lie jirocess of manufacture in the most economical manner. In 
a)\ ember, 11)18, it was calculated that smokeless cannon i)owder Avas 
e'mrr produced there at an actual cost of 38 cents per pound. 
The plant covers an area of i\ by 3 miles, and is TO times the size 
f the largest plant in this country before the war. In full operation 
, would use 1,500,000 pounds of nitrate of sotla, 075,000 pounds of 
.dphur, 450 tons of coal, and 100,000,000 gallons of water per day. 
'he complete plant Avould have been composed of nine separate 
nits. When the armistice was signed it was about 80 per cent 
nished and was producing at about 500,000 pounds per day. 
The other (jovernment plant was being built at Nitro,* W. Va., 
ouiior a capacity of 650,000 pounds per day. It was about 50 per cent 
ompleted when construction ceased in November. The Hercules 
ptii *owder Co., which had undertaken to operate the plant, had already 
reduced a large quantity of pyro cotton there. Plans had been 
rawn for a third Government plant, but no work on it was under- 
iken. 
Under this program America would have supplied the bulk of the 
►ropellant powder used on our side of the lines in 1919. In order 
simplif}' the placing of contracts and the control over the flow 
f raw materials to the plants, the policy was adopted during the 
ummer of 1918 of having the Ordnance Department purchase the 
ntire American output for 1919, the department to resell in turn 
o the Allies such quantities as their respective programs required. 
)n this theorj' a contract for 234,000,000 pounds, to be delivered 
luring the first six months of 1919, was placed with the Du Pont 
^o. on September 24, 1918, at a base price of 43^t cents per pound. 
?his was the lowest figure at which they had ever sold smokeless 
>owder. This gives a notion of the dimensions of the American 
rogram for the production of propellant powder. 
Modern warfare requires for high explosives, used as shell filler, 
tonnage equal to about 85 per cent of that of the pro[)ellants. Raw 
flaterials for high explosives weigh about 20 pounds to 1 pound of 
inished product. While P>ngland had some of these materials, 
rancp ind Italy had practically none. Shipping conditions required 
hat America should take the burden of the manufacture, and she set 
bout to do it. 



'Called Old Hickory plant. 
•Near Charleston. 

105826—21 12 



178 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

The three principal high explosives used as shell filler were trini- 
trotoluol, ammonium nitrate, and picric acid. (3ur production of all 
three was limited by our facilities for producing the three coal-tar 
products, toluol (for T. N. T.), aqua ammonia (for ammonium 
nitrate), and phenol (for picric acid). The country's dcA^elopment 
in these industries will be explained in the next chapter in connection 
with d3^es. 

The United States had not used T. N. T. for shell filler before the 
war, but by the spring of 1917 the Allies had developed a monthly ca- 
pacity of 5,000,000 pounds here. This was, however, still needed by 
them. Our requirements, with theirs, would consume much more 
tlian could be produced from the toluol which it was possible to turn 
out in this country. We had used ammonium nitrate, but tlie Allies 
had discovered that a mixture of ammonium nitrate and T. X. T. 
produced a shell filler wliich was at once cheaper and more easilj 
procured than the pure T. X. T. In October. 1917, this mixture, 
called " amatol," was adopted as the American shell filler. 

New toluol plants Averc stimulated all over the country. In many 
cities gas-stripping plants were built. Beehive coke ovens were sup- 
planted by by-product ovens everywhere. Various T. N. T. plants 
were enlarged. The Du Pont plant at Barksdale, Wis., increased its 
capacity by 2,000,000 pounds per month, and the Hercules plant at 
Giant, Calif., by 3,500,000 pounds per month. Contracts were signed 
for the erection of three (Jovernment-owned plants at Racine, Wis.; 
Giant, Calif.; and Perryville, Md. The Racine plant was under 
construction, but little more than the plans had been finished for the 
other two when the armistice came. These plans called for a total 
monthh' capacity of 12,000,000 pounds. The working capacity 
November 11, 1918. was about 22,000,000 pounds per month. The 
price of T. N. T. followed a course very similar to that of smokeless 
powder. We were i^aying less than 50 cents per pound when the end 
came. 

There are three principal processes for the manufacture of am- 
monium nitrate. The most direct and economical is the nitrogen fixa- 
tion process used in Germany and Scandinavia. The common process 
used in American has been the neutralization process, by which aqua 
ammonia and nitric acid unite to produce the product. It was be- 
cause no method was in sight for the production of enough either 
of ammonia or of nitric acid to meet the ammonium nitrate require- 
ments that the two huge nitrogen fixation plants at Muscle Shoals 
and Sheffield, Ala., were undertaken. It was expected that these twc 
plants would come into operation by the beginning of 1919. A nevi 
plant using the Brunner-Mond process^ was erected at Perryville, 

» This process is by a double decomposition of nitrate of soda and ammonium sulphate 



AMERKWN INOrSTHV IN 11 1 K WAK. 171) 

tijj, ^Id., and was prodnciiiir over 4r){),()()() |)()unds pcM- diiy on Xovi'iiihiT 
of. .1, 1918. 



While the fixation plants wore being built il was necessary I'or ini- 
nediate purposes to stimulate further extensions of plants using the 
leutralization process. These had reached a monthly capacity of 
5,000,000 pounds before the end came. A shoiiage of annnonia 
vas the limiting factor. This conunodity was handled by an inter- 
lepartmontal committee. The Food Administration took control of 
immonia and established a fixed price of 8^ cents per i^oiind. 
rhe Government bought ammonium nitrate at 15 cents per pound, 
md the price was never higher than 20 cents. 

Picric acid was the sliell filler used by the French and Italians. 
We used only a negligible quantity in the manufacture of anunonium 
aicrate for armor-piercing shells, and in our Chemical AVarfare 
Service. It is phenol trinitrated. The price before the war was 
ibout 25 cents per pound. It jumped to $1.50 early in 1915, when 
he French began to buy here and remained at this price until the 
sarly part of 1916, when facilities had been amortized in quantity to 
neet the demands. It sold at 75 cents in December, 1916. 
In the spring of 1918 the annual output of our numerous plants 
as about 135,000,000 pounds. There were no plans for an increase 
n consumption by the American forces, though, if the war had 
:ontinued for a number of years, it might have been necessary for 
qs to adopt it as a shell filler as a supplement to our amatol produc- 
tion. This, however, was not contemplated for 1911). 

Shipping conditions at this time were making it impossible for 
the French and Italians to obtain sufficient phenol, sul|)huric acid, 
nitric acid, and other constituents to keep their ]dants going at home. 
They asked this country to double its output of picric acid in order 
to meet their programs. The plan was that France should take 
70 per cent of the new product, Italy 20 per cent, and the United 
states the remaining 10 per cent. With this understanding, the 
Government undertook the construction of three large ])lants at Lit- 
tle Rock, Ark., at Grand Rapids, ^lich., and at Brunswick, Ga. 

We began at the same time to provide for a sufficient production 
of phenol (for which a synthetic process of manufacture was al- 
ready on a commercial basis) and the acids and other materials re- 
quired. This program was just reaching production Avhen the 
armistice came. It would have been in full capacity early in I'JlO. 
Picric acid was selling at 56 and 5,s cents per pound on Noxcuilier 
10, 1918, and it was the hope of the ()rdii;ince Dcpartniciit to reduce 
the price eventually to 45 cents. 

It is interesting to note that tbc ])riiicipal (•Jicuiicids used in ihc 
manufacture of ]-)owder and exi)i;)>i\es are also tlie priiuipiil i lieui- 



llilE 

nil 

igCi 



180 AMERICAN^ INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

icals of agricultural fertilizers. For war purposes we needed largf 
crops of the fields — cotton, food, and other things — as well as large 
quantities of cannon filler. In normal times the fertilizer industry 
is the largest producer of sulphuric acid and other heavy chemicals, 
1 1 happened that the sulphuric acid used for fertilizer was the weak 
chamber process kind, so that production for both purposes could 
be maintained at a maximum. In the case of nitrate of soda and 
sulphate of ammonia, the problem was more diffi;.ult. There w^as a 
direct conflict, and in the latter part of 1918 the fertilizer industry 
Mould have suffered severe curtailment had the war continued. The 
big increase in the production of ammonia from by-product coke 
ovens, brought about by war needs, has given a surplus to the country 
and considerable exportation is now going on. 



CHAITKR G. 

INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS. 



The relation of explosives chemicals to the chemicals used in the 

as(|Jyeing and tanning industries, for the preservation of wood, and for 

sjit!'>ther industrial purposes is very close. The Board found it iuipoi"- 

1\j, tant to establish further chemical sections, not only to guard tlie use oF 

ul^icbemieals needed for explosives, but to exercise control in the develop- 

ilrj^ment of certain of these industries essential in themselves to tlie war 

I and to the civilian population. The following sections were formed 

lat various times during 1918: Artificial Dyes and Intermediates: 

'Industrial Gas and Gas Products; Creosote; Canning Materials and 

Natural Dyes; Paints and Pigments; Wood Clieinicals: and Miscel- 

' laneous Chemicals. The technical aud consulting stalT, functioning 

'from the beginning, handled witli unusual skill a large number of 

special investigations. 

II ARTIFICIAL DYES AND INTERMEDIATES. 

•' There are two aspects to the way in which the war has brought 
dye manufacturing to America. When the German supply was cut 
off, the Americans were challenged to manufacture their own dyes. 

i 1 Prices were high enough to stimulate CA^ery eiFort, At the same lina* 
I the war was demanding for the manufacture of high explosives the 

■ same chemicals in huge quantities which for the most part are the 
vonstituent materials of synthetic dyes. 

Before the war Germany manufactured more than three-f()Ui-th< <»f 
i the world's supply of dyes, and nearly all of the intermediates ' used 
! in their manufacture. This country had plants producing about 1<> 
i per cent of its consumption, but 90 per cent of the intermediates used 
i in these plants came from Germany. Every necessary basic raw 
1 1 material, however, except nitrate of soda, is found in this country in 
! abundance greater than we can use. Many of the processes of niaiui- 
i facture were not known here, and the Germans had fought jealously 

■ any development. In 1900 we started to manufacture aniline, but 
the Germans flooded our markets with analine at a price so low that 

:j our plants never got established. 

ij Commerce in German dyes and intermediates began to be cur(aili-d 
as soon as the war broke out in Europe, and prices rose 1,500 per cerit 

» " Intfrmediates " Is the trade name for coal-far derivatives used In the inanufnciure ..f 
dyes and explosives. 

181 



182 A-MEEICAN I:NDUSTEY in Till:: WAR. 

or more before the end of 1915. Two features affected prices: The 
fact that the shortage was so much discussed lead to an extraordinary 
amount of speculation; and the fact that the cost of dye enters as 
such a small percentage of the value of finished textiles, while the 
dye is itself an absolute essential, made textile manufacturers pay 
any price in preference to closing their mills. 

Artificial dyes, called, also, coal tar, aniline or synthetic dyes, are t( 
be distinguished from vegetable or natural dyes. Natural dyes car 
not compete with synthetic dyes in normal times, the latter being 
produced at a very much lower price. The dry distillation of bitu- 
minous coal gives as products coke, ammonia, gas, and coal tar. Bj 
fractional distillation and other processes, some 150 different chemi- 
cals can be derived from coal tar. The elemental derivatives, chief 
examples of which are benzol, toluol, creosote oil, solvent naphtha 
naphthaline, xjdol, anthracine, and carbazol, are called in the trad< 
" crudes." By the chemical processing of crudes, the so-called " in- 
termediates" are derived. Intermediates of higher complexity are 
also made from intermediates of lower complexity. Some of the besi 
known intermediates are aniline oil, phenol (carbolic acid), salic^dii 
acid, beta-naphthol, and para-nitraniline. For example, benzol, upor 
treatment with nitric acid, gives nitro-benzol, an intermediate. Nitro- 
benzol, upon reduction, gives aniline. Aniline, upon treatment wit! 
methyl alcohol, gives dimethylaniline, an intermediate. Some 30( 
intermediates are used in making the 900 synthetic dj^es known to the 
trade. 

Very few intermediates were produced in the United States before 
the war, but in 1917, 134 different intermediates were made by 11^ 
different firms. The total weight was 287,000.000 pounds, valued al 
$104,000,000. The synthetic phenol industry was created during thf 
war to meet the demands for this material in the manufacture of 
picric acid. The synthetic process is, however, too expensive to com- 
pete with its production as a coal tar derivative for the normal market 
Synthetic dyes are built up from the intermediates. 

This country manufactured dyes to the value of about $3,500,00C 
in 1914 and $68,700,000 in 1917. The production in 1917 equaled the 
prewar importation in tonnage, but not in the variety of dyes. The 
azo and the sulphur dyes were made in largest amounts. Only about, 
3 per cent of the prewar importation of indigo dyes was produced, and 
the alizarines were little beyond the experimental stage.^ 

The most difficult period of the war for American dye consumers 
was late 1915 and 1916. Small amounts were brought in from Ger- 
many in exchange for shipments of cotton, but it was done with great 
difficulty on account of British objection. Importations from Switzeri 

- The Tariff Commission issues an anuu;il Census of Dyes and Coal Tar Chemicals ir 
tlie United States, fiom which these figures are taken. ! 



A-MEKU'AN IMHSTKV IN llIK WAi:. 183 

and were two or three times normal. American capital was slow in 
imtering the production industry, and many of the processes were 
)rotected bv (lerman-controlled patents. On September 8, 191G, a 
^' lye-stuff tariff law was passed providing for a duty of 30 per cent 
dIus 5 cents per pound on dyes with certain exceptions, 15 per cent 
dIus 2i cents per pound on intermediates, and placing crudes on a 
free list. With the passage of this law capital turned to the industry. 

The trading with the enemy act, October G, 1917, broke the Oerman 
ontrol of patents. Under its provision the Federal Trade Commis- 
sion was given authority to issue licenses under patents owned by 
jnemy aliens. With this much protection, but under circumstances 
in which the manufacture of explosives was demanding every pound 
)f coal-tar derivatives which the country could produce, the dye manu- 
facturers built an industry which was in operation in time to save the 
textile manufacturing business of the country from the disastrous 
effects of a dye famine. 

Supervision of the dj'e industry was from the beirinning of the 
council an important part of the work of the Chemicals Division. 
The Artificial Dyes and Intermediates Section Avas formed in the 
spring of 1918, with J. F. Schoellkopf, jr., as chief. When he en- 
tered the Army in September, V. L. King succeeded him. 

Many of the constituent materials of dyes were placed under 
(jlovernmcnt control during 1918 — toluol, phenol, acetic acid, wood 
alcohol, chlorine, caustic soda, nitrate of soda, anmionia, and others. 
It became the problem of the section to make careful studies of the 
exact needs of the dj^e manufacturers in order to sup[)ly them with 
enougli to encourage a development sufficient for the necessities of 
the textile trade and yet not subtract more than was absolutely neces- 
sary from the manufacture of explosives. 

A nimiber of programs of conservation and curtaihuent had to 
be inaugurated. Among notal)le examples of these are sul]jhide of 
soda, toluol, acetic acid, and nitric acid. The demand for olive-drab 
cloth for uniforms made the consumption of sulphide of s:)da ab- 
normal. Orders for olive-drab cloth for civilian use were cut to 
25 per cent, and an agreement was reached with the trade to eliminate 
them and to eliminate the use of sulphide of soda for dyeing l)lack 
hosiery, but the end came before this plan was put into operation. 
A saving was also effected by a rule requiring sulphide of soda to be 
shipped in fused form instead of crystal form, which is two-thirds 
water. A new method was discovered l)y which the quantity of 
nitrate of soda used in azo dyes was cut down. The use to some 
extent of vinegar as a substitute for acetic acid was inaugurated. 

It was the purpose of the section also to protect the industry in its 
relation to foreign trade. Two problems arose. A group of Swiss 
color manufacturers made overtures to obtain the release of certain 



184 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

scarce raw materials from this country under a promise to furni 
finished dyes in return to the United States. This action was oppos( 
by the section and was not carried out. 

Nutgalls, imported from China, are manufactured into tanni. 
gallic acid, and pyro gallic acid. These in turn are used for dyes f • 
developing moving-picture films and other films and for medicina 
Shortage in shipping reduced importations, and it became necessa: 
for the section to allocate all that arrived. In order to do this i 
telligently it was necessary to study the relative needs of each indu 
try using the product and the proportion of nutgalls which shou^ 
go into each of the acids, in order that each consumer might ha^ 
his fair share, as the importance of his product was determined. 

The close of the war left the dye industry in a favorable cond 
tion for full development. Prices of all the constituent materia 
were immediately reduced and many of them were a drug on tl 
market. Toluol, which had been commandeered at $1.50 per gallo 
sold in December, 1918, at 25 cents per gallon. Phenol fell from 4 
cents per pound to 11 and 12 cents. I'he extent to which the indu: 
try had groAvn even before the end of 1917 is shown in the tab! 
printed in the appendix.^ 

INDUSTRIAL CASKS AND GAS I KODUCTS. 

Karly in 191S, ,J. M. JNIorehead came to Washington to take charg 
of stimulating the production of toluol under the direction of Mi 
Summers. In the spring the Industrial Gases and Gas Product 
Section was formed and Mr. Morehead became chief. The sectio: 
dealt with a large number of commodities, but its principal activi 
ties were in connection Avith toluol, saccharine, acetylene, and oxygen 

P>esides the use of toluol in T. N. T. and in synthetic dyes, sac 
charine and benzoate of soda are made from it, and it enters int 
the fabrication of dope for airplane Avings. The stimulation of it 
production has already been noted in this report. During 1917 th 
Ordnance Department advanced money for the construction of nu 
merous new plants and built several new Government-owned strip 
ping plants at the works of large gas producers. The entire outpu 
of the country was commandeered in February, 1918, and a price o 
$1.50 per gallon was fixed by agreement between the producers an( 
the Government. This price was confirmed by the price-fixing com 
mittee in July, 1918. The section took care of all allocations, thi 
Explosives Division agreeing that 5 per cent of the output might h 
diverted to nonmilitary uses. The rate of production had reachec 
25,000,000 gallons per year by December, 1918, and would hav( 

" See Appendix XXVI for table of quantities produced in 1917 of ceitaiu seleete 
crudes, intermediates, and dyes. 



AMEKiC'A.N IXDI'STIIY IN Tl I K WAi;. 185 

'ifiiii reached a5,000,()U0 ^rallons in lt)i;). It is ostiinatc.l th;it civiliiui 
*Pos! uses will require only about 1,200,000 gallons per yeiir, hut it is 
suggested that at 25 or 20 cents per gallon it might Hud a use as a 
'i'ni| dilutent for gasoline as a motor fuel. Toluol is one of the deriva- 
tives of the "aromatic series" — benzol, toluol, xylol, and solvent 
naphtha. If the last stage of retinement, involving the separation of 
the series into these constituents, be omitted, a proihict suital»U> for 
diluting gasoline coulil be })r()duced at a profit at 20 cents i)er gallon. 
Saccharine is used as a substitute for sugar, particularly abroad. 
The principal domestic use is in chewing tobacco. To sa^•e toluol, the 
manufacture of saccharine was restricted and its export stopped tiur- 
ing the war. The section, however, permitted enough to be made to 
idi satisfy essential domestic needs. 

Acetylene gas is produced by adding water to calcium carbide. The 
electric power for the manufacture of calcium carbide is interchange- 
llft'l able with the power for the manufacture of ferroalloys. The war 
demand for ferroalloys resulted in a shortage in the carbide supply. 
Exports were cut oil' and domestic use curtailed. The section, how- 
ever, discovered that it would be necessary to supply certain com- 
panies doing important war work in South America, and secured 
export releases for their benefit. 

Ox^'gen is used in connection with acetylene in many kinds of metal 
i work. It is shipped in steel cylinders. The Avar brought a greatly 
^*f increased demand, and one of the plants making oxygen cylinders was 
'"' diverted to the manufacture of trench mortars. By August, 11)18, 
•^'1 the shortage in cylinders had become critical. The section called a 
"' meeting of the industry and after a long conference it was con- 
"I eluded that the situation could be relieved by establishing a system 
' providing for a more rapid return of cylinders. This was accom- 
[ plished through the cooperation of the large consumers and the Rail- 
"j road Administration. Ninety-two per cent of our oxygen output is 
H manufactured by two companies which use the liquid-air process. 
'! More than 30 smaller companies manufacture by the electrolytic 
M process. During the war construction began on 21 new plants, cal- 
'[ culated to increase the production of oxygen 25 per cent. Some 
j of these were in operation when the end came. 

Ira C. Darling, chief of the Creosote Section, had chai-ge as associ- 
I ate in this section of problems relating to oxygen. 

crp:osotk. 

1 Creosote is a coal-tar product used as a preservative for wood. 

1 The chief problem of the section lay in the fact that not enough creo- 

I sote could be produced to satisfy the needs of the Kailroad Ad- 

■ ministration, the Emergency Fleet, the Army, the Navy, and tho 



186 AMEEICAX liSTDUSTEY IX THE WAR. 



I 



Government-controlled telephone and telegraph companies, even by 
allowing none for private consumption outside these activities. 

The ordinary automatic priority rules gave all of these agencies 
priority, and it was impossible for the producers to decide to which! 
orders they should give preference, for they could not fill all Gov- 
ernment orders. Commandeering the entire output was suggested as 
a solution, particularly by the producers, but the section and the 
Eailroad Administration both opposed this, and a plan was adopted 
under which the section allocated all orders of the Army, ^avy, and 
Emergency^ Fleet, giving first preference to these. A letter, setting 
forth the program, was approved by the priorities commissioner 
and sent to the producers October 23, 1918. 

The railroads were b}^ far the largest consumers, they having used 
about 40,000,000 of the 52,000,000 gallons produced in 1917. The 
Administration estimated that it would need 50,000,000 gallons for 
1918; but studies of the section made in July showed that only 
24,700,000 gallons had been produced during the first six months 
of 1918, and that not more than 26,500,000 gallons could be looked 
for during the last six months. 

Investigations were made of possible increased production and pos- 
sible importation from Japan and England. Replies to a question- 
naire, sent out b}^ the section July 19. 1918. to the 26 producing com- 
panies, indicated that production could not be materially increased 
during 1918. The section found that 1,000,000 gallons could be ob- 
tained from Japan, and that none could be obtained from England. 

The Eailroad Administration had been studying methods of con- 
servation in substitution of materials for treating ties, and they 
adopted a program which cut down their requirement about 20 per 
cent. This, together with the section's careful control over all other 
Government orders through clearances, was meeting the situation 
when the armistice came. 

Four of the 26 producing companies turned out over 85 per cent of 
the supply, and the Railroad Administration bought about 80 per 
cent of it, and thus were able to maintain a fair price without 
formal control. Creosote was not used in any way in the explosives 
program. Creosote remained at 7 cents per gallon from 1913 
through until the beginning of 1918, when it rose to 9 cents and re- 
mained at that figure until the end of the war. 

The Creosote Section was formed in Februar}-, 1918, and Ira C 
Darling was chief throughout the period. 

TANNING MATERIALS AND NATURAL DYES. 

The tanning materials and natural dyes industries Avere affected 
by the war in two ways: (1) The disturbance of shipping made the 
importation of raw materials difficult; and (2) the shortage and high 
prices of SA'nthetic dyes brought the more costly natural dyes to the 



AMEIMCAX IXnrSTHV IN TIIK WAll. 187 

arket as a substiluto. ^'ol•y few natural dyrs can comix'tc wiili 
ynthetic dj'es in normal times, because their production is more 
costly and their use has no particular advantajre over synthetic dyes 
of the same color. 



Logwood, for exam|ile, may be used for blacks on silk and leather 
and for dyeing wool and cotton black or blue, liut it is no better than 
€oal-tar dyes for the purpose. The increase in its use from l!)i;i to 
1916 by several representative textile firms was given by the Tariff 
Commission as follows: Cotton, .'367 per cent: silk, 4-1:7 per cent: and 
wool, .'>28 per cent, wliile the average price paid for logwood in- 
creased about 320 per cent. 

Both the raw materials and finished products of dyes and tanning 
extracts come to the United States from all parts of the world. The 
dyes increased more in price and were more difficult to secure than 
the tanning materials, wdiile the price and scarcity of both varied 
with different origins. Divi-divi, coming from tropical America, ad- 
vanced in price to only 160 per cent, while gambier, coming from 
Singapore, advanced to 600 per cent. The tanning extracts, like 
chestnut, hendock bark, and oak bark, being domestically j)roduced, 
showed very little advance. In fact, oak-bark extract sold at 3..') 
cents per pound in January, 1918, while its average price through 
1913 was 8 cents. Quebracho extract, coming from South America, 
sold during 1918 at only about double normal prices. 

The section was made a separate unit under the Chemicals Division 
May 1, 1918, and ¥.. J. Haley, who had been handling tanning mate- 
rials in the Quartermaster Corps, was made chief. By this time the 
shortage of tanning materials Avas so great that the problem of the 
section was to provide for more importations and to take sullicient 
control over the distribution of both imported and domestic prod- 
ucts that the w^ar needs for leather might be satisfied. 

Arrangements were made with the War Trade Board and Shipping 
Board for bringing in 60,000 tons of quebracho extract from Argen- 
tina. Shipping could not be provided for quebracho logs. Prac- 
tically all imports from distant countries had to be eliminated. l)ut 
arrangements were made for bringing in limited (piantilies fr(»m 
Central and South America and the west coast of Africa. In order 
to insure a distribution of these satisfactory to the war program, the 
War Trade Board granted import licenses sul)ject to allocation of the 
material upon arrival by the section. The section also allocated ship- 
ping spate to the quebracho extract .shippers. Each tannery was 
requested by the section to submit a careful estimate of the (piantity 
and kinds of imported tanning materials to be recjuired for the bal- 
ance of the year on (lovernment contracts. When this information 
was compiled, a systematic distribution was made in accordance with 
the supply available, contracts for leather for war purpo.ses beiiiL' 
taken care of before all others. 



188 AMEKKAX 12S-DLSTHY IX THE WAR. 

Domestic production also had to have attention. Prices were high, 
but the rate of output seemed to be decreasing rather than increas- 
ing in the summer of 1918. There were 42 plants in the country, most 
of which produced tanning extracts entirely from chestnut wood. 
The supply of wood was very short, due to labor and transporta- 
tion difficulties. The section called a meeting of the extract manu- 
facturers, and in conjunction with the Railroad Administration a 
zone system was arranged for the chestnut wood producing districts 
for the purpose (1) of distributing the wood supply where it was 
most urgently needed, and (2) of conserving transportation. 

No price-fixing became necessary, but the section had to limit dis- 
tribution almost entirely to direct and indirect Government contracts 
of the United States and Canada, Canadian needs being put on the 
same basis as our own. 

The control over dj^ewood iind natural dyes was very similar to 
that over tanning materials. The War Trade Board found it neces- 
sary to restrict importations to those coming from near-by ports. 
An arrangement was reached as the result of a meeting with rejjre- 
sentatives of natural dye manufacturing plants and of the War 
Trade Board and Shipping Board, to limit the importation of dye- 
woods and dj'cs to certain specified kinds and quantities and to grant 
licenses upon the condition that the section might allocate all of the 
materials.* 

Allocations of dyewoods were made to the seA'eral manufacturers 
on the basis of their relative consumption for the three years — 1915, 
1916, and 1917. This consumption, incidentally, had been two and 
one-half times the corresponding consumption of the three years im- 
mediately preceding 1915. A very effective dyewood war service 
committee of five members was organized- 

The section also handled wool grease. This was first used for 
the war as shoe dubbin. But it was discovered early in September, 
1918, that a large quantity would be needed for the manufacture of 
lanoline, used to prevent mustard gas burns. The section called a 
meeting of the producers, presented the facts, and an agreement Avas 
reached under Avhich the (TOA'ernment was to take over the entire 
output at 16 cents per pound, the section allocating the purchases to 
the Chemical Warfare Service and the Quartermaster Corps. 

I'AIXTS AND PIGMENTS. 

The section was organized ISlay 6, 1918, with Russell S. Hubbard, 
chief. Upon the death of Mr. Hubbard," November 5, 191S. L. R. 
Atwood succeeded him. 

♦ Soe Appendix XXVII for ruling of \V;u- Trade Board on dyewoods and dye.-*, effective 
Oct. 10, 1018. 

<• Russell Sturgis Hubbard, chief of the I'aint and I'ignient Section, died in the service 
of his country on Xovember 5, 1018. He had come to Washington with full knowledge 
that V>ecause of his health the supreme sacrifice was not unlikely, and he carried on to 
the end with the finest courage. 



A.MKKK'AX INnrSTIJY IN I'lir, WAIl. 1S9 



The paint and varnisli industry of (he United States is murli hir«,a'r 
:han that of any other country. The vahie of its pro(hict in 15)17 
imounted to $175,000,000. There -was never any important shorta<re 
lurinf^ the war nor concern in fillin*! (lovernment re<iuirenients. 
Averafre prices, however, advanced to about 2;]5 per cent of normal, 
because many of the raw materials consumed by the industry entered 
also into war production, while others were imi)orted and involved 
"'liiipping. 

The Avork of the section was devoted chiefly to conservation and 
also to keeping the Government agencies advised concerning possible 
shortages in particular elements that their specifications for pro- 
";' ducers might be revised so as to avoid shortages. Very important 
conservation programs were inaugurated: (1) In the use of tin for 
cans (several sizes were eliminated) ; (2) for reducing the number of 
colors produced; (3) for reducing the output devoted to nonwar 
uses; (4) for substituting female for male workers in the plants; 
and (5) for reducing the importations of shellac and varnish gums. 

The constituent materials for our paint and varnish industry are 
derived principally as follows. Pigments are substantially all of 
domestic origin, but of these 400,000 tons were produced in 1917 by 
chemical or metallurgical processes and only 40,000 tons by the 
simple crushing, grinding, and washing of minerals. Linseed oil is 
produced in very large quantities in this country, but in 1917 one- 
third of it was from imported seed. Flaxseed competes with wheat 
for farm land, and with wheat at $2.20 per bushel, flaxseed should 
sell at $3.54 per bushel.'^ 

We also use imported china-wood oil and soya-bean oil. the bean 
being imported from Manchuria. Linseed oil, however, is by far the 
most important. The gums for varnish, with the exception of rosin, 
are all imported. Damar gums are from Batavia, Java, and Singa- 
pore. The very important Kauri gums are from New Zealand. The 
copal gums come from the Congo, Zanzibar, Madigascar, Angola, 
the Gold Coast, British Guiana, the West Indies, and Manila. 
Shellac all comes from Calcutta. Shellac is derived from a rosinous 
encrustation exuded by a scaley insect which infests the fig trees of 
India. 

The waxes are also largely imported. (Jarnal)ua wax comes from 
Brazil, Japan wax from Japan, candelilla wax from Mexico, boeswax 
largely from Cuba, Brazil, and Chile. 

The varnish industry is thus dependent to a great extent u|)on 
materials which must be transported long distances by shipping. 
The paint industry finds its best pigments derived from metals wit lei v 
used in other industries and related to the war program. Lead is 
a conspicuous example. And finally linseed oil competes with wheat. 

•Flax for textiles bas to be cut before the seeds are rip<\ so tbe two demnn.Is ran not 
be supplied from tbe same crop. 



190 AMERICAN INDUSTRl- IX THE WAR. 

An interesting example of the way in which a conservation pro- 
gram is capable of being used indirectly to control prices, even under, 
adverse conditions, is afforded by the case of linseed oil. The pricei 
of linseed oil had almost reached its maximum in July, 1918, whea: 
importation of seed was cut off. It rose rapidly. The section thea 
began a series of meetings with the paint industry, and, as soon as- 
tliey had worked out an agreement for a plan to cut down the number;! 
of colors and the number of sizes of cans, the slack in the demand fori 
oil was sufficient to cause the price to recede rapidly. It was $1.90 
per gallon in September, and $1.55 by November 1. 

The importation of shellac was restricted by the War Trade Board^ 
and the section, in agreement with the Avar service committee of the 
shellac importers, allocated whatever quantities came in. The same 
thing was done with Kauri gum. A war conference committee of the 
paint, varnish, and allied trades on September 18 asked for a hearing 
before the section, and presented a request to be given a place on the- 
" preference list." The situation was studied and data furnished to- 
the priorities commissioner, but the end came before the request had 
been acted upon. 

WOOD CHEMICALS. 

This section was formed in December. 1917, when the Secretary 
of War commandeered the industry. C. H. Connor was section chief.. 
The so-called wood chemicals are the products obtained from the- 
distillation of hardwood. The primary derivatives are acetate of 
lime, crude wood alcohol, and charcoal. 

Acetate of lime results from the neutralization of pyroligneou» 
acid with lime. From acetate of lime is obtained either acetone or 
acetic acid. In distilling for acetone, methyl ethyl ketone and acetone 
oil are obtained. Important derivatives of acetic acid are acetic an- 
hydride, ethyl acetate, and amyl acetate. 

From the crude wood alcohol the various grades of wood alcohol 
and methyl acetone are obtained. Wood alcohol is used largely as a 
denaturing agent for grain alcohol and to make formaldehyde. Botli 
acetone and acetic acid were used in very large quantities in the 
manufacture of airplane dope. Acetone was also used by the British 
in making the high explosive cordite. 

War purchases of the Allies in this country before we entered 
the conflict had stimulated both increased production and ad- 
vancing prices. The British War Mission alone purchased acetone 
during this period at a rate greater than 50 per cent of the rate 
of total production in 191-1. The average of all prices of wood 
chemicals was about 190 per cent of normal in the spring of 1917. 

As the American air program developed, it became clear that our 
Government would have to inaugurate important measures of con- 



J 



A.MKKK-AN lNI)r>^TnY IX THE UAl?. 191 

trol in onlor to insure an adcHiuato siipjily for diusi'lvi's without 
'listurbin<; the American source for the Allies. In December. 1!M7. 
liy order of the Secretary of War, all wood chemicals were com- 
mandeered for Government use, and control over their distribution 
was placed in the hands of the section. The followinjj prices were 
established by agreement with the trade, to take effect as soon as 
oxistin<j: supplies should be exhausted, stocks on hand to be di- 
posed of by allocation : 

, ("nits 

Acetate of lime per poiintl.. 4 

Crude wood alcohol IH>r pillim.. .'lO 

Ninety-live per cent wood alcohol do 79 

NInet.v-seven per cent wood alcohol do 82 

Pure methyl alcohol do SG 

Methyl acetone do S6 

Denaturing grade wood alcohol do 79 

Acetone do 25. f' 

Methyl ethyl ketone do 2.'. .^ 

On February 13, 1018, tlie follov.inp- prices for acetic acid were 
agreed upon : 

Cents. 

f;';!cial acetk- acid p«'r iiound _ 1!" 

iiniercial 100 per cent acid do 1.'.. T.") 

These prices were all naked at the plant, and a definite charge for 
the container was to be made. They were continued throughout the 
period of the war. 

Acetate of lime was the limiting factor. Several new i)]ants were 
started under Government aid during 1918, but they did not reach 
production. A number of conservation programs were inaugurated. 
For example, the use of acetone in the manufacture of chloroform 
was stopped and denatured alcohol used in its place. Two or three 
new methods of producing acetone were developeil. Ouc. called 
the Weisman process, by which acetone and buytyle alcohol are pro- 
luced from the fermentation of sour and low-grade corn, woidd 
have been of great importance had the war lasted longer. Another 
process obtained icetone from seaweed; and still another from 
calcium carbide. The production of methyl acetate was developed 
and the ingredient Avas used as a substitute for methyl acetone in the 
airplane program. 

The war requirements for acetone were very large, and well ove» 
60 per cent of all the acetate of lime was used for the production of 
this solvent. Industrial uses were almost eliminated. The draft 
on acetate of lime for the production of acetone naturally caused a 
stringency in acetic acid and acetic anhydride, which were also war 
necessities. It became an important problem of the section to de- 
crease the nonwar uses of acetic acid and its derivatives, which play n 



192 AMEEICAX INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 

];irge role in the manufacture of d3'es. tanning materials, chrome 
yellow, insecticides, etc.. as well as acetates. 

In order to be sure that there would be enough acetic acid for war | 
uses and yet that as small an amount as possible of acetate of limei 
should be used for producing this commodity, a program of control!! 
was established. All industries were allowed 100 per cent for their 
Government orders, but no industries were allowed more than 50 per j 
cent for their ordniary needs, except for making synthetic indigo, sal- , 
varsin. and cellulose acetate. Certain industries were allowed 25 per | 
cent of their ordinary needs, and other industries (laundry, soap, food 
products, toilet articles, and millinery) were allowed no acetic acid 
made from acetate of lime.*' 

This ruling naturally led to the use of substitutes. Vinegar, which 
contains from 9 to 10 per cent acetic acid, was found to be the most 
important substitute. It was used in insecticides, in white lead, in 
the bleaching and cleaning of textiles, etc. Lactic acid, formic acid, 
and Erusto salts were also important substitutes. The section 
assisted the insecticide industry in obtaining a sufficient supply of 
Ainegar. 

Acetic anhydride is used in making acetjd salicylic acid (aspirin" 
The influenza epidemic in the fall of 1918 made it necessary to re-| 
lease acetic anhydride to increase the production of aspirin. Only 131 
]>er cent of the acetate of lime produced during the first 10 months of 
J 918 was available for nonwar industries, while the Allies used the 
solvents made from GO per cent of the production. 

Wood alcohol was never a serious problem. Civilian consumers 
were allowed 45 per cent of the production in 1918. Its use as a de- 
naturing agent for grain alcohol was restricted, and other agents 
were substituted, but other conservation was not found necessary. 

The American production of wood chemicals in 1917 has been esti- 
mated as follows : 

Acetate of lime pounds__ 200,000.000 

Acetic aciil, 2S per cent do SO. 000, 000 

Acetone do 27. 500, 000 

Acetone oil gallons__ 4.50, 000 

:\Ietli.vI ethyl ketone pounds__ 1, 900, 000 

.Methyl acetone gallons— 1, 400, 000 

AVood alcohol do 8, 000, 000 

The production in 1918 was no doubt considerably greater. 

MISCELLAXEOUS CHEMICALS. 

On April 23, 1918, the Chemicals Division formed a Miscellaneous 
Chemicals Section with A. G. Rosengarten as chief. The section 
held itself ready to study and control a long list of chemicals or to 

8 See Appendix XXVIII for the classification of industries using acetic acid, published 
for the instruction of the trade and subject to revision upon presentation of suitable 
t\i(lenc<'. 



AMERICAN IXDUSTUV IX THE WAR. 193 

?conimcn(l the formation of iicav sections as necessities mi«j:lit de- 
elop. Particular attention had to be given to five of these cliemi- 
ils: "White arsenic, bromine, camphor, celhiloid, and metallic mag- 
esium. 

The Food Administration had taken charge of white arsenic on 
ccount of its importan c in the manufacture of insecticides: but in 
le spring of 1918 a demand developed for it to be used in the jiro- 
U( tion of toxic gas. Studies showed that the annual production 
ere was between 12,000 and 14,000 tons, 8,000 tons being used for 
isecticides, 2.500 tons in the glass industry, and the balance in 
liscellareous industries. To meet the new Avar demand, its use in 
le glass industry was eliminated, and steps were taken to reduce the 
mount used for insecticides. At the same time the Anaconda Co. 
egan the construction of a new plant with a capacity of 10,000 tons 
er annum. The price was fixed February 23, 1018. at 9 cents i)er 
ound f. o. b. plants. 

Bromine was required also for toxic gas. Normal production was 
bout GOO.OOO pounds per annum. This was increased before the 
nd of the war to 1,600,000 pounds, while an additional plant with 

capacity of 750,000 pounds per annum was under construction, 
lie Government was installing some 17 deep wells near Midland, 
iich., in connection wnth the bromine manufacturing of the Dow 
""hemiv al Co. Bromine is recovered from the bittern remaining 
fter the extraction of the salt from salt brines. The price of bro- 
nine rose to 1,670 per cent of normal right after the 'first German 
;as attack. It sold at about 75 cents per pound or 250 per cent of 
■ormal while we were in the war. 

Camphor comes from the Island of Formosa and is controlled by 
he Japanese monopoly bureau, whose policy it is to restrict its re- 
ining except in Japan. Its largest use is in the manufacture of 
elluloid. The Du Pont Co. has developed a synthetic process for 
)roduting camphor from Savannah turpentine as a base. It would 
ppear to be to the interests of the country to have manufacture by 
he synthetic process continue. The celluloid industry consumes a 
arge quantity of nitric acid, sulphuric acid, and camphor. There 
re four large manufacturers in the T'liited States, and it is esti- 
nated that 250,000 people are connected with its produi tion and dis- 
ribution. The section worked out a program of curtailment for 
his industry and made a recommen<lation to the Conservation Divi- 
sion, but it never berame o})erative. 

Metallic magnesium was used in the war in tracer bullets, as an 
lloy in shells and castings, as a substitute for aluminum in gas 
nasks, as a flux for nickel and Monel metal, and as a deoxidizer and 
scavenger. It is produced from magnesium oxide and magnesium 
chloride. In the light of the war reciuirement for metallic mag- 
105826—21 13 



194 AMEPJCAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAE. 

nesiiim, the section made a tlioroiif^li survey of production. It was 
found that the country's capacity Avas about 40,000 pounds per 
month, and that tliis would not meet the growing demands of our- 
selves and the Allies. There were plants at Niagara Falls, Ivumford, 
;Me.. and Lockport, N. Y. The section recommended that the plant 
at Ivuinford, Me., be expanded so as to produce 70,000 pounds per 
month. 'J'he Ordnance Department had prepared a contract for this, 
which was ready to be signed when the end came. 

THE TECHNICAL AND CONSULTING STAFF. 

This staff was organized in the early days of the Chemicals Division 
to handle special problems arising anywhere in the work and to take 
up commodities for which separate sections had not yet been found 
necessary. The staff consisted for the most part of a group of pro- 
fessors of chemistry. Dr. INI. T. l>ogait began the work. l*rofs. II. 
Iv. INfootly, S. A. Tucker, and T. P. IMcCutcheon were important fac- 
tors in it. E. Iv. AVeidlein, acting director of the ^lellon Institute, 
carried on important research in behalf of the staff, turning over tho 
valuable equipment and personnel of the institute's laboratories at 
Pittsburgh without cost to the Government. lie was also frequently 
in consultation at Washington. 

The work centered around special problems arising out of the dif- 
ficulty of manufacturing certain chemicals needed in unusual quan- 
tities for the war. It was in particular devoted to developing sub- 
stitutions for chemicals not obtainable in sufficient quantities. A 
substitute for platinum in the equipment for the production of acid 
by the contact process was developed at the Mellon Institute. In 
the early days of the Chemicals Division, before there were many 
commodity chiefs, almost every chemical problem, except explosives 
and nitrates, was referred to this section for such action as was pos- 
sible with its limited staff. In this way the consulting staff was the 
origin of many of the chemical sections. The catalogue of cases re- 
ferred is too long to print here, but a fcAV examples will give zn idea 
of the field. 

One of the first tasks attempted by the staff was a complete survey 
of hydroelectric power which was or might be devoted to chemical 
manufacture. This was followed by a study of the bromine situa- 
tion, which resulted in the sinking of new wells in Michigan and 
the stimidation of production in Ohio and on the Pacific coast. 

A problem on the type of cell most suitable for chlorine produc- 
tion and another on plant locations for caustic soda manufacture 
led, after the general lines of a solution had been worked out, to 
the formation of the Alkali and Chlorine Section. The staff gave 
particular attention to the production of radium and the discovery of 
stocks in existence needed for the war. Both this countrv and the 



AMEKlt'AN lXri-STi:V IN TIIK WAT.. 195 

Allies needed pot.issiuni and sodinni pemKinnanate ior jjjas tnaslcs in 
quantities unnsnal in j^eace time. A method was found lor pioducinjjr 
(hem in (juantities lai'<jjer than needeih 

Ihe problem of meeting a shortage in sodium hilieate, used for 
fooil eontainers, was presented to the stall early in the war. It was 
solved eventually by eliminating^ the use of wall board in Govern- 
ment temporary buildings. There Avas a conflict in demands for 
the limited supply of arsenic on the pait of the insecticide indus- 
try, the tannin^^ ind.ustry, and the manufacturers of i)oisonous "rases 
for the war. The Food Administration interceded in behalf of the 
insecticide producers. The staff devoted considerable attention to 
the problem and the shorta<:e was finally relieved by a jjjreatly in- 
creased production at Anaconda. 

When acetic acid was commandeered for use in the manufacture of 
airplane dope, there followed a severe shortage for commercial pur- 
poses, particularly in the textile industry, in laundries, and for the 
production of insecticides. The staff worked on the question of sub- 
stitutes in connection with the Wood Chemicals section.' Vinegar, 
formic acid, and lactic acid proved to be the most valuable substi- 
tu'es. The production of lactic acid came into conflict with the (^as 
Defense Service, for the latter was usin<^ clippinj^s of ve<^etable 
ivory (the normal source of lactic acid) as a source of carbon for 
canticles. 

The staff made extensive investigation of the possibility of a 
substitution of other oxidizing agents in place of nitrates in the 
manufacture of explosives. The perchlorates seemed to offer en- 
couragement. These experiments were still going on when the armis- 
tice made them unnecessary. 

An analogous investigation was made of the question of produc- 
ing telryl from dimethylamine, the latter being produced from the 
nitrogen compound beetain, obtained from beet-root molasses. The 
beet-root industry was interested and offered important assistance. 
No conclusions, however, had been reached when the end came. 

The ordinary production of phosphorus, limited to a few uses like 
til!' manufacture of matches and vermin poisons, is naturally not 
large. When the war began to use it to produce smoke s:^-reens, a 
great increase in production was necessary. The technical staff 
solved the problem. 

These are only a few of the cases which came before the staff, 
Man-*^ of the chemical problems discussed in connection with the 
work of particular sections began Avith the technical staff, and in not 
a few instances AA'cre assisted to a solution by it. The staff did 
important Avork in connection with such diverse problems as pro- 
ducing the materials for charging horse masks for gas defense, in 
producing tear gas. and in developing domestic production of casein 
for aircraft glues. 

' See p. 191 for fuller treatment. 



C'lIArTER 7. 

AUXILIARY MINERAL PRODUCTS. 

There were seven further sections which functioned under the 
Chemicals Division as follows: Refractories and Native Products, 
Electrodes and Abrasives, Chemical Glass and Stoneware, Asbestos 
and Magnesia, Mica, Ferroalloys, and Platinum. The work of the 
sections handling the ferroalloys and platinum has already been dis- 
cussed in chai:)ter 4, along with other metals, although the important 
relation of these metals to the chemical industry is obvious. 

REFRACTORIES. 

The general term " refractories " is applied to fire-clay brick, 
silica brick, etc.; that is, to all materials used for lining furnaces, 
coke ovens, and other crucibles where a lining capable of withstand- 
ing high temperatures and chemical reactions is needed. Refrac- 
tories are made from various clays and other minerals, a mixture 
of several substances being usually necessary to secure the desired 
resisting qualities. Suitable clays occur in numerous parts of this 
country, but it was the practice before the war for our brickmakers 
to import quantities of particular clays whose effect in producing 
certain specific qualities in the brick was well known. Klingenberg 
clay from Germany is a marked example of this. Most American 
manufacturers of crucibles have always felt that they could not 
make a satisfactory product without having the German clay to mix 
with local materials. Experiment and study during the war has 
produced a mixture of American clays, which 12 out of 16 manufac- 
turers of crucibles declare to be quite satisfactory, and the others 
claim that they are getting fair results from it. 

Because of the increased activity in smelting and refining metals, 
occasioned by the war, the supply of refactory brick became a prob- 
lem of vital importance. The section was formed early in July, 
1918, with Charles Catlett as chief. Steps were immediately taken 
to make a careful study of the conditions of manufacture and the 
relation of possible supply to the need. The section found two im- 
portant difficulties in the industry, in which improvement from a 
central point seemed possible: (1) Users were in the habit of buy- 
ing by " brands " rather than by tests of quality and (2) the num- 
ber and variety of shapes of brick required by different consumers 
seemed unnecessarily large. 
196 



AMERICAN IXDrsTItV IN THE WAR. 107 

A system of tests for stamlardi/.iii": specificntions for cluy firo 
Drick had been Avorked out by the MeUon Institute in conjunction 
with the Bureau of Stanchirds. The section published these specifi- 
cations to the trade, askin*? for comments and objections with a 
view to issuinpr them as standard. The problem was considerably 
involved, and final specifications had not yet been issued when the 
armistice came. 

Standardization of shapes had been proposed and a^jreed upon to 
a larg:e extent by the brick makers, but they had not yet been fully 
adopted by the users. The section was in the midst of work on this 
problem when the end came. 

Xo attempt was made to fix prices. In a general way the work 
of the section with the producers was (1) to get them to improve 
labor supply by special training and better working conditions, 

(2) to increase the capacity by the installation of additional ma- 
chinery, and (3) to improve the quality (a) by a more careful study 
and test of the materials available, (h) by better manufacturing 
methods, and (c) by better inspection before shipment. The section 
worked with the consumers to induce them (1) to confine their re- 
quirements so far as possible to standard shapes, (2) to differen- 
tiate material by tests rather than by brands or trade-marks, and 

(3) to study more fully the question of suitability of particular 
brick for specific purposes. 

Ceramics. — Ceramics were handled by H. F. Stanley in the tech- 
nical and consulting staff. The work, carried on in connection Avith 
Mr. Catlett, was devoted to the purpose of investigating possibilities 
of stimulating the further use of domestic clay in American potteries. 
Before the war we imi)orte(i annually about 250,000 tons of selected 
clays, while not more than 30(),0()() tons of domestic clays were used for 
our china, porcelain, paper, and linoleum industries, (ierman clays 
were, of course, cut off, and the British limited shipments to this 
country to very small amounts. 

Attention was devoted not onlj' to studies in the use of domestic 
clays at the potteries, but also through the State councils of defense 
and the State geologists to examinations of .sources for new types 
of domestic clay. Assistance was given in finding markets and 
securing transportation for new developments of the domestic 
product. The potteries found difficulty in persuading their skilled 
workmen that domestic < lays would give satisfactory results 

Production of pottery was stimulated during the war not only 
by the needs of the Army. Xavy. and Shiii|)ing Board, but by the 
general increase in standard of living throughout the country. The 
demand is said to have in leased 300 per cent, while the production 
was about 75 per cent of normal. 



198 AAIERRAX IXDL'STRY I^• THE WAJl. 

ZLECTIIODES AXD ABRASI^•ES. 

The problems falliiiL;- in ihis field were handleil by >. A. Tucke: 
in the teehnieal and consultinii staff until June. ll'lS. wlien a separat 
section was formed with Henry C. Du Bois as chief. 

t'lccf/'odcs. — Electrodes bear the same rehition to an electric furnace 
or an electrojlieniical crucible as the carbon or other filament bears to 
an arc liiiht. Carbon electrodes are used only for eiectrothermic proc- 
esses, while irraphite electrodes are used in both the eiectrothermic and 
electr.ichemical plants. Eefiners were hindered in their work con- 
siderably during the war from shortajies in the supply of electrodes. 
Efforts were made to increase production, and the output of graphite 
electrodes was expanded by a ruling that 20 per cent of American 
graphite shoiikl be used iu all construction, be a use the supply of 
Ceylon graphite was the limiting factor. 

But in the spring of 10 IS immediate relief seemed to be promi-ed 
by a more careful distribution of the i ommodity among the con- 
sumers. It was found that many plants had on hand a supply of 
electrodes sufficient for 15 or IS months, while other plants had a 
week's supply or were closed down because it was impossible to secure 
any. The section took steps to direct that those who had abundance 
should sell or loan to those who were short. These directions were 
enforced when necessary through the jiriority power. 

The section formulated a questionnaire whidi was sent to ea h of 
the 300 users of electrodes in the country, and required that it be 
answered in fidl on the lath of each month. ^ 

In the light of the information, which was thus brought together 
by the section, it was jiossible to control distribution of eletrodes 
in such a way as to keep all plants in operation during the remainder 
of the war period. 

The produ. ing companies were less difficult to handle, for they 
were only four in number. They reported also on the 15th of each 
month on a form sent to them by the section. 

It was also very difficult to determine whetb.er a plant was using 
its electrodes for war purposes or not. The plant might be producing 
a commodity which entered into the manufacture of another com- 
modity, parts of which were useful for the war. For this reason 
priority among users was practi ally impossible to determine. 

The large chlorine program of the Chemical Warfare Service 
gave rise to a suddenly increased need for graphite electrodes. A 
questionnaire was sent out for the purpose of determining to what 
extent carbon electrodes could be substituted for the graphite ones 
in certain industries, and plans were being worked out for inaugurat- 
ing a program of substitutions when the end came. 

> Sw Apt'emiis XXIX for ropy of the gui stiocnaire sent to the us^rs of electrodes. 



AMERICAN IXDUSTRV IX TIIK WAR. 199 

Ahra<^frc!^. — "Abnisives '' is tlu' toini !ii)pli(Ml to all siibstiiiici's used 
or f;rin(lin<r nnd polisliinir irlass, iiu'tals, wood, etc. The lii^ii-^rradc 
brasivos. paiticiilaily eniorv. coi-iindiini, -uul silicon carbide, used in 
:riiidin<r ;rlass. steel, and otliei- metals, were the only ones in which n 
horta<:e re(]niiin<r attention ajij^eared. Emery is required for <rrind- 
n«r oi)tical «rlass. 'J'urkey was the chief source of supi)ly before the 
var, thou<:h a small quantity of low-«i:ra(le emeiy is mined in this 
ountry. After Turkey was cut off. the Island of Naxos. (Jreece. be- 
anie the sole source of hi;j;h-^rade emery for ourselves and the Allies, 
("he Fien:h (Government controlled its disti'ibution. 

This country experienced jrreat diniculty in jrettin^ a sulTlcient 
sujiply to satisfy the newly <levelopinfr optical plass industry. "Work 
ad been carried on for some time to develop a synthetic sul)stitute, 
ind in February, lOlS. (he Norton Co.. at Xiajraia Falls. l)e«ran the 
Tianufa( ture of an aitificial abi-asive which satisfied the tests. Other 
itificial abrasives Avere bein^ manufactured at Nia<rai-a Falls in 
rreat quantities, and the congestion at this point, due to the lar^e 
lumber of Avar industries dependinfr upon the hydroelectric power 
there, caused a strinjreiicy in abrasives. Avhi h. in the summer of 
1018. was thi'eateninnr seriously to curtail many lines of war woik. 

It was impossible to do very much l)y Avay of classifyinjr consumers 
lecause of their complex relaticm with so many metal inchistries. 
[J"urtailment was left to the indirect effe; t of other conservation pro- 
grams, but to stimulate i>ro(hiction the priorities commissioner 
placed the manufat turers of aitificial abrasives on Preference List 
N'o. 1. and allowed them to store coal for future use. The section 
induced the Eailroad Administration to pive the producers special 
priorities in (arryin<r their raw materials to Nia^rara Falls. These 
measures more than made \\p for the practical elimination of im- 
ports, and tliey solved the problem. A small amount of emery con- 
tinued to arrive from Naxos throu<rhout the period, but the impor- 
tation of corundum from India and South Africa was very small. 

CHEMICAI- GLASS AND STONEWARE. 

This section, as well as the section on asbestos and majrnesia, was 
in char<re of R. M. Torrance. It pive special attention to glass 
carboys, chemical stoneware, and laboratory n:lass. 

(ilass carboys, particularly the 12-frallon ones, Avere needed in 
unusual quantities during the Avar for shipping and storing heavy 
acids. A serious shortage Avas threatened in the spring of 1918. 
The section discovered that it Avas not the custom to ship back empty 
carboys for refilling. When this practice was established, by re- 
quiring that a clause providing for the return of empty carboys 
should be in all acid contracts, used stocks in warehouses were 



200 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

cleared and the situation was very much relieved. The civilian use] 
of 5-gallon water bottles and other glass containers was curtailec 
The (luestion of production was examined by the section and stej 
were taken to stimulate its increase. The Illinois Glass Co. built 
plant capable of turning our six 12-gallon carboys per minute bj 
the Owens bottle-machine process. The two large older companies^ 
producing carboys by the blown-glass method, were limited by the 
supply of the highly skilled labor required. The section took steps 
to guard against having the labor withdrawn by the draft. Some 
experiments were made in the production of clay carboys as a sub- 
stitute, but the substitutes were considered unsatisfactory because of 
their weight and because of the difficulty of inspecting the acid which 
they contained. 

Chemical stoneware is used in the equipment for the manufacture 
of acids, explosives, fertilizers, and chemicals of every sort. It is 
required in hundreds of different shapes and forms; pipes, flanges, 
pump valves, storage receptacles, conveyers, etc. It must be acidi 
proof, not only in glaze but throughout the structure. Chemical stone- 1 
ware has largely supplanted lead and glass in acid plants. The secr 
tion made a complete survey of production and facilities, and held a 
number of meetings with the manufacturers. With such priority 
as>istnnce as was given the various plants from time to time, they had 
no difliculty in expanding to meet the war demands. No imported 
raw niiiterials are necessary, though Cornwall stone and English 
china clay are used in normal times. 

In scientific glassware, used in chemical laboratories and medical 
and metallurgical works, American glass blowers were able during 
the war to develop a product quite as satisfactory as that imported 
from (Germany in normal times. Production was ample for all needs, 
and it was not necessary for the section to take any important meas- 
ures of control. 

ASRESTOH AND MAGNESIA. 

A mixture of 8.5 per cent magnesium carbonate and 15 per cent 
asbestos with water produces the material used for the heat insula- 
tion of pipes and boilers. The war, in its shipbuilding and plant- 
building program and its aircraft and motor-truck production, 
needed great quantities of asbestos and magnesia. Our asbestos comes 
chiefly from mines in the Province of Quebec, Canada, though in 1918 
three new properties were opened in Arizona, where a satisfactory 
product was obtainable. The mines, however, are too far from a 
railroad to be able to compete with the Canadian production. Our 
domestic production of magnesia comes from eastern Pennsylvania 
and southern California. 



AIMERICWX INIU'STRV IX TIIF, WAII. 201 



I't 



L...,„. „ ,,. .„._„,. 

held before the priorities commissioner July 2, 1018. It wns decided 
that the industry as a whole was a war essential and that indivichial 
plants should be placed on tlie " Preference List." It was decided that 
individual priorities certificates would not be necessary if the concerns 
iMiuaired in the industry would pledire themselves to distribute their 
in-oducts on orders bearinfj the highest priority classifications. The 
section kept in touch with the firms and saw to it that fuel and trans- 
[lortation were furnished in such a way as to <juard the (Government 
[iroirram. 



Mica or isin<rlass is a hydrous silicate of potassium, occurrinir in 
natural deposits in various parts of the world. The hiirhest jrrade. or 
Muscovite mica, comes to us from India throujih Enirhind. A miter 
mica comes from Canada. Brazil and Aro:entina also produce the 
hiirher grades in small quantities. Large domestic depos'ts are found 
in North Carolina and Xew Hampshire, but our mines have never 
turned out hi^jh-grade blocks or splittin<2;s in quantity. 

Block, split, and sheet mica are used for motor spark plu^rs. for 
condensers of radio apparatus, for condensers for magnetos of auto- 
mobiles and airplanes, for phonograph diaphragms, for teU^phonc 
apparatus, in electric generators, etc. It is also used to make lamp 
chimney's for gas jets and transparent fittings for stoves. (~J round 
mica is used in the fabrication of decorating paints and various 
building materials. Mica sheets are either natural or are built up 
from splittings bj' the use of shellac and high pressure. 

The war demands, direct and indirect, were chiefly for the higher 
grades of mica, and they made necessary a control over imports. 
The section was formed in March, 1918. 11. J. Adams was the first 
chief, and he was succeeded by J. W. Paxton. The section was re- 
organized in July and placed under the Chemicals Division with 
C. K. Leith in control and he remained until the end. Lieut. C. P. 
Storrs, a mica expert, who joined the Navy, was the most important 
factor in carrying out the control over im])orts. 

It was clear in the spring of 1918 that war needs would make 

necessary the continuation or increase in imports of high-grade mica 

I from India. England was controlling the supply; she had {\koi\ 

prices and placed strict supervision over exportations. The British 

I Government was consulted through the State Department, and con- 

I sented to allocate shipments to us, provided our (Joverimieiit would 

control the distribution. The section held a conference of the parties 

interested, and the use of a Navy commandeering order was agreed 

upon and issued in June, 1918. A li-t of tli.. iriii'<>rtcr~, to whom 



202 AMERICAN jNDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

the order \vas issued, was furnished to the British GoA^ernment, an( 
the British fixed prices phis fixed costs for importing were estab 
lished as landed prices in the United States. Lieut. Storrs tool- 
char«re of the commandeering, dividing his time between the com 
niandeering board in New York and the section here. 

Enough mica was actually commandeered to maintain a reasonabUj 
emergency reserve and to stabilize prices to the users. It was thd 
])iirpose throughout simply to act as intermediary between im-^ 
l)orters and consumers, and not to use the authority of the orden 
more than necessary. The mica importers formed an association tc 
represent their interests. Later in the summer the commandeering 
order was extended to cover imports from South America in orderj 
to stabilize prices, and the question of harmony in allied purchasing! 
in that market was taken up through the Foreign Mission of the! 
Board in London. It was not deemed wise or necessary to extend 
(lie order to domestic production. 

Domestic production increased considerably during the spring and 
summer of 1918, and some discontent seemed to be exhibited among 
the promoters. Pressure was brought to bear to have the Govern- 
ment use a much larger part of the domestic output, and requests for 
financing enterprises were made. In response to this the section 
undertook a careful investigation of the situation among our own 
producers. 

The Association of Southern Mica Miners and Manufacturers was 
formed as a war service committee. After a thorough study by the 
section and by the association, the following conclusions were 
reached: (1) Artificial stimulation, either in the form of price fixing 
or financing of mica mines by the Government, was not warranted 
because its only result could be an increase in the production of the 
inferior grades, of which there was abundance; (2) there was little 
]^io.spect that the Government could use a much larger proportion 
of domestic mica; (3) the situation did warrant the assistance of the 
Board in priorities and in retaining skilled labor for the production 
of the commodity, and in having skilled labor returned so far as 
possible; and (4) new enterprises should be encouraged to the extent 
of receiving and advising on conditions and the best means of mar- 
keting the output. 

Slow progress was made by the section in building up a statistical 
background because of the immense variety of sizes and grades. No 
questionnaires were used because it was believed that results obtained 
in this way would be impossible to analyze. Careful estimates of 
requirements on the part of Government contractors were used as a 
basis for judging needs. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TllK WAi;. 203 

Us Toward the end of the period the shortnire in hij^hcT <rriide niicii 
Jstj legan to look serions, even with the increased supplies which were 
ominnj from South America. Steps were l)ein<j; taken to «;et a hir^er 
llocation from Enj^hmd when the end came. It is ilillionlt to make 
, statement concernin<^ prices because of the inliuite vai'iety iu the 
ommodity. Prices in 1918 ran from ;"■)() or GO cents to $12 or $15 
sii )er pound, as compared to a ran<re from 2.") or HO cents to $4 or $."> 
)er iK)und in 1913. The only method of price iixiii;! used was (hat 

I aider the commandeering orders, where the dei)artuieuts coiicenied 

II ixed the prices. 

Til 



Chapter 8. 
MEDICAL SUPPLIES. 

The work of the Section on Medical Industry was a continiiati( 
of Avork begun by the committee of American physicians for mec 
cal preparedness, which was appointed April 14, 1916, by joi 
action of the presidents of the five leading national medical ass 
ciations. This committee was taken over by the Council of Nation 
Defense shortly after its organization in December, 1916, and co] 
tinued as a section of the council, a part of it being made a sectic 
of the War Industries Board on May 31, 1918. Lieut. Col. F. ] 
Simpson, of the Army Medical Corps, was secretary of the con 
mittee and became chief of the section under the Board. 

The first general survey made by the committee disclosed the fa( 
that the country's productive capacity of surgical instrument; 
amounted to scarcely 20 per cent of current civilian needs. In th' 
matter of drugs and pharmaceutical supplies the unpreparedness fc 
a war emergency was not so critical, but in many of these ther 
were important shortages, and prices were very abnormal. Ou 
medicinals come from all parts of the world. Many of then 
particularly those derived from coal-tar products, had been mann 
factured before the war in Germany alone. 

A careful inventory of American hospitals disclosed the fact tha 
enough surgical supplies to equip an army of 1,500,000 to 2,000,00 
men could be commandeered, in case a pressing emergency made sue] 
drastic action necessary, and the result would not cripple civiliai 
institutions beyond repair. 

Tlie IMedical Section of the council, however, soon determined tha 
work more important than the taking of inventories could be ac 
complished by them. They secured the appointment, by the chair 
man of the council, of a committee on standardization of medical an( 
surgical supplies, whose purpose it should be to eliminate, in so fa 
as possible, individual specifications of the Army. Js'aA^A^ Publi 
Health Service, Red Cross, and civilian agencies, and thereby brin; 
about economies in raw materials and manufacturing facilities 
After preparatory studies, this committee and the IMedical Sectioi 
called together in Washington on April 11, 1917, a meeting com 
posed of representatives of the Army, Mavj?^, Public Health Service 
Bed Cross, the various medical specialties, and manufacturers o 
surgical instruments. An agreement was reached that for the perio( 
of the emergency the variety of products should be radically reduced 
New catalogues of specifications were agreed upon. The most im 
portant economies were effected in the production of surgical instru 
204 



AMEincAN I.NDrSTnV IX THE WAR. 205 

ents. Thostaiuliuil illustrated cutalooiu^ of siirirical instninu'iils in 

is country before the war contained ai)()ut 1.100 pa<;es. The illus- 

ated catalogue accepted by this conference contained ol pages. 

On April 15. 1917. the section held a meeting with some '250 of the 

nijtjlading manufacturers of drugs, medicines, and surgical supplies, 

,jij( id they agreed to begin at once producing at maximum speed the 

j^j tides agreed upon and outlined in the several lists accepted as 

iple by the departments and specialists assembled a few days before. 

(j^^j The section also began promptly to bring about a marked increase 

the manufacture of surgical instruments. Numerous jilants were 

nverted for this work. Manufacturers of household scissors were 

duced to make surgical scissors. Makers of pocket knives and 

itcher knives were encouraged to make surgical knives. Sewing- 

achine companies and jewelry factories began to make surgical 

edles and other instruments. Nearly all of the surgical needles 

jed in this country had previously been made in England. P2ng- 

nd's supply was so short that she could not furnish this country 

ore than 5,000 cases of needles for all purposes in 1917, while our 

[|j^ ilitary needs alone amounted to 75,000 cases. Broken needles had 

a t be resharpened for a short period, but the American manufacturers 

[j^i >on began to meet the need, and needles of the highest quality were 

irned out. The number of styles of surgical needles was reduced by 

zreement to 12. 

The manufacture of dental instruments was about equal to civilian 
Beds before the war, and the extra war requirement was just alxnit 
let by the conservation involved in the standardization program. 

V shortage arose in suture material. This is made by tanning and 
:erilizing catgut, made principally from the intestines of sheep. The 
reater part of this raw material is used in sausage casings and for 
bringing tennis racquets and musical instruments. A very high type 
f technical skill is required in the preparation of surgical sutures. 
3 that it was difficult to increase the production in this country. 
'he section made provision for increased importations from Spain 
nd New Zealand. 

The production of surgical dressings was enormously increased and 
he Army was supplied with a superabundance everywhere ii; 
urope. The production of clinical thermometers and hypodermic 
yringes had to be greatly increased to meet the war needs. Very 
lighly skilled workers are required in these industries, and few men 
nth the technical training were found in this country, most of the 
nstruments having been imported from Ciermany in the days befon* 
he war. The stocks of thermometers were commandeered by the 
?urgeon General at a fixed price of 40 cents each. 

This country was a very large producer of medical and surgical 

Tibber goods before as well as during the war. P^urope gets its main 

pply from us. This industry normally uses about 2^ per cent of 



206 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

tlie rubber consumed in the country. AVhen the importation of rubi 
ber was curtailed, the section took care to see that the makers of rubi 
ber sur<?ical supplies should receive thoir full quota. There was i 
considerable expansion in the manufacture of sterilizers, but to meet 
the growing discrepancy between production and needs, a conserva^ 
tion program, under which the number of styles was reduced from 
OG to o, was just going into etl'ect Avhen the end came. 

To meet the war need for metal hospital furniture, civilian hos-! 
pitals were asked to stay out of the market so far as possible, and 
the manufacturers had agreed to sell for civilian purposes only 5C 
per cent of their normal output. A portable X-ray apparatus on 
wheels, and carrying its own power to produce current, was developed 
by the Surgeon General's Department in conjunction with a com- 
mittee of manufacturers. Work was also done by way of making 
substitutions for platinum in X-ray tubes. A shortage developed in 
artificial eyes. The sale of these for civilian purposes was guarded 
for a while and steps were taken looking to the expansion of the 
manufacture of suitable glass for their production. 

The principal activities of the section in connection with the manu- 
facture of pharmaceuticals were as follows: 

(1) Some synthetic drugs had been made under patents held by 
German firms and made principally in Germany. Under the pro- 
visions of the trading with the enemy act of October 6, 1917, these 
patent rights were granted to American manufacturers, and the 
manufacture of such commodities as appeared on the approved lists 
was rapidly developed. 

(•2) The enormous demand by the war program for such chemicals as 
phosphorus, sulphuric acid, acetic acid, chlorine, and many others was 
in excess of the productive capacity of the country. The work of the 
section in studying the needs of drug manufacturers for these chem- 
icals and in conferring with the various sections charged with the con- 
trol of their distribution was of very great importance. While the per- 
centage of each needed for medicinals was very small, the needs were 
essential to the welfare of both the Army and the civilian population. 

(3) Shortages frequently developed in some of the drug-producing 
plants which are ordinarily grown only in distant lands. The section 
conferred with the Department of Agriculture on the question of 
encouraging the production of some of these plants within the United 
States. Among these were digitalis and castor-oil beans, produced 
for the double purpose of use in the air program and the medical in- 
dustry. 

(4) The section secured the cooperation of the National Research 
Council in developing methods of producing substitutes for local 
anasthetics, such as cocaine and novocaine. The Research Council 
also worked on the question of producing aspirin under a substitute 
name. The Bayer patent on acetyl salicylic acid expired February 



AMERIC^\N INl)i:STI!V IN TllK WAU. 207 

i). 1917, but the company claimed that the name "aspirin" was 
vuietl by their trade-mark. The prothiction of aspirin hud been 
iiited by the wood chemicals section in order to economi/^e in acetic 
iihydride. The section secured a release of this limitation to meet 
he inlluenza epidemic, 

(5) When the country was divided into cane-su<rar zones and beet- 
uirar zones it was necessary for the section, in behalf of dru.ir manu- 
aoturers whose plants Avere in beet-sufiar zones, to appeal to the 
lovernment for arrangements to have sufticient cane sugar shipped 
<) satisfy their needs. 

Just before the armistice the section was engaged in a compre- 
lensive collection of data on the exact capacity of the drug manufac- 
tners of the country and the amount and sources of their supplies 
)t raw materials. The inventory of needs, both civilian and mili- 
ary, was then nearing completion. Work along both of these lines, 
1- it affected particular medicinals, had been carried on by the section 
hroughout the period. 

Another comprehensive analysis Avhich the section was engaged in 
It this time would have shown the flow^ of labor to communities 
iiaking war materials. Its purpose was to furnish information to 
he Public Health Service, so that proper medical equipment and 
ittendants might be provided at these centers as their populations 
increased or decreased. 

An idea of the extent of the drug industry in the United States 
can be obtained by reference to a chart showing production and im- 
ports for 1917 of 34 selected commodities.^ 

The average price of medicinals in this country rose very r.ipidly 
from the beginning of the war in Europe. Speculation on reser\e 
stocks began almost as soon as importations were disturbed. The 
advance in drugs remained almost 100 per cent above the general 
advance in the cost of living, and the war closed with prices at about 
;i'0 per cent of normal. 

Some individual commodities showed most remarkable lluctua- 
tions. Acetiphenetidin sold at 84 cents per pound in 1914 and $42 
l)er pound in 1916; but America discovered a process of manufacture, 
and it was selling at $2.75 per pound on November 11. 19IH, the 
average 1918 price being $3.94. Licorice root, with a normal pv'icv 
'if 4^ cents per pound, sold at 30 cents in 1918. All our licorice comes 
from the Near East. On the other hand, menthol, with a prewar 
normal of $4,175 per pound, sold throughout our perioil in the wai- 
at about $3.30 per pound. 

The average price of all drugs in the country advanced rapidly 
throughout our period in the war, and began to decline rapidly 
upon the signing of the armistice. 

• Soe Appendix XXX for ch.art showing 1917 production and ImportH of .14 Importunt 
medicinals. 



tl 



Chapter 9. 
TOBACCO. 

A Tobacco Section was formed April 26, 1918, in response to a 
growing concern over the price and supply of tobacco not only for 
the armed forces but for the civil population. A. I. Esberg was 
made chief. The section began immediately the preparation of a 
statistical background. Studies were made of the purchases and 
consumption of the various armed forces and of the Allies and tables 
were prepared showing normal consumption both here and abroad. 
At the same time investigations were made of the stocks of leaf, the 
crops, and the condition of the manufacturing establishments. 
Records of these studies are to be found in the files of the Board. 

The consumption of tobacco both in this country and in Europe 
increased considerably during the war period. It is estimated that 
men in service used on an average of 60 to 70 per cent more than 
they did in civil life, and that the civil population, due probably 
to increased prosperit}^ the cutting down in this country of alcoholic 
beverages, and the sentiment developed by the various campaigns for 
supplying " smokes " to soldiers, used 15 or 20 per cent more tobacco 
during the war period than before. The stringency, however, was 
probably due more to heavy purchases by the Government agencies 
of particular brands than to a real shortage in supply. Xo im- 
portant control beyond some conservation in methods of packing 
was found necessary, though a price-fixing plan was on the calendar 
when the war closed. 

The studies in average consumption made by the section were 
valuable to the Government purchasing agencies in estimating their 
needs. There had been some tendency to overstock with particular 
brands. 

America supplies herself and most of Europe with tobacco. About 
1,500,000 acres are planted each year. And the crop for the 
past five years has exceeded 1,000,000,000 pounds of leaf, being 
1,340,000,000 in 1918, valued at the farm at $374,000,000.^ 

The country exports annually more than 400,000,000 pounds of 
leaf besides large quantities of manufactured products.^ 

The country manufactures annually about 240,000,000 pounds of 
smoking tobacco, 186,000,000 pounds of chewing tobacco, 33,000.000 

2 See Appendix XXXI for table of production of tobacco in the United States 1913- 
1918, compiled from the year books of the Department of Agriculture. 

•See Appendix XXXII for table of exports of tobacco, 1913-1918, taken from the 
records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. 



yi 



AMERR'AIs IXDl-STliV IN Till: WAi:. 209 

pounds of snuff, 8,000.000.000 cigars, and 8r),000,00().0(l() '.'igarcttcs. 
Over 700,000,000 pounds of tobacco leaf are consunuMl in these. If 
we assume that about 85,000,000 of our popuhition are tohac. o users, 
these figures mean that our consumers average over 20 pounds per 
annum each. 

The price of tobacco was slow in rising as a residt of the war. 
That of the finished product was slower than that of the leaf. The 
period between the harvesting of the leaf and the turning out of the 
manufactured product is a year and a half or two years. The sale 
of the 191G crop saw the first significant increase in the price of leaf. 
The 1917 crop, although it was 100,000,000 pounds larger than that 
bf 1916, brought a still higher price and the 1918 crop sold at con- 
siderably over 200 per cent of normal. 

The demand from Europe, as well as from our own manufacturers, 
had continued to increase, and when our producers saw by the fall 
of 1917 that they could successfully increase the price of their inanu- 
J faetured articles, even in the face of the increased revenue taxes, 
very high prices for leaf were assured. It was not until the mi;lille 
of 1917 that the prices of finished products began to rise. This was 
probably due to the fear of injuring the market for well-known 
brands, and as the tobacco which was being used had been bought 
two years earlier on a normal market, they were losing nothing in 
keeping the prices down. But after a careful advertising campaign, 
smaller packages at the regular prices began to appear and new-sized 
packages had advanced prices. The advance was steady and rapid, 
reaching 200 per cent of normal on many products by Se[)tember, 
1918. 

At this time the section referred the tobacco question to the price- 
fixing committee and studies were begun by the Federal Trade Com- 
mission into the cost of production and manufacture. This action 
was accompanied by a decline in prices. The data for price fixing 
were about ready when the armistice made action unnecessary. 

The exportation of tobacco was licensed during the war, but it 
was not necessary for the AVar Trade Hoard to refuse licenses on the 
ground of safeguarding our own needs. At no time was tobacco on 
the export conservation list. It has a very hicrh value for its tm- 
nage and the world had been in the habit of depending upon us for 
its supply. The actual exports in 1917 fell about 47 per cent below 
those of 1916. but most of the tobacco represented in this decline was 
purchased in the country by ICngland, France, and Italy and stored 
here while it seasoned and until a more favorable time for shipping 
should arrive. 

After May 14. 1918, imports of tobacco were prohibited except 
from Cuba and the West Indies, but imports from other sources had 
105826—21 14 



210 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

never been very significant. The tax on tobacco has been increase! 
by two successive war revenue acts, one dated October 3, 1917, th 
other February 25, 1919. But these increases formed a relative!; 
small part of the increase in price. 

The section formed a point of contact for the industry in it 
approach to the Government for aid in getting fuel, transportatior 
and supplies. The packing of tobacco requires tin, which is im 
ported and was very difficult to secure during the war. There was 
substantial curtailment in the use of tin in the tobacco industry. I] 
1917 the manufacture of chewing tobacco consumed 53,000,000 pound 
of licorice root, all of which comes from southeastern Europe an( 
Persia. The chewing-tobacco industry also uses an importar 
amount of saccharine, which is made from toluol, which in turn wa 
much needed for the manufacture of T. N. T. 



Chapter 10. 

FORESTRY PRODUCTS AND BUILDING MATERIALS. 

While lumber, paper, cement, brick, tile, and other materials falling 

this catc<rory. had their places in the war program and important 

regulations were directed to tiie meeting of Government needs, on 

* 'the whole the sections handling these commodities, unlike most sec- 

^^ tions. had as perhaps their principal function the problem of dis- 

^"^ 'ecu raging maximum or even normal production in order to efToct 

'^^' 'economies in labor, capital, and transportation. The total building 

operation of the country during tlie war, including war construction, 

was less than 50 per cent of normal.^ Separate sections of the Board 

wore formed to handle Lumber, Building Materials, Wood Products, 

and Pulp and Paper. 



The declaration of war brought an immediate requirement for over 
a billion feet of lumber for cantonments. The countrj' was easily 
capable of producing it, but it was clear that, if orders for such a 
quantity should be placed by a large number of competing buyers 
for quick delivery, a great confusion in prices would follow and de- 
lay in deliveries. 

A lumber committee was promptly formed in the Raw Materials 
Division of the Council of National Defense, and its first work was 
to organize a scheme by which the Government should be able to 
purchase its building lumber directly from the sawmills at reasonable 
prices. 

The bulk of the cantonment order would fall to the producers of 
, southern yellow pine, for not only is this the leading construction 
1 timber in time of peace, but the pine forests were located nearer the 
I sites selected for the camps than were the forests of Douglas fir of the 
I Pacific Coast,^ The committee called to Washington representative 
j producers of southern pine lumber. On June l;}. 1917, tliey agreed to 
I a price of $20 per thousand feet for average lumber used for a 
j standard cantonment, giving a mill run average to manufacturers of 
about $24.8.5 per thousand. And for the purpose of distributing all 
Government orders to the sawmills, that their burdens or benefits 

'The Nonwar Construction Swtion of the Board, referred to on p. .17, was tlio ni<>st 
Important direct factor In brlnglnj; this about. 

* For the construction of cuntonmonts, liospltals, warehouHCH, etc., the woodH us«m1 by 
the Government were 70 per cent soutliern yellow pine, 10 p<r cent DoukIom flr, 7 per 
cent hemlock, 3 per cent spruce. 1 per cent oak, and 3 per rent miticellaneoii.x. 

211 



212 AAIEPdCAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAll. 

miglit be borne in proportion to the size of each mill, plans were laid 
down for diviclin*:; the producing areas into a series of districts, eachi 
district to be handled by a "lumber emergency bureau." Four 
bureaus were organized to handle southern pine, and as time went 
on other bureaus were formed to handle other building lumber.^ 

Throughout the war whenever a Government order for building 
lumber was to be placed, the committee, and later the section, would 
first allocate it to one or more of these emergency bureaus, and each 
bureau in turn would allocate its share to the various mills under its 
jurisdiction. Any sawmill could participate in Government orders 
by listing its stocks and capacity Avitli the em.ergency bureau of its 
district. The committee, and later the section, stood ready at all 
times to investigate any charges of unfair distribution of orders as 
between the saAvmills. Under this system an emergency order could 
be placed by telegraph in a few hours. One order for 5,000,000 feet 
was distributed in Louisiana and Texas in five or six hours, and the 
materials were all shipped within four days. Over 200,000 carloads 
of lumber, amounting to about 4,000,000,000 feet, were delivered to 
the Government under these arrangements. 

In September and again in October and November prices were 
sliglitly reduced by agreement with the manufacturers, the items of 
the final sclicdule, adopted Nov. 11. 1917, giving a mill run average 
of about $23.20 per thousand. In the beginning of 1918 lumber 
prices to the trade began to advance, and by May they were $5 to $7 
above the prices at which the Government was making its purchases. 
It was believed that production for civilian purposes ought not to be 
stimulated by high prices. The Federal Trade Commission had been 
examin'nn: the costs of producticn, and the Price Fixing Committee 
granted a hearing to the manufacturers in March. But no change in 
status was made until further hearings on June 12, 13, and 14, 1918, 
when, a^ter a special committee appointed by the Price Fixing Com- 
mittee had discussed the question fuily with representatives of the 
southern yellow pine manufacturers in th.e light of the figures on cost 
of production presented by the Federal Trade Commission, the Price 
Fixing Committee reached an agreement with the manufacturers of 
yellow pine to fix prices for Government and commercial purchasers 
alike according to the terms of a schedule which was adopted in con- 
ference and which averaged about $4.80 per thousand advance over 

•The bureaus and dates of organization were as follows: Southern Pine Emergency 
Bureau, May, 1017; North Carolina I'inc Kraoi-rency Uiircau. May. l'.>17: Ocorgia-Klorida 
Yellow IMne Enicrgoncy Bureau, June, 1017 : New England Spruce Emergency T.ureau. June 
6, 1917; Douuias Fir Emergency Bureau (later reorganized as the I'ir I'roduetio)i Board), 
Oct., 1917; Northern Hardwood Emergency Bureau, Nov. '24. 1017; Central I'ennsylvania 
Hemlock Bureau, Apr. 6, 1918; Cypress Emergency Bureau (date unknown), 1918. A 
hardwood emergency bureau was organized eariy in l'.>17 and reorganized and enlarged 
in Nov., 1017; but it was dissolved in .Mar.. lOlS, because the supply of hardwood 
seemed to be coming forward satisfactorily without the operation of the bureau. 



AM KIM CAN IXnrsTRY l.\ TlIK WAH. 213 

he previous Government purchase prices. It was estimated that tiic 
irui-; of this schedule Avould yield about $28 per thousand for mill 
nil standard averaire production. 

The manufacturers agreed at the same time to nlakc commercial 
ales subject, at any time before delivery, to an oi)tion in favor of 
he Cjovernment or a nominee of the section. They agreed further 
() comply with the directions of the War Industries Board as issued 
Knii tifue to time Avith i-eference to (illing commercial re(|uiiemeiits 
n the order of their public importance, and they agreed to furnish 
iieii information and make su.h reports as might be recjuired. The 
isiial clause i)rotecting labor against reduction in wages or condi- 
ions was included. This price arrangement ran to September 15, 
nd just before its expiration the manufacturers appeared before the 
nice-h.xing committee with data to show that a furlher increase was 
(>ce?sary. The committee de. ided, however, tiiat the same prices 
hould be continued in efle -t until December 2;i, 1918. As time went 
n prices were fixed and other control was instituted over various 
tiio)' types of lumber. M p t i Jiiiji)a i (i ' yiiiL S>^^it»CTe --feaiedf^tt tev^^ 

iUjP»wwii»A yiiiitiiiliiUMit." 
resides five or six billion feet of softwoods for cantonments, hos- 
itals, warehouses, and other structures, and for boxes and crating, 
le Government bought for airjilane construction over 1()(),()()().()()0 
oct of spruce. 70,000,000 feet of Douglas fir, and four or five million 
:'et of Port Orford cedar. It bought for airplane propellers ma- 
<)L''any, black walnut, cherry, and birch aggregating 40.000.000 
■c't. The entire black \\'alnut resources of the country were needed 
or gunstocks. propeller blades, etc. Artillery wheels and Army 
I hicks consumed about 120.000,000 feet of hardwood. The Emer- 

• •Mcy Fleet used over 790.000.000 feet, including 2,142,000 feet of 

• list, for treenails, required for wooden ships and very difficult to 
cure. The Navy used about 122,000.000 feet. 

The total production of lumber in the United States for 1918 was 
timated at 32,925,000,000 board feet. Of this about 38 per cent was 
)nlhern j'^ellow pine, IG per cent Douglas fir, G per cent oak, with 
bite pine and hemlock in equal amounts.* This was about 
,000,000,000 feet less than the production of 191G. The country 
nports annually from Canada about 3 per cent of the lumber con- 
imed, and we import small tonnages of mahogany and other rare 
oods from Central and South America and West Africa. Exports 
t' not large even in normal times. Those for the maximum year, 
'i;5. were about three and a quarter billion feet, or 8.4 per cent of 
ir cut. The volume of 1918 was 35 per cent of that of 1913. Europe 

♦See Appfncllx XXXIII for lumber cut In Ihe UnUcd States 101.1 to 1918. showing 
Kls of wood. 



214 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

has taken little since the war began, and even shipments to South 
America fell off 39 per cent in 1918. Shipping bulk is, of coiTrse, 
the explanation. 

The war purcliases of the Allies in this country before the spring 
of 1917, which brought prosperity and high prices to so many in- 
dustries, causing the average price of commodities to advance before 
the end of 1916 to more than 150 per cent of 1913 prices, did not 
have a like effect upon the lumber industry. In 1916 the prices of 
oak, maple, and chestnut, for example, were below prewar normal, 
and the average price of all lumber for the year was not above the 
average for 1913. The events of the spring of 1917, however, saw 
the prices of lumber begin to advance rapidly. The price agreement 
on yellow pine, made shortly after our entrance into the war, has 
been noted. This had a general effect in steadying most other soft- 
woods, for they are sold in competition with yellow pine. By the 
spring of 1918 prices to the trade of all softwoods had reached a level 
considerably above the Government purchase prices. 

It was felt by the Board that production of lumber for civilian 
purposes ought not to be stimulated. The Board decided, therefore, 
that maximum prices ought to be fixed for the trade and the (Gov- 
ernment alike, to be accompanied by some control over distribution. 
The Federal Trade Commission had been studying costs of pro- 
duction. Groups of operators, representing the several divisions of 
the industry, were called into conference in succession. The price 
fixing committee established, by agreement, a schedule of maximum 
prices for North Carolina pine June 28, 1918.^ This schedule, with 
slight changes made October 1, remained effective until December 31, 
1918. Douglas fir was sold to the Government at an agreed rate 
similar to the arrangement for yellow pine until June 15, 1918, when 
the price fixing committee set maximum prices for all purchases at 
an average advance over the Government purchase prices of $2.75 per 
thousand.^ These prices were continued, after conferences with the 
producers in October, until January 15, 1919. 

The committee established maximum prices on eastern spruce 
April 12, 1918. These were adjusted after studies of cost by the 
Federal Trade Commission and following a hearing of the New 
England Spruce Emergency Bureau on July 19, an advance averaging 
$8 per thousand being allowed. The July 19 schedule was con- 
tinued until December 1, 1918.^ Pennsylvania hemlock was placed 
on the control list May 9, 1918, the price schedule to expire August 8. 
On August 15 a new base price of $29 per thousand was adopted, 
representing an average advance of $2.^ Following conferences in 
October, these prices were continued until December 20, 1918. 

In the latter part of May, 1917, the lumber committee of the coun- 
cil reached an agreement with the yellow pine manufacturers cover- 

» See W. I. B. Price BuUetin No. 43, Prices of Lumber, for copy of the schedule. 



AMERICAN INDUSTUY IN lill, WAIl. 215 

ng prices for a specific schedule of (he yellow pine enterinpj into the 
jonstruction of -wooden ships of the Ferris type at an a vers) "^e rate 
jf $3') per thousand feet. The Shipping: Board subse(|uently 
)laced orders with the Southern Pine Emerpency Bureau for one 
lundred schedules on the basis of that price. The prices for a 
»hedule of this kind were later raised by mutual agreement between 
he manufacturers and the Shippino; lioard to an average of $40 ])er 
;housand, and later, on account of higher specilications, advanced to 
144.72. About the same time the fir nuinufacturers on the Pacific 
Doast agreed to furnish a schedule of the Ferris type of ship at 
137.50 per thousand, the Shipping Board placing orders on this 
>asis until the schedule was changed to call for much larger timbers, 
it which time the price was raised to conform to the new require- 
nent. 

In July, 1917, the lumber committee of the council held confer- 
nces with the spruce producers of Washington and Oregon and rep- 
resentatives of the Aircraft Production Board and of the British, 
French, and Italian missions. The producers agreed to furnish air- 
;raft spruce of specified quality and size during the remainder of 
he year at $105 per thousand board feet. On April 10, 1918, the 
Spruce Production Division of the Signal Corps* issued a new sched- 
ule of prices for western spruce and Port Orford cedar airplane 
material. The price for "A" wing-beam stock of western spruce 
ind Port Orford cedar was set at $175 per thousand board feet 

o. b. mill; "B " long clears at $80, and " C" short and thin clears 
it $45. Western spruce cants for aircraft grade I were set at $90 
md grade II at $50. These prices remained throughout the period. 

No official price was set on black walnut lumber as a whole, but a 
fliii ixed maximum w-as placed on gunstock flitches and propeller 
grades. On August 10, 1917, the Ordnance Department fixed $1.05 
ach for gunstock dimension blanks f. o. b. mill. On August 1, 1918, 
:he price-fixing committee raised this to $1.20 each. The Signal 
Dorps set a maximum price of $310 per thousand board feet for air- 
plane propeller stock on January 28, 1918, which was continued 
throughout the period. On August 1, 1918, the price-fixing commit- 
made an informal agreement, placing the price of 2i-inch black 

alnut flitch at $80 per thousand, and a similar agreement on Au- 
gust 7 on the prices of walnut logs. These prices were published to 
DUrchasers and producers of the logs with the announcement that the 
prices, which the Government was paying for propeller limiber and 
jtK junstocks, were based on the announced prices for logs and would 
illow only a fair and reasonable profit to the mills. Informal agroe- 
nents were also made and published to the producers, covering 
ypress, tupelo, birch, and mahogany. Mahogany was placed at $350 

•After September, 1917, the Board no longer assisted In negrotlatlng or fixing price* 
or airplane lumber. 



216 AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAK. 

per llioiisand board feet. Tlic pi-icc of all lumber during 1018 aver- 
aged about 170 per cent of normal as against an average of nljout 
190 per cent for all commodities. 

In connection with administei'ing the fixed prices of softwoods to 
all consumers, certain wholesalers, who had been in the habit of buy- 
ing from a large number of small mills for resale, raised the question 
that they should be allowed to add their profit to the fixed mill pi'ice. 
Under the price-fixing rule it had been contemplated that the (lov- 
crnment and other consumers should puichase directly from the mills. 
These wholesalers claimed that they performed a useful function in 
collecting lumber from mills too small to bargain for themselves. 
The i)rice-fixing committee ruled, however, that these wholesalevs 
should look for their profits from the producers and should be re- 
quired to sell at the fixed price. 

In order to carry out more effectively the rulings of the price-fix- 
ing committee, it was decided early in July, 1918, to appoint a num- 
ber of regional lumber administrators. W. J. SoAvers was appointed 
for the region covered by the Southern Pine Emergency Bureau, and 
T. J. Aycock for that of the Georgia-Florida Yellow Pine Emergency 
Bureau. To handle the administration of priority in production and 
shipment, price rulings, and other matters of control in the Pacific 
Northwest, where so much ship timber and airplane lumber was be- 
ing produced, the Fir Production Board was appointed in January, 
191S, and maintained by (he Government departments interested. 

In ^lay, 1918, the Paili'oad Atlministration began to ])lace its 
orders for softwoods through the organization for distributing 
orders, which had been created and was administered by the section. 
The first order of this kind was for 278,000,000 feet, and other orders 
followed. The Railroad Administration placed a representative on 
the staff of the section. 

During the course of the war it was found necessary to limit the 
activities of various wood-using industries in order to make available 
to the Government the lumber ordinarily used by them and to divert 
hibor, transportation, and supplies to military purposes. This con- 
trol was exercised chiefly through the Priorities Division,'* which 
from time to time issued orders governing priority in securing fuel, 
transportation, labor, and materials. On March 21, 1918, the Board 
passed and published a resolution, in part as follows: 

Tb:it in the public interest all now undertnkinss not esspntinl to and not 
contributing? eitlior directly or indirectly toward v.-lnning tlie wnr, wLich in- 
volve the utilization of labor, materiul, ;'nd capital required in the production, 
supply, or distribution of direct or indirect war needs, will be discoura;:od, 
notwithstanding they mny l)o of local importance and of a character whicb 
should in normal times meet with every encouragement. 

"The various priority rulings referred to here were not prepared nor handled by the 
Lumber Section. 



AMKKICAX IXIUSTin IN Till WAI:. 217 

111 puisuiince of this resolution, the inaiuil'ncturers of tht* principal 
jiiildino: materials were requested to si«2:n and lile with the Priorities 
Division the following pledge, and to exact a similar pledge from 
ucli of their customers as purchased lor resale : 

The midersijnied hereby pledjios itself nut to use, nor so f;ir ns lies within 
ts p',)\\or permit to he used, any produils of its nianiilactiire now in. or wliidi 
;iiay heie.ilter come into, its possession or eonirol. save (</) I'or essential nsi's. 
IS tli.it term has l)eeu or may ho defined or jipplied ironi linio to time liy llie 
i'riorities Division of the War Industries rmaiil, or (/;) under permits in writ- 
er sifined by or under antiiority of sucli Priorities Division; tliat it will malce 
. sale or delivery of sucii products ti> an.\ customer tor resale until such 
stonier has tiled with it a siudlar pledj;e in writinj: and tliat it will use its 
;:iiost eudeavor to insure that its prodn<ts sliaii l)e distrilmtcd solely for 
ssential uses. 

The Nonwar Construction Section of the Board watched the efTect 
f these regulations, and at its suggestion Circidar No. 21 was issued 
"September 3, 1918, to all manufacturers, jobbers, distributors, deal- 
i-rs, and cou'^umers of building materials. This circular contained 
he resolutions and pledges referred to above, together with an inter- 
: otation of them in order that — 

ill interested in tlie manufacture and sale of l)uildin?c materials, as well as 
:liose interested in l)uildiu;jC projects of every cli;iracter, may liave a di-ar 
Ictinition of or a ready means of aseertainin;: the uses to which such materials 
nay he put, and be advised of binldiiif: proji-cts which may be prosecuted dnrin;; 
he war with tlie approval of the War Industries lioard. 

It announced that building permits woidd be required for all con- 
-truction, except under Government contracts " cleared " by the 
Board, repairs not exceeding $2,500, construction directly connected 
with mines producing coal or metals, and highway improvements 
lijproved by the United States Highways Council." A few days later 
the Board announced that the ruling did not apply to construction 
;ilready under wa}'. 

Preference List No. 1 was issued by the Priorities Division, April 
'i. 1018, announcing a list of the industries which shoidd receive 
preferred treatment by all Government agencies in the supply and 
distribution of coal. Lumber manufacturing plants were not in- 
cluded in this list, but on it were numerous industries using lumber 
;is raw material. On September 3, 1918, Preference List No. 2 super- 
-cled Preference List No. 1 and all its amendments and sui)plements. 
1 he lumber manufacturers were not included on this list either, but 
'lass groupings were assigned as follows to industries using wood : 

Aircraft, I; farm implements, IV; food contaim-r.s, IV; public institutions and 
iiuiklings (maintenance and operation of) other than hospitals and saidtarlums, 
III; public buildings (maintenance and oi.eralion of) used as hospitals or sani- 
tariums), I; public utilities, II; pulp and paper i.lant.s, IV; ships. I; War 
Department and Navy D( partment construction work, II. 



•See Appendix XXXIV for Circular No. 21, Issued Sept. 3, 1918. 



218 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

A series of conservation protrrams was inauffiirated after confer- 
ence with representatives of each industry involved. On March 28, 
1918, producers of walnut timber agreed to refrain for the period of 
tlie war from the manufacture of veneer from walnut lumber other 
than butts, crotches, or figured material. The musical-instrument 
industry agreed April 9, 1918, to curtail their output 30 per cent 
.'ind to make arrangements for the transfer of war work to their 
factories. The builders of farm wagons and trucks agreed July 26, 
1918, to make large reductions in the varieties of their product for the 
purpose of conserving material. This was directed principally to 
saving iron and steel, but it also reduced the lumber required. 

Conservation plans were discussed with the furniture manufactur- 
ing industry August 2, 1918, and an agreement was reached Septem- 
ber IG, 1918, to cut down the number of patterns made at least 50 
per cent. A conservation program was put into effect September 10 
by the cotton spool manufacturers reducing the use of lumber, card- 
board, twine, nails, and other materials. 

On September 17, 1918, Labor Priority Bulletin No. 1 was issued 
by the priorities commissioner, and defined priority for employees 
engaged in the lumber industry. This bulletin explained that the 
essential nature of the industry as a whole was recognized, even 
though for special reasons it had not been included in the preference 
list. The district boards were advised that in passing upon claims 
for industrial deferment, the lumber industry should be treated 
equivalent to those which appeared in Class IV on the preference list. 
Attention was also called in the bulletin to the lieaA^y Government 
orders for lumber in certain regions. 

On October 25, 1918, the priorities commissioner issued Circular 
No. 54 to all lumber manufacturers, which read in part as follows: 

I. Each manufacturer will conserve to the greatest possible extent materials, 
fuel, and labor; will so far as is practicable, having due regard to the produc- 
tion of lumber necessary for direct war uses, limit his production of lumber to 
the current demand therefor ; \\ill refrain from unnecessary acquisition of and 
the hoarding of fuel, supplies, equipment, and materials; and will limit his 
items and amounts of production for export to those covered by export licenses 
issued by the War Trade Board. 

II. No manufacturer will sell or deliver lumber except for essential uses, 
as that term may from time to time be defined by .the Priorities Division of 
the War Industries Board, which until further order shall include only the 
following : 

(a) For supplying the requirements of the United States Government, or of 
any department, agency, or bureau thereof, or of the Allies. 

(&) For supplying railroads operated by the United States Railroad Adminis- 
tration. 

(c) For supplying to others lumber of primary Importance in war work or 
in essential civilian requirements. Each manufacturer should carefully and 
conscientiously scrutinize every order received for delivery to a user in order 
to ascertain that the use to which the lumber is to be put is an essential use. 



AArF.i;";CA.\ l^'Dl'STlt^ I.N 1111. V..\i;. 21U 

llifllShould the manufacturer be in doubt, he will submit tlie matter to the Trloritle.s 
hii Division, malcing a full statement of the name of the purcluiser, the amount of 

the order, and the use to whieli it is to l»e pui. Siioulil the lumber be .sold to a 

customer for resale, the manufacturer will protect himself by obtiiiniiiK the 

pledge provided for in Paragraph IV hereof. 
"ifH Construction projects, neither («) falling within any one of the seven classes 
requiring permits by the terms of Circular No. 21 Issued by the Priorities 
tlifilDivision, September 3, 1918, as revised October 15, 1918, nor {b) for which no 

eonstructinn permit shall have been issued by the Nonwar Constrnction Section 
, of said Priorities Division shall not be deemed essential within the meaning n( 
' "the foregoing paragraph. 



The ( ircular also contained new pledges for lumber manufacturers 
md sellers. These various restrictions were removed or modifietl on 
Nfovember 11, 1918, and all were removed by December 1. 

E. H. Downman came to Washington on April 7, 1917, to take 
change of lumber under the raw materials division of the Council. 
He became director of lumber under the earlier Board and remained 
in charge until January 1, 1918, Avhen Charles Edgar succeeded him 
and conducted the work until the end. 

The work of the committee on emergency construction, first of the 
council and then of the Board and the Army, should be mentioned in 
connection with lumber. Col. W. A. Starrett was chairman through- 
out the period. This committee did very valuable and far-reaching 
work in bringing together on a common plan of operation the various 
agencies of the Government engaged in constructing contonments, 
hospitals, warehouses, etc., throughout the coimtry. 

RUILr)IN(; M \TKm.\LS. 

The Building Materials Division was formed March 16, 1918, 
with Richard L. Humphrey as director. The control of building ma- 
terials, other than lumber and steel, began April 21, 1917, with 
cement: .sand, gravel, and crushed stone being added soon afterward. 
A committee of the council fir.st took up the work. Tlicn building 
materials were under the Nonferrous Metals Section of the old Board 
and later under a section by themselves until the division was formed. 
Mr. Humphrey was connected with the work from October 7, 1917, 
until the end. 

The attention of the division was devoted principally to Portland 
cement, brick, hollow tile, gvpsum j)lasterboard and wallboard, and 
sand, gravel, and crushed stone. The conservation regulations dis- 
cussed under lumber above applied e(iually, of course, to cement, 
brick, structural steel, and other building materials, and they need 
not be repeated here. The building industry had become very active 
and prosperous by 1916. The general prosperity made necessary 
plant extensions, and rising Avages encouraged the building of homes; 
and building activity continued into 1917 even with the advancmg 
prices of materials. 



220 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

By tlie summer of 1917, however, the advancing cost and scarcity 
of hibor and materials were beginning to effect curtaihnent. I)Ut 
tlironghout 1918. as noticed earlier in this report, the Board found it 
important to institute regulations for the j^urpose of curtailing con- 
struction not necessary for the war. The normal prewar annual 
building program for the entire country is estimated at $3,000,000,000. 
AVar construction for 1918 amounted to about $1,50(),()0(),00(). Xon- 
war construction for the same period is estimated at $1,000,()0(),()0(). 
When it is considered that phvsical valuations in 1918 were about 
double prewar normal, it is seen that the aggregate physical building 
in the countr3% including war building, Avas less than 50 per cent of 
normal. 

There was no actual war shortage in any of the materials handled 
by this section. An abundan e of Portland cement is produced in 
various parts of the country, and this is equally true of common brick 
and the other commodities. But the unnaturally large Government 
demands in particular, congested localities made a limited conti-ol 
over prices and distribution necessary. The Government used only 
11,000,000 barrels of Portland cement in 1918, out of a total produc- 
tion of over 71,000,000 barrels and from an industry which ordinarily 
produces more than 90,000,000 barrels per year. 

Fixed price schedules for cement were arranged, after investiga- 
tions by the Federal Trade Commission and hearings with the pro- 
ducers, first in December, 1917, and again in August, 1918. The 
prices were effective over four-month periods. They applied to 
Government purchases only, and varied with 30 different producing 
points, from $1.30 per barrel in Texas, for example, to $1.90 per 
barrel in California. A slight advance in Government price was 
made for the four-month period ending August 31, 1018. but no 
advance for the last period of the war. Prices to the general public 
ranged about 30 cents per barrel higher than the Government prices. 
On April 13, 1918, the Fuel Administration, in cooperation with the 
division, reduced the fuel allotment of the cement mills to 75 per cent 
of normal on the theory that part of the coal used in this industry 
could be better employed for other war work. This was part of a 
general program curtailing the use of fuel in building-material in- 
dustries. Prices were kept low enough to cause an important cur- 
tailment of production, and ordinary civilian purchases were running 
very low toward the close of the war period. 

The Government price-fixing of brick was also localized and ap- 
plied to Government purchases only. It varied from such figures 
as $9 per thousand for light-burned common brick in Chicago to 
$15.50 per thousand for the same brick in Philadelphia. Through- 
out the period only about 108.000.000 brick were allocated at Govern- 
ment fixed prices out of a total production of 5,800,000,000 in 1917 



AMKincAX lM)i:sri;Y IN TllK WAII. Ii21 

Mul about 2.500,000,000 in 1918. The production and use of hiicU 
ore declining very rapidly toward the close of the period. 
Local prices for Government purchases of hollow buihlinj; tile 
,v(>re also fixed by the committee, and 176,000 tons were bou«j;ht by 
!io Government. 

By the sprinfj of 1918, due to the Government demands and trans- 
)ortation difHculties, a shortajje in sand, fjravel, and crushed stone 
il)peared in the conf^ested district of the East, and it became neces- 
ai y to fix prices and allocate orders in the Philadelphia, New York, 
! Baltimore, AVashington, and Norfolk districts. xV total of 2,949,87.) 
ons, valued at over $3,000,000, was allocated. 
It was the general purpose of the division and the price fixing coni- 
:ttee to hold down the prices of building materials, because normul 
loduction was in excess of all essential war needs, and it was desir- 
iMe, in the interests of war conservation, to enforce a price low 
nough to haA^e a tendency to curtain production. Prices fixetl for 
aiilding materials allowed about 7 per cent on investments. The 
li\ision, however, found one item of building material in which the 
n)\ernment required more than double the normal capacity of the 
ilants. This was gypsum wall board and plaster board. It was nec- 
-sary to take over the entire output of these materials for (iovern- 
nent use, and to authorize plant extensions. The material was 
1 located at tentative prices, and the price fixing committee acted 
ipon the question February 27, 1919, The Government took about 
.2.000,000 square feet, valued at $956,000. 

The division did a very important body of work in the direction 
if conservation by preparing and establishing schedules of standard 
pecifications applicable to war building projects. Standardization 
vas accomplished in the following industries: Carpentry and mill- 
\ork, composition roofing, slate roofing, clay tile roofing, gypsum 
vail and plaster board, fiber wall board, finishing hardware, door 
langers and track, plumbing and gas fitting, heating, electric wiring 
11(1 lighting fixtures, painting, hollow building tile, magnesite stucco, 
re prevention and protection. 

The extreme difficulty of the work of this division on account of 
lie wide scope and great diversity of the industries under its control 
111 be readily understood. The work covered 43 industries. The 
i vision had a staff of fifty-five persons, exclusive of the represent a- 
ivos of the War, Navy, and other Government departments, who 
.orked with it. Plans for a wide extension of its activities were in 
'locess of execution when the end made them unnecessary. 

WOOD PRODUCTS. 

This section originated in October, 1917, when the deman<ls of the 
rmy for escort wagons, artillery wheels, machine-gun carts, and 



222 AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAK. 

other vehicles seemed to be disturbing the woodworking:^ industry. 
E. E. Parsonage was chief throughout the period. A thorough 
analysis of the wagon industry and light woodworking plants was 
made. There was a shortage of diy hardwood. The Govemmenti 
gave aid in constructing adequate dry-kiln facilities. The section 
assisted in allocating the Army orders to the various wagon, truck, 
and wheel manufacturers of the country, and assisted in inducing 
about 125 furniture manufacturers to participate by producing 
vehicle parts. 

As time went on the principal work of the section was to make 
plans for so allocating the various Government requirements for 
wood products that the 12,000 woodworking plants of the country 
might not be driven out of business; for in general facilities greatly 
exceeded war-time needs. At two separate times in 1918 the Army 
and Navy purchasing agents reported shortages in wooden handles 
for axes, picks, etc. The section found, upon investigation, both 
times that the shortage was more apparent than real, and seemed to 
be largely due to indiscriminate and competitive buying. Arrange- 
ments were made to "clear" orders and requirements were met. 

The supply of black walnut had to be very materially increased to 
meet the requirements for gunstocks and airplane propellers. This 
section joined the Lumber Division in a "campaign of education" 
to bring up production. The Boy Scouts were appealed to and gave 
real assistance. 

PULP AND PAPER. 

The Pulp and Paper Section was organized June 6, 1918, with W. B. 
Colver as chief. He was later succeeded by T. E. Donnelly, and on 
October 1 the section was made a division. Its work was then sub- 
divided under a Manufacturing Section, S. L. Wilson, chief ; a Paper 
Economies Section, I. W. Blanchard, chief; a Newspaper Section, 
G. J. Palmer, chief ; and a Fiber Board and Container Section, H. W. 
Nichols, chief. 

This country manufactures about one-half of the world's output of 
paper. It consumes about 90 per cent of its own production, and 
its imports amount to about 8 per cent of the domestic consumption. 
Domestic production in 1917 was 6,595,637 short tons, of which 30 
per cent was boards ; 22| per cent newsprint ; 17 p)er cent wra})ping 
paper; 15 per cent book paper; 6 per cent writing paper; and the 
rest scattered among building paper, tissue paper, specialties, etc' 

Our paper is made of basic raw materials as follows : About four- 
sevenths is made of wood pulp, two-sevenths of old paper stocks, 
6 per cent of old rags, 5 per cent of straw and vegetable fibers, and 
a little over 1 per cent of rope. Various chemicals, like bleaching 

' See Appendix XXXV for domestic production of flnislied papers, 1917. 



AMEraCAN INDUSTRY IX TJIK WAU. 223 

powder, sulphur, lime, caustic soda, soda ash, clay, rosin, <;lue, etc., 
are also used in large quantities, totaling over 1,00(),()()() tons per year, 
for the entire industry. Large quantities of felt and copper wire 
-c Tcening are consumed in the plants. 

From a report made to the division by G81 paper mills it was 

! mated that the annual fuel consumption was 9,375.000 tons, that 4 
luiis of raw materials would produce 1 ton of paper, that 1,204,()()0 
lars were loaded and unloaded aimually with materials and prod- 
ucts connected with paper manufacture, that the annual output at 
1918 prices was valued at $850,000,000, and that GO per cent of the 
mills were located in the congested area of the East. 

The paper industry passed through two crises during the World 
U'ur. one in 1916-17 and the othei- in 1918. In 191G and early 1917 
increased demands, accompanied by difficulties of production, threw 
:lie average price of paper to about 200 per cent of normal, causing 
news print to rise to 250 or 300 per cent. Then prices began to de- 
cline and continued to go down through the rest of 1917. And it was 
not until the summer of 1918 that prices had come back to their 
high level and seemed to be going higher. It was to the problem of 
•ombating this second rise that the work of the division was devoted. 

This case could not be solved by an increase of production because 
;Iiere was not onl}'^ a shortage of coal, labor, and transportation, but 
uuny of the other materials essential for paper were more essential 
fur direct war purposes — sulphur, soda ash, chlorine, wood pulp, 
■tc. It was planned for 1919 to withdraw 150,000 tons of wood fiber 
from the paper industry to be used as a substitute for cotton linters 
111 the manufacture of smokeless powder. The solution, therefore, 
which commended itself to the division was first curtailment and 
Monomy in consumption and to a lesser extent the elimination of 

I'-teful practices in production. 

rhe price advance of 191G, following, as it did, a market which 
!iad been practically stationary for over 20 years, was led by news 
|)rlnt. The war in Europe brought us prosperity, and it furnished 
us with news which the people wanted to read. Increased business 
tucant more advertising and war news meant more newspaper copy. 
The result was an enormous increase in the consumption of news- 

iper print. There was more advertising space in each newspaper. 
re was more news in each paper, and more people bought papers. 

Moreover, as the manufacture of munitions began to cause a 

iicity of metals, the use of paper as a substitute in the fabrication 
M containers of all kinds developed rapidly. At the same time the 
•utting off of importations of pulp and dyes, together witli the gen 
■ral rise in wages, made the cost of production advance. 

The first work of the division was to study with the war .service 
committee of each branch of the producing industry plans for elimi- 



224 AMEFiK'AX i.viirs'iuY ia tup: war. 

nutiiig- wasteful practices and for curtailing the use of certain chen 
icals needed for the war. Just before the armistice, paper makei 
had agreed to give up the use of a large percentage of the chlorii 
to Avliich they had been accustomed. This was to have been done b 
reducing the amount of Ijleaching. It would have changed the qua 
ity and character of paper very materially. 

The priorities commissioner placed the pulp and paper industr 
on the preference list for coal and transportation, Class IV, in n 
turn for pledges to eliminate wasteful usages and pledges to obe 
all rules and regulations issued b}^ the Board in respect to distribui 
ing to consumers. But the great work of the division consisted i 
the series of regulations worked out and issued to 36 branches of tt 
industry consuming large quantities of paper. 

The paper used by daily and weekly newspapers was reduced 1 
per cent ; Sunday newspapers, 20 per cent ; periodicals and genen; 
job printing, 25 per cent. It was planned that the paper used ic 
packing should be reduced to the greatest possible extent, consistei 
with proper protection for carriage. The war service committees c 
the various industries were in turn invited to Washington, and tj 
these committees were explained the curtailments thought necessarj 
Each committee was requested to work out its own methods of ai, 
complisliing the savings and to recommend such methods to the divj 
sion. When these recommendations were acceptable to the divisio! 
they were mailed to the entire industry with request for criticisn 
Then, after tlie division had given careful consideration to all ol 
jections filed, the matter was again taken up with the original wa 
service committees and the final regulations were formulated an 
issued. 

Tlie newspaper publishers were met on June 19, 1918, and certai 
regulations, designed to eliminate wasteful practices, were issued o 
July 5. On July 19, 20, and 21, another series of meetings was hel 
with the newspaper publishers. The war service committee recon 
mended that the curtailment ruling should not be applied so as t 
recjuire each individual paper to reduce exactly 15 per cent for dail 
and 20 per cent for Sunday papers. It was felt that some publishei 
were so much more wasteful than others that the general curtailmer 
could best be effected by treating many of them individually. Th 
recommendation also contained a clause requiring that all news 
papers should be raised to 2 cents, and on this account the divisio 
refused to accept it. The committee met again on August 3, and o 
August 5 a new set of regulations was issued. An organization wa 
formed to obtain reports upon all newspapers, covering size, circi 
lation, and paper used, for the first six months of 1918, with Tveekl 
reports for August and September, 1918, and monthly reports then 
after. Through this system the curtailment program was to be ac 



AMERICAN INDUSTnV IN Till': WAR. 226 

•^■^ministerecl. In the same manner the " country '' newspapers were 
^'^•laken up througjh their war service committee. 

™l The periodicals were to suffer a curtailment in the use of paper 

'^Jvmounting to 25 per cent. Early in July, after a conference with 

'''^!he war service committees of the periodicals' publishers and the 

irade journal publishers, a set of questionnaires was sent out with a 

'^i'iew to establishing the practicability of certain curtailments and 

■^j-egulations suggested by the committees. The answers of the ques- 

*iionnaires showed that it would work a very great hardship to estab- 

^"|!ish over periodicals the rules applied to daily and Sunday papers, 

' "^'jarticularly to eliminate the return privilege or to eliminate the 

''^jriving of premiums as inducements to subscribers. Eegulations were 

issued August 22, making reductions in weight and size and advocating 

' ^ he elimination of wasteful practices. No exact percentage of reduc- 

'^'^jion was established so as to apply equally to each publication. But it 

"'?as attempted, through a careful watch over reports from each 

'^^l)ublisher, to see that the industry as a whole should curtail from 

''j:0 to 25 per cent, and that the burden should fall where it could be 

^'|)orne with the least disadvantage. Accompanying the regulations 

"lyas a request for a statement from each publisher of his consunip- 

^'fion of paper for the year ending June 30, 1918, and also a state- 

''^JQent of his requirements for the 10 succeeding months, based on 

''%e reductions established by the regulations. Each publisher was 

''■^tequired to sign a pledge that he would not exceed his allotment, 

^l^hich was to be calculated by the division as based on a comparison 

f all requirements filed with possible production. He was also re- 

uired to file a report every three months showing the exact amount 

f paper which he had actually used. Special consideration was 

iven to those publications which, during the last few months, had 

ad a legitimate increase in paid circulation, and consideration was 

Iso given to those periodicals of an industrial or scientific character 

^hose size had been increased by the demands of the war program. 

■|*testrictions did not apply to export journals. The plan was just 

oing into operation when the end came. 

A separate war service committee of agricultural publications 

5i«'^'orked out a plan under which their use of paper was to be curtailed 

^"jnly ]5 per cent. Trade books were taken up thi-ough the war service 

^l^'bmmittee of their publishers. It was decided that it would be 

'''%fair to curtail publishers by reducing the allotment of paper by 

^^ certain percentage of the paper used during any previous year. 

he business of a book publisher varies materially from year to year 

1 account of "runs" on certain successful books. A curtailment 

ade on the basis of previous years would leave some publishers with 

lore paper than they could use and others with a quantity insufiiciont 



105S26— 21 15 



226 AMERICAN IXDUSTRY lis THE WAR. 

for carrying on their business. The plan established curtailed eacl 
publishers (1) by reducing the number of new titles to be issued 
(2) by reducing the weights of paper, sizes of type, widths o 
margins, etc.; and (3) by the elimination of certain other wastefu 
practices. 

Regulations governing the publication of school textbooks wen 
issued August 21, 1918. They followed the trade books, with the ex 
ception that it was found impracticable to reduce the weights o: 
paper and the sizes of type because of the large number of contract; 
which various publishers had with State governments to furnisl 
books to conform to samples on file. The reduction in new title; 
constituted the chief economy. 

The publishers of medical books objected to having their produe 
classed with either of the above, and desired that no curtailmen- 
should be attempted in their field, because it was very importan 
that accounts of the development of medical science occasioned h} 
the war should be published fully. A separate program was estab 
lished for these publishers on November 1, but it was very sooi 
withdrawn. 

The committee representing mail-order houses met the divisioi 
in June, 1918, and discussed plans for economies in the use of papei 
in their catalogues. A questionnaire was issued and a meeting heh 
in September to discuss its results and decide upon the regulations 
It was found that the preparation of " spring of 1919 " catalogues hac 
by that time already reached a stage of completion which wouk 
make curtailment impossible, except in circulation. It was agreec 
that each house should curtail circulation 10 per cent for the sprin< 
of 1919 and establish a sj^stem whereby their total consumption o 
paper for the " fall of 1919 " catalogues should be diminished by 2( 
per cent. 

Wall-paper manufacturers were met, but little was accomplishec 
in reducing their consumption of paper. Calendar manufacturer 
met with the division September 26, 1918. It developed that th^ 
designs for 1920 were well advanced and that it was too late to cur 
tail the production of calendars for the year 1920, except by limita 
tions on the weights of paper. It was agreed that no regulation 
would be issued at that time, but that after the first of the year, whei 
plans were being made for 1921, another meeting would be held. 

To cover general book, job printing, and lithographing the wa 
service committee decided that the most important economies couk 
be accomplished by limiting the weights of paper at the source am 
by reducing margins and the number of blank pages. The Unitec 
Typothetae of America, an association of master primers, hek 
their convention on September 24, 1918, and explained to the trad 
the desires and the regulations of the War Industries Board, point 



AMERICAN INDTSTKY IN THE WAPx. '22 i 

ini: out to all printers the importance of their consultinj^ with tlioir 
( ustomers with a view to accomplishing: the curtailment phm. 

On October 2, 1918, the division held a conference with various 
agencies of the Government for the [)urp()se of developinfi a phm 
toi- eliminating wasteful practices in the use of stationery. Instruc- 
rions and suggestions were issued to the various (iovernment tlcpart- 
nu'uts, boards, and commissions. A publicity bureau was organized 
in rhe Paper Economies Section of the division. It issued suggestions 
concerning the unnecessary wrapping of merchandise and other 
practices in the use of paper and they were circulated among retail 
merchants throughout the country. '' Don't-waste-paper " window 
( ards were broadly distributed. The effect of these various regula- 
tions in accomplishing the general purpose of equalizing supply 
and demand can not be fairly measured, because few of them had 
lucn operating long enough to show results, when the need for such 
regulation came fortunately to an end. 

The division did no direct work on the question of price control 
and prices w^ere regulated on only one commodity in this field, 
namely, newsprint. The price which this article had reached by 
the spring of 1916 caused both Houses of Congress to begin an in- 
\ cstigation. A resolution, dated April 24, 191G, recjuested the Fed- 
t ral Trade Commission to examine into the cost of prodming news- 
print and the reasons for its high prices. The commission reported 
.Tune 30, 1917, recommending $3.10 per hundredweight as a fair and 
reasonable price for newsprint. After a number of appeals and 
hearings, a base price of $3.10 w^as established on April 1, 1918. On 
>i'l)tember 25, 1918, the United States Circuit Court for the South- 
ii District of New York gave a decision as arbiter that $3.50 per 

.iindred weight was a fair and reasonable base price from April 1. 
i.'I8. forward. On October 18, 1918, the Federal Trade Commis- 

m, after a series of hearings, decided that the base price sliould be 
reased to $3.63| per hundredweight to become effective May 1. 

• '18, to account for the wage increase; and that to account for the 

rcight increase, becoming effective July 1, 1918, an additional amount 
-iiould be allowed, making the total base price $3.75:1 j)er hundred- 
weight. On October 30, 1918, the division adopted ])lans for con- 
nolling and allocating all newsprint tonnage to go into operation 
November 15. 1918, but the order was re.scinded before it beeame: 

ifective. 



Chapter 11. 
TEXTILES. 

The war brought with it a very distinct disturbance in the various 
textile industries. In clothing alone it became necessar^^ to provide 
at once entirely new and unusual outfits for a prospective army of 
5,000,000 men, and further to prepare for a reserve of four spare 
outfits for each of these men. Hospital supplies in unheard of quan- 
tities, knapsacks, gun covers, hosiery, blanket's, overcoats, duck, 
tarpaulins, tents, shoe linings and innumerable articles requiring 
textiles had to be provided for at the expense of civilian needs. In' 
a word, it was necessary to direct to war use over 70 per cent of the| 
textile products of this country, and in many cases to create new! 
sources of supply or adapt machinery to new uses. The extent of thei 
undertaking can be appreciated when it is realized that this country's! 
average production of textiles at normal prices aggregates in value 
between four and five billion dollars per year. 

At the same time the shortage of ocean tonnage was causing a. 
shortage in wool. Dyes were almost impossible to obtain. Labor! 
was leaving the factories to go to war or to work in munition? 
plants, and coal and transportation were becoming hard to secure. 
Heavy buying by separate agencies of the Government caused un- 
stable markets. The textile industry is old and well established.. 
The mills are controlled by many individual owners, each plant has 
its specialties, and competition is keen. 

The textile problem was taken up by the committee on supplies 
of the council as soon as we entered the war. War service com- 
mittees were formed in the summer of 1917 for various branches of 
the industry. The committee brought together the separate pur- 
chasing agencies of the Government, so that they dealt in a group 
to lay^ out production programs in consultation with the several w^ar 
service coromittees. Many of the members of the textile committee 
of the council joined the forces of the Quartermaster General in the 
spring of 1918. Then separate sections of the War Industries Board 
were formed for the particular branches of the trade. 

John W. Scott was director of the Textile Division, which operated 
under the direction of George N. Peek, Commissioner of Finished 
Products. 

COTTON GOODS. 

The Cotton Goods Section of the Board, with Spencer Turner as 
chief, was organized in the summer of 1917. The section inherited a 
body of information from its predecessor and continued as an infor- 
mation bureau and point of contact between producer and Govern- 

228 



AMERICAN I^I>L\STK\ 12^ TllK WAR. -J'ilJ 

lunt purchaser, indicating sources of supply, making allocations, 
lib! securing the cooperation of the cotton-goods industry in turning 
ver its production to the Government at reasonable prices. I^y way 
it routine, 1,150 questionnaires were used to verify and complete 
he Government's information concerning equipment and facilities, 
.'.100 monthlv reports from manufacturers were received and classi- 
\vd. 1,733 ordei-s were cleared, and 1,752 priority certificates were 
et onmiended and handled by the section. 

The heaviest demands of the Government on tiie cotton goods 
laJe, and those which strained it most, were for duck, denim, and 
wills. The shortage in duck and methods for overcoming it had 
iren studied from the beginning of the war. Many carpet and tire- 
aOric mills converted their machinery for the manufacture of heavy 
luck, specialty mills for shelter-tent duck, and fine-goods mills for 
irplane and balloon cloth. But with all that could be done by 
\ ay of increased facilities the summer of 1918 faced both a present 
nd anticipated shortage in this fabric. 

The condition naturally stimulated speculative purchasing and 
loarding as well as high prices. Army duck, ordinarily sold at 15^ 
ents per yard, was bringing 34 cents. Sail duck, normal at 20 cents 
»er yard, brought 52 cents. To combat this, cotton duck was made a 
controlled " industry. The manufacturers were called together, and 
fter conference th&y agreed to sell their product only on permits 
ssiied by the section. Under this agreement 1,330 permits were 
ssued. 

For the cotton goods industry as a whole, the question of prices 
nd the advisability of price fixing was a problem continuously be- 
ore the section. A careful study was made of the condition and 
ecent history of the industry, the sources and condition of the supply 
t raw materials, and the machinery of production, as well as a com- 
aiison of war needs with ordinary peace-time consumption. The 
I 1 resentatives of the industry itself were for a long time strongly 
pDosed to price fixing. It seemed to them a dangerous departure 
I oni the theory on which the business had always been conducted. 

Die United States grows more than three-fifths of the world's 
iilply of cotton. We export in normal times between 6.000.000 and 
,000,000 bales of 500 pounds each, from a total production of 
1,000,000 to 16,000.000 bales. We import only a few thousand bales 
f the long-staple Egyptian variety for special uses. It happened 
liat our 1914 crop was very huge — 2.000.000 bales more than usual — 
^hile disturbance of manufacturing conditions in Kurope, combined 
dth the difficulties of shipping, cut down our exports by more than 
,000,000 bales. This left a surplus to be carried over to the 1915 
;ason of over 3,000.000 bales in addition to the normal surplus of 
bout 1,500,000 bales. The natural result was a great depression in 



230 AMERICAN IKDUSTKY IX THE WAR. 

the price of cotton. The " Buy-a-bale " movement was insti<^ated in 
order to relieve distress among the smaller cotton growers of the 
South, who were unable to convert their sole source of revenue into 
monej', and for the purpose of improving prices. 

By January, 1915, the price began gradually to rise, and continued 
until the fall of 1916, when the German peace proposal caused uncer- 
tainty again. On February 3, the daj^ after diplomatic relations with 
Germany were severed, the price began to rise sharply and the ad- 
vance continued until the spring of 1918, when Government price 
regulations were threatened and later inaugurated. For the greater 
part of the period from July 27, 1914, until February 3, 1917, prices 
were beloAV normal. 

The crops of 1915, 1916, and 1917 were all below normal, and the 
consumption abroad, as well as the ability to ship, proved more favor- 
able to sellers than the trade had anticipated. As a matter of fact, 
less than 250,000 bales of cotton were actually lost at sea during the 
entire war. The fear, however, that it might be lost, together with 
the shortage of bottoms, caused a marked decrease in exports. 
Throughout the war there was always a surplus of raw cotton in the 
countr}' and this section never found it necessary to control either 
prices or distribution of the domestic fiber. The Egyptian fiber was 
imported under the direction of the War Trade Board and the sec- 
tion indicated its distribution. 

As soon as the United States entered the war the prices of cotton 
fabrics, cotton yarns, and raw cotton all began to rise rapidly — the 
fabrics more rapidly than the yarns and the j^arns more rapidly than 
the law cotton. The explanation for this can be found in the very 
urgent demand for finished fabrics, which had to be met at any cost. 
To satisfy the increased demand, manufacturing costs were increased 
both by the use of inferior machines and the conversion of machines 
to the production of new commodities, and by the expense of break- 
ing in untrained workmen, as well as by increased wages. In addi- 
tion to these substantial reasons the very urgent war demand, com- 
bined with the decentralized purchasing methods in use during the 
first few months of the war, gave much incentive to speculators and 
dealers to profit at the expense of the Government. 

In the spring of 1917 the cotton goods section of the committee 
on supplies of the Council of National Defense undertook to recom- 
mend to the trade prices which the committee considered as fair and 
reasonable for a number of fabrics especially needed in war. These 
prices were accepted by many influential manufacturers and served 
as a guide to Government purchasing agents in placing contracts. 

The war service committee of the cotton manufacturers was organ- 
ized in September, 1917, with subcommittees on denim, cotton duck 
flat duck, outing flannels, tire fabrics, gingham, and ticking. These 



AMERICAN IXDUSTHV IN THE WAH. 231 



li, committees served as points of contact between the manufactiuvrs 
tl and the section. They represented the interests of the trade before 
iiiti the section, discussing suggestions, furnishing information, predict- 
ing tendencies, etc. For a long time they fouglit (Tovcrnment price- 
m fixing. 

cet Finally, however, a majority of the representatives of the trade 
vid were persuaded that price-fixing would be necessary in order to pre- 
ad t^ent profiteering and to insure reasonable prices not only to tlie (iov- 
nij Brnment but to civilian consumers as well. On July 8, 1918, at a 
ate meeting of the price fixing committee witli representatives of the 
■icf 30tton industry, maximum prices on certain basic fabrics were agreed 
jpon.^ Further lists of prices were to be issued as soon as they could 
til 36 prepared and agreed upon, and accordingly additional schedules 
TO! 3ame out during July, August, September, and October. The first 
y schedule was to expire October 1, and meetings were held in Septem- 
tli Jer for the purpose of agreeing upon a revision, but as no agreement 
iviti ^as reached the original prices remained effective until January 1, 
orti L919. All of these fixed prices were maximum net prices at the mills 
I til ;o the United States, the allied Governments, and to the American 
tlii jublic. They covered primary sales made after June 8 for delivery 
n ifter October 1 and all primary sales made after June 21. They in- 
s« ;luded brokerage and commission for selling, 

A special committee, with T. W. Page as chairman," was appointed 

itto 3y the President in the spring of 1918, to study and report on the 

dvisability and feasibility of fixing the price of raw cotton. After 

tin in extended investigation the committee reported unanimously 

y([ igainst such action. 

As a result of the activities of the council and Board, the cotton 
nanufacturers, along with a number of other industries in which 
igorous competition had been the rule, have learned some significant 
' j lew habits. The exigencies of the war impelled the formation of 
,| '^arious associations within the industry, in order through coopera- 
ion to accomplish war purposes which would have been impossible 
therwise. This was all done under closest Tiovernment supervision, 
hese associations exchange trade information and will very likely 
n the future show the effects of cooperation in pursuance of common 
mrposes. This may not result in advantage to the public if it is 
ceompanied by no public control. 



coi 



[hf The chief war problem of the wool industry, unlike that of 
jrn otton, lay in the supply of raw material. We now import two-thirds 
f our raw wool — that is to say, we did in 1917 and again in 1918 — 

rga 



» See Appendix XXXVI for schedule of fixed prices for cotton Roods. July 8, 1018. 

"The committee consisted of Thomas W. Page, chairman. R. L. Bennett. Ward M. 
urgess, Edward F. Green, .T. C. Redmon. M. I". Sturdlvant, S. W. Wels. D. 8. Murphy, 
7. R. Beattle. 



232 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. j 

and we consumed nearly twice as much wool during those years a,' 
we did before the war in Europe began. 

The trade enjoyed a season of great prosperity during the yearr 
immediately preceding our entrance into the war in spite of the 191; 
tariff reductions, which were more than compensated by the economir 
conditions of Europe. While our people had few war orders foi 
woolen goods, European manufacturers were prevented from pro 
ducing the surplus which we had ordinarily bought. There was 
moreover, a marked increase in the consumption of woolen goods ii 
this country, due, no doubt, to general prosperity and high wages 
enabling a larger number of people to use woolen garments. 

The annual consumption of raw wool in the United States in 
creased steadily from about 450,000,000 pounds in 1913 to T52,000,00( 
pounds in 1918. Our domestic production was about 290,000,00( 
pounds a year. Thus, our imports have more than tripled since 1913 
As the period of production from raw wool to clothing varies fron 
six months to a year, it can be seen how a prospective demand foi 
large and prompt deliveries of cloth, such as the war brought about 
together with a shortage of wool in sight and a suitable supply o: 
shipping in doubt, would stimulate speculation to the highest pitcl 
unless some control could be devised. Prices rose 65 per cent durinc 
the first few months of 1917, and that on top of an already higl 
market, although there was no real shortage of wool in the country a 
that time. 

The first act of the Government in the direction of control was th( 
setting aside in July, 1917, of $25,000,000, to be used in the purchase 
of wool; and 6,000,000 pounds were immediately purchased by th( 
committee on supplies of the council. This was held through th( 
year, ready to dump in case the market should fluctuate too radically 
But it soon became evident that Government buying for actual us« 
was going to be necessary, not only as a price-control measure but ii 
order to make sure of securing a sufficient supply of wool for the wai 
requirements. 

In 1916 the British Government contracted with the Australiar 
and New Zealand Governments for their entire output of wool yeai 
by year during the war. Our merchants had been obtaining in norma. 
times over 150,000,000 pounds a year from these sources. Durinc 
1917 practically no wool came to us from Australasia on account o1 
shortage in shipping. In order to cover the deficit, the War Depart- 
ment on October 10, 1917, arranged to purchase 247,000 bales 
(123,500,000 pounds) of this wool from the British Government foi 
delivery in 1918, at the British " civil issues " prices. The British hac 
been able to purchase this wool at very low prices by taking the entin 
clip and in this way insuring the producers against a shortage oi 
bottoms which might leave them out of contact with the world mar- 
kets. They resold the wool under two schedules of prices, namely 



AMERICAN INDLSTUY IN THK WAR. 233 

fsj "military issues," which represented cost plus transportiition, and 

"civil issues," which represented cost plus transportation phis a 
'^"1 margin to cover insurance and the overhead incident to the whole 
i^l wool purchase, the last being divided evenly between the Britisii 
ODii Gtovernment and the respective selling Governments. On Novem- 
ffliber 9, 1918. another purchase of 325,000 bales of Australasian wool 
pr was made, but only 110,000 bales were delivered, the rest being can- 
" eeled without payment of indemnity by the United States, indemnity 

being waived in consideration of payment by the United States of 
- •• civil issues " prices for both lots of wool. 

Three other important steps were taken by the Government for 

the purpose of turning raw wool into direct war-industry channels. 

In November, 1917, wool was put on the list of materials for which 
' an import license was required, and on December 15 the War Trade 
-' Board annoimced that any applicant for an import license for wool 

purchased after that date would have to comply with the following 

regulations: 

1. No imported wool should be sold to any person other than a manufacturer 
without the consent of the War Industries Board. 

2. The United States Government should hold an option on all wool im- 
!">tteil, for 10 days after the customhouse entry, and thereafter on any unsold 
part until the whole amount had been disposed of. * * * 

The price for Government purchases was fixed on the basis of the 
Boston exchange price of July 30, 1917, less 5 per cent. It was not, 
however, until March 1, 1918, that the Quartermaster Corps began to 
exercise the option to purchase all imported wools. 

About this same time the estimates of Army requirements were 
increased. The available supplies of stocks were studied and found 
very short. It was decided, therefore, on April 5, 1918, that the 
Government would purchase all stocks held by wool dealers, and a 
few days later it was further decided that the Government would 
purchase the entire 1918 domestic clip. At the request of the Qiiar- 
torinaster General, prices for both transactions were set by the price 
tixing committee to be those prevailing on July 30, 1917, or, if wool 
liiid cost a dealer more than that, then the July 30 price plus 5 per 
r,.nt. This placed the Government in complete control of all raw 
^^ ool in the United States. 

Machinery was set up for handling the business. The ofiice of 
wool administrator. Quartermaster Corps, created in March, 1918, 
took care of receiving the wool under all three of the purchasing ar- 
rangements. The domestic clip was handled thrcnigh ordinary busi- 
ness channels under the guidance of " regulations " issued by the 
Wool Division of the War Industries Board on May 21, 1918.2 Qn the 

■ See Appendix XXXVII for copy of " Government Regulntlons for Handling Wool Clip 
' f 1918," Issued May 21, 1918, by Wool Division, War Industries Board. 



234 AMERICA]Sr INDUSTRY IIST THE WAR. I 

other hand, the wol distributor parceled out these wools to the manu- ji 
facturers holding Government contracts as they were needed.^ j 

There remained one more problem in connection with the purchase ' 
of wool. South America and South Africa were open markets where j 
the Allies and private merchants were competing with each other inl 
making purchases. For the purpose of eliminating competition! 
between American traders and the American Government, an im- 
port regulation was made effective July 28, 1918, restricting licenses 
to the Quartermaster General only. In order to handle the pur- 
chases in South America for the Quartermaster General, the South 
x^merican Wool Purchasing Syndicate, consisting of six large im- 
porters, was formed under the supervision of the War Department 
and operated from July 23 until October 10, when the wool pur- 
chasing commission superseded it. Under this arrangement 44.500 
bales of wool were brought in. 

Lewis Penwell was chief of the Domestic Wool Section of the Board 
throughout the period of control and was responsible for this im- 
portant work. 

It will be seen that from the beginning of the summer of 1918 
no new stocks of raw wool became available for civilian uses in the 
country. At the same time only about 45 per cent of the looms were 
engaged on war work. This presented a very serious problem, in 
view of the fact that it was then thought that the war might extend 
over a period of several years. For the purpose of studying means 
of relieving this situation, as well as to serve as an information 
bureau and point of contact for all parties interested in wool manu- 
factures, the Woolen Goods Section of the Board was formed on June 
1, 1918, with Herbert E. Peabody as chief. 

The Woolen Goods Section sent out questionnaires to determine 
how much privately owned wool remained in the possession of man- 
ufacturers throughout the country. It also, through the war service 
committees, and through individuals, made a study of the condition 
of clothing stocks, both wholesale and retail. It was clear that im- 
portant steps by way of conservation would have to be inaugurated 
if none of the Government stocks of wool could be diverted to civilian 
use for months to come, and this appeared to be the case. Instruc- 
tions were issued to cut off the dyeing of wool and the spinning of 
yarn for hand-knitting purposes; but at the same time, in order to 
assist the American Red Cross to obtain its requirements of hand Imit- 
ting yarns, an appeal was issued to spinners and dealers throughout 
the country to turn over all stocks on hand to that organization. 

A careful study was made of methods of conserving woolen cloth 
in the manufacture and distribution of clothing. The Conservation 

» For prices at which this wool was sold, see booklet " Government Issue Pricps of 
Wool to Manufacturers Holding Government Contracts," May 15, 1918. 



AMERICAN n.'TSTr.V IX TUV. WAI;. 'J;K") 

Division of the Board, working: tliroiio:h tho industrial adjustments 

Munittee and the priorities commissioner, reached an a^neenicnt 
vitii tlie trade and issued instructions desig^ned to cut down (he 
number of styles and to eliminate certain features which required an 
( .\trava<rant use of cloth in the manufacture of men's, women's and 
children's suits and overcoats. A great saving was effected, both in 
cloth and in bairgage space, b_y reducing the dimensions of samples 
carried bv traveling salesmen and bj- reducing the number of sample 

its allowed to a given house. It was estimated that several million 
liids of cloth would be saved annually by these means. 

As the shortage of wool began to bo anticipated, and actually felt, 
in the mills manufacturing for civilian consumption, the demand for 
rags and reworked wools began to be very sharp and the prices ad- 
vanced rapidly. Very little of this material was used in Ciovern- 
ment work, so that it was not considered wise to have the Govern- 
ment purchase the stocks. As an alternative, Government control 
was exercised by means of price fixing, and a rag administrator, A. L. 
'nfl'ord. was appointed to supervise the application of prices and 

uulate the distribution of materials. 

With no wool in sight for civilian use, speculation began in woolen 
piece goods in some of the larger markets of the country during the 
late winter and spring of 1918. In June the Board requested tlie 
Federal Trade Commission to make an investigation of the situation 
in New York. Mam^ pieces of goods, whose sales were traced from 
the woolen mill through the hands of jobbers and cutters, had 
Imnged hands as many as eight times. The presence of Federal 
1 rude Commission agents in the field abated speculation somewhat, 
Tliough prices continued to climb throughout the year. By fall the 
'■!ivately owned stocks had become so low that persistent demands 

<ve made hj manufacturers that (xovernment wool be allocated for 
llian cloth. The section made a careful survey of available stocks 
l it was decided that this could probably not be done before April 
. 1019, without encroaching upon necessary military supplies. 

The close of hostilities naturally left very large stocks of raw wool 
III the hands of the War Department because there had been necessity 
1or preparing for the future. On December 'M) they amounted to 
-.me 813,000,000 pounds plus 70,000,000 pounds in the hands of 
I'-alers 3'et to be taken over. Total purchases by the wool purchas- 
ing quartermaster up to March 20, 1919, were 612,450,108 pounds, 
\alued at $436,781,206. There had been sold to manufacturers 235,- 
349.628 pounds, worth $193,347,536. The 1918 domestic clip had 
amounted to 298,000,000 pounds. Imports for the year were 450.- 
000,000 pounds. 

For some months following the armistice the trade was full of mis- 
givings as to how the Government would dispose of these immense 



236 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

stocks. A multitude of suggestions came in. A plan was suggestec 
by the War Industries Board, but it was not adopted. The progran 
was finally announced that sales by auction would be conducted froir 
time to time, such quantities being offered at each auction as the tradf 
was in the habit of absorbing. The auctioneers were given an un- 
announced minimum price. Sales were suspended during that period 
of 1919 in which the domestic crop was being marketed. 

KNIT GOODS. 

The Army purchased knit goods to the value of $304,630,850 during^ 
the war. It was made by an industry whose product, prior to the war ! 
was mostly cotton, but which under the guidance of this section was- 
quickly transformed for the production of woolen materials suited tc^ 
military requirements. 

There are 1,622 knitting mills of all sizes in the United States, many, 
of them being very small ; in fact, less than 5 per cent have an annual 
production valued at over $1,000,000. It has never been possible to 
form large combinations in this industry, due partly to the small cap- 
ital required to start a new plant, partly to the individual quality of 
many products, and partly to the type of men who have been the 
leaders in the trade. 

Our war orders caused upheaval in the industry almost as soon as 
they began, first, because they were large and urgent; and, second, 
because they called for a much higher percentage of shirts iind 
drawers than our mills had been accustomed to producing. Yvliile 
American-made knitting and spinning machinery is considered the 
best in the world and is exported everywhere, we had been getting 
many of our knitting needles from England and Germany and our 
dyes from Germany. Shortages soon developed in needles, dyes, 
trimmings, and fuel, all aggravated by increasing delays in trans- 
portation. Wages increased 100 per cent. The Government had 
taken control of raw wool, and other raw materials were hard to 
get. Prices advanced during 1917 from 110 per cent to 280 per 
cent of those of 1913. It was necessary, as time went on, to convert 
more and more of the machinery to war work. 

In order to cope with all of these problems, the Knit Goods Section 
was organized on June 10, 1918, with Lincoln Cromwell as chief. 
He and the men whom he brought in to assist him had been bmdng 
knit goods for the Army since the beginning of the war. It had been 
necessary to draw revised specifications for Army knit goods in 
order to put into immediate use the machinery which the industry 
possessed. These men had been instrumental in drawing the revised 
specifications. 



(AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 237 

, The section served as an information bureau for both the manu- 
at ifacturers and for the purchasing agents of the (iovernment. It coin- 
t ipleted a census of the underwear materials of the country, showing 
i: the weekly production, machinery equipment, and kinds of garments 
HE made. A similar census was made of hosiery mills. A census was 
1) taken of the knit goods in the hands of jobbers in order to ascertain 
the condition of the civilian stocks and to determine the steps neces- 
sary to protect consumers from unfair prices. 

|i The section was able to arrange with the knitting and yarn mills to 

jj eliminate a great deal of useless transportation in the delivery of 

'"^tyarns. Statements of capacity, unfilled orders, and requirements of 

"i materials furnished monthly by spinners and knitters enabled the sec- 

^^^Ition to guide and control the industry in purchasing yarns and other 

' • supplies. All French spun w^orsted yarns were reserved for the 

underwear manufacturers. Some Bradford spinning was allotted to 

"'^ the hosiery makers but most if it went to the weavers. 

'" The section, of course, passed on all requests for priorities by mem- 

";bers of the trade and made their recommendations to the Priority 

^P'i Division. The section suggested and supervised the conversion of 

"'most of the mills from civilian to war work. Factories famous for 

"''itine silk hosiery were adjusted to produce woolen stockings. Women's 

; underwear mills were converted by the exchange of machinery to 

^'i larger sizes to the production of men's heavy woolen underwear. 

"^1 Something like 1,200 stocking machines were specially built to supply 

''ithe heavy worsted socks for the Army, There was, of course, a 

''' I shortage of woolen yarns. The section supervised experiments which 

tl^'i culminated in the use of a low-grade South American wool (whose 

'"•i usefulness had been limited) for the production of a successful 

""i hosiery yarn. The woolen stocking production was developed from 

practically nothing at the beginning of the war to 8,0()0.()()() pairs per 

month at its close. 

By way of conservation, a program was worked out for eliminating 

packing boxes in the shipment of knit goods. The materials were 

j^'i baled in place of being boxed. Thus both shipping space and pa<-k- 

^^jing materials were saved. A program was worked out for tlie stand- 

i ardization of colors and models in sweaters, but was not put into 

'^'"l effect on account of the armistice. 

«'■} There was no price fixing in this industry, though there had been a 
"^[Continuous rise since 1915. The (Government was buying a high 
jsii enoi'.'jh ix'rcontage of the product to have an important effect in 
i« establishing prices and the section worked with the Quartermaster 
trj Corps in establishing maximum prices beyond which no Government 
d contracts would be placed. The section secured cost sheets from all 
mills and analyzed them before bids were requested on any new 

i 



238 AMEPJCAX INDUSTRY IN THE WAE. 

requirements. It was made known to the manufacturers that no bids 
would be received for prices in excess of 10 per cent of cost to the low^ 
cost producers. 

About 75 per cent of the cost of knit "roods is contained in the cost 
of yarns. It was. therefore, by controlling the price of yarns and ir 
guiding the distribution of raw wool to spinners working exclusivel} 
on Government contracts that the section did its most effective worii 
in securing knit goods for the Government departments at reasonable 
rates. 

FELT. 

The felt industrj^ in its various branches depends principally upon 
wool, cotton, and to a lesser extent upon rabbit fur for its raw mate- 
rials. When the Government took control of wool the problem of dis- 
tributing it suitably to the large number of felt manufacturers be- 
came a serious one. 

The Army had direct requirements for large amounts of felt foi 
hats, for padding coats, and for the manufacture of armaments, par- 
ticularly gas-defense equipment. But on the whole this industry 
was marked by the multitude of indirect requirements for its prod- 
ucts, and on this account the work of the section was peculiarly im- 
portant and difficult. Felt was required for canteens, gas masks, 
helmets, clothing, hats, caps, splints, shells, fuse boxes, chevrons, 
surgical uses, packing, shipbuilding, airplane construction, percus- 
sion caps, motor trucks, and in small quantities for hundreds of 
places in all kinds of machinery. Paper makers can not function 
without a large supply of felt, which must be constantly renewed in 
their machines. 

When the war began the felt industry was in a prosperous condi- 
tion with a moderate but remunerative export trade, so that when 
war bids began to be requested the response was not at all satis- 
factory. To overcome this, the Council of National Defense estab- 
lished the Felt Section early in the war, and there began the work of 
studj'ing requirements, advising on specifications in the light of 
facilities in existence, and of assisting the mills in procuring raw 
materials, as well as bringing together the various purchasing 
agencies of the Government. At the beginning the section did a 
great deal of work in studying specifications, recommending blends 
and mixtures, and testing finished samples. It also used its knowl- 
edge of the industry in advising purchasing agencies regarding costs 
and fair selling prices for the product. 

The Felt Section, under Sylvan I. Stroock as chief, in the form in 
which it had been effective under the council, continued under the 
Board, and after the Government took control of wool in the spring 
of 1918, its work was greatly increased. There was no difficulty 



AMERICAN INDUSTliY IN THK WAH. 23i) 

l)i( involved in passing upon the allocation of wool to factories engaged 

c^ on direct war orders, but the number and variety of indirect require- 
ments and the number and variety of factories producing felt, some 
of which was on order from factories producing war materials in 
whole or in part and some being produced for the open market, ren- 
dered the problem of the allocation of raw wool very complex. Ar- 

01 rangements were made with the wool distributor to have all such 

jIjI allocations pass through the Felt Section. 

A. severe shortage in "'textile felts'' was showing itself by the 
spring of 1918. The new Government requirements seemed to show 
a demand for several times the capacity of the country, while the 
demands of the allied Governments for both military and civilian use 
were also ver^- great. The section called together all the manufac- 
turers for a conference. An appeal was made to them to eliminate all 
sales for civilian uses until the emergency should pass. The}' agreed 
to do this and to place the control of both the production of their 
mills and the sale of their goods in the hands of the War Industries 
Board. This control was exercised by a system of applications and 
permits. The manufacturers would submit their orders and contracts 
to the Felt Section for approval before accepting them. The applica- 
tions were required to show precisely what types of wool, noils, waste. 
etc., and what quantities, were required to produce the felt, and to 

^^ show further what specific Government contract or contracts wouhl 
later use the felt. In this way felt novelties of all kinds and many 
other nonessential or less essential products were done aAvay with, in 
spite of the fact that their manufacture would have carried much 
higher profits for the mills. A tabulation of the reports of all felt 
mills for the first seven months of 1918 showed an average profit of 
but 6.3 per cent. The mills were willing at all times to shoAv the 
Government their cost sheets for each item, and they accepted such 
prices as the Government considered fair. 

The problem of the factories which required felt in the production 
of some entirely different Government requirements, direct or in- 
direct, received attention by the section. These factories would 
apply for permits to purchase felt and for instructions regarding 
possible sources. In this way it was possible so to direct buyers that 
various felt mills were able to make large and long runs of a few 
varieties of felt and thereby important economies were effected. 

It frequently occurred that manufacturers of certain less essential 
felt products did not possess "trade secrets" necessary to enable 

o«t|them to produce goods required by the Government. At the request 
of the section many mills gave unhesitatingly of their knowledge to 
prospective competitors. Methods of conservation and of substitu- 

tl tion of other fabrics for felt were matters of continuous study by the 
section. In a number of those cases the substitutions liave worked 
so well that the use of felt was abandoned until normal times. 






240 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Felt cutting is a special industr3^ The cutters purchase the fel 
and sell a great variety of small objects like percussion caps, fust, 
caps, gaskets, buffers, bumpers, oil rings, mats, pads, etc. It wai 
necessary for the section to parcel out felt to the cutters on theii 
individual agreements that the product would be sold for essentia 
uses only. 

The sheet felt makers turn out a product ordinarily used in pianos 
for dental and surgical work, and for polishing and buffing wheels 
These factories proved to be the most suitable for the production oi 
the felt required in gas masks, and their facilities, except those usee 
for surgical and dental felt, were entirely converted to the productior 
of this ncAv war need. 

The felt-hat industry" brought several problems to the section 
Large quantities were needed for the Army, and there was naturally 
a great falling off in capacity of production for civilian use. Woo] 
and rabbit fur were needed. Kabbit fur comes chiefly from Austra- 
lasia ; and in an effort to force ships from Pacific trade to the Atlantic, 
an embargo was placed on this commodity along with many others 
on May 23, 1918. A lot of fur found its way into the country in 
violation of the embargo, but the Government would not release it on 
the theory that it would only encourage further violations. The 
section worked with the War Trade Board and Shipping Board to 
obtain its release. A program of conservation for the felt-hat in- 
dustry was worked out by the section. The number of stjdes and 
types of hats were reduced considerably, and restrictions were placed 
on imports, making them conform to domestic specifications in such 
a way that fair competition should not be destroyed. An elaborate 
program was worked out for conservation of materials for packing 
hats. It was designed to save 50 per cent of the shipping space 
ordinarily required and large quantities of packing material. 

The wool felt hat manufacturers were assisted by the section, not 
by supplying them with wool so that they could continue in their 
usual pursuit's, but by supervising the conversion of their plants to 
the manufacture of felt for gas masks. 

A plan for extensive conservation in the straw-hat industry was 
also worked by the section. Under it the number of styles and 
shapes were greatly reduced and plans for shipping and handling 
samples made more economical. It was put in effect in October, 
1918, and canceled shortly afterwards. 

There was one special problem which the section worked over in 
behalf of the manufacturers of paper-makers' felt." They had had a 
large export business before the war. The paper mills of some for- 
eign countries depend entirely on our felt makers. Thus, when the 



" Fletcher H. Montgomery was in charge of the Felt Hat Section. 
" Edmund N. Huyck was in charge. 



1 



AMERICAN l.NDUSTHV IN THK WAR. 241 

ool restrictions stopped the export of this commodity, a "jreat strug- 
le began both on the part of the countries who had been accustomed 
receiving our felt and on the part of the makers. The section 
inally worked out a sohition which provided for a certain amount of 
xport, all shipments being conditioned on the shipment to this coun- 
ry in return of a corresponding supply of raw wool. 

In conjunction with the pulp and paper section, the section con- 
lucted experiments looking to a more efficient use of felt in the paper 
lills, and a set of instructions embodying the results was sent to each 
taper mill. 

Woven felts, used in lithographic work, for newspaper presses, in 
extile mills, filtering apparatus, etc., presented a problem very 
imilar to that of the paper-makers' felt, and solutions were worked 
ut bv the section alono- the same lines. 

SILK. 

Owing to the comparatively small diversity in the large quantity 
f silk fabrics required for war work, the difliculties encountered 
y the industry were intensive rather than extensive. The articles 
lanufactured consisted of cartridge-bag cloth, silk parachute flares, 
Eirtridge-igniter cloth, cartridge-bag lacing cord, ballastite rings, 
iffetaline, cotton webbing, cap ribbons, cravats, neckerchiefs, spool 
iwing silks, and banner silk. But there were two principal products 
ivolved in the war program ; first, the cartridge-bag cloth, a heavy 
atural silk fabric, and, second, a light-weight pure silk taffeta cloth, 
sed for parachute flares. The cloth most adaptable for these flares 
'as Japanese habutai, but the available stock of this was soon ex- 
austed. To meet the deficiency a similar fabric was woven by 
.merican mills and gave complete satisfaction. 
But the problem of securing the millions of yards of coarse silk 
squired to make the bags in which all propellant powder for large 
iins is loaded was a more difficult one. Experiments were made 
>oking to a substitution of cotton cloth chemically treated, but they 
liled. Silk is the onl}' fabric which is known to be completely con- 
imed in burning, never leaving hot ashes in the gun after firing. 
During the first few months of the war, orders were place<l by the 
'rdnance Department for 7,000,000 yards of cartridge-bag silk, and 
lis seemed to absorb the facilities of the country, so that in Novem- 
iT, 1917, when a further 10,000,000 yards was needed, new facili- 
es had to be developed. All of the raw materials come from the 
ar East. To meet the situation the American sink spinners were 
tiled together to discuss ways and means. The meeting resulted in 
ie formation of the Allied Silk Trading Corporation, composed of 
K>582G— 21 16 



242 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, 

the seven American manufacturing companies, each contributing 
proportion to its normal output. This corporation tool^ a contra 
for the 10,000,000 yards at cost plus 7^ per cent. This 7^ per ce 
was later voluntarily reduced to 1 per cent. A further contract f 
20,000,000 yards was placed with the corporation on July 12, 191 

Production was just about meeting the program on Novemb 
11. A great many cotton and woolen looms were converted to t 
production of this silk. The corporation itself did much of the bu 
ing of raw material abroad, but as the demand was so searchii 
speculation by American jobbers naturally began to creep in. ''. 
cope with this, the War Trade Board, at the request of the W 
Industries Board, made a ruling empowering the Government to ta 
over an3' importations of raw materials entering into cartridge clo 
at foreign cost plus 2 per cent. 

The Silk Section of the Board was not formed as a separate ur 
until August 2, 1918. William Skinner was chief. The secti( 
had numerous smaller problems connected with the purchasing, ha 
dling, and testing of silk. 

FLAX PRODUCTS. 

The war problem of the flax industry was handled from the begi 
ning by one man, George F. Smith, who came to Washington 
June, 1917, as advisor to the Ordnance Department on linen threa 
In the autumn he was attached to the Council of National Defen 
and the following spring was made a section chief of the W 
Industries Board. 

Linen thread is required for sewing all kinds of leather goods ai 
canvas equipment. It is quite superior to cotton both on account 
its strength and durability and because moisture causes it to sw( 
and fill out the hole made by the needle in sewing. This count 
imports most of its flax. The 1913 tariff reduction weakened t' 
industry. It had scarcely recovered when we entered the war, and 
greatly increased supply was required to meet the increased demai 
for finished leather goods. A shortage was anticipated from t 
start, and experiments were conducted for the purpose of finding 
suitable substitute or method of diluting the base material. An a 
mixture of hemp to the flax was tried and to a limited extent w 
successful. Cotton thread was used as a substitute, also with limit 
success. The use of flax for linen cloth was practically eliminat< 
during the war. 

The problem of the section was to assist in getting a suitable su 
ply of flax into the country, to guide in its distribution to the thref 
trade, and so to control the distribution of the linen thread itse 
that various war orders could be met. 



Item 



Wii 



AMERICAN IXDUSTKY IN TllK WAH. 243 

''"■gl Enp^lancl controls the world's trade in flax, which is raised cliiefly 
"Hin Russia, Belfrium, Holland. Ireland, France, and Canada. Russian 
^^^^'tflax is of an inferior quality and has to have an admixture of Irisii 
f^cti(|^P Belirian fiber to produce a g^ood thread. There was throuj^hout 
■•l^llthe war a struggle with the British to obtain from them enough of 
'vemliittjjg Irish product for this country. 

totii On February 25, 1918, a system of control over the distribution of 
"'""ilthread by licenses was established. From that date forward no 
;'™brders were accepted nor shipments made by the trade to any destina- 
'" Jttion, military, naval, or civilian, without first obtaining a license 
* '''Ifrom the Board. A list was secured from each manufacturer of all 
'° '^(unfilled orders on his books. These were examined and blanket 
^'^^Hicenses issued for most of them and then all new orders had to be 
{submitted for approval. 
Restrictions in the civilian use of flax gave rise to several inter- 
^^*?sting problems. All fine gill fishing nets have to be made of linen 
'e'™3ecause it gives strength without bulk and is much less visible to a 
ish than cotton or other line. A great shortage in fishing nets de- 
veloped toward the autumn of 1918. The Food Administration took 
I hand in the matter and carried on a correspondence with the Brit- 
sh Government looking to a release of nets. About the time of the 
irmistice the nets began to arrive. 

I The section worked out a program for distributing flax seed 
Through the Department of Agriculture with a view to encouraging 
md fostering the cultivation of fiber flax in this country, but the 
olan was never made effective. This country produces a moderate 
hare of the flaxseed consumed here in the manufacture of linseed 
lil. but the same plant is not available for the double purpose, be- 
ause fiber flax has to be harvested before the seeds are ripe. 

JUTE, HEMP, AND CORDAGE. 

This section was formed May 16, 1918, with E. C. Heidrich, jr., as 
■hief. The two largest problems in this field had to do with (1) jute, 
jvhich comes from India and produces burlap and gunny cloth, and 
2) henequen or Mexican sisal, which comes from Yucatan antl is 
he source of more than 85 per cent of the world's supply of binder 
wine.* 

Tlie section also dealt with Manila fiber, kapok, coir yarn, linoleum, 
nik, and bristles. But none of these involved problems so diflicult 
s burlap and binder twine, though they or their constituent ma- 
crials are practically all imported into this country. 

Upon the declaration of war, cordage and twines of all descrip- 
ions, from wrapping cord and linen thread to the heaviest marine 

* The Food Administration handled the principal problems relating to binder twine. It 
Iso dealt with burlap until Sept. 1, 1918. 



244 AMERICAN INDLFSTEY IN THE WAR. 

cordage, were in immediate demand in extraordinary quantitie 
Japan increased her shipbuilding rapidly. Our Shipping Board r 
quired marine cordage for the emergency fleet. Our navy yards ii 
creased their supplies of cordage, jute products, and oakum about i 
per cent. Immense quantities of fiber products of all kinds wei 
consumed in the packing of materials for transportation from tl 
United States to France. 

In June, 1918, the Army abandoned crating in wooden box( 
because it required too much shipping space, and burlap coverint 
were in part substituted. The coverings were required to be cut i 
certain sizes, to be used later in France as sandbags in trench wa 
fare. The British controlled both the jute fiber and the burla 
manufactured from it in the mills at Calcutta, India, and Dunde 
Scotland. 

In 1917 this country imported 325,000,000 yards of burlap, 12£ 
000,000 pounds of jute cordage, and 196,000,000 pounds of raw jut 
AVe have 554 importers or manufacturers and 2,919 companies whi( 
consume large quantities of jute products. One hundred and fift; 
four millions pounds of gunny cloth are used annually in balir 
cotton. Sugar, flour, meal, rice, potatoes, nuts, beans, grain, seed 
cofi^ee, wool, fertilizer, nitrate of soda, etc. are packed in burlap f< 
shipping. Meat is wrapped in it for shipment. 

In June, 1916, the British Government placed an embargo on tl 
exportation of jute and jute products. They required that all licens 
for export into the United States would have to be approved by tl 
British Embassy at Washington and the material purchased throuf 
the Textile Alliance (Inc.). Prices were practically fixed at Ca 
cutta by the jute merchants, the British Government taking tl 
position that it was not willing to interfere with the course of 
trade of such importance to India. On October 4, 1918, the Boar 
through the section, secured a voluntary agreement with our ir 
porters establishing maximum prices for burlap based on 16 cents p 
yard Pacific coast for 40-inch, 10^-ounce material, the open mark 
being 21 cents at the time. The agreement further stipulated th 
these prices should not affect contracts made before October 3, 191 
and that any cancellation of contracts or repudiation of agreemen 
made before that date would be regarded with disfavor. 

On October 5 it was further resolved that no licenses should 
granted for the importation of burlap or jute without the joi 
approval of the Board and the Food Administration. At the sar 
time further freight space for the Calcutta-United States burli 
trade was secured, so that rates were reduced from 400 to 300 shr 
lings per ton. Buying in the Calcutta market was held up for 
short time, so that prices fell from 22.69 cents per yard in Septemb 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 245 

tibtto 15.05 cents per yard by late October, 1918. The January, 1915, 
ritorice was 4.45 cents per yard. English restrictions were removed 
isi February 1, 1919. An international jute executive was under dis- 
iit'f'ussion in London when the end came. The Board's foreign mission 
ivfivas negotiating with the Indian Government to have a study made of 
mi; costs of production with a view to price-fixing, which would have 

•ffected enormous savings in our purchases. 
kn! Eeferring to the henequen or sisal of Yucatan, there was an 
jriit jibundance produced for all needs; but the fiber is controlled by a 
cat (Mexican monopoly, the Reguladora. Practically the only substitute 
ml.OT henequen in the manufacture of binder twine is Manila hemp, 
m\\.nd not enough of this could be brought into use to combat success- 
111:4 (iilly the power of the monopoly to raise the price of henequen. 
Che problem was solved by the Food Administration buying of the 
, iij^^eguladora on behalf of all American interests at a price fixed by 
jjuliegotiation. 
- - Manila hemp, the chief material for heavy marine cordage, oil- 

■ vW cables, transmission rope, and similar line, is raised exclusively 
jji^iii the Philippines. Manila hemp sold at 11.19 cents per pound at 
jfjjl'ew York in January, 1913. It had declined to 7 cents by December, 
jni J914. It then began to rise and reached 15.75 cents in January. 1917. 
irom which point it rose rapidly to 28.25 cents by the beginning of 
,rj|918. It continued at this figure until April, when the War Trade 
lffii;jJoard fixed a minimum price at Manila of 17 cents per pound and 
livci maximum price at New York of 26 cents per pound, with $15 per 
',r jale ocean freight rate, to continue for four months from date. In 

line, 1918. Gov. Harrison, of the Philippines, issued an edict de- 

laring the fixed price null and void after .July 25. 1918. 
,j fiji On July 22 the War Industries Board fixed a price on ^fanila 
]5f,j.jemp of 14 cents at Manila and 26 cents at New York. In August, 
.jfillie price-fixing committee, at the urgent request of the governor of 

i*» Philippines, discontinued price fixing. The purpose of the price 
:ng had been to steady the market. It was the intent to prevent 

n' too great fluctuations in price which tended to accompany the 

rif-ertainty of shipping. 

Kapoc comes from Java and is used for life preservers, mattresses, 

illows, etc. Import and export embargoes were placed upon it, and 

K' Navy commandeered all stocks in the United States. 
As a measure for conserving linseed oil, cork, and burlaji, the man- 
^:, facture of linoleum was curtailed to 40 per cent of the 1917 produc- 
- on. The ^avy substituted koko mats made from coir yarn as floor 

'verings and the section took control of the distribution of the 

tter for Government use. 



246 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

While the consumption of cork was curtailed by cutting do-w 
linoleum manufacture, its use for refrigerators at sea and in tl 
various Army storage plants gave rise to more than normal demand 
The section gave aid in securing supplies from Spain, Portugal, ar 
Algiers. 

The shortage in bristles did not become apparent until Octobe 
1918, and the plan which the section worked out for revising Arn 
and Navy specifications for brushes and conserving the use of bristl 
in other ways was never put into effect. 



!al,aij Chaiter 12. 

)^j^^ LEATHER AND RUBBER. 

lirisfli . 



HIDES, LEATHER, AND LEATHER GOODS. 



The United States manufactures more leather than all the coun- 
.ries of Europe combined. This countrj^ is also the lar<2;est consumer 
3f leather in the world, the largest item of export being from 
il5,000,000 to 25,000,000 pairs of shoes per annum. We import raw- 
liides in great quantities. Thirty-four per cent of the cowhides and 
|kips, 72 per cent of the calfskins, 88 per cent of the horsehides. 99 
ber cent of the goat and cabaretta sldns, and 67 per cent of the sheep- 
-kins tanned in the United States are imported. 

In 1914 we made 292,000,000 pairs of shoes, valued at the source 
it over $600,000,000, and our product leads the world both in quality 
md quantity. The war brought new and tremendously increased 
iiemands for leather goods. Our shoe manufacturing industry had to 
produce 20,000,000 pairs of a new type of shoes for the Army in 
11917 and 29,000,000 paii^ in 1918. Saddles and harness were required 
n such quantities that a decadent trade had to be brought back to 
leavy production. More than 3,500,000 leather jerkins and more 
ban 7.000,000 pairs of heavy leather work gloves were actually 
lelivered to the Army. Belting leather and specialties of various 
cinds were required in extraordinary quantities. These require- 
iients were faced under conditions in which the shipment of raw- 
lides and tanning materials to the United States was becoming 
ncreasingly difficult, while the industry was hindered by the common 
hortage of labor, transportation, and fuel. 

The price of hides and leather, however, never reached the iiigh 
iverage of all commodities during the war. It advanced rapidly 
n 1916 until December, when the British inaugurated a system of 
)rice fixing, which had a remarkable effect in stabilizing the i)rices 
'U this side of the water. In December, 1916, our prices averaged 

M.ut 165 per cent of prewar normal, and they never went beyond 
:.') per cent throughout the period. Some particular commodities, 
lowever, varied from the general average, sheepskin for leather 
erkins reaching 350 per cent at one time. 

Leather problems were first handled under the council by the 
oather equipment committee and the shoe committee. The War 
Trade Board early took control over the importation of hides. In 
t'^bruarv', 1918, abide and leather control board was formed with. 



i 



248 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

C. F, C. Stout as chairman. This board functioned in very clos( 
cooperation with the Quartermaster Corps, which maintained a large 
force of field men who did inspecting and collecting of information! 
In the spring of 1918 the control board Avas reorganized into th( 
Hide, Leather, and Leather Goods Division of the War Industries 
Board. The division as constituted during the summer and fall oi 

1918 had C. F. C. Stout as director and was composed of nine sections 
as follows: Hides and Skins, O. C. Howe, chief; Sole and Belting 
Leather, H. W. Boyd, chief, succeeded by T. Cover ; Upper Leather 
F. A. Vogel, chief; Harness, Bag, and Strap Leather, F. A. Vogel 
chief ; Sheepskin and Glove Leather, T. C. Shotwell, chief ; Boot and 
Shoe, C. D. P. Hamilton; Harness and Personal Equipment, C. A 
Eogers, chief; Belting, C. B. Rowbotham, chief; and Gloves anc 
Leather Clothing, H. J. Lewis, chief. i 

With the increasing demands of an increasing Army, prospects foil 

1919 pointed to Government requirements equal to or exceeding in 
some branches of the industry our entire productive capacity. These 
conditions were faced at a time when imports of raw hides had tC' 
be cut down in order to economize shipping space, and in light ol 
the fact that hides are a by-product of an industry aimed at pro^i 
ducing food, so that domestic output could not be greatly increased 
Systems of economies and curtailments in civilian uses seemed t( 
offer the only hope of relief, and it was felt that these should h 
accompanied hj price fixing. 

The period of manufacture through the various stages from ra-w 
hides to finished articles is so long (six months or a year or more) 
that plans had to be laid down on an elaborate scale and had tc 
extend over a long period. The problem required a vast amounv 
of organization and a vast amount of study before effective step: 
could be taken. The numerous branches of this industry involvec 
an invested capital of nearly $2,000,000,000. The purpose of th( 
division was to build up a coordinate scheme of control from th( 
take-off of the raw hide to the last stitch of the finished leathei 
product. Steps were taken to eliminate wasteful practices in taking 
off the hides and in preserving them during the marketing processes 
Elaborate plans were worked out for simplifjdng the manufactur* 
and distribution of certain articles for civilian uses, in order to sav( 
leather for the military program without causing a leather-goodly 
famine in the country. 

Uides and skins. — The first commodity over which the divisiof 
inaugurated a control was sheepskins for leather jerkins. The Armi 
demands had caused the price of these to advance to 250 per cent 
normal, and the Army needed virtually the entire domestic outpi 
estimated at 1.000,000 pelts per year. On March 20, 1918. the vario\ 
packers and wool pullers producing these pelts were called together i 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 249 

W ashington. The meeting resulted in an agreement wliereby the 
>vc)t)l pullers promised to give to the tanners of jerkin leather an 
ipiion on all picked sheepskins at a maximum price of J4 cents per 
qiiare foot, while the tanners in turn agreed to dress these skins 
or the Government at a fee of 4 cents per square foot. The arrange- 
mut amounted practically to a contract by the Army to take over 
ill pelts of this description at a fixed price for the period ending 
June 7, 1918. 

This made no provision for prices to civilian purchasers, and 
cnvard the expiration of the period it was thought best not to 
■enew the contract but to place the whole matter before the price- 
ixing committee. Data were presented by the industry and by the 
livision, and on June 7 the price-fixing committee adopted a sched- 
ile of maximum prices for various grades of sheepskins, ranging 
"rora 8 to 18 cents per pound, to be effective for the period ending 
Vugust 1, 1918. These prices were later extended through October, 
.918, when with a slight downward revision they were reissued, 
lltctive until the end of January, 1919. 

< )n April 26, 1918, the producers, importers, and distributors of 
attle hides met the price-fixing committee for the purpose of dis- 
u-sing a price agreement. The price of cattle hides at this time 
vas declining slightly, but the division had under consideration with 
he Shipping Board and the Food Administration a plan for cur- 
ailing importations in order to economize in shipping space, and it 
vas felt necessary to do something to steady the market before put- 
inir this program into effect.^ 

The committee representing the industry presented to the price- 
ixiiig committee a schedule calculated on the basis of the average 
e\fl of prices for the period April 1 to 24, 1918. This was about 
• ' per cent above current market quotations. The price-fixing com- 
nittee objected on the groimd that it was contrary to their policy 
M raise existing prices, and the live-stock producers objected on the 
ridiind that in their opinion no emergency existed sufficient to jus- 
if\ the Government in fixing prices. The committee, nevertheless, 
s~ued two schedules of maximum prices on April 30, 1918. Both 
jvere calculated on the basis of hides from heavy native steers No. 1, 
:nd differentials were applied for other types. A price of 29 cents 
)er pound was set for all stocks on hand April 30, and a price of 
3 cents per pound for the domestic take-off during the months of 
lay, June, and July and for imported hides shipped before July 31. 

On July 19 another meeting was held with representatives of the 

dustry for the purpose of continuing or revising these schedules. 



» These restrictions became operative June 15, 1918, and limited importationg of raw 
to certain heavy cattle hides from Sonth Amorlca, to hides comlnff hv rnil, nnd to 
Ides coming as back haul from Europe. 



250 AMEPJCAIC lATDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Complaints were made of the impracticability of these fixed prices. 
It was claimed that the committee had placed an artificial price on 
hides ; that the better grades were being purchased by the Govern- 
ment at the maximum price, thereby keeping the figure up, while 
the cheaper grades, for which there was little demand, were selling 
below the fixed maxima. The committee suggested as a solution a 
reduction in the schedule, but this was objected to on the ground 
that a change in prices at that time would inject an element of doubt 
into the market and diminish production. The price-fixing com- 
mittee, however, after appointing a board made up of members of 
the trade and of the division to study and draw a new price schedule, 
established a series of prices based on 80 cents per pound for No. 1 
native steer hides, to be effective until November 1, 1918. This 
schedule was in turn revised downward in October, 29 cents being 
made the basis for November-December prices and 28 cents for 
January, 1919, at the end of which period price-fixing ceased. The 
various price schedules were administered by the Hides and Skins 
Section. The task was difficult and enormous. 

There are several thousand junk dealers, hide dealers, and tanners 
who collect hides throughout the country. Prompt action was taken 
by the section whenever violations of the schedules were reported, 
but it was only the good will of the trade as a whole which made 
a successful administration of the program possible. A set of regu- 
lations designed to standardize the taking off of hides and their 
handling and curing after being taken off was published by the divi- 
sion. Before the end of the war reports were beginning to indicate 
that these regulations were having an important effect in preventing 
waste in the branch of the industry producing what are Imown as 
" country hides." These regulations were simply an effort to bring 
up the standard of the small butchers to that of the great packing 
houses in the handling of hides. 

The end came before it was found necessary for the section to 
allocate domestic stocks. But the rules of the War Trade Board 
required that all applications for import licenses after June 15 
should be accompanied by allocation certificates issued by the sec- 
tion. In this way all imported hides were applied to war purposes. 

Sole and helting leather. — Army shoes require a particularly heavy 
and strong quality of sole leather, and by the spring of 1918 shortages 
were being felt. On May 18 the section issued instructions to all tan- 
ners, sole cutters, strip and block cutters, and shoe manufacturers re- 
stricting them in the sale and use for civilian trade to such sole leather 
as was not suitable for Government shoes. In administering this plan 
the section required weekly reports from all tanners that it might 
direct the distribution of accumulated stocks to shoemakers having 



AMERICAN TNDTTSTHY IN TIIK WAR. 251 

Government contracts. Weekly reports wore also required from slioe 
iiKinufacturers and sole cutters. 

This section had at its disposal a field force which visited tanners 
for the purpose of guiding the industry in the manufacture of 
leiither meeting the Army specifications. A protracted study was 
made of the cost of tanning this leather before price fixing was inau- 
•rurated. 

Upper leather. — The term "■ upper leather " is applied to all types 
of leather used for the sides or upper parts of shoes. It is made vari- 
ously of calf skin, kip," sheepskins, goatskins, cabarotta, kangaroo, 
and horse hide. These depend largely on imports, and as was natural 
their price advanced to a higher point than that of any other leather 
during the war. 

In addition to the system of weekly reports from tanneries and 
shoemakers, by which the section was able to assist in a fair dis- 
tribution of materials and to bring about further standardization in 
the industry, the section carried through two very large and impor- 
tant tasks, (1) in connection with the production of upper leather 
for the new " trench shoe," and (2) the preparation of data for the 
price fixing of upper leather. 

Early in March, 1918, the American Expeditionary Forces decided 
that our Army shoes were not heavy enough to be suitable for trench 
service. The British were using a slioe made of bark-tanned India 
kip, finished flesh out in the natural color. It was a shoe of this 
character which Pershing's staff decided that we wanted. We had 
been using a lighter chrome-tanned calfskin. The shoe committee 
of the Quartermaster Corps designed specifications for the Ameri- 
can trench shoe and the section undertook to get the American tan- 
neries to turn out a sufficient quantity of upper leather meeting the 
new specifications. The standard required was a bark-tanned or 
•chrome-retannod "bend,"" of kip or calfskin of proper weight. 

A great deal of work was done in connection with the plan to llx 
maximum prices for all purchases of upper leather. This work was 
■closely connected with thf work which was going on at the same time 
in preparation of the price fixing and conservation program to be 
applied to shoes. The tanners of both the eastern and the western 
group were called together and formulated recommendations. The 
Federal Trade Commission carried out a long and painstaking in- 
Testigation of costs. The differences in the various findings were 
discussed by the section with various representatives of the trade 
and were finally, in October, 1918, reconciled. The section, together 
with representatives of the trade, appeared before the price-fixing 



*Kip3 are hides from young cattle weighing from 2.'5 to r)0 pounds per hide. 
•A bend of leather is a tanned hide with the flanks and other undesirable portions 
trimmed off. 



252 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

oommittee and recommended a schedule of maximum prices, which 
was adopted November 1, 1918. The armistice came, however, before 
it was announced. 

Harness^ hag^ and strap leather. — A schedule of maximum prices 
for black harness leather to all consumers was established by the price- 
fixing committee June 25, 1918. It was calculated on the basis of 70 
cents per pound, grade A, and reached by the usual procedure 
No fixed prices were established for russet harness, bag, or strap 
leather, though studies had been made and the schedules were pre- 
pared when the end came. 

The important work of the section was in bringing about a better 
distribution of leather from tanneries to the harness makers. This 
was done through a system of periodical reports from both groups. 
The data thus collected put the section in a position to direct both \ 
purchasers and sellers in such a way as to keep up a steady supply 
of the limited stocks of leather to Government contractors and others. 

SheepsMn and glove leather. — This section was active in administer- 
ing the leather jerkin price-fixing arrangement referred to under hides 
and skins above. It also had charge of sheepskin shearlings required 
for saddles and for aviators' boots. 

Perhaps the most important work of this section related to the 
supply of horsehide leather for Army gloves. It appeared in the- 
summer of 1918 that the Quartermaster Corps had authorized pur- 
chases of gloves exceeding the country's entire supply of horsehide- 
leather. Through the instrumentality of the section a substitute in 
the form of cowhide splits was used for the heavy mittens.. Ail 
horsehide and cowhide split leather was allocated to Government. 
contractors. 

Boots and shoes. — This section undertook one of the most ambitious- 
programs attempted by the Board. Its work was the first step in a- 
general plan to reduce the cost of wearing apparel which was under- 
taken by the chairman of the Board with the approval of the Presi- 
dent. A committee representing the retail merchants of the country 
was called to Washington and notified that immediate steps must be 
taken to reduce the price of w^earing apparel. The director of the 
division took an active part in the program designed to regulate the 
price of shoes, as did the Conservation Division and the Priorities 
Division. The plan vvas to put the entire industry, including the 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of shoes for civilian use on 
a controlled basis. The first step in this direction was taken on June 
29, 1918, when the Conservation Division issued a set of regulations 
broadly outlining a scheme for cutting down the number of styles,- 
colors, and lasts of shoes and eliminating certain styles which. required 
an extravagant use of leather. The section administered these regu- 
lations. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 253 

In order to make these reo;ulrttions more efTective the i)rionties 
-commissioner on August 7, 1918, issued circular No. 10,* requirinir 
of each manufacturer of boots and shoes a pledge to practice the 
economies outlined in return for a place which the priorities com- 
missioner gave such manufacturers on the preference list for fuel 
and transportation. Each manufacturer was required to exact a 
like pledge from those who purchased from him for resale. The 
trade was instructed that any firm which failed to carry out the 
terms of the regulations in good faith woidd receive no aid in pro- 
curing coal and transportation. 

From this time forward elaborate studies were being carried on. 
and many conferences were held with every branch of the shoe 
industry for the purpose of developing a plan for much more rigid 
conservation and for control over prices including retail prices. A 
number of plans were suggested. The idea of producing a single 
type to be called the " liberty shoe " was given careful consideration. 
It was proposed that nothing but black leather be allowed. Women's 
styles at this time required a different colored glazed kid shoe for 
each gown. The price of glazed Idd was 350 per cent of normal, and 
it was hard to get. It was proposed that the wholesale price be 
stamped on the sole of every shoe, but the industry objected strenu- 
ously to this. 

After a long series of conferences with representatives of more 
than 50 per cent of the producing companies involved, an agreement 
was reached and a schedule of regulations issued on September :^0. 
1018. to be applicable until June 1, 1919. Colors of shoes were lim- 
ited to black, wiiite. and one shade of tan. Heights Avere limited. 
The introduction of. new lasts was stopped. The production of 
certain styles requiring an extravagant use of leather was forbidden. 
Manufacturers were required to reduce the variety of their product 
by about two-thirds. 

All shoes were reduced to four classes which the trade agreed to sell 
at retail as follows: Class A, $9 to $12 for high shoes, $9 to $11 for 
low shoes; class B, $6 to $8.95; class C. $3 to $5.95; class D. any 
price below $3. Each shoe was to be stamped with a number and a 
k-ey to the numbers was to be provided so that the purchaser would 
be able to determine by whom the shoe was made and in which class 
it belonged. This last regulation represented a compromise on the 
question of printing the wholesale price on the sole. 

A system of pledges was reciuired of manufacturers, jobbers, and 
retailers. Retailers were required to exhibit a card explaining the 

* See Appendix XXXVIII for cop.y of Priorities Circular No. 10. 



254 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

scheme in a conspicuous place in their stores. It was contemplatedl 
that this plan in its entirety should be applied for the spring seasoill 
of 1919. After the armistice the pledge and price-fixing elements' 
were rescinded, but the trade voluntarily retained some of the con- 
servation features. This plan would have reduced enormously the 
amount of leather stock carried by the various agencies all the way 
from the tannery to the retail store. One tanner, who had been turn- 
ing out leather in 81 colors and shades, was able to simplify his 
plant to produce only three colors, and thus he was saved the neces- 
sity of carrying in stock raw hides and leather to the value of many' 
thousands of dollars. Retail stores were enabled to reduce their lines; 
and thus reduce the total quantity of stock carried and the risks of; 
loss on left-over ends of particular styles. It is estimated that under] 
this program the industry would have been freed from the burden! 
of carrying materials to the value of more than $100,000,000 per year. 
All parties in interest were convinced that all branches of the in- 
dustry would have reaped reasonable profits and the price to con- 
sumers would have been far below what has been recently paid. 

Harness and persoval equipment. — This section, formed June 12 
1918, devoted its attention principally to the inauguration of a con- 
servation program. In cooperation with the war service committees 
and the Conservation Division a plan for eliminating about 75 per cent 
of the styles and types of harness and saddles was developed. Near 
the close of the war the manufacture of light harness was entirely sus- 
pended. There had been 60 styles of horse collars. The program 
limited them to 15. Heavy team and farm harness was limited to 12 
types. Styles of riding saddles were reduced from 200 to 36. The 
Armj^ demand for saddles, particularly McClellan saddles, caused a 
shortage of saddle trees. At first an attempt was made to allocate 
the production, but this was abandoned and the section set about to 
encourage the production of saddle trees by the numerous small wood- 
working plants throughout the country. All prices of harness and 
saddles as well as all contracts for their purchase were made by the 
appropriate Army bureaus before the formation of the section. 

Belting. — In the fall of 1918 the shortage in the supply of russet 
harness leather for the Army made it necessary to form a section to 
control the distribution of belting leather. Sales were restricted to 
Government contractors from October to the end. The section used a 
questionnaire and established a system of monthly reports. 

Gloves and leather clothing. — This section was formed late in the 
summer of 1918 and devoted most of its attention to the preparation 
of a conservation program for the glove industry. The work was 
not yet completed when the end of the war made its adoption un- 
necessary. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 255 

RUBBER AND lU'UnKK GOODS. 

The United States leads the -world in the manufacture of rul)l)er 
^ goods, producing about seven times the output of (Jreat Britain, the 
llj^next largest manufacturer. Our production has increased very 
^jjij rapidly in recent years. In 1906 we consumed 24,113 tons of crude 
, J 1 rubber. In 1917 this had increased to 157,371 tons, the finishcvl 
y I product that year being valued at $896,000,000. In 1914 we made 
„;' 8,021,000 pneumatic tires, while in 1917 our output amounted to 
■J5.S35,000 tires. 

Over 70 per cent of the rubber consumed in the United States goes 
into automobile tires and tubes, about 14 per cent into mechanical 
rubber goods of various kinds, 8 per cent into boots and shoes, 2 per 
cent into druggists' and stationers' sundries, of which we produce the 
bulk of the world's supply, and the rest goes into miscellaneous 
articles.-"^ 

Priestley discovered the first use to which rubber Avas put in 1770 
when he found it w'ould " rub out " lead pencil marks. 

The Amazon Basin was the original source of rubber and is still 
the principal source of wild rubber, though 80 per cent of the crude 
material which reaches the United States comes from the rubber 
[.lantations of xVsia. Ceylon, and the East Indies. There are 60 
lypes of rubber plants, but the industry depends mainly upon two 
trees — the Heva Braziliensis and the Castilloa. Besides the crude 
rubber, which enters every year into our product in a quantity ex- 
( eeding 150,000 tons, we use about 90,000 tons of reclaimed rubber 
annually. We also use about 11,000 tons of rubber substitutes. 

The Rubber and Rubber Goods Section was not formed until Au- 
gust 5, 1918, though the War Trade Board took control of rubber 
imports in December, 1917, and other important measures for regu- 
lating the industry were put into effect before that time. H. T. 
Dunn was chief of the section. 

Crude rubber is, perhaps, the only important staple which did not 
experience an increase in price during the period of the World War. 
The price during 1915, 1916, and even 1917 and 1918 was, with the 
exception of two short periods, considerably below that of 1912, 
1913, and 1914. The price of rubber products followed quite closely 
tliat of crude rubber without showing the sudden fluctuations. The 
a\erage price of all rubber products during 1917 and 1918 ranged 
from 70 to 80 per cent below the average relative ])rice of commodi- 
ties in general. 

The important reason for the low-price levels of rubber during 
the war was that while the world consumption increased continu- 



• See Appendix XXXIX for table of crude and reclaimed rubber consumed In the Unltod 
States In the production of rubber goods, 1917. 



256 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

ously over the period, the production increased still more rapidly. 
The plantations of the Far East were reaching the " bearing " 
age. In 1904 these plantations produced 43 tons of rubber; 
in 1913, 47,618 tons; in 1917, 204,348 tons; and in 1918, about 240,000 
tons. At the same time Germany, which uses from 15,000 to 20,000 
tons per year, practically dropped out of the buying market; and 
in 1917 and 1918 Russia, with a consuming capacity of more than 
20,000 tons per year, also ceased buying. This left heavy surpluses 
in the plantation countries. 

The only problem for us was one of shipping. The first regula- 
tion of the War Trade Board was issued December 7, 1917, and was 
aimed to prevent rubber from reaching the Central Powers, who 
were greatly in need of it. No restrictions were placed on amounts, 
but the regulations provided for the licensing of imports, for the 
consignment of shipments to the Rubber Association of America, 
and for the submission of guaranties by importers and manufac- 
turers that they would not sell any rubber directly or indirectly to 
any country at war with the United States nor to any person unless 
satisfied that he had no intention of exporting without an export 
license. 

By the spring of 1918, as part of the program to force shipping 
from the Pacific which was needed on the Atlantic, it was felt that 
the situation necessitated a curtailment of the amount of rubber to 
be imported. The War Trade Board held conferences with rep- 
resentatives of the rubber industry and the Shipping Board, and 
on May 8 issued regulations restricting the quantity of rubber to 
be licensed for import during the three-month period May, June, 
and July, 1918, to 25,000 long tons, which represented a rate of im- 
portation about two-thirds that of 1917. The restrictions did not 
apply to shipments which had left the foreign ports before May 8, 
and. as they had been anticipated by the trade, there was heaA'y buy- 
ing in April, so that 55,000 tons actually reached the United States 
during this three-month period. 

The war requirements of rubber were for motor vehicles, airplanes, 
gas masks, medical supplies, etc. It was estimated that about 30,000 
tons would go into direct war work in 1918. This meant that heavy 
curtailments would have to take place in other industries, particu- 
larly automobile tires. The various manufacturing concerns were 
classified, and imports were allocated to them on the basis of a defi- 
nite percentage of their 1917 and early 1918 consumption. The 
manufacture of motor cars for civilian use was curtailed under a 
separate program, and the use of motor cars for pleasure was dis- 
couraged. This naturally led to a decrease in the demand for tires. 
Toward the end of the period a program was worked out for greatly 
reducing the number of types of automobile tires, and this in turn 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TUB WAR. 257 

vas designed to reduce the consumption of rubber by making it 
innecessarv for manufacturers and dealers to carry large stocks. 

The section carried on the usual routine of collecting information 
Hid discussing problems involved in adjusting the industry to war 
sonditions. A series of 27 questionnaires Avas issued to the trade 
hrough its War Service Committee. Data were collected and confer- 
snces held in preparation of the regulations issued September 21, 1918, 
)y the Priorities Commissioner in the form of Circular Xo. 24, which 
)laced the rubber trade in the list of controlled industries. This cir- 
ular. following the usual form, instructed the industry that in order 
conserve the supi^ly of rubber in the United States, as well as to 
ave labor, fuel, and transportation, it would be necessary for the 
arious firms to cut down their production of rubber goods to the 
greatest possible extent. It suggested that unnecessary and unde- 
irable types, sizes, and styles of articles be eliminated, that produc- 
ion be kept as near to current demand as possible, and that nothing 
hould be produced or delivered except for such essential uses as were 
[esignated by the Board. The circular i^rovided that the production 
f pneumatic automobile tires and tubes should be cut doAvn during 
he last three months of 1918 to three-twelfths of 50 per cent (meas- 
red both by units and amount of rubber consumed) of the annual 
roduction of each firm, estimated on the basis of the 18 months 
nding June 30, 1918. The ruling on tires did not apply, however, 
) direct orders from any agencies of the United States, and no re- 
lictions were placed on solid tires. 

The manufacturers were required to file a pledge in which they 
romised (1) not to use any product of their manufacture except for 
Bsential purposes, (2) to make no sale to any customer for resale 
ntil such customer should have filed a similar pledge to do his best 
5 insure the distribution of his products for essential uses only (this 
'as not to apply to tires), and (3) to observe the production pro- 
ram set forth in the circular and make such reports concerning 
roduction and activities as might be required. The industry, in 
irn, was placed on the Preference List for fuel and transportation, 
nd was given an automatic class C rating. 

On October 1, 1918, there was issued through the War Service Com- 
ittee of the industry a set of regulations defining more fully the 
rogram of control outlined in Circular No. 24. Manufacturers 
ere to be guided in their work by the following four general classes 
f articles, rated according to their importance to the war: 



Class I. Aiticles to bo supplied on direct orders received from Kovenimental 
partmonts, railwnys, express companies, telephone and te!ej.Taph companies, 
e lied Cross, and Allied Governmenls. Production was limited only l»y orders 
band, and tbe crude ruliber consumed in filling tbese orders was to be replaced 
ider tbe War Trade Board plan of issuing allocation certificates. 
105826—21 17 



258 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Class II. Articles to be supplied for use in industries approved by the War 
Industries Board. Production of articles in this class was authorized in quan- 
tities sufiicient to supply essential requirements of those engaged in industries 
on the preference list and individual manufacturers who had been given prefer- 
ential treatment. 

Class III. Articles for general use. They were to be produced only to the 
extent necessary to meet current demands, unless othenvise specified. 

Class IV. Non-essential articles — so considered by the War Industries Board. 
Their production was absolutely prohibited. 

A list of the preferential industries, as well as of the various arti- 
cles coming within each class, was furnished to the trade, and the 
regulations became effective upon receipt of the list. 

During October the Board issued a revised circular of instructions 
containing only three classes and naming, so far as possible, the 
articles in Class II. Class I continued to include direct Government 
orders. The new Class II became (1) a list of articles which were 
included wdthout comment and could be produced in sufficient quan- 
tities to meet current needs, (2) another list of articles the produc- 
tion of which was limited to a certain percentage of 1917 production, 
and (3) a list of articles which could be produced only for designated 
purposes. The new Class III was a list of articles whose production 
was prohibited. All regulations were rescinded shortly after the 
armistice, except rules of the War Trade Board prohibiting exports 
to the Central Powers. 



am 



ClIArTER 13. 

MACHINERY AND TOOLS. 



t|| The problems arising in the machinery and tools industries re- 
lated in many respects, particularly during the later period of the 
ctioi ^^^^ ^^ ^^^6 work of the Resources and Conversion Section, But it was 
■ til found necessary as early as 1917, in some of these trades, to establish 
sections of the board to handle special situations. Sections were 
formed for machine tools; forgings, ordnance, small arms, and am- 
munition; hardware and hand tools; cranes; chains; and military 
Dptical glass and instruments. 



MACHINE TOOLS. 



udid " Machine tool " is the name given to a piece of machinery used 
:r tl to produce other machines, implements, factory equipment, or tools. 
sport [t is evident that the development of new facilities for the manufac- 
iure of guns, shells, powder, and other supplies, directly needed in 
Bwly enlarged quantities by the war, occasioned the manufacture or 
inversion of machinery for the rapid equipment of many new 
jlants. In most cases it was necessary for the management of a new 
nunitions factory to know the design of the product which was to be 
urned out before it could place orders with machine tool manufac- 
urers for the equipment of the factory. The integration necessary 
<o make this process go forward with dispatch could hardly be ex- 
pected without the assistance of such an agency as the AVar Industries 
Board. 

Thus it was that the Machine Tool Section was formed October 1, 
L917, and G. E. Merryweather, who had come to Washington in 
tfarch and in association with the Munitions Board had worked on 
;he problem of securing machine tools for the War Department, was 
nade chief of the section. He had 14 assistants besides the coordinat- 
ing members representing various departments of the (Jovernincnt. 

The first work of the section was to prepare a careful inventory of 
production and facilities. Manufacturers were asked to submit a 
complete report of their shop schedules, giving the output of tiieir 
lants in detail per month and indicating the sold and unsold por- 
ions of the output. These figures were supplied monthly from Oc- 
ober, 1917, to February, 1918, and when tabulated under types and 
they indicated which machines were being produced in sufficient 

259 



260 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

quantities, which ones were overproduced, and which underproduced 
As a result of this inventory the section was able to advise the vari-: 
ous departments of the Government in the placing of contracts and, 
to advise the Wnv Trade Board in the modification of its conserva- 
tion list. By comparing estimated requirements of the Government 
with existing facilities it was possible to work out and suggest plans 
for expansion and conversion. 

Cincinnati is the greatest machine tool manufacturing center in 
the world. In 1913 the total value of the annual product of the 
United States was only about $50,000,000. During the war period 
preceding our entrance, our productive capacity was more than double, 
but the expansion took place largely in the output of small and 
medium-sized machines — machines for the production of shells, rifles, 
bayonets, fuses, etc. — for the Allies were not ordering the larger 
and heavier types of ordnance materials in this country in great 
quantities. The shipping question was a deterrent to the produc- 
tion of heavy artillery on this side of the water both before and after 
the entrance of the United States into the war. Economy required 
that as a general policy, smaller parts should be manufactured here 
and heavier parts abroad. As the pressure of increased demands 
developed, however, plans were made for producing large quantities 
of heavy parts also in this country. 

On July 1, 1917, the export of machine tools, consigned to countries 
other than England, France, Italy, and Japan, was stopped. As a 
result the section found, when it began its inventories, that there were 
about 6,000 machines valued at approximately $5,000,000 standing at 
various ports consigned to forbidden countries. Some of them had 
been sold and part payments had been made. Most of them were 
waiting in idleness for possible shipment. Some were being specu- 
lated on. The section made arrangements to have them purchased, 
or, if the title was doubtful, commandeered by the Secretary of War. 
and installed in the factories of Government contractors. 

It was clear in the latter part of 1917 that an important shortage 
of larger machine tools was likely to be felt if the war should con- 
tinue over a long period. With a view to discovering what could 
be done in case it should become necessary to commandeer machinery 
of this type in use in private plants, the section made a survey of 
all available machine tools of the larger sizes. Manufacturers were 
requested to submit lists of all the larger machines which they had 
produced for periods ranging from 10 to 20 j'^ears prior to 1917. 
This information was tabulated, the list comprising approximately 
50,000 machines. It did not become necessary to commandeer many 
of these machines, but the lists were frequently consulted when the 
question of placing contracts for heavy machinery was being con- 
sidered. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR 261 



The section did not a little in arrun^in^ for the conversion of 
factories making wood-Avorking machinery, etc., into the manufacture 
)f metal-workini:: machinery. It also assisted several concerns in 
securing patterns, drawings, and other information needed to develop 
nachine tool plants. The producing capacity of the country was 
ept carefully tabulated so that prompt instructions could be given 
ihowing by what plant and in how long a period any certain order 
)f machine tools could be produced. 

A new method of manufacturing certain heavy machine tools was 
leveloped. This method used reinforced concrete for the construc- 
ion of the principal parts, with the wearing surfaces provided with 
netal facings. There were two features of economy in this: (1) 
There was a saving in time, labor, and materials; and (2) large 
nachines were not needed for the construction. 

The question of conservation by limitation of types and styles was 
tudied. It was not felt, however, that a general policy of reducing 
lesigns and models could be applied to the manufacture of machine 
ools, owing to the varied nature of the requirements. Furthermore, 
he manufacturing equipment of most of the machine tool plants was 
)alanced for the production of machines of various sizes and types 
hat a curtailment of any individual size or type would not, as a 
ule, tend to increase, relatively, the output of others. In a few 
ases, however, this thing was done by appeals made through the 
ditorial columns of trade journals. 

The indirectness of the requirements for machine tools was a 
ource of great difficulty in calculating quantities needed. When an 
rdnance program was laid down, it was necessary to know the 
peed at which a given machine could turn out a given article in 
rder to determine the number of machines required to carry out the 
)rogram. This section secured for the Ordnance Department a 
umber of experts in the use of machine tools, who devoted their 
ittention to time-studies in the calculation of requirements. 

To cover a shortage which developed in testing-machines, the sec- 
ion sent out a questionnaire and appeal to the colleges, universities, 
nd technical schools, which uncovered the fact that sufficient testing- 
nachines could be spared from various hil)oratories to satisfy tlie 
lovernment need. 

On account of the characteristic indirectness of war requirements 
or machine tools, the administration of priorities was particu- 
arly difficult. At first the industry was not placed on the pref- 
rence list for fuel, labor, and transportation, but it was soon found 
xpedient to give the industry an automatic rating of A-6. In order 

assist the priorities committee in is.suing certificates covering 
rdei-s for the machines themselves, a card record system was in- 
tailed by the section. Manufacturers were requested to report 



262 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

every order placed for machines, deliveries of which were more thar 
30 days removed. A card showing the nature of the order was seni 
to the section and a duplicate retained by the manufacturer in his filej 
until the machine was completed, diverted by priority, or the ordei 
cancelled, when notation was made on the duplicate card and it was 
sent to the section so that the section's file could be corrected. The 
card showed the customer's order number, date of order, promisee 
date of delivery, size and type of machine, manufacturer's name 
and grade of priority. Some 20.000 orders were recorded in thij| 
way, giving a complete running inventory. j 

This industry developed during the period of the war from ai 
capacity represented by an annual output of about $50,000,000 to: 
that of an output estimated at nearly $400,000,000 in 1918. 

rORGINGS, ORDNANCE, SMALL ARMS, AND AMMUNITION. 

The field contemplated by this section fell so peculiarly within the 
province of the war-making agencies themselves that the work of 
the section was perhaps more indirect and less exhaustive than that 
of man}^ of the other commodity units. The section was not formed 
until June 1, 1918, when S. P. Bush was made chief, though much 
work in advising and assisting the War and Navy Departments in 
laying down their ordnance programs was carried on throughout the 
earlier period by a committee of the Council with S. M. Vaiiclain 
as chairman. 

The principal functions of the section were to study and allocate 
the resources needed for the production of forgings, ordnance, ord- 
nance ammunition, small arms, and small arms ammunition ; to 
bring information concerning facilities to the various Government 
dej^artments ; to coordinate the demands of the several departments 
and of the Allied Governments so that the needs of each might be 
supplied to the fullest possible extent; and to study the distribu- 
tion of new facilities in the light of industrial conditions in various 
parts of the count^3^ 

The section kept itself carefully informed on the questions of 
power, transportation, labor, and fuel in their relation to the produc- 
tion of ordnance. The section did nothing with reference to designs 
and specifications. It acted only in a broadly advisory character in 
the matter of creating new facilities, pointing out in respect to 
projects the availability of power, transportation, labor, and fuel. 

The function of " clearing " purchase orders submitted by the) 
various agencies of our Government and the Allied Purchasing Com- 
mission constituted an important part of the duty of the section. 
When a request for clearance was made, the section would study it 
in the light of conditions in the locality where the order was contem- 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 263 

plated and in the light of the success of the pLint desigjnated. It 
mid then either clear the proposal as made or return it with a 
ommendation suggestinjj: another place and manner believed to be 
more suitable for accomplishinii; the order. 

Prior to the war the production of the implements and munitions 
<,>t' war was restricted to a very small number of plants situated in 
the eastern part of the country on or near the seaboard. Small arms 
1 ammunition were produced by a few companies in Connecticut, 
iiode Island, Massachusetts, and New York, and ordnance was 
l>r()duced principally by the Bethlehem and Midvale Steel Cos., with a 
-'!i:ill quantity being turned out by Government arsenals. The in- 
iiments of trench warfare had never been produced in this country 
;iini no one was familiar with the processes of their manufacture. 
The production of all munitions which were manufactured in this 
untry was surrounded by more or less secrecy and few people out- 
!e of the regular establishments knew anything about the work. 
< Mjviously when necessity arose for unprecedented quantities of all 
of these articles, the Allies and later the United States turned natur- 
ally for their requirements to those comparatively few establish- 
ments which were familiar with the work. Time was of the essence, 
and expansion of these establishments seemed to promise the quick- 
est method of supplying the need. In many respects the eastern sec- 
tion of the country was more suited for work of this character as 
well as for other manufacturing essential to the war. 

The general result was that by the spring of 1918 the congestion 
the eastern manufacturing district had become very serious. If 
■re had been a central control over distribution of orders, this need 
I r\ er have occurred. There was a shortage of power, fuel, and trans- 
portation. Nearly all work was far behind the ambitious program 
which had been laid down. The heart of the manufacturing center 
of the country was declared by the Board a restricted area, and all 
Olds, particularly the Ordnance Section, gave careful study to the 
lestion of directing expansion of war work in other centers where- 
(■r the peculiar nature of the product to be turned out made the 
• of facilities in other parts of the country possible. 
The conservation agreements which were reached by the Board 
during the summer of 1918, as well as the general application of the 
priorities system which was diA-erting materials and the use of trans- 
portation from many of the less essential industries, were gradually 
producing a condition in which many well-organized factory man- 
agements and plants were functioning at a very low ebb. As needs 
arose it was the purpose of the section, in close conference with the 
Resources and Conversion Section, so to direct the i)lacing of orders 
involving developments as to utilize managements and plants already 
in existence and which could be turned to the new work with a little 
encouragement and instruction. 



264 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TB.K WAR. 

The Ordnance Section did not always attempt to allocate in detail 
the various facilities required, but by refusing clearance to some pron 
posals, where resources were known to be inadequate, and by indicat- 
ing localities in which resources were available, and by constantly pre^ 
senting the importance of avoiding congestion, it did much to equalize 
the burdens and benefits of direct war contracts. This was particu- 
larly true when the plan for the enlarged Army was adopted, and a 
great expansion of our production was undertaken. 

HARDWARE AND HaND TOOLS. 

This section dealt with a large number of industries manufacturing 
small finished products made of metal — sewing machines and needles, 
horseshoes, fire extinguishers, bedsteads, plumbers' supplies, gauges, 
twist drills, pneumatic tools, woodworking tools, precision machin-' 
ery, and the like. In most of these industries the war requirements 
represented a very small percentage of normal output, and they were 
industries in which curtailment for the purpose of releasing metal, 
labor, capital, and factory organization for war work was possible. 

Fourteen industries supervised by this section were placed on a 
ration basis. Most of the plants were located in the congested area, 
and the industry as a whole has always been on a highly competitive 
basis. A great deal of prosperity was being enjoyed at the time this 
country entered the war, due partly to the elimination of German 
made products from the markets iii this country and South America. 

The section was first organized in April, 1918, and was reorganized 
and enlarged so as to contain a number of subdivisions in charge of 
particular commodities on June 1, with Murray Sargent as chief. 
One of the few commodities under the section, in which there was a 
serious shortage for war purposes, was textile needles of all kinds. 
These had been manufactured largeh' in England and Germany : and 
this country, before the war, was in the habit of importing practically 
its entire supply, in face of the fact that this is the leading country 
of the world in the production of textile machinery and sewing 
machines. Facilities were rapidly developed by construction or con- 
version for the manufacture of these articles, and before the war was 
over all needs were being satisfactorily met. 

A shortage occurred also in saddlery hardware. This industry 
had been rapidly declining before the war, and the new demands 
were accompanied by verj?^ high prices. Meetings were held with 
the manufacturers, and studies were made in the cost of production 
with a view to fixing prices ; but while this activity was going on, a 
better system of distribution of orders had so cleared the situation 
that price fixing was not resorted to. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAK. 265 

The manufacture of fire extinguishers came into conflict with the 

I induction of toxic gas for the Chemical Warfare Service, carbon 
. I rachloride being needed in quantities greater than were available 

hoth purposes. The price of fire extinguishers began to advance 

i idly. At the suggestion of the section, the Navy sent an account- 

nt to the plant of the Pyrene Co. to study costs, and later a price 

;^rcement was reached for Government purchases at $4.25 each for 

(luart Pyrene fire extinguishers and 90 cents for refilling one. 

A difficulty arose in connection with the purchase of horseshoes by 

hv several Government departments. The industry organized and 

isted on dealing as a unit. There was no shortage, and the depart- 

ts preferred to buy on a competitive basis. The section called 

representatives of the industry to Washington and explained the 

ition, calling attention to the fact that onl}^ a small percentage 

L the output would be needed for Government purposes, that the 

apartments preferred to purchase on a competitive basis, and that 

() }jrices would be fixed. 

A shortage occurred in ships' hardware. The most important ac- 

ion in relief of this was an agreement brought about by the section 

( tween the War Service Committee of the industry and the Emer- 

y Fleet for a set of standard specifications. Steps were taken 

ievelop a similar arrangement between the Navy and the industry, 

ut the work had not been completed when the end came. • 

The Engineer Corps of the Army brought to the attention of the 

. ion the fact that it was unable to place business with individual 

.iiuifacturers of hydrants and valves for the reason that all in- 

II i lies were referred to a single representative of the manufacturers 
1 Washington. Attention was also called to the fact that the prices 
imtcd by this representative were higher than prices quoted by the 

' "JUS manufacturers for analogous materials not being sold to the 

crnment. Investigation showed that this process of representing 

industry through a single channel had been established early in 

war at the request of the Council, but it was clear that such a 

I liod of purchasing could not be satisfactory without its corollary, 

e fixing. There did not seem a sufficient shortage to warrant 

' fixing, and therefore it was recjuested that the centralized sell- 

_ method be broken up and selling be put on a competitive l)asis, 

Inch was done. 

Metal beds were another problem. Their manufacturers had been 
ut on a 50 per cent ration basis by the Priorities Commissioner. The 
ifiuenza epidemic brought on a severe shortage. Plans were imme- 
iately projected to have wooden beds manufactured as substitutes. 
ho Army and Navy, however, objected to them on sanitary grounds. 
Ikiilders' hardware was put on a ration basis, and soon a shortage 
egan to appear in the supply for the housing program. A list of 



266 AMERICAX INDUSTEY IIT THE WAE. 

standard articles was drawn up and plans were made for allocatir 
the business so as to draw on existing stocks as far as possible ar 
not to require new manufacture. It was arranged that each pr 
gram involving $5,000 or more should be cleared through the sectio 
Toward the end of the period a great many concerns, who we 
operating on a ration basis, were beginning to find that their prioril 
rating was so low that they would have to close shop unless t\u 
could get Government orders, bringing with them higher rating 
They were flocking to Washington and seeking contracts at wha 
ever prices they could get in order to secure higher priority ratine 
for the supply of raw materials. This is an interesting commei 
on the effect of the priorit}' system on prices. There are two sid' 
to the matter, however. It is likely that, if the war had coi 
tinned for two or three more years, the priority system would ha-s 
developed further refinements designed to give more complete pr( 
tection to the industries which it was putting on a skeleton basi 
The end came while the development was in process. 

CRANES. 

The crane industry depends upon the activities of railroads, cor 
tractors, blast furnaces, steel mills, ore docks, coal companies, shij 
yards, etc. This country manufactures all the cranes needed for i< 
own use, and exports to England, France, Germany, Chile, Brazi 
Japan, China, India, and other countries. The business w? 
below normal until the beginning of 1915 when the war deman 
appeared and increased steadily through to the end. 

The most important shortage occurred in locomotive cranes. The se( 
tion was formed November 12, 1917, with Alexander C. Brown as chie 
By that time the direct Government requirements for locomoti\ 
cranes had reached a point which indicated the possibility of a 
acute shortage in the near future, making a general survey of th 
situation necessary. Data were collected covering the availa])le ou 
put of the builders whose plants could be easily converted to th 
production of locomotive cranes. Builders of steam shovels were th 
most important on the latter list. 

In normal times the delivery period for locomotive cranes is onl 
two or three weeks, because, while orders are by specifications, nearl 
all of the constituent elements are standard and are held in reserv 
stock by the builders. But by the summer of 1917, the demand fc 
these cranes had been so great that reserve stocks were practically e: 
hausted and delivery periods began to grow longer and longer. 

The section took over the administration of priorities both in th 
delivery of cranes and of raw materials for their manufacture. 
July 1, 1918, materials for the construction of locomotive cranes wer 
placed on the list entitled to automatic priority. It was necessar 
to make very careful studies of the relative importance of the need 
of those who came to buy the limited supplies. But price fixing neve 
became necessary. 



■■■ 



america:n industry in the war. 267 

The section made a careful study of cxistinp; cranes and current 
iitput, as well as present and prospective requirements of the various 
iovernment agencies. Quite satisfactory figures were received on 
future requirements, so that the section was able to arrange in ad- 
\nnce for sufficient capacity to turn out the required cranes. The 
i>ven regular builders who were producing cranes when the section 
as formed increased their production 50 per cent during our period 
11 the war, and in addition 11 other plants were converted to 
r;me production to meet the war program. By October, 1918, ca- 
acity to produce standard locomotive cranes had been developed to 
rovide for 140 cranes per month as compared to a miximum monthly 
iitput in 1913 and 1914 of from forty to fifty cranes. The produc- 
lion of special designs of the locomotive cranes type brought up the 
total capacity of the country to 240 standard and special cranes per 
month. The 1918 output was nearly all purchased for direct Govern- 
ment use. 

The production of electric traveling cranes was always sufficient to 
meet all war needs; and, while they were placed on the list of com- 
modities requiring clearance of orders, they never involved a serious 
problem. In December, 1917, the Army purchased 60 gantry cranes 
for use on the docks in France. They were shipped to our ports 
early in 1918 and stood there all through the spring and early sum- 
mer, while plans in France seemed not to be requiring them. The sec- 
tion took steps to have them released for use in loading vessels on this 
side, but in August it was arranged to have them shipped to France. 
In September, 1918, the A. E. F. asked for a new and enlarged 
supply of cranes. In order to expedite production to meet this 
special demand, the Priorities Committee arranged for special pri- 
ority to be given to what was termed the " Pershing crane program," 
and the requirement was promptly taken care of. 

CHAINS. 

This section was formed April 11, 1918, on account of the shortage 
of anchor cables brought on by the shipbuilding program. The 
section found it necessary to deal also with sprocket chains, and it 
administered the conservation and rationing program applied to 
trace chains. John C. Schmidt was chief of the section. He wit- 
nessed a test of a new type of anchor chain made of cast steel at the 
factory of the National Malleable Castings Co., Sharon, Pa., and 
made a favorable report on the results of the test. This process 
seemed to present the solution of the chain shortage. 

The Emergency Fleet placed an order with the company for 150 
suites of chain at a very satisfactory price. The company had great 
difficulty, however, in getting its factory built, and no important 
-deliveries had been made by the time of the armistice. A sample of 



268 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

the chain, however, has been used on one of the buoys in New Yoi 
Harbor since August 8, 1918, and inspections show that it is resis' 
ing corrosion as satisfactorily as the welded wrought-iron chai 
attached to the same buoy. 

Manufacturers of anchor chain were encouraged by the section tj 
increase their output and new manufacturers were brouglit into thi 
work. The output was increased also by the abrogation during thj 
war of a number of the highly technical rules which the skilled labc 
of these shops was in the habit of observing. With all that coulj 
be done, however, not enough chain could be produced to equip shipi 
as rapidly as they were being turned out by the Emergency Flee 
Corporation. As a temporary expedient the American Bureau o 
Shipping agreed that for the period of the war the requirements o 
the length of ships' cables might be reduced 25 per cent. 

The section was asked by the Army to make a comparative stud 
of chain tire grips. Samples were secured and an exhaustive repoi 
made, touching weight, prices, and suitability for particular serviceij 
The section also prepared a complete descriptive and illustrated catai 
logue of every known make and type of chain. 

No prices, except those included in the Iron and Steel Institute' 
schedule, were ever fixed in this industry. The price of the basi 
raw material having been fixed, it was possible by the exercise o! 
the priorities system so to control the output that further fixing o 
prices did not seem necessary. 

MILITARY OPTICAL GLASS AND INSTRUMENTS. 

Before the war this country produced practically no optical glas 
and comparatively few optical instruments. Europe, particularl; 
Germany, supplied us. By the time the United States entered th 
war reserve stocks were largely exhausted and little progress ha( 
been made in the production of glass, though many instruments wer 
being made and fitted with imported lenses. The Army and Nav^ 
needed great quantities of field glasses, cameras, fire-control instru 
ments, sextants, surveying instruments, microscopes, and the like 
There was a strong demand for moving-picture machines. 

The period from April, 1917, to about June, 1918, was one of ex 
perimentation and development. Glass formulae had been secret an( 
well guarded. The difference between the kinds of glass used for th( 
various types of lenses lies in the basic constituents required to pro 
duce different densities. While formula were being discovered anc 
developed, it was necessary to train workmen in the art of makin^ 
and grinding glass. A school was established at Eochester, N. Y. 
under the supervision of the Mechanics' Institute, where skilled me 
chanics were given a special course to fit them for this work. Th( 
Geophysical Laboratory, under the personal directon of Col 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 269 

I'^JFred. E. Wright, gave valuable assistance in determining tiie 
"■'^'tnaterials suitable for optical glass, sending a staff to the Bauscii & 
"^iLomb Optical Co., where the scientific problems, connected with 
JDptical-glass manufacture, were solved and the product turned out 
"Idii a commercial scale. The proper pot for melting glass presented a 
'^^'serious difficulty, credit for the solution of which is due to Prof. 
'%leininger of the Bureau of Standards. 

'"^J The Government gave assistance to the Pittsburgh Plate (llnss Co., 
"%nd they became the largest producers of optical glass. The Spencer 
"'IJILens Co. was given a Government contract which necessitated the 
erection of a new plant. Dr. Morey of the Geophysical Laboratory was 
tationed at this plant and there discovered, in the summer of 1918, 
method by which the period required for making glass was reduced 
from 40 to 24 hours. The Mount Wilson Observatory, aided by the 
rdnance Department, entered the field of grinding precision optical 
lass. One new concern, Keuffel & Esser Co., built a plant at Ho- 
oken, N. J., for the manufacture of optical glass. 
By June, 1918, the country was producing glass of a quality com- 
paring favorably with the product of Europe, and was producing in 
quantity almost sufficient for current demands. When a little later 
MS Dr. Morey's discovery reduced the period of manufacture, capacity 
^flbecame sufficient for all essential needs. 

?(| The section was formed early in March, 1918, with George E. 
Chatillon as chief. On March 27 the entire industry was notified 
that it had been placed under the supervision of the War Industries 
Board, and that no company could accept orders Avithout the ap- 
:l;i! proval of the Board. Labor was controlled by placing restrictions 
arl upon shifting from plant to plant. Prices were left entirely to the 
tt jrovernment purchasing agencies. By a system of permits the section 
lis L'ontrolled the distribution to the various Government departments 
svei and to manufacturers having direct Government contracts. 
;jT Requests for priority on raw materials, including steel and l)rass, 
•tn v\-ere passed upon by the section. In conjunction with the War Trade 
lilj Board, the section passed upon a number of applications for both im- 
port and export licenses for materials affecting this industry. 
:fj Practically the entire available capacity for optical instruments 
jj was occupied with Government orders. Production increased from 
,;l month to month during 1918. The total number of orders placed 
n by the Government amounted to more than $50,000,000, of which 
.,j about $15,000,000 went to the Navy. It is believed that the produc- 
^jj tive capacity brought about by the war is considerably in e.xce.ss of 
^ the normal commercial demand of the country. There is no tariff to 
jjji protect the industry from foreign competition, and our manufacturers 
fl will likely have difficulty in maintaining the position which they have 
Pj gained during the war. 



Chapter 14. 

TRANSPORTATION AND POWER. 

The sections falling -svithin the scope of this chapter handled AutO'-i 
motive Products, Railroad Equipment and Supplies, Stored Mate-' 
rials. Fire Prevention, Power, Electrical and Power Equipment, and 
Electric Wire and Cable. 

AUT0M0TI%'E PRODUCTS. 

C. C. Hancli was made chief of the Automotive Products Section 
on June 19, 1918, when the section was reorganized to conform to the 
final form of the War Industries Board. The work of supervision 
in this field began, however, June 4. 1917, with the formation of the 
Automotive Transportation Committee of the Council, this committee 
consisting of representatives of the industry itself. The committee 
was reorganized and placed under the Board on September 4. 1917^ 
with H. L. Horning as chief. 

The section had jurisdiction not only of the automobile industry 
but also of the other lines of production in which the automobile 
industry engaged; for example, airplane engines, tanks, marine 
gas engines, armored cars, motor cycles, and bicycles. The auto- 
mobile factories supplied for the most part the engineering skill and 
the skilled workm.en, which carried forward the vast airplane pro- 
gram of the war. In addition, some of these manufacturing 
establishments converted a part of their equipment to the production 
of gun carriages, gun recoil mechanisms, escort wagons, water carts, 
artillery wheels, litters, shells, depth bombs, mine anchors, grenades, 
torpedo directors, balloon winches, and other military equipment. 
It is estimated that the automobile industry took contracts for direct 
and indirect war work to the amount of nearly $1,000,000,000. 

The section did a vast amount of work making clearances of pur- 
chases of the various Government departments and of the Allies. It 
studied and recommended sources of supply and allocated orders 
where that was found necessary. It made investigations for the 
Priorities Commissioner. But perhaps the most important and dif- 
ficult work of the section was the administration of the program 
under which the automobile industry was curtailed to 50 per cent of 
normal production during the latter half of 1918. 
270 



AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IN T]IE WAR. 271 

This industry has had a phenomenal <rrowth (hirinfr the past two 
ecades. This country produced durinfr 1917 passenfror automobiles 
the number of 1,740.791 and trucks 128,157, a«i:f];rejratin*T in whole- 
ale selling value $1,288,979,891.^ Approximately 300,000 men were 
mployed in automobile and truck factories and another 820,000 in 
actories making component parts and accessories. High-grade steel 
nd other metals were being consumed by the industry at the rate of 
V than 2,000.000 tons per year in 1917. 

'f course, the war requirements represented only a small percent- 
of this capacity. The requirement for trucks, however, was such 
..it that branch of the industry had to be assisted by favorable 
liorities on materials and transportation throughout the period. 
ibout 40,000 trucks went to England, France, and Russia before the 
'nited States entered the war. About 200,000 trucks and ambulances 

ere ordered by our Army and Navy, and 54,343 were shipped to 
"urope. It was thus that, in the spring of 1918, when industrial con- 
it ions were such that the Conservation Division and the Priorities 
)i vision began to examine the different industries for the purpose of 
iimining which could be most satisfactorily curtailed for the pur- 
; of saving materials, labor, and capital the automobile industry 

,- one of the first to be taken into consideration. 

luirly in ISIarch representatives of the industry were called into 

■liference by the Board and. after full discussion, it was agreed that 

30 per cent reduction in the current manufacturing schedules of 
assenger cars could be made without undue disturbance; and that 
lis curtailment, effecting economies in metals and skilled labor, was 
f tlie utmost importance. The manufacturers consented to effect this 
irtailment in their respective plants from March 1 to July 81, 1918. 
'iider this plan only manufacturers having Government orders got a 
igh priority rating, and, as time went on, the vast majority of 
lakers were becoming less and less able to secure materials for con- 

Muing their work. The shops began to be short of stocks of par- 

ular parts of a finished machine and to have vast surpluses of other 
arts. They w^ere unable to turn out more than a small percentage 
P their usual production. 

"urther conferences were held in July, and some dissatisfaction 

expressed. It was finally agreed that preference would be given 

- -ach manufacturer of passenger automobiles who would subscribe 

> a pledge the essence of which was as follows: "That its ])roduc- 

lu of passenger automobiles and of repn'w parts therefor shall 
nt. for the six months ending with December 31, 1918, exceed 25 
( r cent of its production for the calendar year 1917." This pledge 
nant that passenger-automobile manufacturers were permitted — in 

' See Appendix XL for tables showing production of automobiles In the United States 

:co 1899. 



U4 

i 



272 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

fact, aided — to operate on a 50 per cent basis during the last s; 
months of 1918. It was believed that this basis would support tl 
organizations of the various plants until such time as they cou] 
convert their facilities, so far as practicable, for the production 
direct and indirect war requirements. The attention of the ma 
facturers was called to the urgent war requirements for iron ai 
steel and to the possible necessity of eliminating the manufactu. 
of passenger automobiles after January 1, 1919, if the war shoa 
continue. 

The arrangement to curtail was contained in a letter from tl 
Priorities Commissioner to the industry, dated August 24, 191 
The administration of the plan was turned over to this sectio 
The section began by requiring the manufacturers (1) to subm 
sworn inventory figures showing value of materials on hand ar 
value of materials required to balance their stocks; also tonna^ 
of principal classes of steel and the number of principal uni 
on hand, with the tonnage and number of units required to ba' 
ance the stocks on hand; (2) to submit a statement showing tl 
number of finished cars which could be built from the abo^ 
inventory when the stocks had been balanced, and the time r 
quired to build them; and (3) to submit sworn production figur 
separately for the years 1916, 1917, and the first half of 1918. Upo 
receipt of the foregoing information, the section certified to tl 
Director of Steel Supply the requirements of each manufacturer f( 
the principal classes of steel in tons and the principal units nece; 
sary to balance stocks on hand and to produce the number of cai 
allotted under the manufacturer's pledge. 

Each manufacturer was then notified that he Avas privileged i 
build his specified number of cars and that materials therefor migl 
be obtained by filing in triplicete with the Director of Steel Supp] 
applications for " permit to purchase." The manufacturer's cop 
of application for " permit to purchase," when granted, constitute 
the necessary authority for the seller to fill the manufacturer 
order. In case the supplier or manufacturer of parts was not tl 
original source of supply of the raw materials required, he in tur 
made application for " permit to purchase " in like form as tlu 
required from the maker of passenger automobiles. Under th: 
procedure the section certified to the Steel Division the requiremeni 
of 95 manufacturers covering the production of 295,468 cars durin 
the last half of 1918. 

The control of the industry under the arrangements made with : 
was accomplished by monthly reports of operation, submitted by th 
manufacturers containing the following information: (1) Numbe 
of finished cars on hand at beginning of month; (2) number of cai 
produced during month; (3) number of cars delivered to Unite 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 273 



H 



states Government during month; (4) number of cars delivered to 
j^^jAllied Govemments ; and (5) number of cars delivered for civilian 
jjj luse. A total of 186,178 cars were produced durintj the third quarter, 
„,^and on November 11, 1918, a circular was issued which removed 50 
per cent of the restrictions; and this was followed a short time after- 
ward by a complete removal. 

The manufacturers of accessories and spare parts were also dealt 
with by means of the system of " permits to purchase." No definite 
ruling was made as to what allowance of materials could be made to 
[individual factories, but each concern was advised to make appli- 
,jj^ cation for "permit to purchase" and each application was con- 
sidered on its merits, a general ruling allowing each manufacturer 
sufficient materials to carry him through a period of from CO to 00 
iays at a rate of production of about 50 per cent of normal being 
ipplied. 

The manufacturers of motor trucks were treated separately on the 
heory (1) that a large percentage of their output was needed for 
iirect war work, and (2) that trucks were an important transporta- 
tion medium in essential civilian industries so that curtailment 
;hould be avoided as far as practicable. Circular No. 11, dated 
A.ugust 8, 1918, was sent to truck manufacturers by the Priorities 
Commissioner and explained the conditions under which fuel and 
iteel would be furnished the industry. The circular said : " It ap- 
pears, however, that there exists in this industry, as in many others, 
"factors of non-essentialitv which must, as a war measure, be elimi- 
lated." A pledge was required with a view to eliminating these fac- 
ors of non-essentiality, and the creation of new facilities was dis- 
ouraged. The pledge bound the manufacturers and dealers to sell 
10 motor trucks except for essential uses; to sell to no user an un- 
lecessary number of trucks, even for essential uses; to discourage 
he purchase of any truck to replace a usable truck already in 
ervice; to give maximum encouragement to the repair of trucks; 
nd to make monthly reports to the section. 
Instead of issuing individual priorities certificates to truck manu- 
'acturers for each purchase of parts and materials the section rec- 
mmended that an "industry priority certificate" be issued to each 
Qanufacturer, under which he could order his materials in the 
isual way by attaching the prescribed form of affidavit to his pur- 
hase orders. This plan facilitated procurement and avoided an 
normous amount of clerical work. 



tt 



RAILWAY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. 



This section was formed July 30, 1918, with J. Rogers Flannery 
chief. During the earlier period, the Advisory Committoe on 
*lants and Munitions had been doing very important work in aiding 
105826—21 18 



274 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

the Railroad Administration and the United States Military RailwaysJ 
in standardizing types of cars and locomotives and following uf 
their production. But in July so many conflicting orders wert; 
being received for cars and locomotives from the different branches; 
of this Government and from the Allies and manufacturers wert 
having so much difficulty in securing materials, that a central channe^i 
for the distribution of orders and for laying down a plan of delivery 
of the products was decided upon. 

The two large problems related to (1) locomotives and (2) freight 
cars. The former was on account of the limited productive capacity 
as well as the difficulty in securing sufficient iron and steel ; the latter 
lay chiefly in the iron, steel, and lumber supply. 

Locomotives. — There are only throe builders of locomotives in the 
United States, besides a few companies which turn out smaller en- 
gines.^ The Railroad Administration ordered 1,415 large steam loco- 
motives in April, 1918, and was very anxious for speedy delivery, 
C'n July 23, 1918, the United States Military Railways ordered 51C 
standard-gauge locomotives from the Baldwin Locomotive Works 
and insisted upon immediate prosecution of the order. The Railroad 
Administration was extremely anxious that the military locomotives 
should not interfere with its order. It was understood that further 
orders would come from the A. E. F. Plans were considered foi 
adding to the facilities of the Baldwin and American companies at 
Government expense to the amount of $25,000,000. 

A general meeting was held of locomotive builders and repre- 
sentatives of our Government and of the Allied Governments. A 
requirement of about 9,000 locomotives to be supplied between July, 
1918, and December, 1919, appeared. This was clearly greater than 
existing capacities could fulfill. But the delays inevitable in the con- 
struction of new plants under circumstances as they were at that 
time pointed to the fact that no relief could be hoped for earlier than 
the middle of 1919 under a new facilities plan. 

There were about 65,000 engines in use in the country. It was sug-j 
gested that the Railroad Administration wage an aggressive cam-^ 
paign of general repair work at all shops, that old locomotives migh^ 
be returned to service and the administration's demand for new on 
be considerably reduced. This plan was carried out. No new plan 
were started, and the " Pershing engine program " was given a hig" 
preference. It was decided that the Baldwin Works should con| 
centrate on the military standard-gauge engines and that the Ameritj 
can and Lima companies should turn out administration engines^ 

exclusively. Under this plan the Baldwin Works was turning ou^ 

, iji 

' See Appendix XLI for table showing production of locomotives in the United Stated 
1911 to 1918. 



3 



i 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 276 



'he standard military engines at the rate of 256 per month before 

"' ihe end of the war period. For the week ending October 26, 1918, 

^^'''he Baldwin Works turned out 87 engines. Tlie British and French 

vere taking whatever production was not required by the A, F. F. 
"™t The Italian Government was unable to adopt our standard mili- 
i"^' 'ary engine because it was too heavy ^; but they eagerly desired to 
^^' (lace a large order for locomotives here. The American Ix)como- 
, ive Co. had built Italian engines and possessed patterns, but for sev- 
^'^ 'ral weeks it could not devise a way to find facility space for the 
• talian order. The Baldwin Co. offered to takeover the patterns and 

i.ndertake the work, and plans were under way for doing this when 

|he American Co. came forward with an offer to construct them at 
"'H.S Montreal plant, and the order was finally placed that way. 
'^M The war brought out a demand for hundreds of narrow-gauge 

team locomotives and large gasoline locomotives. The larger com- 
^; ['anies, particularly the Baldwin Works, had experts and drawings 
' (or this work. But because their plants were filled to capacity with 
' irdere for standard engines most of this business had to be distrib- 

'ted among the builders of small mining and industrial engines. 
'''^^ !)rawings and specifications as well as skilled workmen, were turned 
[* iver bv the larger companies to the smaller ones in order to facilitate 
^^^'liswirk. 
" Freight cars. — There were 30 car builders in the country capable of 

irning out freight cars for the Railroad Administration and for the 
^P^' umerican Expeditionary Forces. December, 1917, when the Rail- 
'■ ■ bad Administration took control of the roads, saw this industry 
^"' Imning at very low ebb. In April, 1918, the administration ordered 
^ 00,000 standard-gauge freight cars, distributing the order among 
^"'^ite builders. Great difficulty was experienced in procuring the raw 
''"': laterials and in rehabilitating the organizations. Orders were 
"'^ laced with all the car companies at the same time, and efforts were 

lade by all of the concerns to get simultaneous deliveries of the va- 

ous materials. By the time deliveries were beginning the United 
"" fates Military Railways placed orders with the same companies 
:'l 14 additional companies for 30,000 freight cars. An A-5 pri- 
Ji= rity was obtained for the military cars, which gave them preference 
to feer orders for administration cars, which rated only a B-1 priority. 
%\ A schedule of deliveries for the military cars calling for rush 
CO! jork was outlined. This naturally retarded the building of the 
iiier ^ministration cars. But to make matters worse for the Railroad 
."Ik 'dministration orders came on September 26 that military opera- 
lO- ons in France necessitated that the previous schedule of deliveries 

< 'Our so-called "Pershing engine" weighs 83 tons; tho Italian engine weighs 7.'> ton« 



276 AMERICAISr INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

should be anticipated by at least 30 to 60 days. The section tele 
graphed all builders and arranged to expedite delivery of steel t. 
meet the new schedules. A few days later the United States Militar 
Railways brought forward additional orders for 40,915 standard 
gauge cars and 4,000 narrow-gauge cars. The section called a meet 
ing of representatives of the branches of the Government intereste( 
for the purpose of determining the distribution of the new orders 
The Railroad Administration recommended that orders be placed ii 
Canada for as many as possible of the new requirement; but thi 
representive of the military railways objected to this on the grouni 
that too much time would be lost in shipping the raw materials t( 
Canada and that labor conditions were not good there. Finally i 
schedule of distribution of the new order and a new schedule o: 
deliveries for all orders was drawn up and approved by both parties 

In order to assist the manufacturers of cars and locomotives ii 
securing their materials as quickly as possible, this section, with thi 
approval of the Steel Division and the Lumber Section, handled al 
requests for allocation of steel and lumber to these manufacturers 
Standard forms for requesting allocations were sent to all builders 
Immediately upon receipt of the request for allocation the sectior 
would carefully check it, approve it, number it, and send three copief 
to the Director of Steel Supply or to the Lumber Section. Thes( 
requests were followed closely by the section until they were returnee 
with suitable allocations, when the manufacturer was immediately 
notified and requested to place his order. 

Standard forms were adopted by the section on which the railroac 
equipment manufacturers reported at the beginning of each montt 
delivery of materials required for the following month; and froir 
these data the section furnished the Director of Steel Supply with ; 
statement of the steel tonnage required by each manufacturer from 
month to month. By this method orders which had been allo- 
cated were followed through to delivery. 

Definite monthly schedules of shipments from the steel manufac- 
turers were arranged for in order that the railway equipment manu- 
facturers might lay out their programs of work with some certainty 
of receiving materials. The manufacturers of specialties, who fur- 
nished their product to the builders of cars and locomotives, were 
required to follow the same procedure as the car and locomotive 
builders themselves. Under this system a certain percentage of the 
steel tonnage of the country was set aside for railroad purposes each 
month, the amount being determined upon by conference between the 
section and the Steel Division. The section kept a close watch on the 
production of both cars and locomotives throughout the country by 



AMERICAN IXDl-STKV IX TllK WAI!. 277 

a system of weekly reports of output from each builder. The entire 
routine had just become establishe<l and seemed to be workinir well 
when the armistice made its further application unnecessary. 

STORED :mateiuals. 



In the winter of 1917-18 it was discovered that a great many ware- 
3f(lfi houses throughout the country contained he^ivy stores of supplies, 
many of them seeming to be held by their owners for speculative 
"' tl purposes and others held up by export regulations or by trade diffi- 
'fcii culties of some nature. In January, 1918, a stored materials sec- 
tion was formed, with John F. Wilkins as chief, for the purpose of 
securing an inventory of these stores, that they might be turned, where 
Qecessary, to war uses. The section gathered information showing the 
'iirtu character, quantities, and owners of stored merchandise everywhere 
nd transmitted it to the particular bureaus of the Government or 
to the commodity sections of the Board interested in the different 
supplies. Officers representing the Army and Navy in the section 
'™ brought constant advices as to the Government's needs, and searches 
'l<lf' for supplies to satisfy them would follow. Constant contact was 
'^* maintained with the several Government intelligence agencies, with 
•^f fire insurance companies, exporters, shipping brokers, and many 
Tlii nanufacturers. 

^™ The section not only accomplished its main purpose in bringing 
™ forth important quantities of different supplies which current regu- 
ations or appeals had failed to effect, but it was able also, through 
ts several contacts, to lend incidental assistance to other war agen- 
■>'"■' ;ies. It gave the War Trade Board information concerning goods 
'™ iestined for consignees on the enemy-trading list. It gave the Alien 
™ Property Custodian information about enemy-owned goods, ft col- 
'^- ected and maintained an important body of information showing 
' ^^ congested conditions in certain warehouses, docks, and railroad ter- 
ninals. In September, 1918, the section undertook the operation of 
n"^' I plan devised by the conservation division of the Board to create an 
Di^ nterdepartmental clearing house for all classes of inactive (Jovern- 
i^'^ nental materials. Under this plan quantities of materials, which 
0" me Government agency had bought, but on account of some change 
.^' )f program could not use, were inventoried and mado avjiil.ilih' for 
mo'' lome other department which needed them. 



ilro 



FIRE PREVENTION. 



Following the establishment of the War Risk Insurance and the 
jovernment Marine Insurance, there was much discussion of a i)ro- 
)Osal to inaugurate Government fire insurance for plants having war 
rders. Congress did not find this step necessary or advisable. The 



278 AMERICAN IlsDUSTRY IX THE VVAK. 

danger, however, which was involved in less than fully adequa 
fire inspection and protection in such plants was called to the atte{| 
tion of the President, and the Chairman of the War Industries Boai 
was advised to organize a section to take care of this important wor 
The Fire Prevention Section was organized on April 5, 1918, wit 
W. H. Merrill as chief. An advisorj- committee consisting of reprj 
sentatives of the leading insurance organizations was formed to coo| 
erate in the work, and the section itself developed a staff of 31 e: 
perts exclusive of representatives of the War, Navy, and other reguli 
departments. 

The purposes of the section were carried out by means of inspe 
tions followed by recommendations to the Government departmen' 
concerned, the inspections being made either by experts from the sg» 
tion or by the use of various insurance organizations. The first effo: 
Avas to cover only plants where the work was most needed, then late 
a program was laid down for the inspection of all plants haviii 
Government contracts exceeding $100,000 in value. At the begimiin 
the work of the section on any plant ceased after it had completed j 
inspection and drafted a recommendation to the War or Navy E 
partment, but after a few months it was felt that delay would 
prevented if the section could take its recommendations directly 
the owners of the plants. Such an arrangement was made with tt 
Army and Navy representatives, and, during the summer and fall c 
1918, the work was carried on in this way, the proper military o 
naval authorities being advised of the action in each case. QuestioE 
in connection with the production and distribution of fire- pre ventio 
apparatus were also handled by the section. 

POWER. 

During the years immediately preceding 1917 there was a rapi 
and wholesome growth of the central station power business through 
out the country, both on the part of new and of old industries, man^ 
of the latter changing from a system of isolated plants to electri 
power taken from large central sources. 

The work of the Power Section began in December, 1917. A short 
age in power had appeared before this time at Niagara Falls, an« 
the situation had been taken in charge by the Secretary of Was 
who appointed Gen. Charles Keller, Engineer Corps, and R. J 
Bulkley to represent him in handling the power situation. Gen 
Keller secured the assignment of a number of Engineer officers U 
assist in the work. Upon the reorganization of the Board. Frederic! 
Darlington was made chief of the Power Section and Gen. Kel 
maintained an informal Consultation Committee. Later, when 
power shortage became acute in certain localities, Charles K. Foste 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 279 



iequt, 



vice-chairman of the Priorities Committee, was made Director in 
Charge of Preferential Power Distribution, acting under the Pri- 
orities Division, and certain Army Engineers attached to the section 
were assigned to work with Mr. Foster. 

On October 7, 1917, the priorities commissioner issued Circular No. 
45,^ embodj'ing rules and regulations for the guidance of liglit and 
m\ power companies in the distribution of electric energy, which enabled 
Me;| the companies in most instances theiuselves to make priority distribu- 
giili| tions in the event of a shortage without reference to Mr. Foster, the 
Director of Power. 

The generiil purpose of the section was to gather information to 
M\ give a broad picture of the power situation of the country and to 
lie si I establish specifically the localities which had a surplus and those 
eljj which had a shortage. The early attempts of Government agencies 
iikij to locate national plants were necessarily made with incomplete 



knowledge of the total power situation. There was a tendency to 
build power plants without sufficient reference to existing plants 
and available equipment. Before the formation of the Facilities 
Division it was the duty of this section to review the projects con- 
templating the commandeering or building of power plants. Advice 
was given both as to best methods of obtaining power in localities 
selected and as to selection of localities for particular projects. 
The principal work of the section came to be to notify the various 
commodity chiefs and departments of the Government as to where 
there was a shortage of power in order to avoid the placing of orders 
or the erection of new facilities where no power was available. 

With the assistance of material prepared by the section the Pri- 
orities Commissioner advised with the Capital Issues Committee upon 
request as to the war need of electrical power projects in cases where 
application had been made to that committee for the issue of secur- 
ities. Advice was likewise given to the War Finance Corporation 
concerning the need of extensions for which loans liad been requested. 
The section also consulted frequently with the Electrical and Power 
Equipment Section concerning schedules of supplies. It made fre- 
quent recommendations to the Priorities Committee in l)ehalf of com- 
panies needing materials for new construction, repairs, and re- 
placements. 

The growth of power plants was naturally irregular during the 
war on account of the impossibility of so anticipating the develop- 
ment of war needs as to keep them distributed proportionately over 
the country. Many current projects for the construction of (-('ntinl 
station electric power services were halted by the war emergency and 
held in abeyance on account of the high costs involved in completion. 



'See Appendix XLIII. 



^50 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

If other conditions had made it possible to so place war orders that 
these facilities could have been completed in the normal way, no 
power shortage need have developed and much of the power con- 
structed for war purposes and not economical in peace times would 
not have been built. Some of this unnecessary expenditure of wealth 
could, perhaps, have been averted by an earlier establishment of 
such control as the War Industries Board was exercising at the 
close of the period. Much extravagance in this direction was averted. 
The generating capacity of the country in 1917 was approximately 
13,693,000 horsef>ower. Over 2,000,000 horsepower was added during 
the war period. The most troublesome shortages occurred in dis- 
tricts where power is abundant but where war industries happened 
to be concentrated in the most unusual amounts. Assistance was 
rendered by the section to relieve the situation in the Pittsburgh 
district, New Jersey district, Georgia district, and Philadelphia dis- 
trict during the summer of 1918. It was in these districts that the 
special priority director and his assistants were called upon to direct 
the distribution of power in aid of the war program. 

ELECTRICAL AND POWER EQUIPMENT. 

This section was established November 14, 1917. Walter Robbin? 
was made chief and remained in charge through the reorganization of 
the Board and until the section was disbanded. Three subdivisions 
were created in the section, having charge, respectively, of (1) elec- 
trical apparatus and supplies, (2) steam turbines, and (3) boilers, 
condensers, and analogous equipment. 

Electrical apparatus and swpjylies. — No verj^ great difficulty arose 
in connection with electrical supplies, with the exception of electricj 
wire and cable, for which a separate section, headed by LeRo 
Clark, was formed late in the period. The Wire Section allocate* 
Government orders from the middle of August forward. This action 
was necessitated by the general shortage in copper and by the 
confusion which arose when the Signal Corps announced a require- 
ment of 65,000 miles of outpost wire. In general there were heavy 
reserve stocks of electrical supplies throughout the country, and the 
war did little more than reduce these to a point far below normal. 
Studies were made of the locations and conditions of these stocks, 
and 24 War Service Committees were formed to guide the industry 
in its relation to war work, but no important steps on the part of 
the Board had yet been found necessary when the war ended. 

The problem of electrical apparatus was different. Important : 
shortages and threatened shortages were evident from the start. A 
general War Service Committee with 11 subcommittees was organized, 
and with the aid of this committee the section made a survey of the 






AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 281 



jountry to locate and list the available stocks. The record thus ob- 
:ained was kept up to date by senii-uionthly reports from nuiiiufac- 
;urers and others. War requirements in this industry were very diffi- 
;ult to handle because most of them were indirect. But the section 
ioon found itself possessed of sulHcient information about supplies 
ind requirements to indicate wdiere shortages antl surpluses were oc- 
jurring: and thus to guide shifts in production. The section was fre- 
quently able to point out existing equipment or facilities suitable for 
™ ;onversion to some war need, and through this service many new con- 
™1 itruction projects were shown to be unnecessary. The section was in 
™* leveral instances able to anticipate shortages in certain stocks and en- 
ourage sufficient manufacture to prevent them. Adjustable speed 
^ ^^ notors for the manufacture of machine tools and pyrometers required 
n unusual numbers for testing and recording heat in the manufac- 
^f">' ure of munitions were taken care of in this way. 
'^"' Commencing January 1, 1918, all applications for priority certifi- 
™ ates for electrical apparatus were referred to this section for recom- 
(lendation before consideration by the Priorities Committee. Much 
ttention was given to applications involving apparatus going into 
he " restricted area " or into centers where power shortage existed. 
„. )ccasionally when investigation revealed that certain of the equip- 
aent called for could not be produced under any grade of priority 
. nthin the time required, substitutions or altered methods were sug- 
", ;ested by the section for accomplishing the desired results. Some- 
,, imes second-hand equipment located by the section was found to 
erve as a temporary or even permanent solution. 
Applications for priority came in gradually increasing volume up 
! the period when automatic ratings were put into effect. The sec- 
ion received as many as 300 applications in one day. About 29,000 
^ tt all came before the section and their disposition is recorded in 
'^ lie files. The section "cleared" 1,257 orders from various agencies 
^"^'J four Government and 112 orders from the Allied Governments. 
^ , It devoted a great deal of work to the problem of standardiza- 
^"''* ion in this industry, particularly standardization in (lovernment 
■ equirements. The War Department appointed a committee of Army 
ttgineers to work on the question, and this section obtained for the 
' irmy contact with the general War Service Committee and its 3.') 
^ abcommittees. It was the purpose of the Army committee to adopt 
'" ' or its standards such stocks as had reached a reasonable state of 
'^'^ tandardization for industrial uses and not to attempt to establish 
'• ew standards. The War Service Committee had been working for- 
'*' year on a very comprehensive program of standardization, directed 
^[ ) the conservation of raw materials, labor, and transportation. 
^^ Curtailment agreements were arranged with the manufacturers of 
'^ iectric heating devices and of fan motors, and the section adminis- 



282 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

tered the plans. In August, 1918, the Priorities Commissioner h d 
a meeting with the jobbers of electrical apparatus and supplies. !t 
was determined that the jobbers should be recognized and given n 
automatic priority rating Class B-4 upon their pledge to police e 
industry for the observance of all priority rulings. 

Steam turbines. — By the time the section was formed an extree 
shortage in steam turbines was evident. The creation of new f ac i- 
ties for their manufacture is a long process. Hence the first stuc^s 
of the section were devoted to the question of the relative importa; e 
of the various needs with a view to determining a proper sequence f 
deliveries. The first work was on the larger size land type, beca e 
both the Navy and the Emergency Fleet maintained in the turb e 
shops a corps of production experts whose duty it was to direct i e 
sequence of production of orders of the marine type. To take cie 
of companies producing both types, an agreement was reached, af r 
conference of the parties, that the following sequence should, in ie 
absence of express directions to the contrary, hold: (1) Navy, () 
Emergency Fleet, (3) Army, and (4) private companies. 

The section prepared a schedule of all Government requiremeis 
for land-type turbines with date of delivery required. It then call:! 
all manufacturers together to discuss the possibilities of meeting U 
requirements. There seemed to be no available finished stocks !i 
account of acute congestion. The delivery period for new ord(;3 
was estimated at 7 to 10 months for smaller sizes and 18 to 24 monts 
for larger sizes. The only solution seemed to be to divert turbir? 
under order. The manufacturers were requested to submit a tabu 
tion of all units then under order in sizes of 10,000 or more kilowaj, 
and at a later meeting a shipping schedule for Government requhi- 
ments was arranged, diversions being made only after giving fil 
consideration to the relative importance of the various needs. Ti 
requirements of the large public-service corporations were ne 
studied by the section. Following this the manufacturers were ask 
to extend their schedules of information on production to inclu 
all turbines of 1,000 or more kilowats, and a similar production a] 
shipping schedule covering such smaller units was arranged. 

As the spring of 1918 approached the situation was becomii 
gradually worse. It seemed to be impossible to establish a fixi 
schedule of deliveries, because of constant changes in the war pr 
gram, and new difficulties in securing raw materials. On May 5 
1918, following the usual series of conferences, steam turbine produ 
tion was made a controlled industry. All schedules of deliveries > 
both finished products and materials going to the plants were plac( 
under the control of the Board, with detail management in the han^ 
of a special joint committee representing the Navy, Emergency Fle( 
Army, and the division. 



il 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 283 

A tlifficulty arose in regard to large forcings. The only i)lants 

. i available for this work were fnlly occupied with gun forgings for 

r^" ! the Army and Navy on an A-1 priority rating. The matter was taken 

'[ up with the Army and Navy and an agreement reached that a certain 

Bhare of these facilities should be relieved for the production of 

."^ turbine forgings. The section conferred frequently with the Power 

^* Section with a view to reducing as much as possible the requirement 

' for new turbines by the exercise of greater care in locating projects 

'^! devoted to war manufacture. 

Boilers^ condejisers, and similar equipment. — The third subdivision 
J of the section handled the problems arising in this general field. 
\^\ The surface pipe steam condenser industi-y was taken under com- 
plete control by the Board and much attention had to be given 
to the production of steam boilers. By June, 1918, it was clear 
that the war requirement for iron and steel would soon be in excess 
of the country's productive capacity. In line with the general pro- 
gram of conserving iron and steel, the section made investigations 
with a view to withholding priority assistance for the delivery of 
new boilers wherever old ones could be repaired or used boilers 
substituted. 

It was pointed out to the Railroad Administration that many old 
locomotive boilers might be used temporarily for stationary power 
and heating purposes. A protest was entered against the use of 
Scotch marine boilers because their manufacture requires an unusual 
amount of metal. Steps were taken to prevent the expansion of shop 
facilities for their production. 

All important steam power plants, whether on land or afloat, must 
be equipped with condensers of one of the three standard types; jet, 
barometric, or surface. Jet and barometric condensers can be used on 
land, but surface condensers are required for ships. Recently the 
tendency has been to install surface condensers on land, particularly 
in large turbine units. The essential distinguishing feature of a 
surface condenser is the large amount of non-ferrous tubing with 
which it is filled. By the spring of 1918 it became clear that the de- 
mands of the Navy and the Emergency Fleet for brass tubing could 
not be met if the installation of surface condensers on land phxuts 
was allowed to go unchecked. Tlie manufacturers were called to 
Washington for conference and study of the situation, and in August 
an agreement was reached that the distribution of surface condensers 
should be completely controlled by the Board. No sales could be 
made unless the buyer should present a "purchase permit" issued 
by the Board. The Brass Section took control at the same time f)ver 
the distribution of non-ferrous tubing. Efforts were made to ha\«> 
seamless steel tubes substituted for non-ferrous tubes wherever con 
tact with salt water did not make this substitution impracticable. 



284 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

An interesting question arose in connection 
mechanical stokers. The demand for this equipment increased vei^ 
rapidly during the war. The Fuel Administration was encouraginj 
the installation of these stokers under existing boilers with a vie'v 
to conserving fuel. It became a question of balancing the saving i|j 
fuel and operating labor, resulting from the installation of a stoker 
as against the metal and productive labor required in manufacturing 
one. The section studied each important proposed installation, con 
ferring with the Fuel Administration and the War Service Commit 
tee of the stoker manufacturers in an endeavor to adjust the demano 
to production. 

iNIuch the same problem arose in connection with the productioB 
of superheaters and economizers. The general conclusion reached 
with regard to them was that their production should be discouragecl 
on the theory that, for the time being, the saving of metal and labor 
was more important than the saving of fuel. 

The section made studies also in connection with the distribution 
of raw materials to manufacturers of conveying apparatus, fans and 
blowers, small engines, transmission machinery, water heaters, pumpp 
and compressors, refrigerating machinery and other analogous equip-M 
ment. 

Not very much important work was done by way of standardiza- 
tion of machinery, though steps in this direction had been taken ini 
several instances. If the war had lasted several more years, standardly 
zation in all lines of machinery would have become a necessity and! 
would have been one of the deciding factors in the adjustment of pos-^ 
sible production to the requirements of the war. Important econo-- 
mies were effected by the section through the use of priority power so4 
as to divert materials and effort from less essential to more essential' 
purposes. 



APPENDICES. 



Appendix I. 



I i 



SECTION 2 OF THE ARMY APPROPRIATION ACT, APPROVED 
AUGUST 29, 1916. 

Sec. 2. That a Council of National Defense is hereby established for the 
)ordination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare, 
I consist of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of 
le Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and 
le Secretary of Labor. 

That the Council of National Defense shall nominate to the President, and 

lie President shall appoint, an advisory commission, consisting of not more 

lan seven persons, each of whom shall have special knowledge of some 

idustry, public utility, or the development of some natural resource, or be 

therwise specially qualified, in the opinion of the council, for the performance 

E the duties hereinafter provided. The members of the advisory commission 

hall serve without compensation, but shall be allowed actual expenses of 

avel and subsistence when attending meetings of the commiss'on or engaged 

U investigations pertaining to its activities. The advisory commission shall 

old such meetings as shall be called by the council or be provided by the rules 

nd regulations adopted by the council for the conduct of its work. 

That it shall be the duty of the Council of National Defense to supervise 

nd direct investigations and make recommendations to the President an»l the 

eads of executive departments as to the location of railroads with reference 

:5 the frontier of the United States, so as to render possible expeditious con- 

. .'entration of troops and supplies to points of defense; the coordination of 

I lillitary, industrial, and commercial purposes in the location of extensive hlgh- 

I t.-ays and branch lines of railroad; the utilization of waterways; the moblliza- 

' 'ion of military and naval resources for defense; the Increase of dome.stle 

' reduction of articles and materials essential to the support of armies and 

' 't the people during the interruption of foreign commerce; the development 

f seagoing transportation ; data as to amounts, location, method, and means 

; f production, and availability of military supplies; the giving of Information 

1 10 producers and manufacturers as to the class of supplies needed by the 

I inllltary and other services of the Government, the requirements relating 

hereto, and the creation of relations which will render possible In time of 

leed the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation. 

That the Council of National Defense shall adopt rules and regulations for 

he conduct of its work, which rules and regulations Bhall be subject to the 

pproval of the President, and shall provide for the work of the advisory com- 

nission, to the end that the special knowledge of such conimi.sston may be 

ieveloped by suitable investigation, research, and inquiry and n)a<le available 

n conference and report for the use of the council ; and the council may 

» Tganize subordinate bodies for its assistance in special Investigations, elthei 

t 



288 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

by the employment of experts or by the creation of committees of speciall 
qualified persons to serve without compensation, but to direct the investigatioij 
of experts so employed. 

That the sum of $200,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereb 
appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriatec 
to be immediately available for experimental work and investigations undei 
taken by the council, by the advisory commission, or subordinate bodies, for th 
employment of a director, expert and clerical expenses and supplies, and fo 
the necessary expenses of members of the advisory commission or subordinat 
bodies going to and attending meetings of the commission or subordinat 
bodies. Reports shall be submitted by all subordinate bodies and by th 
advisory commission to the council, and from time to time the council sha 
report to the President or to the heads of executive departments upon specia 
inquiries or subjects appropriate thereto, and an annual report to the Congres 
shall be submitted through the President, including as full a statement of th 
activities of the council and the agencies subordinate to it as is consistent wit 
the public interest, including an itemized account of the expenditures mad 
by the council or authorized by it, in as full detail as the public interest wil 
permit: Provided, hoicever, That when deemed proper the President ma; 
authorize, in amounts stipulated by him, unvouchered expenditures and repor 
the gross siini so authorized not itemized. 



Appendix II. 

ADVANTAGES OF WAR SERVICE COMMITTEES REPRESENTING 
INDUSTRIES. 

[As set forth in pamphlet of United States Chamber of Commerce, Feb. 28, 1918.] 

I. They provide an organized method by which the Government can quici 
present to all the factors in an industry its needs in a particular line 
receive dependable information as to how they may be met and what faciliti 
are available for use. Necessary publicity as to Government needs thus p( 
sented simultaneously to all interests in a line prevents the possibility of unfa 
advantage through the presentation of information of this character to separa 
firms or individuals. 

II. They can arrange promptly for gathering figures as to cost of productl^ 
and from time to time report to Government agencies changes in conditio 
which affect such cost. Such cost sheets can, of course, be checked independ 
ently by Government authorities. 

III. They can aid effectively in the distribution and conservation of raw 
material essential for war output. 

IV. They provide organized machinery to collect information and advisi 
the Government as to what the needs of industry will be to meet the futu3?§ 
requirements of the Government, and as a result comprehensive plans maS 
be made well in advance for any necessary readjustments of industry. 

V. When committees are chosen by the industries themselves, so that th^ 
are representative of all interests in each industry, the appointment of thd 
ablest and best posted men in each line is assured, and the basis for any allegai 
tion of favoritism in selection or preferential treatment by Government agencies 
is eliminated. 

VI. The possibility of complaints that business men chosen by the Govern- 
ment for committee work are in a position to influence privately the placing of 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAII. 289 

iiutiac'ts with concerns in \Ylii(,h tlioy are linanciaily interested is iil<e\vise 
. moved. 

\ !I. If committees are organized by the industries themselves, tlie CJovorn- 
it is in no way responsible for them, and is free to consult with them as 
uir merits may justify. 

\III. Tlie committees are able to advance rapidly the process of standardlza- 
i'ln and to eliminate in manufacturing lines unnecessary* sizes, stylos, and 
hapes, thus conserving raw material, labor, and capital. 

IX. The conunittees can bring to the attention of the (lovennncnt miiMiiplnyod 
abilities which may readily be adapted to the production of supplies needed by 
lie Government and thus avoid the misuse of money, material, and labor in- 
x)lved in extension of existing plants. The saving of time in this process Is 
Iso of great advantage. 

Utilization of the committees has these advantages: 

1. A committee chosen by an industry having the confidence of all the 
actors in the line, and for which the industry is responsible, is available at 
ill times on call of the Government to meet with Government agencies for 
onference with reference to any Government needs or policies. 

2. It can give to Government agencies complete information as to all the in- 
lividuals, firms, and corporations in the line, with facts as to their facilities 
lud management. 

3. If the Government places its needs before such a committee in planning 
I certain purchase, the raw material market can be protected and inllation 
)revented. 

4. The committee can have cost figures prepared on the commodity or nier- 
haiulise desired and place before the Government cost sheets, on the basis of 
vhich the Government may fix prices fair to all. 

5. The committee can make recommendations as to the distribution of 
•rders to prevent bad location, railroad congestion, and labor disturbance. 

G. The Government experts can check the cost sheets submitted and the 
Ci'iinmendations as to distribution and make their own decisions, which In- 
lustry will gladly accept if reached in an orderly way. 

7. Each factor in an industry will have to take its share of Government 
)iisiness where full production is required, and advantage to some will be 
)revented. 

8. The Government may be constantly advised by the committee in an 
miliortative way as to changing conditions, and plans may be niade systeni- 
iiif-ally to anticipate emergencies and meet future needs. 

9. Individual applications for priority have in the past greatly complicated 
operations of the priority system. In many lines priority applications can be 
lea red through the committees of the industries and much better resultH 
hereby secured. 

10. Such committees may likewise be utilized to great advantage in dealing 
vith the fuel, transportation, labor, reconstruction, foreign trade, and similar 
Mobleras where an industry as a whole should be considered rather than a 
lart of it or individuals In It. 

105826—21 19 



290 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Appendix III. 

THE OVERMAN ACT. 

[Approved May 20, 1918.] 

AN ACT Authorizing the President to coordinate or consolidate executive bureaus 
agencies, and offices, and for other purposes, in the interest of economy and the mor 
efficient concentration of the Government 

Be it enacted iy the Senate and House of Representatives of the United State 
of America in Congress assembled, That, for the national security and defense 
for the successful prosecution of the war, for the support and maintenance o 
the Army and Navy, for the better utilization of resources and industries, ani ■ 
for the more effective exercise and more efficient administration hy the Presi 
dent of his powers as Commander in Chief of the land and naval forces, th 
President is hereby authorized to make such redistribution of functions amonj 
executive agencies as he may deem necessary, iucUullng any functions, duties 
and powers hitherto by law conferred upon any executive department, commis 
sion, bureau, agency, office, or officer, in such manner as in his judgment shal 
seem best fitted to carry out the purposes of this act, and to this end i; 
authorized to make such regulations and to issue such orders as he may deeD 
necessary, which regulations and orders shall be in writing and shall be tilec 
with the head of the department affected and constitute a public record 
Provided, That this act shall remain in force during the continuance of tht 
present war and for six months after the termination of the war by thi, 
proclamation of the treaty of peace, or at such earlier time as the Presiden 
may designate: Provided further. That the termination of this act shall no 
affect any act done or any right or obligation accruing or accrued pursuant ti 
this act, and during the time that this act is in force : Provided further, Tha 
the authority by this act granted shall be exercised only in matters relating ti 
the conduct of the present war. 

Sec. 2. That in carrying out the purposes of this act the President is author 
ized to utilize, coordinate, or consolidate any executive or administrative com 
missions, bureaus, agencies, offices, or officers now existing by law, to transfe: 
any duties or powers from one existing department, commission, bureau, agency 
office, or officer to another, to transfer the personnel thereof or any part of i 
either by detail or assignment, together with the whole or any part of th( 
i-ecords and public property belonging thereto. 

Sec. 3. That the President is further authorized to establish an executive 
agency which may exercise such jurisdiction and control over the produetioi 
of aeroplanes, aeroplane engines, and aircraft equipment as in his judgment ma} 
be advantageous ; and, further, to transfer to such agency, for its use, all oi 
any moneys heretofore appropriated for the production of aeroplanes, aeroplam 
engines, and aircraft equipment. 

Sec. 4. That for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act, anj 
moneys heretofore and hereafter appropriated for the use of any executivt 
department, commission, bureau, agency, office, or officer shall be expended onlj 
for the purposes for which it was appropriated under the direction of sucl 
other agency as may be directed by the President hereunder to perform am 
execute said function. 

Sec. 5. That should tlie President, in redistributing the functions among th( 
executive agencies as provided in this act, conclude that any bureau should b( 
abolished and it or their duties and functions conferred upon some othei 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TlIK WAR. 291 

:^[i;irtment or bureau or eliminated entirely, he shall report his coiiclusioiis 
I Congress with such recommendations as he may deem proper. 
Sfc. 6. That all laws or parts of laws conflicting with the provisions of this 
t are to the extent of such conflict suspended while this act is in force. 
Upon the termination of this act all executive or administrative agencie.T, 
M>artments. commissions, bureaus, offices, or officers shall exercise the same 
nictions, duties, and powers as heretofore or as hereafter by law may be 
-ovided, any authorization of the President under this act to the contrary 
^withstanding. 



Appendix IV'. 

THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD. 

MAIN DIVISIONS. 
he Board: 

BEBNARD M. BARUCH, Chairman (ex officio member of all committees). 

F.x Legge, Vice Chairman. J. Leonard Replogle, Steel Adrainls- 

:>nr Admiral F. F. Fletcher, Navy. trator. 

aj. Gen. George W. Goethals. Army. L. L. Summers, Technical Advisor. 

•REKT S. Brookings, Chairman Price- Albebt C. Ritchie, General Counsel. 

Fixing Committee. H. P. Ingels, Secretary. 

TGH Frayne, Labor. Herbert Bayard Swope, Associate 

iwiN B. Parker, Priorities Commis- Member. 

sioner. Clarence Dillon, Harrison Wil- 

-OKGE N. Peek, Commissioner of Fin- liams. and Harou) T. Clark, Assist- 

ished Products. ' ants to the Chairman. 

rice-fixing Committee: 

Kiliert S. Brookings, chairman. Members: B. M. Baruch, chairman War 
idustries Board ; W. B. Colver, chairman Federal Trade Commission ; Hugh 
•a,\ ne, labor representative, War Industries Board ; H. A. Garfield, Fuel Ad- 
im'-^trator ; Commander John IVI. Hancock, Navy representative; Lieut. Col. 
'liert H. Montgomery, Army representative; Henry C. Stuart; Dr. F. W. Taus- 
-'. cliairman Tariff Commission; W. W. Phelps, secretary. 

ibor Division. — Hugh Frayne, chairman. 

War Prison Labor and National Waste Reclamation Section. — Dr. E. Stagg 

liitin, chairman executive committee, National Committee on Prisons and 

in Labor; W. .T. Spillman, chief, Office of Farm Management, Department 

Agriculture; Capt. H. L. Baldensporgor, Reclamation Division, United 

s Army; Anthony Caminetti, United States Commissioner of Immigration, 

■p.irtment of Labor; John J. Manning, secretary, union label trades dopart- 

inf, American Federation of Labor; Dr. Charles H. Winslow, assistant dlrec- 

r of research. Federal Board for Vocational Education; Edwin F. Sweet. 

sistant Secretary Department of Commerce; Lieut. J. B. Goldman, United 

• ates Navy; Maj. J. W. Riley, The Adjutant General's Office. 

Hied Purchasing Commission: 

Bernard M. Baruch, Robert S. Lovett, Robert S. Brookings. Business 
'!'i;ijrer: Alex Legge, succeeded by Jan)es A. Carr; a-ssistants: A. L. Bostwick, 

n!fs C. Leddy and F. E. Penick. 

-'quirements Division: 

Alex Legge, chairman. Members: Lieut. Col. C. C. Bolton, General Staff: 
< orge M. Brill, Emergency Fleet representative; James A. Carr, representing 



292 AMERICAN IliTDUSTRY IIST THE WAR. 

the Allies ; Col. George H. Estes, Army representative ; James Inglis ; C. H. Mac 
Dowell, chemicals ; P. B. Noyes, Fuel Administrator's representative ; Edwiu B 
Parker, priority ; George N. Peek, finished products ; Admiral C. J. People^ 
Navy representative; M. B. Pool, Red Cross representative; T. C. Powell. Rail 
road Administrator's representative ; J. Leonard Replogle, steel ; A. W. Shaw 
conservation ; L. L. Summers, technical advisor. War Industries Board ; Capt 
M. N. Taylor, Navy representative ; T. F. Whitmarsh, Food Administrator' 
representative; Maj. Seth Williams, Marine Corps representative; Pope Yeat 
man, nonferrous metals ; W. E. Guylee, executive secretary. 

Clearance office — Requirements division. — J. C. Musser, secretary ; C. I 
Hughes, assistant secretary. 

Finished Products Division: 

George X. Peek, commi.ssioner of finished products; E. L. Crawford, as>;isran 
to commissioner; W. M. Ritter, assistant to commissioner, certifying oftb er 
Walter Robbins, assistant to commissioner. 

Priorities Division: 

Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner; Rhodes S. Baker, as.sistant piior 
ities commissioner. 

Priorities Board. — Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner; Edward Cham 
bers, director of traflic, United States Railroad Administration; Admiral F. ¥ 
Fletcher. United States Navy ; Felix Frankfurter, labor representative ; Gee 
George W. Goethals, United States Army ; Alex Legge, representative of Alliei 
Purchasing Commission; P. F. Noyes, director of conservation, Fuel Adminis 
tration; T. F. Whitmarsh, Food Administration; Charles R. Piez, vice presiden 
and general manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, representing th 
United States Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation ; Clarence 11 
Wooley, member of the War Trade Board; H. G. Phillipps. secretary. 

Priorities committee. — Edwin B. Parker, priorities commissioner, chairman 
Charles K. Foster, vice chairman. Members: George Armsby ; H. H. Barbour 
W. W. Chase ; Percy Holbrook ; J. M. Hopkins ; Henry Krumb ; F. H. Macphei 
son ; Rear Admiral N. E. Mason ; Lieut. Col. C. A. McKenny ; Everett IMorss 
Lucius P. Ordway; T. C. Powell; Rear Admiral A. V. Zane. Maurice Hirsch 
secretary, and Marcus B. Hall, assistant secretary. 

Labor section, prix)ritics division. — A. W. Clapp, chief. 

Nonn-ar constrnction .section, priorities division. — D. R. McLennan, chief. 

Conservation Division: 

A. W. Shaw, Chairman ; Charles K. Foster : Dr. E. F. Gay ; Lieut. Col. W. E 
Roberts ; C. H. MacDowell ; Admiral Samuel McGowan ; George N. Peek ; T. C 
Powell; Poi>e Yeatman; Melvin T. Copeland, executive secretary. 

Division of Planning and Statistics: 

Edwin F. Gay, chairman; Henry S. Dennison, assistant chairman; H. E 
Hatfield, director ; J. Lee Coulter, chief of commodity section ; Wesley C 
Mitchell, chief of price section ; ]\Iills E. Case, chief of contract section : Le^ 
Wolman, editor of Commodity Bulletin; William A. Barber; Alice C. Boughton 
Stuart Daggett; L. K. Frank; Paul Willard Garrett; Walter Holsin^er 
Walter W. Stewart. 

Employment Management Courses: 

James Inglis, chairman ; P. E. Foerderer, vice chairman ; Capt. Boyd Fishei 
Government supervisor. (Operated under joint advisory committee of th' 
Array, Emergency Fleet Corporation, Labor Department, Navy, and Wa 
Industries Board.) 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 293 

icilities Division: 

Samuel P. Bush, director; Capt. C. Baiubergor; C. W. Carroll; M. F. Chase; 
. L. Dame; Capt. W. B. Dickinson; J. I. Downey; L. H. Kittredge; G. E. 
:iller ; L. B. Reod ; II. Williams. 

ivision of Business Administration: 

John Esher Knobel, director and business nuinaser; William E. Goodfellow, 
ssistant business manager; Charles H. Birr, comptroller; W. G. Scott, disburs- 
ig officer; W. B. Martin, chief clerk; Charles J. Davis, assistant; L. Perry 
ergnson, storekeeper; Mrs. Mary Newton, chief of bureau of personnel; H. L. 
anibert, superintendent of buildings. 

OMMODITY AND MISCELLANEOUS DIVISIONS AND SECTIONS. 

NciTE. — Each division and section had as memhors authorized representatives of the 
rmy and of the Navj' and of other purchasing departments interested in the commodity. 

A(/ricultural impJoncnts and wood ji^'oducts. — E. E. Parsonage, chief; P. B. 
chravesande, assistant. 

Automotive products section. — C. C. Hauch, chief; Edward J. Ilickey, 
5sistant. 

Brass section. — Everett Morss, chief. 

Building materials division. — Richard L. Humphrey, director. Assistants: 
r. A. K. Anthony ; Morris C. Betts ; A. L. Gladding ; Norman H. Hill ; Frank 

, Kendall; C. M. Lyman; C. D. Morley; H. A. Schaffer; Edna M. Stangland ; 

. A. Styles; U. F. Turpin; F. W. Walker; Capt. George W. Riddle; Ira H. 
roolson, advisory engineer. New York branch : George L. Lucas, in charge, 
hiladelphia branch: Herbert B. Allen, in charge. Norfolk branch: W. K 
aw, in charge. 

Chain section. — John C. Schmidt, chief; Arthur E. Crockett, assistant. 

hemicals Division. — Charles H. MacDowell, director. 

Abrasives. — See Electrodes and abrasives section, chemicals division. 

Acids and heavy chemicals section. — Albert R. Brunker, chief; Russell S. 
Lubbard, associate ; A. E. Wells, associate. 

Alkali and chlorine section. — (Cau.«tic soda, soda ash, chlorine and chlorine 
roducts, lime, potash, and salt.) H. G. Carrell, chief; Lieut. E. A. Williams, 
ssociate. 

Asbestos. — See Chemical glass and stoneware section, chemicals division. 

Chemical glass and stonexcare section. — (Asbestos and magnesia Included.) 
obert M. Torrence, chief. 

Coal-gas products section. — (Toluol, benzol, xylol, phenol, solvent naphtlia, 
)ad oil, asphaltum, acetylene, nitrogen, calcium carbide, rare gases, saccharin, 
ydrogen, and oxygen, including commandeering and allocation of toluol.) 
. M. Morehead, chief; Ira C. Darling, associate toluol distribution. 

Creosote section. — Ira C. Darling, chief. 

Dye section (synthetic dyes and intermediates section). — Dr. Victor L. King, 
lief; Dr. .J. F. Schoellkopf, jr., chief, resigned. 

Electric furnaces, electrolysis, electrometallurgy. — -See Technical and cnnsult- 

g section, chemicals division. 

Electrodes and abrasives section. — Capt. Henry C. Du Bois, chief. 

Ethyl alcohol secfioH.— William G. Woolfolk, chief; A. E. Wells, associate. 

Ferroalloys section. — (Chrome, manganese, and tungsten ores and ferro- 
lloys, such as ferro chrome, manganese, vanadium, titanium, silicon, and 



294 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

tungsten; also spiegeleisen, mauganesite, and zirconium.) Hugh W. Sanford, 
cliief ; C. D. Tripp, associate. 

Fine chemicals section. — (Miscellaneous analytical, photographic, and pharma- 
ceutical chemicals, etc.) A. G. Rosengarten, chief. 

Fire brick, chrome brick, etc. — See Refractories section, chemicals division. 

Magnesia. — See Chemical glass and stoneware section, chemicals division. 

Magnesite. — See Ferroalloys section. 

Mica section. — C. K. Leith, chief. 

Nitrate section. — Charles H. MacDowell, chief; J. A. Becker, associate; 
H. Ray Paige. 

Paint and pigment section.— L. R. Atwood, chief; Russell S. Hubbard, chief, 
deceased. 

Platinum section. — (Platinum, palladium, iridium.) C. H. Conner, chief; 
R. H. Carleton, associate; G. E. DeNike, associate. 

Refractories section. — (Fire brick, chrome brick, etc.) Charles Catlett, 
chief. 

Sulphur and pyrites section. — William G. Woolfolk, chief; A. E. Wells, asso- 
■ciate ; J. R. Townsend, associate. 

Tanning material and vegetable dye section. — (Including inedible oils, fats, 
iind waxes.) E. J. Haley, chief; E. A. Prosser, associate; Harold G. Wood, 
associate. 

Technical and consulting section. — Dr. Herbert R. Moody, associate; Dr. 
E. R. Weidlein, associate ; Dr. T. P. McCutcheon, associate. 

Toluol. — See Coal-gas products section, chemical division. 

Wood chemical section. — (Including methyl alcohol, methyl acetone, acetone, 
€thyl methyl ketone, acetate of lime, acetic acid, acetic anhydride, formaldehyde, 
aspirin, methyl acetate, etc.) C. H. Conner, chief; A. H, Smith, associate ; R. D. 
Walker, associate. 

Statistics, chemicals section — Joint office on chemical statistics. — Capt. Willis 
B. Rice, associate; Lieut. M. R. Gordon, associate; Asst. Paymaster Dunning, 
associate ; Arthur Minuick, associate. 

Conversion of industry. — See Resources and conversion section. 

Copper tubing. — See Brass section — Nonferrous tubing. 

Cotton and cotton linters section. — See Textile division. 

Crane section. — A. C. Brown, chief; Capt. C. E. Stamp, assistant chief; Louis 
P. Lipps. 

Electrical and power equipment section. — Walter Bobbins, chief; L. W. 
Grothaus, .John H. Waterman, Allen P. Bender, Max Greenburg, Merritt M. 
Hughes, Wm. S. James, Thos. S. Knight, Edward R. Welles, J. A. Merwin. 

Electric wire and cable section. — Le Roy Clark, chief. 

Emergency construction committee. — Col. W. A. Starrett, chairman ; !\Iaj. 
Clair Foster ; John Don! in, American Federation of Labor ; Lieut. J, B. Talmadge, 
secretary. 

Explosives Division.— M. F. Chase, director. 

Felt section. — See Textile division. 

Fiber. — See Jute, hemp, and cordage section. 

Fire prevention section. — W. H. Merrill, chief; Charles H. Smith, associate 
chief of section; George W. Booth, associate chief of section; Frank Pierce, 
Wilbur Mallalieu. 

Flax products section. — See Textile division. 

Forgings, guns, small arms, and small arm ammunition. — Samuel P. Bush, 
chief; Capt. Clarence Bamberger; Charles W. Carroll. 

Odd and silver section. — C. H. Conner, chief. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 295 

Hardware and hand tool section. — Murray Sargont, oliief ; I.awronce J. Stod- 
;ircl. gauges; Thomas F. Bailey, uiill supplies; Alfred I.. Lincoln, drills and 

amers; E. W. Lively, inachiulsts' precision tools; L. H. Wetlierell, cutlery, 
etxlles, sewing luacbines. 

lide, Leather and Leather Goods Division. — C. F. C. Stout, director. 

Section chiefs. — Thomas Cover, jr., in charge of sole leather; O. C. Howe, In 
large of foreign skins and hides; L. B. Jackson, in charge of domestic skins and 
ides; F. A. Vogel, in charge of upper leather; K. M. Pindell, jr., executive 
x-retary. 

Chiefs of bureaus. — C. D. 1'. Hamilton, shoe manufacturers; Charles J. Chis- 
olm, shoe retailers; George Kowbotham, belting; Charles A. Rogers, harne.ss 

ni personal equipment, except shoes and clothing; Harry J. Louis, gloves. 

Assistants. — Robert D. Ware, belting bureau ; George R. Wheeler, shoe mauu- 
acturing bureau; Thomas W. Hughes, assistant to executive secretary. 



Inland traffic section. — Thomas C. Powell, chief; Henry F. Bell, assistant. 

Jute, hemp, and cordage section. — E. C. Heidrich, jr., chief. 

Legal scction.—B.. M. Channing, chief; W. C. Saeger; E. M. Dodd, jr.; H. R. 
fower. 

Linters and cotton goods section. — See Textile division. 

Lumber section. — Charles Edgar, director; Maj. Armistead M. Cooke, as- 

stant. 

Machine tool section. — G. E. Merryweather, chief; Alvin B. Einig; Arthur 
. M. Baker ; Roland Houck ; Ernest D. Crockett ; Floyd C. Lowell ; Walter L. 
)itforth. 

Medical section. — Lieut. Col. F. F. Simpson, chief; David L. Kean, hospital 
urniture and equipment, surgical instruments; A. G. Rosengarten, medicinal 
hemicals. 

Mica section. — See Chemicals division. 

Miscellaneous commodities section. — M. B. Foster, chief. (This section han- 
les all commodities for which we have no specially established commodity 
iction.) 

Nonferrous metals section. — (Antimony, aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, quick- 
ilver, zinc.) Pope Yeatman, chief; E. C. Thurston, assistant; Andrew Walz, 
ssistant ; I. H. Cornell, lead and zinc. 

Nonferrous tubing section. — See Brass section. 

Optical glass and instruments section. — G. E. Chatillon, chief; Maj. F. E, 
V^right ; Lieut. Commander H. A. Orr. 

Power section. — Frederick Darlington, chief; Charles B. Davis, business as- 
istant; Maj. Charles F. Lacombe; Maj. George S. Sever; Maj. Malcolm Mac- 
aren ; Capt. Carroll Shaw ; Capt. Ashton M. Tinsley ; Capt. John C. Damon ; 
ieut. George K. Miltenburger ; Lieut. William W. Stanley. 

Production division. — See Special advisory committee on plants and nmnition.s. 

•ulp and Paper Division.— Thomas E. Donnelley, director. 
Newspaper section. — G. J. Palmer, chief. 
Paper economics section. — I. W. Blanchard, chief. 
Manufacturing section. — S. L. Willson, chief. 
Fiber board and container section. — Harold W. Nichols, chief. 

Railicay equipment and supplies section. — J. Rogers Flannery, chief. 

Resources and conversion section. — Cliarles A. Otis, chief; John A. Kling, 
ssistant chief; Charles H. Anthony; Edward F. Bulmahn ; W. T, Rossiter; 
rving H. Taylor. 



296 AMERICAX INDUSTRY IX THE WAE. 

Rubber section. — See Textile division. 
Shipping — Mineral imports and exports. — C. K. Leith. 

Small arms and small-arms ammnnition. — See Forgings, guns, etc., section. 

Stnall tools. — See Hardware and hand-tool section. 

Special advisory committee on plants and munitions. — S. M. Vauclain, chafagi 

man; Capt. C. K. Rockwell, J. M. Hansen, Henry R. Rea, Frank W, Morse, ( 

E. F. Wood, Admiral A. R. Couden, G. M. Shaw. 

Steel Division. — J. Leonard Replogle, director of steel supply ; Frank Purnell, 

assistant director ; E. D. Graff, special agent. 

Steel products section. — F. E. Thompson, chief; G. M. Bartley, cars and loeo: 
motives ; D. A. Holloran, emergency fleet ; J. A. McDonald, mill expert ; D. F. J 
Mann, wire products; R. I. Richardson, chief clerk; G. C. Shidle, tubes; C. 0, 
Thomas, sheets ; H. H. Weaver, mill schedules. 

Projectile steel, rails, alloy steel, and cold-drawn steel sectvon. — Capt. D. E» 
SaA^Ter, chief; John W. Horr. assistant, alloy steel and cold-drawn steel; IlV 
L. Lovell, assistant, projectile steel ; F. A. Weymouth, assistant, rails. 

Pig iron section. — Jay C. McLauchlan, chief; J. W. Dickson, S. R. Leonard, 
L. R. Smith, B. S. Stephenson, L. W. Williams. 

Permit section. — J. S. Barclay, chief; G. H. Pyne, assistant. 

Bureau of uarehonse distribution. — Andrew Wheeler, chief; Philo B. Rhoades,- 
assistant ; Austin D. Smith, assistant. 

Iron and steel scrap section. — William Vernon Phillips, chief. 

Statistics. — Percy K. Withey, chief; Ernest L. Selden, assistant. 

Stored materials section. — J. F, Wilkins, chief. 

Textile Division.— John W. Scott, director; Henry B. Ashton, assistant. 

Cotton and cotton linters section. — George R. James, chief; George W. Naum^ 
burg, assistant; Sherbourne Prescott, assistant. 

Cotton goods section. — Spencer Turner, chief; Grosvenor Ely, assistant j" 
George F. Smith, thread ; Burton Etherington, yarn ; Ralph E. Loper, mill 
equipment and production. 

Felt section. — Sylvan Stroock, chief. 

Fla.r products section. — George F. Smith, chief. 

Knit goods section.— ''Lincoln Cromwell, chief; Rufus W. Scott, associate; 

F. E. Haight, associate ; John McCauley, associate. 
Rubber and rubber goods section. — H. T. Dunn, chief. 
Silk section. — William Skinner, chief. 

Domestic wool section. — Lewis Penwell, chief; William D. McKellar, as-' 
sistant. 
Foreign icool section. — A. M. Patterson, chief. 

Woolens secfioH.— Herbert E. Peabody, chief; A. L. Gifford, assistant. 
Tar7i section. — See Cotton goods section. 

Tin section. — George N. Armsby, chief; James W. Hitchcock, assistant; 
Lincoln Hutchinson, assistant ; Thomas G. Cranwell, assistant. 

Tobacco section. — A. I. Esberg, chief. 

Wire and cable. — See Electric wire and cable section. 

Wood products. — See Agricultural implements, etc., section. 

Woolens section. — See Textile division. 

Wool section. — See Textile division. 

Tarn section. — See Textile division, cotton goods section. 

News section, committee on public information. — Stanley M. Reynolds, A. O. 
Hayward. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 
Rcijional advisers. 



297 



0. 1, Boston, Mass 

:o. 2, Bridgeport, Conn. 
o.3,Now York, N. Y.. 



0. 4, Philadelphia, Pa . 
,0. 5, Pittsburgh, Pa.. 



To. 6, Rochester, N. Y. 
lo. 7, Cleveland, Ohio. 



To. 8, Detroit, Mich 

to. 9, Chicago, m 

fo. 10, Cincinnati, Ohio. 
rp.U, Baltimore, Md... 



ro. 12. Atlanta, Ga. 



fa 13, Birmingham, Ala. 



fo. 14, Kansas City, Mo. 

lo. 15, St. Louis, Mo 

10.16, St. Paul, Minn.. 
lo. 17, Milwaukee, Wis.. 
(0. 18. DaUas. Tex 



fo.19, San Francisco, Calif. 

lo, 20, Seattle, Wash 

lo. 21, Denver. Colo 



Stuart W. Webb, care of 

chamber of commerce. 
C. D. Pierce, jr., care of 

chamber of commerce. 
Wm. Fellowes Morgan, care 

of Merchants' Association 

of New York. 
Ernest T. Trigg, 1228 Wide- 

ncr Building. 
Geors;e S. Oliver, care of 

chamber of commerce. 



E. A. Fletcher, care of 
chamber of commerce. 

W. B. McAllister, care of 
chamber of commerce. 

Allan A. Templetou, care of 
chamber of commerce. 

D. E. Felt, 29 South La 
Salle Street. 

Edwin C. Gibbs, 31 East 
Fourth Street. 

F. S. Chav;innps, care Mer- 
chants & Manufacturers 
Association. 

Edward H. Inman, care of 
chamber of commerce. 

T. H. Aldrich, 322 Brown- 
Marx Building. 

Franklin D. Crabbs, Tenth 
and Central Streets. 

Jackson Johnson, care of 
chamber of commerce. 

D. R. Cotton, 1414 Pioneer 
Building. 

August H. Vogel, fourth 
floor, city hall. 

Louis I,ipsitz, 407-9 South- 
land Life Building. 

Frederick J. Koster, care of 
chamber of commerce. 

Herbert Witherspoon, care 
of chamber of commerce. 

Cass E. Herrington, 510 
Symes Building. 



Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, eostorn 

Miissachusctts, Rhode Island. 
Western Mnssachusotts, Connecticut. 

Nine southeastern counties of New York, 
Long Ishmd, and northern New Jersey. 

Eastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jcrse 
Delaware. 

Western Pennsylvania, except Erie, Craw- 
ford, and Mercer Counties; JelTer.son and 
Belmont Counties of Ohio. AllcL-any, Gar- 
"•ett, and Waahin,'lon Coimties of Mary- 
land; West Virginia. 

New York State, except Metropolitan dis- 
trict, New "^'ork City. 

Erie, Crawford, and Mercer Counties of Penn- 
sylvania; northern Ohio, exceptmg Jeffer- 
son and Belmont Counties. 

Southern Michigan. 

Iowa, northern Illinois, and northern In- 
diana. 

Southern Ohio, southern Indiana, and Ken- 
tucky. 

Eastern Maryland, Virginia. 



North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
and Florida, excepting western tier of 
counties. 

Tenno.ssee, Mississippi, Alabama, western 
tier of coimties In Florida, and southern 
Louisiana. 

Utah, Wyommg, Colorado, northern New 
Mexico, northern Oklahom:». Kansas, Ne- 
braska, and western strip of Sfissouri. 

Missouri, Arkansas, and southern Illinois. 

Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, 

Mmuesota, and northwestern Michigan. 
Southern Wisconsin. 

Texas, northern Louisiana, southeastern Ok- 
lahoma, southern New Mexico, and south- 
e;i.stern Arizona. 

California, Nevada, and Arizona, except 
southeastern counties m Dallas district. 

Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. 

Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and northern 
Now Mexico. 



298 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Members of the War Industries Board organisation. 



Name. 



Position in "War Industries Board. 



Former basiness. 



Abbott, Arthur J 

Abell,Chas. S 

Adler,H. S 

Aldrich, Lieut. H. R 



AIdrich,H.W 

Aldrich, Truman H. . . 
Alexander, Maurice M. 

Allen, Herbert B 

Alsberg, Dr. CarlL... 



Anderson, Chandler P. 
Anthony, Charles H.... 
Anthony, Wm. A. R... 

Archer, Maj. P. F 

Armsby, George N 

Ashton, Henry B 

Atwood, Lewis R 

Averill, William A 

A ycock, Thomas J 

Baggott, Capt. John C. 



Bailey, Thomas F. 



Baker, A. J 

Baker, Rhodes S. 



Baldenspcrger.Capt. H. L. 

Bamberger, Capt. C 

Barber, William A 

Barbour, Henry H 

Barclay, James S 

Barlow, De Witt D 



Barnes, M. H 

Barnum, Harris" 



Barsh, Waldo A . . . 
Bartley, George M. 



Baruch, Bernard M. 
Bales, Frederic G... 



Bates, Henry M. 
Bayliss, Wm. G. 
Beat, James H. . 



Bean, Charles A.... 
Beatty, William T. 



Chief, questionnaire section 

Assistant section chief, priorities 
division. 

Secretary of special representa- 
tive of United States Railroad 
Administration with War In- 
dustries Board. 

Nonferrous metals section 



Staff, lumber section 

Regional advisor, Birmingham, 

Ala. 
Assistant in platinimi section 



In charge Philadelphia branch 
building material division. 

Advisory board on medicinal 
agents, section of medical in- 
dustry. 

Special counsel on international 
affairs. 

Staff, resources and conversion 
section. 

Assistant to chief, building mate- 
rial division. 

Requirements representative, Ma- 
Marine Corps. 

Member priorities committee, 
chief in charge of tin. 

Assistant to director, textile divi- 
sion. 

Chief, paint and pigment section. . 

Expert, division of planning and 
statistics. 

Lumber production director, 
Georgia and Florida. 

Examiner, Army section, priori- 
ties committee. 

Assistant to cliicf, hardware and 

hand-fool section. 
Assistant, machine-tool section.. . 
Assistant priorities commissioner. . 

Member war prison labor and na- 
, tional waste reclamation section. 
Assistant chief, forgings, guns, etc., 

section. 
Expert, price statistics 



Member priorities committee 

Chief, permit section, steel divi- 
sion. 
Associate chief, dredging section.. 



Assistant machine tool section 

Gold and silver section of the 

chemical division. 
Secretary to director of chemicals 

Expert, steel division 



Chairman nf the Board 

Staff, central bureau of planning 

and statistics. 
....do 



Expert, fire prevention section 

Member advisory committee on 
medicinal agents, section of med- 
ical industry. 

Statistician, division of planning 
and statistics. 

Staff, conservation division 



Member law firm, Evans, Abbott & 

Pearce, Los Angeles, Calif. 
Baltimore, Md. 

Secretary to vice president. Southern Ry. 
Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. 



Chief of field party and petrographer, 
Wisconsin Geographical Survey, Mel- 
rose, Mass. 

Sales manager, Hammond Lumber Co., 
Mill City, Oreg. 

Mining engineer for city of Birmingham, 
Ala. 

In charge of customers' room, John L. 
Dunlop & Co., Louisville, Ky. 

Secretary Eastern Stone Producers' As- 
sociation, Philadelphia, Pa. 

Chief Bureau of Chemistry, Department 
of Agriculture. 

Law firm, Anderson & Anderson, New 

York, N. Y. 
Export salesman, Detroit, Mich. 

Assistant to secretary. Master Builders 

Association, Boston, Mass. 
Washington, D. C. 

Vice president, California Packing Cor- 
poration, San Francisco, Calif. 

Credit manager, Carson, Pirie, Scott & 
Co., Chicago, 111. 

President, Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., Louis- 
ville, Ky. 

Inspector in elementary education. State 
Education Department, Albany, N. Y. 

General manager, the Aycock Lumber 
Co., Aycock, Fla. 

Purchasing agent and factory manager, 
McCormick Manufacturing Co., Day- 
ton, Ohio. 

Manager and treasurer. Banks Supply 
Co., Huntington, W. Va. 

Moseler Sate Co., Hamilion, Ohio. 

Law firm, Thompson, Knight, Baker & 
Harris, Dallas, Tex. 

Reclamation division, U. S. Army, 

Mining engineer. Salt Lake City, Utah. 

Professor of commercial education, New 

York University. 
Manaeer of sales, Lackawanna Steel Co., 

New York, N.Y. 
Trustee of an estate, New York, N. Y. 

Vice president and general manager At- 
lantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., New York, 
N. Y. 

Henry Prentice Co., New York, N. Y. 

Manager Washington branch office, Na- 
tional Fireprooflng Co. 

Private secretary, C. H. MacDowell, 
Armour & Co., Chicago, HI. 

Assistant sales manager, Cleveland Steel 
Co., Cleveland, Ohio. 

New York, N. Y. 

Partner, Bates & Gamble, Toledo, Ohio. 

Dean of law school, University of Michi- 
gan. 

Engineer, Ohio Inspection Bureau, Co- 
lumbus, Ohio. 

Director of pharmacy research, Univer- 
versity of Illinois. 

Salesman and office manager, Merrill 
Oldham & Co., bankers, Boston, Mass. 

President and general manager, Austin 
Manufacturing Co., Chicago, 111. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 299 

Members of the ^yar Industries Board organisation — Continued. 



Becker, John A.. 

Boil, Henry F.... 
Bender, Allan P. 



Bender, Maj. John L. 
Bergen, Charles Wm. 

Belts, Morris C 



Bickford, Roberts. 
Bingham, Harry P. 



Birr, Charles H 

Bhinchard, Isaac H. 



l^lankenship, Lieut. J. M. 
Bolt, Edward J 



Bolton, Lieut. Col. C. C. 



Boniface, Addison O. 



Room, Eugene C. 
Booth, George W 



I 
Bostwick, A. L 

Boughton, Alice B 

Bowler, Marian 

Boyd, Henry W 

Brand, Charles J 

Brayton, Edward 

BriU,Geo.M j 

B rooker, Hubert H ' 

B rookings , Robert S 

Brown, Alexander C 



Assistant chief, nitrates section, 
chemical division. 

Assistant to chief, Inland traffic 
section. 

Expert, electric and power equip- 
ment section. 

Assistant in charge, .Vrmy section 

priorities committee. 
Expert, electric and power 

equipment division. 

Assistant to director, building 
materials section. 

-Auditor, domestic wool section 

Secretary War Industries Hoard, 
Aug. 1.1917-Jan. 1.1918. 

Comptroller, division of business 
administration. 

Chief, paper economics section, 
pulp and paper division. 

Naval assistant 

Assistant to chief clerk, facilities 
division. 

Secretary and assistant to chair- 
man. General Munitions Board, 
and chairman of clearance com- 
mittee. 

Expert, fire prevention .section 



Examiner, priorities division 

.^ssociate chief, fire prevention 

section. 
Member purchasing commission. . . 

Expert, price statistics, division 
planning and statistics. 

Research assistant, division 
planning and statistics 

Expert, leather division, mem- 
ber foreign mission. 

Chairman committee on cotton 
distribution. 

Expert, cotton goods section 



Former business. 



Brown, George S. 



Requirements division, emer- 
gency fleet representative. 

Secretary, foreign mission 

Chairman, price fixing committee. 



Chief, crane section, assistant to 
commissioner of finished prod- 
ucts. 

Expert, cotton goods section 



B-runing, H. F 

Brunker, Albert R 



Bryan, Allen W... 

Bryar,W. B 

Buel, Hillhoiase... 
Bulkley, Robert J. 

Bullard, Percy 

Bulmahn, E. F... 
Burgess, William., 



Staff, conservation division 

Chief, acids and heavy chemicals 
section. 

Statistician, division of planning 

and statistics. 
Expert, hardware and hand tool 

section. 
Expert, division of planning and 

statistics. 
Chief, legal section 



Burke, John H.,Jr 

Burrowes, John F 



Burwell, William R. 
Biish, Samuel P 



Expert, nonwar construction sec- 
tion. 

Member resources and conversion 
section. 

Expert, hardware and hand tool 
section. 



Reporter 

Expert, facilities division. 



■utz, Theodore C. 



Division of planning and statistics 

Director,facilitiesdivision, chief of 

the forgings, guns, etc.. .section. 

Examiner, priorities division 



Traveling auditor. Armour FcrtllUer 

Works, Chicago. tU. 
General agent in Cuba Southern Ry. Co. 

Commercial engineor, We.stinehou.se 
Electric and Manufacturing Co., East 
Pitt'^burgh, I'a. 

President and general manager .\ltoona 

Overland Co., Altoona, Pa. 
New York roprosontatives of the Ford <fc 
KendigCo., Philadelphia, Collin Valve 
Co., I?oston,et al. 

Architect, oflice of Public Roads, Wash- 
ington, T>. C. 

Broker, Boston, Mass. 

Cleveland, Ohio. 

C. P. A. StafI of Baker, Vawter & Wolf, 
Chicago, III. 

President Isaac H. Blanchard Co., New 
York, N. Y. 

Wa.shington,P. C. 

Sales manager, Twentieth Century Pub- 
lishing Co., Philadelphia, Pa. 

Secretary Bourne Fuller Co. Cleve- 
land, Ohio. 



Superintendent of inspections. Under- 
writers Laboratories, Chicago, 111. 

Attorney at law, San Francisco, Calif. 

Chief engineer, National Board of Fire 
UnderwTiters, New York, N. Y. 

Secretary Planning Commission of St. 
Louis," Mo. 

Research e.xpert. Home Economics, Bu- 
reau of Educational Experimontx. 

Instructor of French, Dedham, Mass. 

President Armour Leather Co., Chicago, 

111. 
Chief, Bureau of Markets, Department 

of Agriculture. 
Treasurer and cotton buyer, Towne, 

Bravton & Osborn, Fall River, Mass. 
140 North Broad Street Philadelphia, 

Pa. 
International Harvester Co., Chicago, III. 
President Washington University, St. 

Louis, Mo. 
President Brown Hoisting Machinery Co. 

Cleveland, Oliio. 

Cost and Production Accountant, Ash- 
land Cotton Co., Jewett City, Conn. 

1029 Myrtle Street, Oakland, Calif. 

President Liquid Carbonic Co., Chicago, 
111., and Atlantic Steel Casting CO., 
Chester, Pa. 

Special Assistant Committee on Public 
Information Wasliington, D. C. 

General manager Bailey-Karrei Manu- 
facturing Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. 

Lawyer, Seattle, Wash. 

Law firm, Bulkley, Hauxhurst, Socger & 

Jamie.son, Cleveland, Ohio. 
Filer, Bullard & Smith, New York N. Y. 

Vice president David G. Fisher it Co., 

Davenport, Iowa. 
First vice president, U. 8. Potters' A»> 

s(x;iation, Trenton, N. J., and East 

Liven>ool, Ohio. 
Court Koportcr, Kalamazoo, Mich. 
ArchiU«tau(i i:nKine<T, John I. Downey 

(Inc.), Now York, N. Y. 
Brown University, Providence, R. I. 
President, Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 

Columbus. Ohio, 
l.ackner (V Hutz, Mortgage Investment.", 

Chicago, 111. 



300 AMERICA?^ INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

ilembers of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Former business. 



Caminnetti, Anthonv . 



Campbell, John James. 
Canadav, Ward M 



Callery, John B i Assistant, resources and conver- 
sion section. 
Member of war prison labor and 
national waste reclamation sec- 
tion. 

Nonferrous metals i 

Expert, nonwar construction sec- 
tion. 
Carleton, R. H j Associate chief, platinum section.. 

Carmalt, James W i Staff, central bureau of statistics. . 

Carpenter, Gilbert E 

Carr, James A 



Carrell, Horace G 
Carroll, Chas.Wn 



Expert, manufacturing section, 
pulp and paper division. 

Business manager, purchasing 
commission. 

Chief, alkali and chlorine section. . 

Staff, facilities division 



Case, Mills E ' Cliief, contract section, division 

I planning and statistics. 
Catlett, Charles ! Chief, refractories section 



Chamberlain, W. E , Lumber section 

Chambers, Edward Priorities board, United States 

I Railroad Administration rep- 
resentative. 
Chandler, AVillard D ] Expert, f5re prevention section 



Channing, Henry M j Chief, legal section 

Chapin, Edward F.,jr Examiner, priorities division 

Chappelear, Edgar S I Expert, di\'ision of planning sta- 
tistics. 
Charlton, Earle P I Member of brass section 



Chase, March F i Director, explosives division 

Chase, Wendell W i Member, priorities committee 

Chatillon, George E Chief, military optical glass and 

instrument section. 
Chavannes, Frank S Regional advisor, Baltimore 



Chisholm, Charles K | Assistant to chief, boot and shoe 

1 section, hides, leather, and 
I leather goods division. 

Clapp, A. W Chief of labor section, priorities 

divi-^ion. 
.. Joint oflfice on chemical statistics. 



Clapp, Henry H., 
Clark, Arthur W. 
Clark, Harold T.. 
Clark, LeRoy.... 
Clark, MancelT.. 
Clayton, Wm. L. 

los, Jean H 

Cobb, J. P 

Coffin, John N . . . 



Collins, Walter G . 



Colver, W. B 

Comstock, Louis K. 



Conner, Charles H. 



Secretary to chief of nonwar con- 
struction section. 

Assistant to chairman. War In- 
dustries Board. 

Chief of electric wire and cable 
section. 

Staff, conservation division 



Member of committee on cotton 

distribution. 
Assistant to vice chairman of the 

War Industries Board. 
Examiner, priorities division 



Requirements division, shipping 
board representative. 

Expert, di\ision of planning and 

statistics. 
Member, price fixing committee- . . 
Assistant to chief of brass section. . 

Chief, platinum section, wood 
chemical section, and gold and 
silver section. 



Vice president, Duquesne Fruit Co., 
Charter Oak, Calif. 

Commissioner of Immigration, Depart- 
ment of I abor. 

Morris Heights, New York. N. Y. 
Advertising manager, Willvs-Gverland 

Co., Toledo. Ohio. 
Member of firm, Blodgett & Co., bond 

dealers, New York, N'. Y. 
Chief evaminer. Interstate Commerce 

Commission, Washington, D. C. 
Director and sales manager, Carpenter 

Paner Co., Omaha, Nebr. 
Pre-ident, .\merican Seeding Machine 

Co., Richmond, Ind., and SpringPe'd, 

Ohio. 
Manager, technical service department, 

Solvay Process Co., Syracu-e, N. Y. 
Pr&sident and general manager, Tven- 

tieth Century Publishing Co., Phila- 
delphia, Pa. 
Statistician, New York City. 

Economic geologist and chemist: exami- 
ner of mineral properties, residence 
Staunton, Va. 

John M. Woods Lumber Co., East Cam- 
bridge, Mass. 

.\ssistant rirector <^eneral United States 
Railroad Administration, Washington, 
D.C. 

Engineer and inspector, New England 
Bureau of United Inspection, Boston, 
Mass. 

law firm, Channing & Frothinghanr, 
Boston, Mass. 

District sales manager. Universal Port- 
land Cement Co., Duluth, Minn. 

Assistant general auditor. Bankers' Trust 
Co., Ne V York, N. Y. 

Vice pre-ident, F. W. Woolworth & Co., 
Nev York, N. Y. 

Vice president. Commercial Acid Co., St. 
1 ouis, Mo. 

Consulting engineer, Poston, Mass. 

President, John Chatillon & Sons, New- 
York, N. Y. 

President and treasurer. Chesapeake 
Iron Works, Baltimore, Md. 

President, Chisholm Shoe Co., Cleve- 
land, Ohio. 

Attorney, St. Paul, Minn. 

In charge paper section, Bureau of 
Standards, Washington. D. C. 

Private secretary to l3. R. McLennan, of * 
Marsh & McLennan, Chicago, 111. 

Attorney, member of firm. Squire, San- 
ders Sc Dempsev, Cleveland, Ohio. 

President, Safetv Insulated Wire & Cable i 
Co., New York, N. Y. 

President, Wadsworth-Howlaud Co., 
Chicago, 111. 

Member of f rm, Anderson, Clavton & 
Co., New York, N. Y. 

Advertising manager, L'nited States Cop- 
per Co., New York, N. Y. 

Salesman, Ernest Jacoby Co., Boston, 
Mass. 

Assistant secretary and treasurer, Ten- 
nessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., 
Birmingham, Ala. 

Plant superintendent, L'nion Lumber 
Co., Fort Bragg, Calif. 

Chairman, Federal Trade Commission. 

President, L. K. Comstock & Co., New 
York, N. Y. 

Associated \snth Kissel Kinnicut & Co., 
New York, N. Y. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 301 

Members of the War Industries! Board organizatwn--Cou\'ui\wt]. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Howard H Assistant to chief, tin section. 

>raj. A. ^r Lumber section 



or, Carroll P.... 

land, Mehin T 

:>oran, Lieut. Edward 
T. 
roroy, A. A 

Cornell, Irwin H 

Cotton, Donald R 

Coulter, John Lee 

Cover, Ralph 

Cover, Thomas, jr 



Assistant special reore'entative 
of Vnited i^tates Railroad Ad- 
ministration with War Indus- 
tries Board. 

Executive secretary, conser\'ation 
division. 

Private secretary, R. M. Paruch. . 

Expert, steel di\-ision 



. perthwaite, Mortimer 



( rabbs, Franlclin D . . 

Crarin, B. .\., jr 

Craig, Joseph W 

Cranwell, Thomas G . 
Crawford, Everett L. 
Crockett, Arthur E... 
Crockett, Ernest D... 
(romwell, Lincoln... 



Expert, nonferrous metals section 

foreign mission. 
Regional advisor, St. Paul, Minn.. 

Expert, divi.sion of planning and 
statistics. 

Assistant to secretary priorities 
committee. 

Chief, sole and belting leather sec- 
tion, hides, leather and leather 
goods division. 

Secretary to IT. R. Rea, special ad- 
visory committee on plants and 
munitions. 

Regional advisor, Kansas City, Mo 



Lumber section 

Platinum section of chemical di- 
vision. 
Assistant to chief, tin section 



Former business. 



iirran, John H. 
utter, John 



Assistant to commissioner of fin- 
ished products. 
Assistant chief, chain section 

Assistant, machine tool section... 

Chief, knit goods section 



Staff, conservation division. . 
do 



zirett, Stuart 

me, Frank L 

inon, Maj. JohnC. 

forth, Mary L 

Ming, Ira C 



Expert, division of planning and 

statistics. 
Member of facilities division 



Expert, power section. 



ington, Frederick, 
ditertv, PaulR... 



Expert, division planning and sta- 
tistics. 
Chief, creosote section 



Chief, power section 

Chief, war contract section . 



- is, Charles B 

isChas. J 

..is, Leon K 

Day, E. E 

PcLeeuw, M. n 

- Nike, George F. 



Assistant to chief, power section... 

Assistant to chief clerk 

Expert, fire prevention section — 

Staff central bureau of planning 

and statistics. 
Assistant, machine tool section — 

Associate chief, platinum section. . 



'cnnison, Henry S Assistant chairman, central bu- 

I reau of planning and statistics. 
Mckinson, G . V I Staff, con.servation division 



I'itkson, George R. 
Kiokson, J. W 



Assistant to secretary priontics 

committee. 
Expert, steel division 



Assistant seorotarv, American Iron A 
Steel Institute, New York. N. Y. 

John T,. Roper I umbor Co., Norfolk, Va. 

.\ssisfant to vice president, Southern 
Railwav Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. 



Director of bureau of basine-ss research 

Harvard T'niversity. 
Mechanicsville, N. Y. 

Assistant general superintendent 

Youngsto\\-n Sheet & Tube Co., 

YoungstOT%-n. Ohio. 
Vice pre.^ident, St. Joseph lead Co., 

New York, N. Y. 
District sales manager, Illinois Steel Co., 

St. Paul. Minn. 
Dean of college of agriculture, I'niver- 

sltvof West \irdnia. 
Attorney at law, Baltimore, Md. 

Partner, Cover & Co., sole leather, Phila- 
delphia, Pa. 

Secretary to II. R. Rea, Pittsburgh, Pa. 



Owner, the Union Bank Note Co., Kan- 
sas Citv, Mo. 

Watkin-Gray Lumber Co., Hattlcsburg, 
Miss. 

Southern Railwav Co., Washington, 
D. C. 

President Continental Can Co., New 
York, N. Y. 

Crawford, Patton & Cannon, bankers, 
New York. N. Y. 

Sales manairer, chain department, Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. 

Sales engineer, Henry Prentiss &. Co., 
Springfield, Mass. 

Member of firm of Williams Iselin & Co., 
New York. N. Y. 

Lawyer, Chicaco, III. 

Head of trading department, Harris- 
Forbes & Co., Boston. Mass. 

Professor, University of California. 

Consulting engineer, Harrison Williams, 
New York, N. Y. 

A.ssistant chief engineer Utah Power it 
Liehl Co., Salt Lake City Utah. 

Manufacturer. Milwaukee, Wis., and In- 
dianapolis, Ind. 

President Martholomav A Darling Co., 
Chicago, III. 

Consulting entrincer. New York, N. Y. 

Kmi>Iovment expert, i'ennsylvaniaState 
Department of Labor, Philadelphia, 
Pa. 

Manager of Boston office. General Elec- 
tric Co. 

Democrat and Chronicle, Rochester, 
N. Y. 

Engineer inspector, Fireman's Mutual 
Fire Insurance Co.. Detroit. Mich. 

Asssitanl prorcssor. Harvard University. 

Sineer ManufacturingCo., Klizabcthport, 

N.J. 
Purchase and sales department Graves 

.Maut)ert. Gcoriro .v Co., wholeiale 

lumber, New York, N. Y. 
Provident Dcniiison Manufacturing Co., 

Framingham. Mass. 
General aecnt KIgIn National Watch Co., 

Elgin. 111. 
Sales and advertising manager, .''liannon 

A I.tichs,rcal a-itate, Washington, DX. 
Salesmun, I'.dmtind W. Mudgc Co., 
I I'ittsburgh, Pa. 



302 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Members of the War Industries Board organisation — Continued. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Fonner bnsiness. 



Dillon, Clarence 

Ditfurth, W. L 

Dizer, Malcolm C 

Dodd, E. Merrick, jr 

Doll, Lieut. E. G 

Donlin, John 

Donnelley, Thomas E... 

Doten, CarrollW 

Dowd, Charles F 

Downey, James E 

Downey, John I 

Downman, R. H 

Du Bois, Capt. Henry C. 

Dumm, A. A 

Dunn, Harry T 

Dunning, Lieut. Ray P. 

Eames, Frank W 

Easton, Harry M 

Eaves, Frederick B 

Edgar, Charles 

Edgerly, Hial Stephen. . 

Einig, Alvm B 

Eisendrath, William B.. 

Elton, John P 

Ely, Grosvenor 

Ely, Lieut. M.G 

Emerson, Kenneth Bales 

Esberg, Alfred I 

Estabrook, H.M 

Estes, Col. George H.... 
Etherington, Burton 

Ettinger, A 

Evans, Henry 

Faroat, H. B 

Felt, Dorr E 

Fenner, David C 

Ferguson, George K 

Ferguson, L. Perry 

Field, Herbert E 

Fisher, Capt. Boyd 

Fisher, Frank E 

Flanders, Ralph E 



Assistant to chairman, War Indus- 
tries Board. 
Assistant, machine tool sestion. . . 
Staff, conservation division 

Member, legal section 

Statistics, chemicals division 

Emergency construction commit- 
tee. 

Director of pulp and paper divi- 
sion. 

Expert, central bureau of plan- 
ning and statistics. 

Expert, nonwar construction sec- 
tion. 

Staff, central bureau of planning 
and statistics. 

Member, fa?ilities division 

1 umber section 

Chief, electrodes and abrasives sec- 
tion. 
Assistant, priorities division 

Chief, rubber section 



Navy representative, joint office 

on'chemical statistics. 
Expert, fire prerention sestion 

Assistant chief of tin seition 



Expert, electrical and power equip- 
ment sestion. 

Director of lumber 

Assistant secretary War Industries 
Board. 

Assistant chief, machine tool sec- 
tion. 

Chief, upper, harness, bag, and 
strap leather section. 

Adviser, brass se::tion 



Assistant to chief cotton goods sec- 
tion. 

Examiner, Army section, priori- 
ties committee. 

Expert, division of planning and 
statistics. 

Chief, tobacco section 

Assistant chief .railway equipment 
and supply section. 

Requirements division 

Chief, yarn section 



Member legal section , 

Chairman advisory committee, 

fire prevention section. 
Passenger representative, inland 

traffic section. 
Regional adviser, Chicago 



Assistant cliief, automotive prod- 
uct section. 

Chief clerk, pulp and paper divi- 
sion. 

Storekeeper, division of business 
admimstration. 

Assistant chief, acids and heavy 
chemicals section, chemical di- 
vision. 

Government supervisor employ- 
ment management courses, Fed- 
eral Board of Vocational Edu- 
cation. 

Chief, bureau applications and 
issue, priorities division. 

Assistant, machine tool section 



Member of firm, Wm. A. Reed & Co.; 

bankers, New York, N. Y. 
Hill-Clarke Co., Chicago, 111. 
Foreign sales manager, Dennison Manu^ 

factunng Co., Framingham, Mass. 
Professor of law, Washington and Li 

University, Lexington, Va. 
Foreign exchange department. National 

City Bank, New York City. 
President building trades department, 

American Federation of Labor, Chi^ 

cago, 111. 
President R. R. Donnelley Sons Co.j 

Chicago, 111. 
Professor Massachusetts Institute 

Technology. 
Arkenberg-Machine-Dowd Co. , 512 

Produce Exchange, Toledo, Ohio. 
Head master, Boston High School > 

Commerce. 
President and general manager John 

Do.vncy (Inc.), Ne.v York, N. Y. 
Cypress, New Orleans, T a. 
Assistant secretarv E. J. 1 evino & Co., 

Philadelphia, Pa. 
South"estern sales agent, Sabine Lum- 
ber Co. (St. T ouis), Houston, Tex. 
President :^isk Rubber Co., Chicqpee 

Falls, Mass., and Lederal Rubber Co.. 

Cudahy, Wis. 
Engineer, Springfield, Mass. 

Inspector-engineer, Factory Insurance 

Association, Hartford. Conn. 
Genera] sales manager, Weirton Steel Co., 

Weirton, W. Va. 
Assistant general sales manager, Bryant 

Kle?tricalCo., Bridgeport, Conn. 
Retired from business, Esse^ Fells, N.J. 
First vire president, the Theodor Kundtz 

Co., Cleveland, Ohio. 
Sales engineer, Motch & Merryweather 

Machinery Co., Cleveland, Ohio. 
Secretarv, Monarch Leather Co., Chicago. 

111. 
Vice president, American Brass Co., 

Waterbury, Conn. 
Treasurer, Ashland Cotton Co., Norwich, 

Conn. 
Branch manager, Horace S. Ely & Co. 

(realeitate"!. New York, N. Y. 
Statistician, Sanderson & Porter, Nev 

York, N. Y. 
Retired, Mountain View, Calif. 
President Barney-Smith Car Co., Day- 

ton, Ohio. 
Army representative, Washington, D. C, 
Member of firm, Franklin Oliver & Co.,"i 

New York, N. Y. 
Lawyer, Cleveland, Ohio. 
President Continental Insurance Co. 

Passenger agent, Baltimore & Ohio ; 

R. R.,Wasliington, D. C. 
President Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing i 

Co., Chicago, 111. 
Sales engineer. International Motor Co., 

New York, N. Y. 
Cost accountant and chemist, Water- 

vliet Paper Co., Watervliet, Mich. 
Salesman, Safe Cabinet Co., Marietta, . 

Ohio. 
President and general manager Wheeling j 

Mould & Foundry Co., Wheeling, , 

W. Va. 
Washington, D. C. 



Manufacturing for self, Detroit, Mich. 



Jones & Lampson Machine Co., Spring- 
field Vt. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. .'303 

Members of the Mar Industries Hoard or(/ani:atu>n - Cdnf iinu'd. 



Name. 



rinery, Lieut. Col. J. 

JMecrs. 

„ [ lernin?, Frances 

"- Fletcher, Eston A 

"l ^Fletcher, Rear Admiral 

Frank F. 
*- IFoerdcrcr, Percival E 

'i^' Follansbee, William B 

Foote, Edith L 

^ Foster, Charles K 

Foster, Maj. Clair 

Foster, Mortimer B 

Frank, Lawrence K 

Frankfurter, Felix , 

4 Fraser, W. Hugh 

s; Frayne, Hugh. 

iio;? jFreeman, E. Stewart 

f iFreeman, M. B 

[Friedberg, Ralph J 

"^ Friedlich.H.A 

til : Frost, Edward J 

re iGarfield.Dr. H. A 

Garrett, Paul W 

E Gary, Julian Vaughn 

Gault, P. B 

Gay, Edwin F 

Gay, Edward Randolph. . . 

Glbbs, Edwin C 

x. Gibbs, Louis D 

Gifford,A.L 

.|Gilbert,H.N 

DijMGillen, Martin J 

Dfi jGiUman, Joseph W 

! iGladding, Augustus L 

,, : JGlenn, John F 

Oj! iGoddard, Horace M 

ori IGwthals, Maj.Gen. George 

■ (.' Goldman, Lieut. J, B., 
U. S. Navy. 

Goldsmith, Margaret L. .. . 
*" (Goodfellow, William E . . . . 
|,r;' Goodwillie, George L 

^Gordon, Lieut. M. R 

i Gower, H. R 

' Graff, Everett D 

''I Cramlick, Howard 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Former ba-'ines.". 



Chief, railway equipment and 

suppiv section. 

Secretary to H. P. Tngels 

Regional adviser, Rochester, N. Y. . 



Member, War Industries Board 
and priorities board. 

Vice chairman, employment man- 
aijement courses. 

.\ssistant to southern lumber ad- 
ministration, lumber section. 

-Assistant to secretary priorities 
committee. 

Vice chairman, priorities com- 
mittee. 

Emergency constructionsection. . . 

Chief, miscellaneous commodities 
section. 

Expert, division of planning and 
statistics. 

Priorities board, labor representa- 
tive. 

Assistant, facilities division 



Chairman, labor division 

Expert, central bureau of planning 

and statistics. 
Staff, conservation division 



Draftsman, building material 

division. 

Member legal section 

Staff, central bureau of planning 

and statistics. 
Member of price fixing committee. . 
Expert, price statistics 



Secretary to Gov. H. C. Stuart . 
Secretary, foreign mission 



Chairman of the central bureau of 

planning and statistics. 
Stall, central bureau of planning 

and statistics. 
Regional adviser, Cincinnati, Oliio. 
Staff, division of planning and 

statistics. 

Assistant to chief, woolen section . . 

E.xpert, electric and power equip- 
ment section. 

Assistant to commissioner finished 
products. 

Division planning and statistics — 

Assistant to director, building 
material division. 

Expert, electric and power equip- 
ment section. 

Stall, central bureau of planning 
and statistics. 

Member War Industries Board 
and priorities board. 

Member war prison labor and 
national waste reclamation 
section. 

Expert, war industries abroad 
division plamiing and statistics. 

Assistant business manager, divi- 
sion of business administration. 

Expert, lire prevention section 



Army representative, joint ofTico 
on chemical statistics. 



Member legal section 

Special agent, steel division . 
Wool section 



President Flannery Bolt Co., J'itts- 

burgh, Pa 
Washington, P. C. 
Member of firm, Phelps A Fletcher. 

Rochester, N. Y. 
Washington, D. C. 

President and general manager Rol>ert 
H. Focrderer (Inc.), Philadelphia, I'n. 

Part owner, Marion Lumber Co., llatties- 
burg. Miss. 

Yonkers, N. Y. 

Vice president, .\merican Radiator Co., 

Chicago, III. 
Great Harrington, Mass. 
Treasurer and director. Shield Electric 

Co., New York, N. Y., and Southern 

Export Corporation, New York, N. Y. 
-Vccountant, New York Telephone Co., 

New York, N. Y. ' 

Labor Department, Washington, D. C. 

Traveling salesman, Peeriess Motor Car 
Co., Cleveland, Ohio. 

General orgiinizer, .\merican Federation 
of Labor, New York, N. Y. 

Cost accountant, Dennison .Manufactur- 
ing Co., Framingham, Mass. 

General sales manager, Dennison Manu- 
facturing Co., Framingham, Mass. 

Arcliitect, Akron, Oliio. 

Lawyer, Des Moines, Iowa. 

Vice president Wm. Filene Sons A Co., 
Boston, Mass. 

Chairman Fuel Administration. 

Supervisor of rescarclies. Bureau of State 
Research, Newark, N. J. 

Counsel, State Tax Board, Richmond, Va. 

City passenger agent, B. A O. R. R., 
Louisville, Ky. 

Dean of graduate school of business ad- 
ministration, Harvard University. 

Student, Harvard University. 

Retired. 

Superintendent advertising department, 

Edison Electric Llluminaling Co., 

Boston, Mass. 
Sales agent, Worumbo Co., New York, 

N. y7 
Assistant to president, RotJic Bros. & 

Co., Cliicago, 111. 
President, Mitchell Wagon Co., Racine, 

Wis.,etal. 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, Philadel- 
phia, Pa. 
Assistant to general superintendent. 

Gladding, McUean & Co., Lincoln, Calif. 
New ICngland .sales manager, Edgemoor 

Iron Co., Boston, .Mass. 
President, Advertisir Special Service 

Corporation, New York, N. Y. 
Consulting engineer. New York, N. Y, 

Washington, D. C. 



Graduate student. University of Illinois. 

Manager personal estate, Minneapolis, 
Minn. 

Inspector, Western Factory Insurance 
Association, ( hlcugo. 111. 

Manager, foreign exchange purchase de- 
partment, National Cfty Bank, Now 
York. N. v. 

Associate, law firm Hamilton <Si llamJl- 
ton, Wasliington, 1). C 

Assistant to vice nnsidcnt, Joseph T. 
Kyerson i .Son, Chicago, 111. 

Umversily of .N'ebraska, l>lncoln, Ncbr. 



304 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. 



1 Position in War Industries Board. 



Former business. 



Granger, Capt. A. H. 
Greenburg, Max 



Greenbaum, Charles Jay. 

Grimes, Howard S 

Grothaus, L. W 



Guffev, Joseph F. 
Guylee, W. E.... 



Gwathmey, J. Temple. 
Haight, Frederick E . . . 

Hale, Roberts 

Haley, Edwin J 



Hall,.Tay V 

Hal laday, Calvin L.. 
Hall, Marcus Brown. 
Hamilton, C. D. P... 
Hamilton, James 



Emergency construction commit- 

E Xpert, electric and power 
equipment. 

Assistant to secretary. War Indus- 
tries Board. 

Requirements division shipping 
board representative. 

Electric and power equipment 
section, in charge turbine divi- 
sion. 

Chief, petroleum section , 

Executive secretary, require- 
ments division. 

Member committee on cotton dis- 
tribution. 

Associate chief, knit goods section. 

Staff, central bureau of planning 
and statistics. 

Chief, tanning material and nat- 
ural dye section (including 
oils, fat-S and waxes). 

Staff, central bureau of planning 
and statistics. 

Assistant chief, automotive prod- 
ucts section. 

Assistant secretary, priorities com- 
mittee. 

Chief, boot and shoe section 



Hanch, Charles C 

Hancock, Commander 

John M. 
Hansen, John M 



Hardy, Maj.R. S.... 
Harrison, Francis G. 

Harman, S. Park 

Hart, Dudley N 



Expert, fire prevention section . 



Chief, automotive products sec- 
tion. 

Navy representative on price fix- 
ing committee. 

Member and secretary of advisory 
committee on plants and muni- 
tions. 

Expert, power section 



Assistant to secretary, price fljc- 
ing committee. 

Employment management divi- 
sion. 

Domestic wool section 



Hartigan, Lieut. Com- 
mander Charles. 



Hatfield, Henry R. 
Hawk, Judge M 



Hawley, H. W.. 
Hawley, John C. 
Hay, Richard C. 



Hayes, Lieut. Col. Henry 
R. 



Hay ward, Nathan 

Heacock, J. Linden 

Heibel, Lieut. W. E 

Heidrich, Edw. C, jr 

Henderson, James D. C. . 
Henn, Lieut. Ralph F.... 



Herbst, Edith G 

Hennessey, William H.,jr. 

Herbert, Edith G 

Herrington, Cass E 



Member war prison labor and 
national waste reclamation 
section. 

Director of the division of plan- 
ning and statistics. 

Assistant chief, manufacturing sec- 
tion, pulp and paper division. 

Assistant, inland traffic section 

Expert, fire prevention section 

Staff, central bureau of plaiming 

and statistics. 
Requirements division. Army 

representative. 

Associate chief, dredging section.. . 

Staff, conservation division 

Expert, power section 



Chief, jute, hemp and cordage 
section. 

Expert, wool section 

Examiner, Army section, priori- 
ties committee. 

Bulletins division of planning 
statistics. 

Statistician, hides, leather and 
leather goods division. 

Bulletins, division of planning 
and statistics. 

Regional advisor, Denver 



Granger & Young, architects, Cliicai 

Manager, erecting and service deps 
ment, Worthington Pump & Machi 
Co., New York, N. Y. 

Student, Yale University; residem 
Chicago, 111. 

Catonsville, Md. 

Sales engineer, Allis-Chalmers Manufi 
turing Co., Milwaukee, Wis. 

Pittsburgh, Pa. 

Vise president. Cable Piano Co., Chicaj 

111. 
Retired, New York, N. Y. 

Managing partner, A. S. Haight & Ci 

New York, N.Y. 
Superintendent of special research, E( 

son I lectric Ilium. Co., Boston, Ma; 
President, Haley-Hammond Co., Nc 

York, N. Y. 

Interests in eastern oil and gas fielc, 

Pinehurst, N.C. 
Engineer, Lewis Spring & Axle C<; 

Chelsea, Mich. 
Purchasing agent, American Box Boa; 

Co., Grand Rapids, Mich. 
Vice president. International Shoe C( 

; t. Louis, Mo. 
Fire protection engineer, Underwritei 

Bureau of the Middle and Southe: 

States, New York, N. Y. 
Treasurer, t tudebaker Corporatio 

>" oiith Bend, Ind. 
Grand Forks, N. Dak. 

President Standard Steel Car Co., Pitt 
burgh. Pa. 

Electrical engineer, Los Angeles Gas 
Electrical Co., Los Angeles, Calif. 

President, Western Motor Car Co., Ci 
cinnati, Ohio. 

45 Kenwood Avenue, Rochester, N. Y 

Hallowell, Jones & Donald, Bosto 

Mass. 
Judge Advocate General's OfQce, Na\ 

Department. 

Professor of accounting, and dean, Ue 

versity of California. 
Sales manager and purchasing agen 

Gaw OHara Envelope Co., Chicag 

111. 
Division freight agent, Erie R. R. Co 

New York, N.Y. 
Inspector, Associated Factory Mutut 

Fire Insurance Co., Boston, Mass. ; 
Organization manager. Retail Researa' 

Association, New York, N. Y. 
In charge New York office Stone ' 

Webster, 120 Broadway, New Yod 

N.Y. JH 

President, American Dredging Co., 1^1 

adelphia, Pa. ■ 

Member of firm, Heacock & Hokabi 

Philadelphia, Pa. 
Mechanical engineer, American Bio 

Co., Detroit, Mich. 
Vice president and manager, Peoria CdW 

age Co., Peoria, 111. 
Wool merchant, Philadelphia, Pa. 'V 
National Acme Co., Cleveland, Ohio. '^ 

Editor, Official Bulletin, University | 
Minnesota. i 

Circulation manager. Boot & Shoe m 
corder, Boston, Mass. ' 

Editor OflBcial Bulletin, University * 
Minnesota. 

Attorney, Denver, Colo. 



i 



AMKIMIAX IXDUSTHY IX TIIK WAH. 



Members of the Mar Industries lioanl oruunizututn—CoMhwiviX. 



305 



Name. 



Ilckey, Edward J.... 

V' Ilckox, Raymond . . . . 

lUdreth, Chas. E.... 

im, Norman H 

liller, George F 



lirsch, Maurice 

Iltchcock, James W. 



'^'^loegland, IraO. 
lolbrook, Percy. 
lolloran, D. A... 



tlolsinser, Walter, 
tlopkins, James M. 



lopkins, Louis Jay 

lorr, John W 

' "Ok, Lieut. Roland J... 

;:h, Geo. A.jjr 

■■e, OwenC 



lowell, Frank n. 
lubbard. G.M.. 



lubbard, RussPlIS' 

lughes, Claire C 

lughes, John 

lughes, M.M 

'lughes, Morgan O.. 



Position in War Indtistries Board. 



Former busineas. 



Assi.<5tant chief, automotive prod- 
ucts section. 
Expert, purchasing committee . . . 

Assistant, machine tool section. . . 

Assistant to director, building and 

materials division. 
Expert, fire prevention section... 



Secretary priorities committee 
Assistant to chief, tin section. . 



Expert, fire prevention section. 
Member priorities committee. . . 



As-Distant clerk, Commlttpo on MillUry 
.Vifairs, riiited States .'■eiiatc. 

.\ssi<:t;int niaiiai'or, Proctor &. Gamble, 
Cincinnati. Ohio. 

Whitcomb-BlaisdcU Co., Worcester, 
Ma.ss. 

Graham & Ilill, Indianapolis, Ind. 

Vice president, What Cheer Mutual Fire 

Insurance Co., Providence, K. I. 
Attorney at law, Houston, Tex. 
Cipner.i) nianat-pr. I. >ulzliacher Co., 

Stoubpuvillc, Ohio. 
Si'dvtiiry-trousuror, National .\iitomatlc 
Sprinkler Assocralion. New Vork,N.Y. 
Vice president, the Rail Joint Co., Now 
York, N. Y. 

Expert, steel division Clerk, sales department, La Relle Iron 

Works, Stetilienvilie, Ohio. 

Organization expert Attornev, Minneapolis, .Minn. 

Member priorities committee Chairman of board, Camol Co., Chicago, 

111. 
Assistant, conservation division... Managing partner, Fwallow & Honkins, 
lumber manufacturers, Duluth, Nlinn. 

Expert, steel division Assistant district manager, Peihlehem 

Steel Co., Boston, Ma.ss. 
Assistant, machine tool section — Motch <t .Merryweather Machinery Co., 
Cleveland, Ohio. 

Assistant to H. B. fc'wope Writer, New York World. 

Chief, foreign skins and hides Partner, Sands & Lockie, Boston, Mass. 

section. 
Assistant to director, building ma- American Radiator Co., New York, N. Y. 

terials division. 
Assistant to secretary, priorities Sales manager, Howe, Snow, Corrigan & 
committee. Bertles, investment bankers, Grand 

Rapids, Mich. 
Deceased, former chief of paint Philadelphia, Pa. 

and pigment section. 
Assistant secretary, clearance com- Attorney, Marshall & Fraser, Toledo, 
mittee. Ohio. 

Foreign mission American Iron & Steel Institute, New 

York, N. Y. 
Expert, electric and power equip- Sales engineer. General Electric Co., 
ment section. Schenectadv, N. Y. 

Wool section University ofKentucky, Bowling Green, 

Kv. 
Hide, leather, and tanning section. 608 Continental Building, Baltimore, Md. 
Director, building materials divi- Consulting engineer, Philadelphia, Pa. 

sion. 
Committee on comfort and welfare. Washington, D. C. 

Foreign mission Professor of commerce, University of 

California. 

E.xpert, felt section Member of firm, F. C. Iluyck A Sons, 

Albany, X. Y. 
Secretary, War Industrial Board. . Second vice president, Realty Guaranty 

A Trust Co., Youngstown, < >hio. 
Member requirements di\Tsion President, .\merican Blower Co., De- 
troit, .Mich. 

Regional advisor, Atlanta Inman, Howard A- Inman, Atlanta, Ga. 

Special representative, finished President and treasurer, Boonim & 

products division. Pease, Brooklyn. .N". Y. 

Chief, domestic skins and hides.... Chief, hide department, W. H. MeF.hvain 
<'o., shoe manufacturers, Boston, Mass. 
Statlstician,division planning and Tax expert, Ta\j>ayers' Association, 

.statistics. Santa Ke, N. Me.x. 

Chief, cotton and cotton linters President, Wni. U. .Moore Dry doodsf c, 

section. .Mcmphw, Tenn. 

Expert, electrical and power equip- Salesman, (rouse- Hinds Co., Syracuse, 

ment section. N. Y. . ,, . 

Stall, division planning and sta- Director of publications, Kusscll Sage 

tistics. Foundation, New York, N. Y. 

Secretary to G. N. Peek Sales department, Decrc 4 < o., .Mollne, 

Special agent, division planning Editorial writer, the New Republic, New 

and statistics. York, N. Y. 

Member War Industries Board, Washington, D. I . 

Arinv representative. 

Regional advisor, St. Louis Retired. 

' Russell Sturgis Hubbard, chief of the Paint and Pigment Section, died In the »«>rvlce 
f his country on November 5, 1918. He had come to Wnshlnpton with full knowledRe 
lat because of his health the supreme sacrifice was not unlikely, and he carried on to 
lie end with the finest courage. 



hfs, Thomas W 

i'hrey, Richard E. 



r, Lois B 

hison, Lincoln. 



vck, E.N 

ngels, Howard P . 



n.Edw. H... 
on, Edwin E. 



son, Lewis B 

(s,A. E 

■S.Geo. R 

cs, Wm. S 

cnkins, Frederick W 

I :iscn, A. G 

.-on, Alvin S , 

uon. Brig. Gen. Hugh 
ohnson, Jackson 



105S26— 21- 



-20 



306 AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAE. 

Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continnetl. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Former business. 



Jones, Edw, D. 

Jones, Eliot 

Jones, JohnD.. 



Jones, Walter Clyde. 



Joy, Harold E.. 
Justus, Allen L. 



Kean, David L. 



Kearns, Percy H 

Kellenberger, Max W . 

Kelley, Geo. E. C 

Kendall, Frank A 

Kerr, Clarence D 



Kerr, Karl S 

Kilpatrick, Maj. J. R. 



King, Victor L 

Kirkpatrick, CO... 
Kittredge, Lewis H . 

K:iing, John A 

Klock, LenaM 

Knight, Thos. S 



Knight, W. Hughes. 

Kjiobel, JohnE 

Koch, William C 

Kostcr, Frederick J . 
Kratz, John A 



Krohn, Irwin 

Krumb, Henry... 
Kurt, Franklin T . 



Laeombe, Maj. C. F 

Lamar, Capt. Robt. W. 



Lambert, Howard S . . 

Lamond, William S . . 
Lamson, Frederick L. 

Law, W.E 

La Wall, Charles N.... 



Lawless, Matthew D. 

Leddy, James C 

Lee, John W., jr 

Lee, William L 

Legge, Alex 



Director of course materials, em- 
ployment management courses. 

Staff," central biueau planning and 
statistics. 

Executive secretary, war prison 
labor and national waste recla- 
mation section. 

Counsel for nonwar construction 
section. 

Expert, rubber section 

Expert, lumber section 



Assistant to chief, section on medi- 
cal industry; chief, surgical in- 
struments and hospital equip- 
ment, section of medical indus- 
try. 

Secretary, legal section 

Reporter 



Auditor, rubber section 

Statistician, building materials 

division. 
Secretary, clearance committee 

Crane section 

Emergency construction commit- 



Chief, artificial dyes and interme- 
diates section. 

Expert, nonwar construction sec- 
tion. 

Member facilities division 



Assistant, resources and conver- 
sion section. 

Assistant business manager, di\i- 
sion planning and statistics. 

Electrical and power equipment 
section, in charge of electrical 
department. 

Assistant to secretary, priorities 
committee. 

Director, division of business ad- 
ministrator. 

Assistant, resources and conver- 
sion section. 

Regional advisor, San Francisco. . 

Assistant to vice chairman. War 
Industries Board, in charge of 
cablegrams. 

Expert, boot and shoe section 



Member of priorities committee. . 

Staff, division planning and sta- 
tistics. 

Expert, power section 

— do 



Superintendent of buildings, divi- 
sion of business administration. 

Priorities committee 

Staff, central bureau of planning 
and statistics. 

In charge Norfolk branch building 
materials division. 

Member advisory committee, med- 
ical agents, section of medical 
industry. 

Examiner, priorities division 



Assistant to business manager, 
purchasing committee. 

Expert, nonwar construction sec- 
tion. 

Expert, fire-prevention section 

Vice chairman, War Industries 
Board; chairman, requirements 
division. 



Professor of commerce and industry, 
University of Michigan. 

Associate professor of economics, Leland 
Stanford Junior University. 

Assistant manager, International Corre- 
spondence Schools, Scranton, Pa. 

Law firm, Jones, Addington, Ames & Sei- 
bold, Chicago, 111. 

Expert, B. F. Goodrich Co., Akron, Ohio. 

Partner manager, J. Natwick & Co., Bal- 
timore, Md. 

General manager, Chas. Lentz & Sons, 
Pliiladelphia, Pa. 



Secretary to Oscar L. Gray, M. C. 

Stenotypist, Galbraith &" Comptou, oil 
producers. Independence, Kans. 

Cost auditor, Fisk Rubber Co., Chicopee 
Falls, Mass. 

Architect, 45 Bromfield Street, Boston, 
Mass. 

Attorney, 5 Nassau Street, New York, 
N.Y. 

Fort Myer Heights, Va. 

Thompson-Starrett Co., building con- 
struction, New York, N. Y. 

Consulting chemical engineer. Wood 
Ridge, N. J. 

Publicity man, Chicago, 111. 

President, Peerless Motor Car Co., Cleve- 
land, Ohio. 

President, Kelly Island Lime Co., Cleve- 
land, Ohio. 

Secretary to business manager, Regal . 
Shoe Co., Boston, Mass. 

Head of switchboard department. Gen- 
eral Electric Co., Boston, Mass. 

Attorney at law, Dallas, Tex. 

Manager personal estate, Chicago, 111. 

Vice president. Twin City Brick Co., St. ' 
Paul, Minn. 

President, California Barrel Co., San 
Francisco, Calif. 

Practicing attorney, Charles Henry But- 
ler, Washington, D. C. 

Partner in Krohn, Fechtheimer & Co., 
Cincinnati, Ohio. 

Consulting mining engineer. Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 

Owner of Chauncey Hall School, Boston, 
Mass. ' 

Electrical engineer, New York, N. Y. 

Electrical superintendent. Central Power 
Co., Canton, Ohio. 

Chief clerk, Central RaUroad of New Jer- 
sey, Jersey City, N. J. 

Simplex Wire & Cable Co. .Boston , Mass. 

Treasurer, Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co, 
Norwalk, Conn. 

Sales manager, Clinchfleld Portland Ce- 
ment Co., Kingsport, Tenn. 

Dean, Philadelphia College of Pharmacy, 
Philadelphia, Pa. 

Lawless Bros., paper mills. East Roches- 
ter, N. Y. 

District auditor, Armour & Co., Chicago, 
111. 

President and manager. Overland Syra- 
cuse Co., Syracuse, N. Y. 

Inspector, Underwriter Service Associflr 
tion, Chicago, 111. 

Vice president and general manager. In- 
ternational Harvester Co., Chicago, 111. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 30? 

Mcwbcrs of the War Indnstrica Board o;Y/'nii,c«/iV>«— Continnod. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board; 



Former business. 



iltli,C.K.... 



sngel, Wm.C 

ionlhan, Richard... 

*^panard, Geo. M 

ird, Stephen R. 

Jtts.F.C 

jwenberp, Harry L. 
swis, George 



jwis, Henrv S 

>yden, Maj.H. R 

nooln. Alfred L 



pps, Louis P 




•Kclvey, C. W 

Keiiney, Col. Chas. A. 

•Lain, Percy 

■ Lauchlan, Jay C 

Leary, Frank B 

jLennan, Donald R 

"Williams, Chas. M 

icDowcll, Charles H. . 



Chief, mica section, and advisor 
in relation to mineral exports 
and imports. 

PtiMication work, employment 
manaecmcnt courses. 

Staff, conservation division 

Conservation division 

Expert, steel division 

Requirements division 



Staff, division of planning and 

statistics. 
Assistant, gold and silver section. 

Priorities committee , 

Expert, power section 

E.xpert. hardware and hand tool 

section. 
Secretary, crane section 



Refrional advisor, Dallas 

Expert, hardware and hand tool 

section. 
Assistant, woolens section 



Emergency construction com- 
mittee. 
Expert, cotton goods section 



Chief, gloves and leather cloth- 
ing section, hide, leather and 
leather goods division. 

Expert, steel division 

Priorities Commissioner, retired . , 

Expert, fire-prevention section 



Assistant, machine tool section. . . 
Deceased; steel division 



Expert, division planning and 
statistics. 

In charge New York branch build- 
ing materials division. 

Chairman, emergency construc- 
tion committee. 

Assistant to director, building 
materials division. 

Associate chief, section of medical 
industry. 

Regional advisor, Cleveland 



Assistant chief, knit goods section 

Member of advisory committee on 
plants and munitions. 

Technical advisor, chemical divi- 
sion, foreign service. 

OfTice manager, central bureau, 
planning and statistics. 

Expert, steel division 



Navy representative, conservation 

division. 
Assistant chief, domestic wool 

section. 
Memljcr legal section 



Army representative, priorities 

committee. 
Examiner, priorities division 



Chief, pig-iron section . 



Staff, central bureau of planning 

and statistics. 
Chief, non war coastruction section . 

Examiner, priorities division 

Director of chemical division 



Professor of geology, University of Wis- 
consin, Wis. 

Publicity department, IToggson Bros., 

New "S ork, N. Y. 
Salesman, I.ee, ITigginson Co., Boston, 

Mass. 
Ellis Title * Conveyancing Co., Sprmg- 

field, Mass. 
Second vice president, Oneida Commu- 
nity fLtd.), Oneida. N.Y. 
Red Cross representative. Red Cross 

Headquarters. Washincton, D. C. 
Assistant to vice president, St. Louis 
I CarCo., St. Louis, Mo. 

President, Shreve & Co., San Francisco. 
, Calif. 
[ Pittsburgh, Pa. 

Consultinc engineer, New York, N. Y. 
I Retired, Taimton, Mass. 

I Emrineer with Brown Hoisting Ma- 
chinery Co., Cleveland. Ohio. 
I Business for self, Dallas, Tex. 

Southern representative, L. S. Starrott 
! Co., .\thoI, Mass. 

j Treasurer, John T. Lodge &. Co.. Boston, 
Mas.s. 
Boston, Mass. 

Consulting industrial engineer. Fall 

River, Mass. 
Manager, Bachner, Moses, Louis Co., 

Gloversville, N. Y. 

Broker, New York, N. Y. 



Special inspector and engineer. New 

England Insurance Exchange, Boston, 

Mass. 
Sales engineer, Henry Prentiss & Co., 

Buffalo, N. Y. 
Bethlehem Steel Co., South Bethlehem, 

Pa. 
Instructor in economics. University of 

Missouri, Columbia, Mo. 
Inspector, Public Service Commission, 

New York, N. Y. 
President, Crowell-LundoflT-Little Co., 

Cleveland, Ohio. 
Manager, sales and pubUcity, Inter- 
national Heater Co.,Utica, N. Y. 
Secretary and general manager, Eli Lilly 

& Co., Indianapolis, Ind. 
President, W. R. .Mc.\llister Co., Clev&. 

land, Ohio. 
President and manager, Cumlicrland Drv 

Goods & Notion Co., Cumberlimd, Md. 
Cost clerk, Standard Steel Car Co., 

Butler, Pa. 
Professor of chemistry, University of 

Pennsylvania. 
Agent, Library Bureau, New York, N. Y. 

Vice president, Clark Car Co., Pitts- 
burgh, Pa. 
Washbigton, D. C. 

Wool buyer, Salt Lake City, Utah. 

Member firm Stewart & Scheurer, New 

York, N. Y. 
Consulting engineer, Washington, D. C. 

President and treasurer, J. H. .\lcLaln 
Co.. Canton, Ohio. 

Member of llrm, Picklands, Mather & 
Co.,Clevcbind, Ohio. 

ExaminiT, the Examination Corpora- 
tion, New York, N. Y. 

Marsh i Mclx-nnan, Chicago, 111. 

Lawver, Houston, Tex. 

President, Armour Fertiliser Works, 
Chicago, 111. 



308 AMHIUCAX lNI)i:STRY IN TllK WAR, 

Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. 



Name. 



Mackall, Paul 

MacLaren, Maj. Malcoli 

Macpherson, Frank H.. 

Mahoney, J. Bernard... 
Mallalieu. W. E 

Mann, David F , 

Manning, John J 



Mansfield, Wm. L. 



Manss, Wm. H 

Mapother, Dillon E 

Marshall, Ross S 

Andrew- 



Martin, Capt. 

Penn. 
Martin, Willard B. 



Mason, Newton E., rear 
admiral, U. S. Nav>-, re- 
tired. 

Matlack, John C , 



Maxwell, Lloyd W., 
Mebane, James K . . , 

Meflert, Benj. F 

Merchant, Ely O... 
Mercury, Chester C. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Former business. 



Foreign representative, steel divi- 
sion. 
Expert, power section 



Member, priorities committee . 



Deceased; secretary. B. M. Baruch. 
Member flre-prevention section.. . 



Expert, steel division 

Member, war prison labor and na- 
tional wa.ste reclamation section. 

Passenger representative, inland 
traffic section. 

Director, war service committees. . 

.\ssistant, paint and pigment sec- 
tion. 

Staff, central bureau of planning 
and statistics. 

Secretary, B. M. Baruch at peace 
conference. 

Chief clerk. War Industries Board . 



Priorities committee. 



Merrill, W.H 

Merry weather, George E . 

Merwin, John O 

Meyer, A. J 



Expert, rubber section 

Statistician, division of planning 
and statistics. 

Assistant to director textile divi- 
sion. 

Associate, cotton goods section 

Expert, pulp and paper division . . 

Charee of reception room, priorities 
di^•l3ion. i 



Chief, fire prevention section. 
Chief, machine tool section . . . 



Meyer, Eugene, jr. . . 
Milbank, Dunlevy.. 



Miller, Ellis 

Miller, F. A 

Miller, George E 

Milne, W^m. D 

Miltenberger,Capt . Geo. K. . 
Minnick, Arthur 



Mitchell, Andrew W 

Mitchell, Maj. J. K 

Mitchell, Dr. Wesley C... 
Montgomery, Fletcher H. 
Montgomery, Lieut. Col. 

Moody,' Herbert R 

Moore, Kilbum 



Expert, electric and power equip- 
ment section. 
Expert, fire prevention section... 

E Xpert , n onferrous metals 

Expert, facilities division 



Division planning and statistics... 

Expert, nonwar construction sec- 
tion. 
Expert, facilities division 



Expert, fire prevention section 

Expert, power section 



War Industries Board representa- 
tive in joint office on chemical 
statistics. 

Expert, nonwar construction sec- 
tion. 

Staff, conservation division 



CUef, price statistics. 
Expert, felt section... 



Army representative on price-fix- 
ing committee. 

Technical advisor, chemicals di\'i- 
sion. 

Expert, priorities division 



Assistant sales manager, Bethlehem Ste 

Corporation, Bethlehem, Pa. 
Professor of electrical engineering. Prino 

ton University. 
President and treasurer, Detroit Sulphil 

Pulp & Paper Co., Detroit, Mich. 
Washington, D. C. 
General manager National Board of Fu 

underwriters. New York, X. Y. 
Sales agent, Pittsburgh Steel Co., Pitt 

burgh, Pa. 
Secretary, Union Label Trades Oepar 

ment, .American Federation of I.abi 

Washington, D. C. 
Assistant city ticket agent, Chicagi 

St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry 

Minneapolis. Minn. 
Chamber of Commerce, Riggs Buildin; 

Washinarton, D. C. 
Real estate, Louisville, Ky. 

Superintendent, Seaboard Air Line R' 

Co., Norfolk, Va. 
Squire, Sanders & Demsev, Clevelam 

Ohio. 
Private secretarv to president, Centn 

R. R. Co. of >few Jersev, Planifiek 

N.J. 
Washington, D. C. 



Treasurer and general manager, Aja 

Rubber Co., New York, .\. Y. 
Assistant educational direct or Y. MCA 

New York, N'. Y. ' 

Secretary and treasurer Scott-Mebar 

Manufacturing Co., Graham, N. C. 
Partner of Amory, Browne & Co., Ne' 

York, .NT. Y. 
Special agent. Federal Trade Commi. 

sion, Washington, D. C. 
South Amencan representative, Geo. I 

Emery Co., mahogany and mines, Ba 

ton, Mass. 
President, L'nderwriters Laboratorie 

Chicago, 111. 
President the Motch & Merry weathd 

Machine Co., Cleveland, Ohio. 
Assistant manager, sales office, Burk 

Electric Co., New York, N. Y. 
Inspector, Indiana Inspection Bureai 

Indianapolis, Ind. 
New York, N. Y. 
Real estate and investments, New Yorl 

N. Y. 
Professor, Johns Hopkins University 

Baltimore. Md. 
Auto Strop Safetv Razor Co., New Yori 

N. Y. 
Sales manager, Cleveland Electrical ■ 

Illuminating Co., Cleveland, Ohio. 
Inspector, L'nderwriters' Bureau of Ne' 

England, Boston, Mass. 
Electrical engineer. Union Electric Ligh 

& Power Co., St. Louis, Mo. 
First assistant examiner, LTnited State 

Patent Office, Washington, D. C. 

Salesman, Chicago, 111. 

Philadelphia Rubber Works, Land Titl 

Building, Philadelphia, Pa. 
Professor of economics, . Columbia Uni 

versitv. 
President, Knox Hat Co., New Yori 

N. Y. 
Member of the firm of LybranJ-Ros 

Bros. & Montgomery, New York, N.Y 
Professor of industrial' chemistry, CoUeg 

of City of New York, N. Y. 
Member firm Moore & Goodman, Gal 

vest on, Tex. 



J 



AMERICAN INlHSrr.V IN THE WAR. 309 

Members of the War Industries Board organization— CoiHlnuvi\. 



Name. 



[onliead,MaJ.JobiiM.. 



[organ, Wm. F... 
[organ, Wm. O... 
lorley, Charles D. 

[orriscy, James R . 

[orrison, John A . . 

[Qise, Edward N. 

(oKse, Frank W . . 

[ofss, Everett 



[orton, Ivon T . 



[urchison, Capt. Ken- 
neth M. 
turray, William M 



lurto, Mary F... 
lusser, James C. 



<aumburg, George W. 



aumberg, Ruth M. 
.■lM)n, Frank T 



n, Mary E. 
,,Alex 



ichols, Harold W. 



ixoii, Frederick K 

orris, Henry M 

oyes, P. B 

tliild, James R 

Ir.(r, George S 

Im.^ted, Frederick Law. 

rd way, Lucitu P 

rmsby, William J 

lis, Charles A 

aigp, H. Ray 

aine, Catherine 

aimer, G. J 

arker, Edwin B 

armemcr, Vernon E 

arsonage, Edward E 

a; tcrson, Albert M 



atton, James E . 
axton, Jesse W . 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Chief, coal and gas products section . 

Regional advisor. Now YorkyNY. 

Expert, prioriiios division 

Assistant to chief building mate- 
rial section. 
Expert, lire prevention section 

Expert, priorities division 

Assistant to Mr. S. P. Bush 

Member, special advisory com- 
mission on plants and munitions 

Chief, brass section, member pri- 
orities committee. 

Draftsman, building material sec- 
tion. 

Nonferrous metals, chief abra- 
sives section. Resigned May, 
1918. 

Emergency construction 

Section on medical industry 

Secretary, Mr. Hugh Frayne 

Secretary, clearance ollice, reijuire- 
mrnts division. 

Assistant to chief, cotton and cot- 
ton linters section. 

Divi-ion planning and statistics... 

Mem ber, legal sect ion 

Chief, bureau of personnel, divi- 
sion of busLni'ss administration. 
Expert, lumber section 

Chief, fiber board and containers 
section, pulp and paper divi- 
sion. 

Expert, foreign wool section 

Assistant, machine tool section, 
Cincinnati. 

Fuel Administration representa- 
tive on requirement division. 

Expert, priorities divLion 

Regional advisor, Pittsburgh, Pa. 

Emergency construction 

Member priorities commission 

Assistant section chief, priorities 

committee. 
Chief, resources and conversion 

section. 
Assistant, nitrate section 

Expert, division planning and 

statistics. 
Chief, newspaper section 

Priorities commissioner 

Division planning and statistics.- 

Chief, agricultural implement sec- 
tion. 
Chief, foreign wool section 

Associated chief, paint and pig- 
ment section. 
Priorities examiner 



Former business. 



Consulting engineer, Union Carbide & 
Carbon Corporation and People's Gas 
Co., Chicago, 111. 
Attorney, New York, N. Y. 
Do. 

I'residcnt.Morlcy Bros. Construction Co., 
Si. Louis, Mo. 

Engineer, Wisconsin Inspection Bureau, 
Milwaukee, Wis. 

General agent, Aetna Life Insurance Co., 
Chicago, 111. 

Private secretary to C. D. Velie, Minne- 
apolis, Minn. 

Retired, Atlantic City. N. J. 

I -resident Morss & White Co., Simplex 
Wire it Cable Co., Simplex Electric 
Heating Co., Boston, Mass. 

Drawing instructor, school commission- 
ers. Anne .Vrundel County, Berwyn, 

Treasury Department, Washing! on, D. C. 



Architect, New York, N. Y. 

Purchasing agent. Red Cross, Washing- 
ton, D. C. 

Washington, D. C. 

Law tirm, Musscr, Kimbcr, Huffman & 
Musser, Aknm, Ohio. 

Member of linn, E. Naumbiu-g <Ji Co. 
(bankers), N. Y. 

1755 R Street NW., Washington, D. C. 

Laucking, Helfman, Laucking, Uamlon, 
lawyers, Detroit, Mich. 

Appointment division, Census Bureau, 
Washington, D. C. 

Resident manager, Grande Rondo Lum- 
ber Co., i erry, Oreg.; Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Co., Grand I'ass, Oreg. 

President, lox I'aper to. and the Chesa- 
peake Pulp it Paper Co., Cincinnati, 
Ohio. 

I'resident, Nixon, Walker 4 Tracy, New 
York, N. Y. 

Bickford Tool Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. 

Oneida Community (Ltd.), Oneida, 

N. Y. 
President, Bon Air Coal i Iron Corpora- 
tion, Chietigo, 111. 
President, the Newspaper Printing Co., 

Piitsbiu-gh, Pa. 
01m.ste(l Bros., Landscape Archltecta 

and City Planners, BrooKline, Mass. 
President, Crune-Ordway Co., St. Paul, 

Minn. 
National lank examiner. Farm Loan 

Board, Washington, D. C. 
Member of firm, Otis A Co., Cleveland, 

Ohio. 
President, H. Ray Paige 4 Co., New 

York, N. V. 
Business Administration, Boston, Masa. 

Active vice president, the Houston Poet, 
Houston. Tex. 

Law firm. Baker, Botts, Parker A Car- 
woo<l, Houston, Tex. 

Denni.s<n Manufacturing Co., Framing- 
horn, Ma^. 

SecH'tarv and manager of the John 
Deere Wagon Co., .Mollne, 111. 

President, Textile AlliuniT, New York; 
Waterloo Woolen Manufacturing ( o., 
Waterloo, .N. Y. 

President, I'atton Paint Co., PllubuTKb, 
Pa. 

President, Highland Glove Co., Wash- 
ington, I'a. 



310 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Former business. 



Peabody, Herbert E 

Peek, George N 

Penfield, Frederick W. . . 

Pengnet, Ramsay 

Penick, Frank E 

Pennock, Stanley A 

Penwell, Lewis 

Peoples, Admiral C. J., 

United States Navy. 
Percy, D. C. Steward 

Perkins, Thomas Nelson. 
Perry, Harry W 

Peters, Richard, jr 

Phelps, Wm. Walter 

Phenix, Capt. Spencer 

Philbrick, Merchant E . . . , 

Phillips, William Vernon. 

Phillipps, Henry G , 

Picken, Capt. James H... 

Pierce, B. D.,jr 



Pierce, Curtis W 

Pierce, Dana 

Pierce, Edward Allen. 
Pierce, Frank L 



Pierce, Brig. Gen. Palmer 
E. 



Pierpont, Lawrence. 
Piez, Charles R 



Pinci, Anthony R 

PindeU, Robert M., jr. 



Pond, Helen P. 
Pool, M. B 



Potter, Arthur M . . . 

Potter, Zenas L 

Powell, Thomas C... 
Prescott, Sherburne. 
Pruidle, Arcnts L... 
Prosser, E. A 



Purnell, Frank. 



Pyne, Grafton H. . 
Radcliff, George S. 
Rakestraw, B. B.. 



Chief, woolen section , 

Commissioner of finished products 
Rating committee, priorities board 

Secretary, silk section 

Assistant business manager, pur- 
chasing commission. 
Pulp and paper division 

Chief, domestic wool section 

Requirements division, Navy rep- 
resentative. 
Expert, fire prevention section 

Member priorities committee 

Assistant chief, automotive prod- 
ucts section. 

Assistant chief, iron and steel 
scrap section. 

Secretary, price-fixing committee. . 

Division planning and statistics... 
Expert, lumber section 

Chief, iron and steel scrap section. . 

Secretary, priorities board 

Assistant to Army representative, 

price-fixing committee. 
Regional advisor, Bridgeport, Conn 



Expert, fire prevention section . . . 
....do 



General business executive, foreign 

mission. 
Expert, fire prevention section 

Member War Industries Board, 
Army, representing War De- 
partment. 

Chief clerk, priorities division 

Emergency Fleet Corporation rep- 
resentative on priorities board. 

Assistant to Mr. Frayne, former 
chief personnel division. 

Executive secretary, hides, leather, 
and leather goods division. 

Member legal section 



Comfort and welfare committee... 

Red Cross representative, require- 
ments division. 

Assistant eiiief, automotive prod- 
ucts section. 

Expert, central bureau, planning 
and statistics. 

Member priorities committee,chief 
inland traffic section. 

Assistant to chief, cotton and cot- 
ton linters section. 

Secretary, automotive products 
section. 

Associate chief, tanning material 
and natural dye section (includ- 
ing oils, fats, and waxes). 

Assistant to director of steel supply . 



Assistant, steel division 

Cut soles expert, hide, leather, 
and leather goods division. 

Business manager, division plan- 
ning and statistics. 



Sales agent, Shelbourne Mills, New Yori 

N.Y. 
Vice president, Deere & Co^ Moline, 111 
Treasurer, Aetna Powder Co., Chicago 

111. 
Secretary, Silk Association of America 

New York, N. Y. 
Auditor of sales in Russia, Internationa 

Harvester Co., Chicago, 111. 
Advertising expert, Philadelphia, Pa. 

and Trenton, N. J. 
Lewis Penwell Co., Helena, Mont. 
Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

Inspector, Philadelphia Fire Under 

writers' Association, Philadelphia, Pa 
60 State Street, Boston, Mass. 
Secretary, Good Roads and Motor Trucl 

Committees, New York, N. Y. 
Representative of Rogers, Brown & Co. 

Philadelphia, Pa. 
Director \\ m. Walter Phelps estate(Inc. 

New York, N. Y. 
General Stall, Washington, D. C. 
Secretary, John M. Woods Limiber Co. 

Memphis, Tenn. 
President, F. R. PhilUps & Sons, Phila 

delphia, Pa. 
Vice president, American Bottle Co. 

Chicago, 111. 
Consulting Advertising Service, Chi 

cago. 111. 
Director and executive committee 

Bridgeport Trust Co.; president, Con 

necticut Quarries Co., etc., Bridgeport 

Conn. 
Continental Insurance Co., 80 Maidei 

Lane, New York City. 
Vice president. Underwriters' Labors 

tories. New York, N, Y. 
Member firm A. A. Housman, 20 Broac, 

Street, New York, N. Y. 
President, What Cheer Mutual Fire Ittl 

surance Co., P'rovidence, R. I. 
War Department, Washington, D. C. 



Poultry raising, Bushfield, Va. 

Vice president and general manag 

Emergency Fleet Corporation, Ph' 

delphia, Pa. 
Writer, Munsey, Outlook, Harp 

Weekly, etc., Washington, D. C. 
Vice president Southern Settlement ( 

Development Organization, Baltimo 

Md. 
Law firm, Englehard, PoUak, Pitc 

& Stein, New York, N. Y. 
Wasiiington, D. C. 
Red Cross headquarters, WashingtOIS 

D. C. 
Manager car-order division. Dodge Brou 

Detroit, Mich. ' 

Head of publicity department. Nations 

Cash Register Co., Dayton, Ohio. 
Vice president. Southern Ry. Co., Ctik. 

cinnati, Ohio. 
Vice president, Anglo-American CottoB 

Products Co., New York, N. Y. 
Assistant to S. A. Miles, New Yorkj 

N. Y., and Chicago, 111. 
Industrial chemist and salesman, Bo> 

Scrymser Co., oils. New York, N. Y. 

Manager of order and sales department^ 

Youngstown Sheet & Tube CcJ 

Youngstown, Ohio. 
Member of firm Post & Flagg, New Yor« 

N. Y. . 

Member of firm Boston & Lynn Cut Sow 

Co. .Lynn, Mass. 
Assistant manager, Weinstock, Lubin a 

Co., Sacramento, Calif. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 311 

Mctiibers of the M'or Induftiriis Hoard organisation- -ConlimuH]. 



Ransome, F. H 

Ransome, R. G 

Rea, Henry R 

Reay, W. M 

Reed, J. Burns 

Reed, Lewis B 

Rees, Thomas M 

Replogle, J. Leonard 

Reynolds, Stanley M 

Rhoades, Philo B 

Rice, Capt. Willis B 

Richardson, David Robt. 

Richardson, Nicholas 

Richardson, Ralph I 

Riddle, Capt. Geo. W.... 



Riley, Charles W. 
RUey, Maj.J. W., 



Rippin, Lieut. J. Y. 
Ritchie, Albert C.... 



Ritter, William M. 
Robbins, Walter... 



Robinson, William C. 

Rogers, Charles A 

Rogers, Chilnton L. . . 

Root, Charles T 

Roper, Frank A 



Rosenberg, William S. 
Hosengarten, A. G.... 



Rosensohn, Maj. S.J 



Ross, Harry C 

Rossiter, William S . 
Rossiter, W, T 



Routsong, Ralph C 

Rowbotham, George B. 



Lumber section 

Assistant to secretary, priorities 
committee. 

Member special advisory com- 
mittee on plants and munitions. 

Allied purchasing commission 



Chemicals 

Assistant to G. N. Peek 

Expert, machine tool section. 

Director of steel supply 

Publicity work 



Assistant warehouse section, steel 

division. 
Army represonlative, joint office 

on chemical statistics. 
Expert, priorities division 



Expert, fire prevention section. 
Accountant, steel division 



Rowland, Joseph W 

Rullman, Chas. Phillip... 

Kiimbaugh, R. L 

.-adler, Capt. Harry M. . . 

Saeger, Wilford C , 

Salomon, Joseph , 



Temporary assistant to director 
of building material division. 

Assistant, facilities division ' 

Member war prison labor and na-l 
tional waste reclamation sec- 
tion. 

General counsel. War Industries i 
Board. ' 

Assistant to committee on finished 
products (certifying ofDccr ). 

Assistant to committee on finished 
products; chief, electric and 
power equipment section. 

Expert, fire prevcntionsection 

Chief, harness and personal equip- 
ment section^ 1 eather division. 

Auditor, division of business ad- 
ministration. 

Chief, periodical section, pulp and 
paper division. 

Staff, central bureau of planning 
and statistics. 

Reporter 

Chief, miscellaneous chemical sec- , 
tlon. I 

Member war prison labor and na- 
tional waste reclamation sec- i 
tion. ' 

Assistant to chairman, conserva- 
tion division. 

Staff, central bureau of planning 
and statistics. 

Assistant to chief, resources and 
conversions section. i 

Expert, central bureau of plan- 
ning and statistics. 

Chief, baltiuK section, hide, leath- 
er, and leather goods division. 

Assistant to chief, rubber section. . .| 

Domestic wool section ' 

E Xpert, fire prevention section — 

Examiner, -Vrray section, priori- 
ties committee. 
Member legal section 



Secretary, industrial adjustment 
committee, priorities division. 



Former basincss. 



Eastern & Western Lumber Co., Port- 
land, Orog. 

Vice president Bostrop Water, Light & 
Ice Co., Hostrop, Tex. 

Retired, Pittsburgh, Pa. 

Chief of auditing department, Intcma- 
tioiml Harvester Co., Chicago, 111. 

Assistant professor of mining Case School 
.Vpplicd Science, Cleveland, Ohio. 

Vice president, United States Silica Co., 
Chicago^ 111. 

Sales engineer, Motch & Mcrryweathcr 
Machine Co., Cleveland, Ohio. 

President -Vmerican Vanadium Co., New 
York. N. Y. 

Committee on Public Information, 
Washington, D. C. 

Manager warehouses the Bourne-Fuller 
Co., Cleveland, Ohio. 

Law firm Duell, Warfleld & Duell, New 
York, N. Y. 

Secretarv, Richardson & Boynton Co., 
New York, N. Y. 

Inspecting engineer, Underwriters Bu- 
reau of New Lngland, Boston, Ma-^s. 

Chief clerk, Cambria Steel Co., Johns- 
town, Pa. 

Construction Division, U. S. Army, Wash- 
ington, D. C. 

Attorney, Akron, Ohio. 

Adjutant General's OIBce. 



Reclamation Division, U. S. -Army. 

Attorney general of Maryland, Balti- 
more, Md. 

President, W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 
Columbus, Ohio. 

Vice president, Wagner Klectric & Manu- 
facturing Co., St. Louis, Mo. 

Vice president, Underwriters' Labora- 
tories, Chicago, 111. 
Retired, Hartford, Conn. 

Senior accountant. Baker, Vawter & 
Wolf, Chicaco, III. 

U'nited Publishers Co., director. New 
York, N. Y. 

Farm l:conomics Department, Depart- 
ment of Agriculture. 

Rejiorter, New York, N. Y. 

Vice president and treasurer, Powcrs- 
WeiKhtman-Rosengarten Co., Phila- 
delphia, Pa. 

War Department, Washington, D.C. 



Care of F. P. Luther Co., railway equip- 
ment, Chicatio, III. 

President, Kuniford Printing Co., Con- 
cord, N. H. 

Vice president and general manager of 
the Cleveland Builders' Supply Co., 
Cleveland, Ohio. 

Welfare ilirecf or, National Cash Register 
Co., Daj-ton, Ohio. 

Provident. Bay State BeltlnRCo.. Boston, 
.Mass.: Southern Bolting Co., .Vtlanta, 
(!a.,ctc. 

Olfue manager, Flsk Rubber Co., Chico- 
poe Falls .Nfass. 

Lambert lluntington Co., 79 Fifth Ave- 
nue, New York, N. Y. 

Inspector, Western Snrlnkler Risk Asso- 
ciation, CliUngo, III. 

Manacer, mall order department. Spear 
A Co., PittsliurRh, Pa. 

Law firm of llulklcy, Uauxhurst, Saeger 
A: Jainiirson.Clovpland, Ohio. 

Lawyer, Washington, D. C. 



312 



AMEFJCAX INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 



Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Former business. 



)rdl 
enl 



Sanford, Hugh W 

Sargent, Murray 

Sawyer, Capt. Daniel E . . . 

Sawyer, Harry A 

Schaaf.F. A 

Schaffer, Herbert Allen. . . 

Schlosser, Alexander L.... 

Schmidt, John C 

Schmuckler, Jacob 

Schneider, Albert 

Schoelkopf, J. F 

Schravesende, P. B 

Schubert, Frank II 

Scott, Frank A 

Scott, John W 

Scott, Leiand 

Scott, Rufus W 

Scott, "VV. G 

Seaman, Ir\ing 

Selden, Ernest I. 

Self ridge, Edward A 

Sever, Maj. Geo. F 

Seward, George N 

Shaw, A. W 

Shaw, Maj. C. H 

Shaw, George M 

Shaw, Jean M 

Shepard, William P 

Sherman, Karl W 

Shidle, GeterC 

Shotwell, Edward C 

Siebenthal, Myrtle M 

Simpson, Lieut. Col. F. F, 
Skinner, William 

Sloan, Harry M 

Small, A. R 

Smith, Arthur H 

Smith, A. Homer , 

Smith, Austin D , 

Smith, Charles Henry 

Smith, E. A 

Smith, George F 



Chief, ferro alloys section 

Chief, hardware and hand tool 

section. 
Chief of projectile, steel rails, etc., 

section. 
Expert, chemical statistics 

E xaminer, priorities division 

Assistant to director, building 

material division. 
Assistant and secretary to H. 

B. Swope. 
Chief, chain section 

Nonferrous metals section 

Reporter 

Chief, artificial and vegetable dye 
section. 

Assistant chief , agricultural imple- 
ment section. 

Expert, electric and power equip- 
ment section. 

Chairman munitions board, chair- 
man War Industries Board, 
Aug. 1 to Nov. 1, 1917. 

Director of textile and rubber 
division. 

E.xaminer, inland traffic section.. 

Associate chief, knit-goods section 

Disbursing officer, division of bus- 
iness administration. 
Expert, priorities division 

Statistician, division of plaiming 

and statistics. 
Expert, lumber section 

Expert, power section 

Statistician, division of planning 

and statistics. 
Chairman conservation division. . . 
Expert, power section 

Member advertising committee on 

plants and munitions. 
Expert, hardware and hand-tool 

section. 

Assistant, conservation division... 

Assistant chief, jute, hemp, and 

cordage section. 
Expert , steel division 

Expert, hides. leather, and leather 
goods division. 

In charge of conferences and re- 
ports, secretary's office. 

Chief, section of medical industry. . 

Chief, silk section ". . . 

Assistant to chief, nonwar con- 
struction section. 

Expert, fire prevention section — 

Associate chief, wood chemicals 

section. 
Assistant eUef, section of medical 

industry. 
Assistant, warehouse section, steel 

division. 
Association chief, fire prevention 

section. 

Secretary, lumber section 

Chief, flax products section 



Treasurer and general manager Panfoi 

Day Iron Works, Knoxville, Tenn 
Secretary, Sargent & Co., New Hav 

Conn. 
Salesman Block Maloney & Co., Chi 

cago, 111. 
Assistant chemical engineer, America: 

University, Washington, D. C. 
.Adam SchaaL Chicago, 111. 
Member of firm, Harrison & SchafTer 

Easton, Pa. 
As-istant and secretary to H. B. Swope 

New York World. 
President, Schmidt & Ault Paper Co. 

York, Pa. 
Care J. J. Campbell, 1725 Sedwick A\e 

nue, Morris Heights, N. Y. 
Reporter, New York, N. Y. 
Vice president National .Vniline & Chem 

ical Co., Buifalo, N. Y. 
President Grand Rapids School Equip 

ment Co., Grand Rapids, Mich. 
Production manager '\\Tieeler Condense 

& Engineering Co., Cataret, N. J. 
Vice president Warner-Swasey Co. 

Cleveland, Ohio. 



Member of firm, Carson, Pine, Scott <S 
Co., Chicago, III. 

Tratlic expert. Traffic Association Coa 
Co., Birmingham, Ala. 

Member of firm Wm. F. Taubel (Inc.) 
Riverside, N. J. 

Examiner, Naturalization Service, De 
partment of Labor. 

Secretary W. D. Seaman, Milwaukee 
Wis. 

-Accountant, Oliver Mining Co., Had 
h-me, Conn. 

President Northwestern Redwood Co. 
Willits, Calif. 

Professor of electrical engineering, Co- 
lumbia University. 

Accountant and efficiency man, Minne- 
apolis, Minn. 

President, A. AV. Shaw Co., Chicago. 111. 

Electrical engineer, Minnesota Power Co., 
Eveleth, Minn. 

Mechanical engineer, Standard Steel Cat 
Co., Butler, Pa. 

Vice president, secretary, and general 
manager, Geo. H. Adains & Co., Hill, 
N.H. 

Professor of romance languages, Hamil- 
ton College. 

Manager, hair department, Morris A Co., 
Chicago, 111. 

Sellhig agent, Pittsburgh office. La Bell 
Iron Works, Steubenville, Ohio. 

Member of firm, S. H. Shotwell & Sons^ 
Glovers\ille, N. Y. 

Washington, D. C. 

Surgeon, Pittsburgh, Pa. 

President, Wm. Skinner & Sons, Newt 

York, N. Y. 
Assistant to Federal manager, Chicago,: 

Rock Island & Pacific R. R. Co., Chi-i 

cago. 111. 
Vice president. Underwriters' Labora-i 

tories, Chicago, 111. 
Assistant secretarv, Wm. S. Gary & Co., 

New York, N. Y. 
H. K. Melford Co., Pliiladelphia, Pa. 

Superintendent of warehouse, David H. 

Smith & Sons, BrookljT), N. Y. 
Vice president, Blackstbne Mutual Fire 

Insurance Co., Providence, R. I. 
Wm. Cady Lumber Co., McNary, La. 
President, Smith & Dove Manufacturing 

Co., .Vndover, Mass. 



I'" Smith, Harold O 

N Smith, Lewis Reading 



Q Smlthers, John F... 
Siiowden, Howard J. 



Sowers, W.J 

kit Jpillman, Dr. AV. J 

H Staley, Homer F 

a Stamp, Capt. Charles E.. 

Stanley, Capt. "W. W 

tarrett, Col. W. A 

Stein, C.S 

Jt^ert, Jerome 

Stephenson, Bertram S... 

tewart, Oswald W 

Stewart, W.W 

tockdale, Raymond D . . 
(iBtKtoddard, Lawrence J 



AMERICAN IXnUSTKY IX THK WAII. .S 1 3 

Members of the M'nr Industriefi Board organization— Coin\mivi\. 



Name. 



Stone, George C 

Itout, Charles F. C. 
Stroock, Sylvan I.. 



Stuart, HenrvC 

5,(l|5tyles, Maxwell A.. 

Leland L. 



Sweet, Edwin F. 



erCi 

Swope, Herbert Bayard. 



,m ["almage, Lieut. J. 



[•aussig, Dr. F. W 
aylor, H. K 



aylor, Horace F . . 
aBlPaylor, IningH... 

Sj [^ylor, Capt. M. N. 

[■aylor, Tullie V . . . 

Taylor, William A . 



["empleton, Allen A. 
ij(,j phomas, Clinton G.. 



Percy H. 
''Ihiomas.Wm. tt.. 



pson, Frank E.. 

'■ Thompson, Warren S. 

liurston, E.Coppe... 

^ tai.JohnF 



;; Hnsley.Maj.A.M 



Position in War Industries Board . 



Assistant to chief, automotive 

products section. 
Expert, steel division 



Private secretary to B. if. Banich 
ifemher advisory commission on 

plants and munitions. 
Southern lumber administrator. . 

Member war prison labor and na- 
tional waste reclamation section. 

Technical advisor on ceramics, 
chemical division. 

Assistant chief, crane section 



Expert, power section 

Chairman emergency construction 

committee. 
Member legal section 



Expert, fire prevention section... 
Expert, steel division 

Expert, fire prevention section... 

Staff, division of planning and sta- 
tistics. 
Secretary to W. M. Ritter 



Expert, hardware and hand-tool 
section. 

Expert, nonXerrous metals section 

Director of hides, leather, and 

leather goods section. 
Chief, felt section 



Member price fixing committee... 

Assistant to director, building ma- 
terial division. 

Technical advisor, and chairman 
foreign mission. 

Member war prison labor and na- 
tional waste reclamation section. 

Associate member of War Indus- 
tries Board, assistant to chair- 
man. 

Secretary emergency construction 
section. 

Member of price fixing committee. 

Staff, conservation division 



Luml>cr section 

Staff, resources and conversion 

section. 
Kavy representative, requirements 

division. 
Facilities division 



Assistant, optical glass and Instru- 
ment section. 

Regional advisor, Detroit 

Expert, steel division 



Expert, power section 

DivLslon planning and statistics. 
Expert, steel division 



Expert, central bureau planning 

and statistics. 
Assistant to chief, nonferrous 

metals section. 
Associate chief, alkali and chlorine 

section. 
Expert, power section 



Former business. 



President. J & D Tire & Rubber Co., 

Charlotte. N. C. 
Salesman, Matthew Addv Co., Philadel- 
phia, Pa. 
.\ttorney at law. Providence, R. I. 
Draftsman, the Baldwin Locomotive 

Works, Philadelphia. Pa. 
.Member of lirni, Majors-Sowers Sawmill 

Co., Kplcy, Miss. 
Associate "editor, the Farm Journal, 

Washington, D. C. 
Technical director. Standard Sanitarj- 

Manufacturing Co., Pittsburgh, I'a. 
President and treasurer, C. E. Stamp Co., 

Cleveland, Ohio. 
Assistant to president, Wasson Piston 

Ring Co., New Brunswick, N. J. 
Starrett it Van Vleek, architects, New 

York, N. Y. 
Law firm, Englehard, Pollack, Pitcher 4 

Stein, New York, N. Y. 
National Board of Fire Underwriters, 76 

William Street, New York, N. Y. 
Resident agent, -M. A. Hanna & Co., 

Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Engineer, Manufacturers Mutual Fire 

Insurance Co., Providence, R. 1. 
Professor of economics, Amherst College. 

Secretarj' to W. M. Ritter, W. .M. Ritter 
Lumber Co., Columbus, Ohio. 

Sales manager, gage di\ision, Greenfield 
Tap & Die Corporation, Greenfield, 
Mass. 

-Metallurgist, New Jersey Zinc Co., New 
York, N. Y. 

Partner, John R. Evans & Co., Philadel- 
phia, Pa. 

Meihber of firm, S. Stroock & Co., New 
York, N. Y. 

Ex-governor of Virginia. 

Purchasing agent, .Aberthaw Construc- 
tion Co., P.oston, Mass. 

L. L. Summers & Co., New York, N. Y. 

Assistant secretar}% Department of Com- 
merce. 
City editor, New York World. 



Crowell-Lundoff-Little Co., general con- 
tractors, Cleveland. Ohio. 

Chairman United States Tariff Commiv 
sion. 

Manager, Philadelphia ollice, Dennisoo 
Manufacturing Co. 

Tavlor A Create, Buffalo, N. Y. 

Traffic department, Michigan Alkali Co., 
Wvandotte, .Mich. 

Navy Ordnance, Washington, D. C. 

Buckevc Steel Casting Co., Columbu.t, 
Ohio. 

Student, Yale University; residence. New 
York, N. V. 

Maiiuf.icturer, Detroit, Mich. 

President, the Western Resene Steel 
Co., VVarren, Ohio. 

Consultingclectricalengineer, New York, 
N. V. 

124 Eleventh Street SE., Washington, 
D. C. 

Suporlnlendent, order department, Cam- 
bria Steel Co., Johnstown, Pa. 

Professor, University of Michigan. 

Engineer, with Pope Yeatman, N«w 
York, N. Y. 

Attoriifv, special coun.sel. Diamond Al- 
kali Co., PitUstnirgh, I'a. 

Manager .Missouri Public Utilities Co. 
and Cape fiirardeau-Jackson Inter- 
urban Rv. Co., Cap*> Clrardeiu, Mo 



314 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Former business. 



Torrence, Robert M — 

Townsend, John R 

Trigg, Ernest T 

Tripp. Chester D 

Turkington, Everett E.. 
Tucker, Maj. Samuel A . 

Turner, Spencer , 

Turpin, Upshur F 

Tuttle,M.C 



Ulrich, Ethei E 

Van Deventer, Harry B.. 
Van Doren, Durand H . . . 

Vanduzer, H. B 

Vauclain, Samuel M 

Vaughan, Victor C 

Venard, Wm. S 

Vogel, August H 

Vogel, Fred A 

Wadleigh, Francis K 

Walker, Charles R 

Walker, F.W 

Walker, Reginald D 

Walz, Andrew 

Ware, J.E 

Ware, Robert D 

Waring, Lieut. Wm. E.,jr. 
Waterman, John H 



Weaver, Herbert H . . 

Webb, Stuart W 

Weber, Orlando F . . . 

Webster, Arthur L... 
Webster, Benjamin. . 

Webster, Hosea 

Weeks, Marian F 

Wehle, L. B 

Weidlein, Edward R. 

Weiss, L. S 

Weld.C. Minot 



Wells, E.R 

Wells, Arthur E 



Chief, chemical glass and stone- 
ware section. 

Associate section chief, sulphur, 
pyrites, and alcohol sections. 

Regional advisor, Philadelphia, 
Pa. 

Associate chief, ferro-alloys sec- 
tion. 

Expert, fire prevention section — 

Technical advisor, chemicals di- 
vision. 
Chief, cotton goods section 



Assistant to director building 
material division. 

Emergency construction commit- 
tee. 

Assistant chief, harness and per- 
sonal equipment section. 
Examiner, priorities division 



Member, legal section 

Pacific coast lumber administrator 

Chairman, special advisory com- 
mittee on plants and munitions. 

Member, ad\'isory board on medic- 
inal agents. 

Statistician, division planningand 
statistics. 

Regional advisor, Milwaukee, Wis. 

Expert, hide, leather, and leath- 
er goods division. 

Staff, division of planning and 
statistics. 

Assistant to chief, fiber board and 
container section. 

Assistant to director building ma- 
terial division. 

Executive assistant, wool chem- 
ical section. 

Assistant, nonferrous metals sec- 
tion. 

Staff, conservation division 



Secretary, Highland Glass Co., Was 

ington. Pa. 
Executive engineer, Sanderson & Port< 

New York, N. Y. 
Vice president and general managi 

John lyucas & Co., Philadelphia, Pa. 
Vice president, Miami Metals C 

Chicago, 111. 
Electrical engineer, Associated Facto 

Mutual Insurance Co., Boston, Mass. 
Professor, Columbia Universitv. Nt 

York, N. \. 
Member of firm, Turner-Halsey C( 

New York, N. Y. 
Designing engineer, the Dayton-Wrig 

Aeroplane Co., Dayton, Ohio. 
i Exealti^e oificer, .\berthaw, Constni 

tion Co., construction engineers. Be 

ton, Mass. 
Smith-Worthington Co., Hartford, Con 

Professor of Latin, University of Pen 

sylvania. 
Lawver, Ravmond, Mountain, Van Bl8 

com (t Marsh, Newark, N. J. 
Chairman Fir Production Board, Poi 

land, Oreg. 
Senior vice president, Baldwin Locom 

tive Works, Philadelphia, Pa. 
Dean, medical department, Universii 

of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., San Francisc 

Calif. 
Vice president, Pfister-Vogel Leath 

Co., Milwaukee, Wis. 
General manager, Pfister-Vogel Leatl 
1 er Co., Milwaukee, Wis. 
Consulting engineer, Blair & Co., Ne 

York, N. Y. 
Assistant to President Fox Paper Cc 

Lockland, Ohio. 
Secretary, Association of Tile Manufe 

turers, Beaver Falls, Pa. 
Engineer, L. J. Husted Co., Kansas Cit 

Mo. 
Consulting mining engineer, Gugge; 

heim Bros., New York, N. Y. 



Assistant, belting section 

Assistant to Secretary price fixing 
committee. 

Chief, charge machine depart- 
ment, electrical and power 
equipment section. 

Expert, steel division 



Regional advisor, Boston 

Assistant nonferrous metals sec- 
tion. 

Expert, hides and skins section. . . 

Executive assistant, chemical di- 
\ision. 

Expert, facilities division 



Assistant to chief clerk. War In- 
dustries Board. 
Member legal section 



Technical advisor, chemical di- 
vision. 

Jf ember legal section 

Representative Bureau of Mines 
on ferro-alloys section. 

Consulting engineer , electrical and 
power equipment section. 

Associate chief, acids and heavy 
chemical section sulphur, py- 
rites, and ethyl alcohol sections. 



Member of firm, Maesel-Ware Co., Ne 

York, N. Y. 
Salesman, Bay State Belting Co., Bo 

ton, Mass. 
Baltimore, Md. 

Engineer, A His Chalmers Manufactu 
ing Co., Milwaukee, Wis. 

With Citizens Heat, Light & Power C 

Johnstown, Pa. 
President, Clinton Wire Cloth Co 

Boston, Mass., etc. 
Eugene Meyer, jr. Co., New Ycrk, N. Y. 

A. L. Webster & Co., Chicago, 111. 
Engineer with Albert Mebster, Nc 

York, N. Y. 
Engineer and sales manager, Babcocl 

Wilcox Co., New Y'ork, N. Y. 
Wellesley Hills, Mass. 

Law firm Wehle & Wehle, Louisvilli 

Ky- 
Acting director of Mellon Institute 

Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Lawver, Cleveland, Ohio. 
Chief, War Minerals Bureau, Bureau < 

Mines, Washington, D. C; residenct 

New Y'ork, N. Y. 
Chief Mechanical Engineer, J. A. WTiit 

<<: Co., New Y'ork, N. Y. 
With United States Bureau of Mines. 



AMERICAX INDUSTKY IN THE AVAR. .'U f) 

Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continiie<l. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Former business. 



Wendt, Alfred 

UTestJieimer, Leo F . 



Wheeler, Andrew — 
Wheeler, George R... 

,.^| White, Carl H 

Whitin.Dr. E. Stagg. 

Whiteside, Arthur D. 
Whitmarsh, T. F 



Wetherell, Lawrence H. . 
Weymouth, Frederick A. 



Assistant chief, silk section 

Resources and conversion section . 

Expert, hardware and hand tool 

section. 
Expert, steel division 



Chief, warehouse section, steel 

division. 
Assistant chief, boot and shoo 

section. 
Stall, conservation division 



Member war prison labor and 
national waste reclamation sec- 
tion. 

Expert, foreign wool section 



Whitmore, Brewer G. 

Whitney, A. M 

Whitsit, Capt. Lyle A. 
Whittier, Carl S 



Requirements division. Food Ad- 
ministration representative. 

Dean of students, employment 

management courses. 
Staff, conversation division 



Wigele^worth, Albert W. 
Wiidman, M. S 



Wilhoit, Frederics. 



Wilkins,John F. 
Williams, Ben P . 



Expert, power section 

Central bureau of planning and 

statistcis. 

Machine tool section 

Staff, division of planning and 

statistics. 
Expert, electrical and power 

equipment section. 



Chief, stored materials section. 
Expert, steel division 



Williams, Lieut. Edward 
A. . 



Williams, Harrison 

Williams, Leonard AV 

Williams, Maj. Seth 

Williamson, Capt. Stanley. 

Willson, Sidney L 

Wilson, Creede W 



Ordnance department. U. S. 

Army, associated alkali and 

chlorine section. 
Member, facilities division 



Wilson, John P 

Winkleman, Richard 

Winquist, Raymond V. . . 

Winton.C. Y 

Winslow, Dr. Charles II. . . 



Assistant chief, pig iron section ... 

Marine Corps representative re- 
quirements division. 

Assistant to commissioner finished 
products. 

Cliief.manufacturingsection,pulp 
ancl paper division. 

Secretary of knit goods section 



Assistant to chief to tin section. . . 

Draftsman, building materials di- 
vision. 
Chief report er 



Wlsner, Frank 

Wisner, Newlin M 

Witherspoon, Herbert. 
Withey, Percy King . . 

Wolman, Leo 

Wood, EarleD 

Wood, Ezra F , 



Ivumbcr section 

Member war prison labor and 
national waste reclamation sec- 
tion. 

Lumber section 



Wood chemical section 

Regional adviser, Seattle 

Statistician, steel division 



Wood, Harold G. 
Wood, Leslie D . . 



Staff, division of planning and 

statistics. 
Inspector, fire prevention section. . 

Membei advisory committee on 
plants and munitions. 

Associate chief, tanning material 
and natural dye section (in- 
cluding oils, fats, and waxes). 

Expert, fire prevention section.... 



Partner, Wendt Bros. New York, N. Y. 

President Ferdiuiui.l Weslheimer A Sons 
Co., ("inciiiMiili. I iliio. 

Vice pro.sidiMU ;md treasurer, WotliercU 
Uros. I'o., r.osliin, Ma.ss. 

Sal&s nietalliiridciil engineer, Hptlilelicm 
Steel Corporation, South Met lilel'.cm 
Pa. 

Senior partner. Morns Wheeler &. Co., 
Philadelphia, I'a. 

Interests in several lumber and orchard 
companies, Cumberland, Md. 

Vice president, Jos. Richard Co., New 
York, N. Y. 

Chairman executive committee, Na- 
tional Commission on Pri.sons and 
Prison Labor. 

President, National Credit Office, New 
York, N. V. 

Francis II. Liggett Co., Twenty-seventh 
Street and North River, New York, 
N. Y. 

Profes.sor of English and Government, 
Harvard University. 

Treasurer and trustee, Massachusetts 
Lighting & Power Co.. IJoston Mass. 

Engineer, United States Forest Servce, 
Washington, 1). C. 

Manager, Foreign Trade Bureau, Ameri- 
can Cyprass Co., New York, N. Y. 

Hill-Clarke Co., Chicago, 111. 

Head of economics department, Lcland 
Stanford Junior L'niversily 

Manager, printing and equipment divi- 
sion, the Cutler-Hammer Manufactur- 
ing Co., Milwaukee, Wis. 

Treasurer, Wilkins Securities Corpora- 
lion, Washington. D. C. 

Vice president, Hickman, Williams Co., 
St. Louis, Mo. 

Starkweather, Williams & Co., Provi- 
dence, R. I. 

Director of various companies. New 

York, X. Y. 
Vice iiresident and treasurer, Park & 

Williams (Inc.), Philadelijhia, Pa. 
Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

Lawyer, Land Title Building, Philadel- 
plua. Pa. 

Vice president, Graham Paper Co., St. 
Louis, Mo. 

Superintendent of agcnt.s^ Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. ol New Y ork, Cumber- 
land, Md. 

Assistant manager, National Lead Co., 
New York, N. Y. 

.Vrchitect, 1401 Webster Street, Wash- 
ington, 1). ('. 

Stenotyi'ist. Navy Department; res- 
dence, Kockford, 111. 

Security Building, .Minneapolis, Minn. 

Assistant director of r&search. Federal 
Board for Vorational Education. 

Eastman-Gardner Lumber Co., Laurel, 

.Mi.ss. 
Thomas Mattocks Son's Co., Trenton, 

N.J. 
Vice president, Spokane Si Eastern 

Trust Co., Spokane. Wash. 
Sales department, I.ackawanna Steel 

Co., Lackawanna, N. Y. 
Instructor, Johns Hopkins University. 

Underwriters' A.s.social ion of New York 
State, Syracuse, N. Y. (Insiector). 

First vice president and consullinK en- 
gineer, Inlernutlonal Nickel Co., New 
York, N. Y. 

Examiner of surveys and national forest 
examiners. United Slates Forest Serv 
ice. 

Inspector, Michigan Inspection Bureau, 
Detroit, .Mich. 



316 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Members of the War Industries Board organization — Continued. 



Name. 



Position in War Industries Board. 



Former business. 



Wood, Richard L 

Wooley, Clarence M 

Woolfolk, William G 

Woolson, Prof. Ira A 

Worcester, Chas. H 

Wyraan, Henry A 

Wynegar, Howard L 

Yeatman, Pope 

Young, Neil 

Yuengling, George W 

Zane, A. V., rear admiral 
U. S. Navy, retired. 



Assistant to director, chemical 
. division. 

Priorities board, war trade repre- 
sentative. 

Chief, sulphur, pyrites, and alco- 
hol sections. 

Advisory engineer, building ma- 
terials division. 

Lumber committee 

Member, brass section 

Assistant, nonwar construction 
section. 

Chief, nonferrous metals section . . . 

E.xpert, electric and power equip- 
ment section. 

Executive assistant, miscellaneous 

commodities section. 
Priorities committee 



Richard L. Wood Co., Buffalo, N. Y. 

President American Radiator Co., New 

York, N. Y. 
Manager, Chicago office, Sanderson &, 

Porter, engineers and contractors. 
Consulting engineer, National Board Fire 

Underwriters, New York. N. Y. 
1409 Y. M. C. A. Building, Chicago, 111. 
Attorney, Boston, Mass. 
V'ice president. Continental Guaranty! 

Corporation, New York, N. Y. 
Consulting engineer. New York, N. Y. 
Assistant manager, industrial depart-^ 

ment , Westinghouse E. & M. Co., East 

Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Secretary, Globe Indemnity Co., New 

York, N. Y. 
Washington, D. C. 



Appknuix v. 
CLEARANCE COMMITTEE. 
CLEARANCE LIST, FEBRUARY 25, 1918. 

1. There is presented lierewitli a list of items which should not be ordered 
Without first consulting with the clearance committee of the War Industries 
Board and having clearance granted thereon (the only exceptions being the 
items marked thus (*) and outlined under the price plan below). 

2. Clearance is necessary either because of a shortage which exists or is 
probable on certain items, or because prices have been arranged on others, and 
the allocation of the various items is necessary through a central agency to 
obtain adequate production or to receive the benefit of such prices as have 
been arranged or fixed. 

3. In the letting of genei-al contracts where subcontractors are required 
to furnish any of these items, the subcontractors' requirements should also be 
brought to the committee's attention by the department interested in the same 
manner as the department's requirements. 

4. The above action does not apply to contracts already awarded. 

5. The above action only relates to orders in quantity, which point, when 
question arises, should be determined by the department representative on the 
committee. 

6. The list of items mentioned will be modified as occasion arises. 

7. The list is as follows: 



Acids. 

Chemicals. 

Gasoline. 

Oil, meaning fuel oil or lubricating 

oil ; also castor oil. 
Nonferrous metals, consisting of — 
*Aluminum. 
Antimony. 
♦Copper. 
Tin. 
♦Lead. 



Nonferrous metals, consisting of — Con. 

Nickel. 

Platinum. 

Zinc. 
Lumber, meaning — 

Basswood, 2^ inches and thicker. 

Clear spruce, 2 inches and thicker. 

Clear fir, 2 inches and thicker. 

Clear cypress, 2 inches and 
thicker. 

White oak, IJ inches and thicker. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAR. 



;il 



l.uinhor. meaning — Continued. 
Mahogany. 

Yellow pine timbers. 
Fir timbers. 
Y'ellow pine piling. 
White oak railroad ties. 
AValnut. 
•Portland cement. 

CJotton and cotton goods, including — 
Numbered duck. 
Single and double filling duck. 
Twills and drills. 
Denims, Osnaburgs, or any articles 

manufactured therefrom. 
Cotton thread, meaning of highest 
quality. 
Knit goods. 

Leather and leather goods. 
Linen and linen thread. 
Rubber goods, meaning footwear, 
wearing apparel, and hospital sup- 
plies. 
TV'ool and woolen goods. 
Cannon, meaning the forging and ma- 
chining necessary therefor. 
Machine guns and accessories thereof. 
Small arms. 

Explosives and components thereof. 
Silk noils and silk cartridge cloth. 
Forgings, for guns, projectiles, or 

shafts. 
Optical glass and instruments. 
Mica. 
Needles. 



Cranes. 

Items of railway transportation. 

Machine tcx>ls, large. 

Motor trucks, gasoline. 

Electrical equipment, meaning motors, 

generators, and transformers. 
*Iron ore. 
♦Coke 
*Scrap. 
♦Iron and steel products, meaning — 

Bands. 

Billets. 

Blooms. 

Boiler tubes. 

Cold-rolled steel. 

Hoops. 

Ingots, 

Merchant bars. 

Pig iron. 

Pipe. 

Plates. 

Rails and accessories. 

Rods. 

Seamless tubing. 

Shapes. 

Sheets. 

Sheet bars. 

Sheet steel. 

Skelp. 

Slabs. 

Tin plate. 

Wire and wire products. 

Wire rope. 



PRICE PLAN. 

The following articles were placed on the clearance list In order to lake steps 
which would result in the Government securing the benefit of any special price 
concession from the trade, the benefit of a uniform method of securing its siii)- 
plies, and the benefit of the cooperation in certain cases by the repre-scntativos 
of the industries for the purpo.se of expediting delivery and saving transiior- 
tation. 

Aluminum.— The Aluminum Co. of America has offered to supply nlunilniiin 
for the Government ni-eds subject to later prife determination. The cost of 
production is being determined by the Federal Trade ComniKslon. and in the 
meantime orders are to be placed with the cmnpatiy at an ndvanced-payiucnt 
price as may be fixed by the department, subject to a final price determination. 
Standard trade differentials on various forms of alundnuin are offered by tlie 
company. 

No clearance on aluminum is neces.'sary if the purclmse i)Ian outlined above 
is followed. A monthly summary of all orders placed by each depart tnent 
Should, however, be furni.shed the raw materials division of the War Industries 
Board. 



318 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Copper. — The maximum price on copper has been fixed at 23^ cents f. o. h.. 
New York. Clearance on detailed requirements is not necessary, but full ad- 
vantage must be taken of the fixed price so that the Government contractors 
will be enabled to secure copper at the fixed prices for Government require- 
ments. Requests for allotment of copi:)er are to be addressed to the copper 
producers' committee, Munsey Building, Washington, D. C. Quarterly estimates 
of requirements of copper should be sent by consuming departments to the 
clearance committee for transmission to the raw materials division. 

No clearance is necessary if the purchase plan outlined above is followed. 

Portland cement. — The industrj' has offered to supply Government require- 
ments on terms and prices outlined in a letter addressed to the departments by 
the raw materials division of the War Industries Board. 

Applications for cement requirements should be addressed to the Portland 
cement committee, 30 Broad Street, New York City, Allotments will be made 
by the committee subject to the supervision of the raw materials division. 

No clearance on Portland cement is necessary if the purchase plan outlined 
above is followed. 

Lead. — An arrangement for providing lead requirements until the end of 
March. 1918, has been made with the industry on behalf of the departments- 
with the approval of the War Industries Board. A full explanatory letter has- 
gone forward from the raw materials division of the War Industries Board' 
to each department giving details of the method of procedure with respect tO' 
lead requirements. 

Estimates should be in the hands of the raw materials division of the War 
Industries Board on the 13th of the month preceding the month for which the 
deliveries are required. 

The price basis is the average of the Engineering aiid Mining Journal quota- 
tion for the month in which the delivery is made, using East St. Louis basis. 

If the suggested procedure on procuring lead is followed, no clearance on lead; 
is necessary. 

Steel. — Prices have been fixed on steel and many steel products. On such 
items, namely, those marked *, allotments are made upon request to Mr. J. L. 
Replogle, director of steel supply, raw materials division. War Industries Board. 
Estimates of requirements covering the wants of the various consuming depart- 
ments until December 31, 1918, should be forwarded to Mr. Replogle at once, if 
this has not already been done, in order that requisitions may be allotted 
without delay. 

No clearance on the steel items referred to is necessary if the purchase plan 
outlined above is followed. 

Zinc. — The following prices have been fixed on zinc, which are effective until 
June 1, 1918: 

Grade A, maximum, 12 cents per pound f. o. b. East St. Louis ; sheet zinc, 
maximum, 15 cents per pound f. o. b. plant, subject to the usual trade dis- 
counts ; plate zinc, 14 cents per pound f. o. b. plant, subject to the usual trade 
discounts. Application fro zinc requirements should be addressed to Mr. Pope 
Yeatman, raw materials division, War Industries Board. Estimates of require- 
ments up to July 1. 1918, should be forwarded at once to Mr. Yeatman, 

Clearance is not necessary on zinc if the foregoing plan is followed. 



AMERICAN IXnrSTUV IN TIIH WAR. 

Appendix VI. 
CLEARANCE LIST, JUNE 24, 1918. 



3iy 



dds. 

^icultural implements, vehicles (not 
auto propelled), and wood products: 

A. Veliicles — 

Army wagons. 

Army carts — two-wheel. 

Artillery wheels, spokes, 

and hubs. 
Spare parts. 

B. Truck bodies. 

C. Wood products, meaning han- 

dles, boxes, containers, 
crates, propellers, etc. 

D. Agricultural tractors, 
utomotive products, meaning: 

A. Motors — truck, tractor, aero- 

plane. 

B. Transmissions. 

C. Axles. 

D. Springs, 

E. Forgings. 

F. Tires, solid. 

G. Rims, pressed on. 
H. Motor-cycle rims. 
L Pneumatic tires. 
J. Steel wheels. 

K. Magnetoes. 

L. Spark plugs. 

M. Valves. 

N. Cam shafts, finished and rough. 

O. Crank shafts, finished and 
rough. 

P. Trucks. 

Q. Military tractors. 

R. Motor cycle. 

S. Trailers. 

T. Storage batteries. 

U. Ball and roller bearings. 

V. Steel castings for motor cars. 

W. Drive and link belt chains. 

X. Radiators. 

Y. Babbitt-lined bearings. 

Z. Frames. 

AA. Truck bodies for motor 
chassis. 

BB. Sets of spare parts for auto- 
motive vehicles. 
Tass and copper rods, tubing, and 
sheets. 



Chains (all chains otlier than automo- 
tive drive and link belt). 

Chemicals. 

Cordage, hemps, and fibers, includ- 
ing: 

A. Jute. 

B. Manilla. 

C. Kapoc — mattresses, pillows, 

pads, and life garments. 

D. Coir yarn. 

E. Manilla rope. 

F. Sisal rope. 

G. Cocoa mats and cocoa matting. 
H. Linoleum. 

I. Oakum. 
J. Burlap. 

Cork. 

Cotton linters. 
Cotton goods. 
Cranes : 

A. Locomotive. 

B. Electric traveling. 

C. Gantry. 

D. Shipyard. 

E. Buckets (grab buckets). 

F. Hoists. 

G. Portable electric. 
H. Electric monorail. 
L Wrecking. 

J. Track pile drivers. 
Cylinders and containers (pressure). 
Electric equipment : 

A. Generators. 

B. Turbines. 

C. Condensers. 

D. Pumps. 

E. Compressors. 

F. Transformers. 

G. Current breakers. 

II. Oil switches. 

I. Lightning arresters. 
J. Motors, special, machine tool, 
adjustable speed, direct cur- 
rent, and crane. 
K. Electrical supplies. 
Electrical wire and cable. 
Explosives and components tliereof. 
Felts. 



320 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



Fire-prevention apparatus : 

A. Hand fire extinguishers. 

B. Fire liose. 

Forging and machining for guns, pro- 
jectiles, or shafts. 

Hardware — mill, plumbers', and heat- 
ing supplies. 

Hides and skins. 

Iron and steel, of which the follow- 
ing are allocated through the di- 
rector of steel: 

A. Bands. 

B. Billets. 

C. Blooms. 

D. Boiler tubes. 

E. Cold-rolled steel. 

F. Hoops. 

G. Ingots. 

H. IMerch.int bars. 

I. rig iron. 

•T. I'ipe. 

K. riates. 

T.. Hails and accessories. 

yi. Hods. 

X. Seamless tubing. 

O. Shapes. 

P. Sheets. 

Q. Sheet bars. 

R. Sheet steel. 

S. Rkelp. 

T. Shibs. 

U. Tin plate. 

V. Wire nnd wire products. 

W. Wire rnfu^. 
Knit gi.ods. 

I.ejitlior iiiid leather goods. 
Linen :uid linen thread. 
LunibiT. 



Machine guns and accessories (clearec 

through Ordnance Department 

U. S. Army). 
Sletal-working machinery, includini 

tools, forge-shop machinery, anc: 

plate-working machinery. 
Mica (cleared through Bureau of Sup' 

plies and Accounts, U. S. Navy). 
Needles. 
Nonferrous metals : 

A. Aluminum. 

B. Antimony. 

C. Copper. 

D. Lead. 

E. Zinc. 

F. Mercury (cleared through Bu- 

reau of Supplies and Ac- 
counts). 

G. Nickel. 
H. Tin. 

Oil: 

Castor oil (cleared through Signal 

Corps, U. S. Army). 
L'useed. 
Optical glass find optical instruments. 
Paper, 100 per cent sulphate kraft. 
Power equipment. 
Railway equipment. 
Rubber. 
Rubber goods. 

Silk noil and silk cartridge cloth. 
Small arms. 
Small - arms ammunition (clear( 

through Ordnance Department, U. S 

Army). 
Small tools. 
Tobacco, 
Wool. 
Woolen goods. 



I 



Appendix VII. 



ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF REQUIREMENTS DIVISION 
OF WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD. . 

(Ch-cular Creating Requii-ements Division.) 

In order that the responsibilities which the President has laid upon thet 
chairman of the War Industries Board, as outlined in his letter of March 4, 
1918, may be discharged, there has been created a " requirements division " of 
the said board, to which each supply division of each department of this 
Government and the Allied Purchasing Commission shall furnish " as far in 
advance as possible " statements with as much detail as practicable of their 



IB 

AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 321 

•' {irospective needs " of raw materials and linished products. TJie President 
has decreed that the chairman is to be constantly and systematically informed 
of nil contracts and purchases in order that he may have always before him 
11 >( lieniatized analysis of the progress of business in the several divisions 
of the Government in all the departments, and in order that this may be 
accnniplished, the statements above mentioned will include not only those com- 
iniiditios. materials, or products of which a present or threatened shortage 
ixisis, but also those of which the supply is ample, and will also include not 
.mly connuodities, materials, and products required by several different depart- 
imnts or nations but also those required by one department only. 

In the procurement of materials and tinished products in which no short- 
aui' exists and where no allocation seems necessary or desirable the require- 
ments division will so advise the department presenting the requirements, which 
will thereupon proceed with the purchase in pursuance with their established 
[iraotices. 

.Skction. 1. Notice of requirements. — The statements above mentioned will, 
iinin time to time, and as far in advance as possible of the date required, be 
luisented to the requirements division by the member or members thereof rep- 
n-tuting the department in which the requirements originate or by the rcpre- 
-( nrative of the Allied Purchasing Commission. Where the requirements are 
niiv(>l or unusual, either with respect to the amount of the proposed expenditure, 
fHiaiitities involved or location proposed, or where the requirements division for 
any reason deems it desirable that the project be considered in conference 
lit^tween the head of the department in which it originates and the chairman 
of the War Indu.stries Board, the matter shall be immediately called to the atten- 
tion of the chairman of the War Industries Board, and also submitted to the 
lioard at its next meeting, without, however, delaying ref(>rence to and con- 
<iilcration by the appropriate commodity section. 

Si;c. 2. Commodity neetions. — The chairman of the War Industries Board 
>ha!l utilize existing sections and, where necessary, create additional sections 
lo handle raw materials and finished products of which there is an actual or 
ihnatem'd shortage, or the price and production of which should be controlled, 
in order that the United States Government, its Allies, and the civilian popula- 
liiin may be protected as far as possible. The.se sections shall be designated 
■ nmiodity sections," and each shall be in charge of an executive officer to be 
-ignated "chief" of such section. 

i:ach section chief shall create and maintain such organization atid keep 

■ u<h records as may be prescribed by the authority appointing him. 

.'<EC. 3. Members of eommodity sections. — Each conunodity section shall be 

imposed of the section chief and representatives (hen-inafter called nn'inbers) 

1 each of the supply departments of the Government interested in the com- 

iKtdity in question. Each member .shall be named by his department head. 

-^inee each member will have regular duties to perform in connection with the 

Plily department which he represents, he need give to the commodity section 

w hich he is attached only so much time as may be necessary to perform the 

luUes herein prescribed, and will not be charged with the executive conduct of 

he business of the section, but will have access to all data and information 

nllected by the section and will in turn supply the section with all information 

le may have or can procure iK'rtaining to the conunodity In question. 

8kc. 4. Duties of coinmodity sections.— \^\M^n receipt from the requirements 

livision of statements embodying the requirements of any department of this 

r.ivernment or of its Allies, it shall be the duty of the chief of the section to 

' arefully study and consider same and procure from all available .sources Infor- 

' 105826—21 21 



322 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

mation and data which will be helpful in the allocation of such requirements. 
Meetings of each commodity section shall be called by the chief thereof at such 
times as will interfere as little as possible with the other duties of the members. 
At such meetings the requirements referred to the section shall be considered, 
and wherever possible the allocation of material or facilities to meet such 
requirements shall be determined. In the event any member is dissatified with 
the decision reached he may at his election file a protest with the section chief 
and also with the head of his division or department. The latter may at his 
election appeal to the chairman of the War Industries Board, whose decision, 
after giving all interested parties an opportunity to be heard, shall be final, 
subject only to modification by agreement between the chairman of the War 
Industries Board and the respective Secretaries of War and the Navy and the 
Chairman of the Shipping Board to the extent of their respective interests. A 
record of each meeting will be preserved in the office of the chief of the section, 
the decisions reached at meetings will be reduced to writing in a succinct form, 
and a copy thereof will be transmitted to (1) the chairman of the requirements 
division ; (2) to each member of the section; (3) to the director of Army pur- 
chases; (4) to the Paymaster General of the Navy; (5) to the vice president 
and general manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation; (6) to the priorities 
commissioner; and (7) to such other official or officials as may be from time to 
time designated by the chairman of the War Industries Board. 

Each commodity section will also from time to time consider the necessity 
for expansion of existing sources of production or the creation of new facilities, 
and the disclosing, if necessary, the opening up of additional sources of supply 
and the conversion of existing f acihties to new uses. 

Each section chief will be charged with the responsibility of collecting from 
the several departments of the Government, from the manufacturers and pro- 
ducers, and from the committees representing them, and especially from the 
war-service committee or committees created under the supervision of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and from any and all other 
reliable and available sources information concerning the production of the 
particular commodity or commodities with which his section has to deal, in- 
cluding available supplies, new sources of supply, methods for increasing pro- 
duction, etc. These data and information will at all times be available to 
the several interested departments, the price committee, the priorities com- 
mittee, and any other agency that may be designated by the chairman of the 
War Industries Board. 

Each commodity section shall consider market conditions pertaining to the 
materials or commodities over which it has jurisditcion, and shall, where 
deemed advisable, recommend purchase plans to the several purchasing de- 
partments. In cases where it becomes necessary to control an industry in 
whole or in part by means of allotments, the appropriate section will deter- 
"jlne the allotments of materials, commodities, and facilities to the several 
departments of this Government and to its allies, and also the extent to which 
manufacturers and others, whether serving the civilian population or engaged 
in the manufacture of war supplies, shall be rationed. 

Sec. 5. Special commodity section. — Where the requirements deal with a com- 
modity listed, where a shortage exists, or where an allocation seems desirable, 
but for which no regular section has been established, such requirements will 
be considered by a special section created for such purpose by the requirements 
division, which shall perform the same functions as are performed by the 
regular commodity sections. 

Sec. 6. Priorities. — When a commodity section comes to make its final report 
on the allocation of any specific requirement the chief of such section shall 



AMERICAN INDUSTKY IN THE W'All. 323 

otify a member of the priorities committee, to be designated for sucli purpose 
y the priorities commissioner, who shall, with the section chief and (lu> mem- 
er, consider and tentatively determine the priority rating which such require- 
lents shall take when orders therefor shall have been placed. Such tentative 
ating shall be observed by the priorities committee in connection with all 
pplications for priority on orders covering such requirements unless the 
riorities committee should (because of conditions changing in the time inter- 
ening between the time of the fixing of the tentative rating and the appllca- 
on for priorities, or other good cause) conclude such rating to be improper, 
1 which event the section chief and each member of the section fixing the 
ntative rating shall be notified and have an opportunity to be heard before 
ach rating shall be changed. In the event a change is made the .section chief 
r any member may appeal from such decision in the manner prescribed by that 
ortiou of the organization plan of the War Industries Board governing priori- 
?s. 

Sec. 7. Inspection and production. — It shall be no part of the task of the War 
adustries Board to make inspection of products for which orders have been 
laced, to keep in touch with production or to follow up delays, which duties 
evolve upon the several governmental supply departments. Each supply de- 
artment, however, will promptly and fully advise the requirements division 
henever serious delays in deliveries or shortages in requirements occur or 
re threatened. 

Sec. S. Membership. — The requirements division shall be composed of Mr, 
lex Legge, chairman ; Mr. James Inglis, executive secretary ; Mr. Edwin B. 
arker, priorities; Mr. George N. Peek, finished products; Mr. J. Leonard 
eplogle, iron, steel, and steel products ; Mr. L. L. Summers, chemicals and ex- 
^osives ; Mr. Pope Yeatman, nonferrous metals ; Mr. J. A. Carr, representing 
aiied Purchasing Commission ; one or more representatives of the War De- 
iirtment; one or more representatives of the Navy Department; a representa- 
ve of the Marine Corps; one or more representatives of the United States 
lipping Board, Emergency Fleet Corporation; and a representative of the 
ailroad Administration. 

The chairman of the War Industries Board shall from time to time agree 
lith the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the chairman of 
e Shipping Board, respectively, as to the number of representatives from 
eir respective departments, and when the number shall have been determined 
ch representatives shall be selected by the Secretary of War, the Secretary 
the Navy, and the chairman of the Shipping Board, respectively. 
The Fuel Administrator, the Food Administrator, and the American Red Cross 
all each de.signate a representative who shall attend meetings of the require- 
ents division whenever they are prepared to present plans or projects under 
nsideration, the consummation of which will require materials, supplies, 
cilities, electrical power, fuel, or transportation affecting the industries of the 
lited States. 

iSec. 9. Meetings. — Meetings of the members of this division shall be held in 
e office of its chairman at 9 a. m. each day, at which all advices of requlre- 
nts received since the preceding meeting and all other matters affecting 
luirements in which the members of the division as a whole shall be Inter- 
ted will be considered, after which the statements of requirements shall be 
?regated as far as need be and referred by the executive secretary to tic 
propriate commodity section. 



324 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



Appendix VIII. 

LIST OF THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD PRICE BULLETINS, 
NOS. 1 TO 57. 



1. Summary. 

2. International price comparisons. 

3. Government control over prices. 

4. Prices of foods. 

5. Prices of clothing. 

6. Prices of building materials. 

7. Prices of chemicals. 

FOOD. 

8. Prices of feed and forage. 

9. Prices of Avheat and wheat prod- 

ucts. 

10. Prices of corn and corn products. 

11. Prices of oats, rice, buckwheat, 

and their products. 

12. Prices of barley, hops, rye, and 

their products. 

13. Prices of sugar and related prod- 

ucts. 

14. Prices of vegetables and truck. 

15. Prices of edible vegetable oils. 

16. Prices of fi'uits, nuts, and wine. 

17. Prices of spices and condiments. 
IS. Prices of tea, coffee, and cocoa. 

19. Prices of tobacco and tobacco prod- 

ucts. 

20. Prices of live stock, meats, and 

fats. 

21. Prices of poultry and dairy prod- 

ucts. 

22. Prices of fish and oysters. 

CLOTHING, 

23. Prices of cotton and cotton prod- 

ucts. 

24. Prices of wool and wool products. 

25. Prices of silk and silk products. 

26. Prices of hides and skins and their 

products. 

27. Prices of hatters' fur and fur felt 

hats. 

28. Prices of hair, bristles, and feath- 

ers. 

29. Prices of buttons. 

JUBBER, PAPER, FIBER. 

SO. Prices of rubber and rubber pi'od- 
ncts. 



RUBBER, PAPER. FIBER COntilUied. 

i 

31. Prices of paper. | 

32. Prices of fibers and fiber product| 

i 

METALS. I 

38. Prices of iron, steel, and thej 

products. 1 

34. Prices of ferroalloys, nonferroij 

and rare metals. i 



FUEL. j 

I 

35. Prices of coal and coke. | 

36. Prices of petroleum and its pro; 

ucts. i 

37. Prices of matches. | 

i 

BUILDING MATERIALS. 

.38. Prices of clay products. 

39. Prices of sand and gravel. 

40. Prices of quarry products. 

41. Prices of cement. 

42. Prices of glass. 

43. Prices of lumber. 

44. Prices of paints and varnishes. 

CHEMICALS. 



45. Prices of mineral acids. 

46. Prices of heavy cheiuicals. 

47. Prices of miscellaneous inorgai : 

chemicals. 

48. Prices of fertilizers. 

49. Prices of soaps and glycerin. 

50. Prices of essential oils, flavor! ; 

and perfumery materials. 

51. Prices of wood-distillation pr<- 

ucts and naval stores. 

52. Prices of natural dyestufEs a 

tanning chemicals. 

53. Prices of coal-tar crudes, interiTj 

diates, and dyes. 

54. Prices of drugs and pharmacei? 

cals. 

55. Prices of proprietary preparatio 

56. Prices of explosives. 

57. Prices of miscellaneous orga^ 

chemicals. 



L AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 325 

The above bulletins may be obtained at a nominal cost I'mm tlic -himihi- 
\S tendent of documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 



Appendix IX. 
(1) PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 1. 

DIRECTIONS AS TO PRIOHTTV. 

(Septpmber 21, 1917.) 

During the war in which the United States is now engaged, all individuals, 
Ifjr, iflrms, associations, and corporations engaged in the production of Iron and 
steel and in the manufacture of products thereof are requested to observe the 
following regulations respecting priority, viz : 

CLASSES PRESCRIBED. 

i|i» I 1. All orders and work shall be divided into three general classes, Class A, 
Class B, and Class C, with various subdivisions of Classes A and B, indicated 
by a suffix number, thus: Class Al, A2, A3, A4, etc., and Class Bl, B2, B3, 
B4, etc. 

PRECEDENCE OF CLASSES. 

2. Orders and work in Class A shall take precedence of orders and work in 
both Class B and Class C, and orders and work in Class B shall take precedence 
of orders and work in Class C, irrespective of the date the orders were received ; 
and orders and work in Class Al shall take precedence of orders and work In 
Class A2, etc., and Class Bl shall take pecedence of Class B2, etc. 

CLASS A DEFINED. 

3. Class A comprises war work; that is to say, orders and work urgently 
necessary in carrying on the war, such as arms, ammunition, .ships, etc., and 
the materials required in the manufacture of same. 

CLASS B DEFINED. 

4. Class B comprises orders and work which, while not primarily designe<l 
for the prosecution of the war, yet are of public Interest and essential to the 

j^ 1 national welfare, or otherwise of exceptional importance. 



CLASS C DEFINED. 



[ 5. Class C comprises all orders and work not embraced in Class A or Class 
'' B, and no certificate of the priorities committee will be require<l therefor. Any 

order for work or material not accompanied by a certificate in substantially 
' ' the form set forth on page 3 of this circular, to the effect that the work or 

material falls within Class A or Class B, should be treated as an order for 
«■ i work In Class C. 

MATEBIALS CLASSIFIED. 

#1 

6. All materials required in the manufacture of an article or in the prose<'u- 
ji tlon of any work will be entitled to take the class of such article or work 
onless otherwise specified in the certificate covering the same. 



326 AMERICAlir INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

CERTIFICATES OF PBIOBITY. 

7. Certificates in the form set forth on page 3 of this circular will be issue' 
by the priorities committee upon application therefor specifying the classificg 
tion of the order or work, and priority should be given accordingly in producin 
and furnishing the material or supplies or in manufacturing and delivering th 
article. Certificates of a subsidiary nature will be issued upon request for th 
furnishing of material and articles required in manufacturing the article o 
prosecuting the work ordered. 

CLASSIFICATION OF EXISTING OBDEES. 

8. All orders placed prior to the date hereof by or on behalf of the Wa 
Department or Navy Department of the United States or the United State 
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation should be classed as subdivisio; 
A-1 of Class A unless otherwise ordered by the officer placing the order o 
by the priorities committee, and all orders for arms, ammunition, and othe 
military supplies and equipment placed prior to the date hereof by or on behal 
of the nations associated with the United States in the war in which it is no\ 
engaged should be classed as subdivision A-2 of Class A unless otherwis 
ordered by the priorities committee. 

CLASSIFICATION OF FUTURE ORDERS. 

9. All orders placed after the date hereof should be classed as class C unles 
covered by certificates of the priorities committee or other written direction 
of the said committee. 

EXECUTION OF CERTIFICATES. 

10. Certificates or other documents signed by the chairman or any membe 
of the priorities committee shall be deemed to have been authorized by sai( 
committee and by the War Industries Board of the Council of Nationa 
Defense. 

Robert S. Lovett, 

Chairman of the Priorities Committee. 

Council of National Defense, 
By Newton D. Baker, 

Chairman. 
Approved : 

Newton D. Baker, 

Seci'etary of War. 
JosEPHUs Daniels, 

Secretary of the Navy. 



No 

War Industries Board of the Council of National Defense. 

Washington, , 1917. 

priority certificate. 

This is to certify that priority as Class (here insert letter, or lette 

and number, indicating class) in accordance with the regulations set forth li 
priorities committee Circular No. 1, is given to (here in 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 327 

sert name of iiulividual, firm, or company having contract to furnisli tlic nia- 

li'iiiil or article) for the followmg: (hero insert materials 

ur articles to be supplied) and for all the materials and articles required in the 
manufacture of the same, the said materials or articles being for the following 

purposes: (here insert, so far as the committee deems 

advisable, the use to be made of the materials or articles). 

Signed on behalf of the priorities committee by its chairman, or member, at 
^\■ashington on the date above mentioned. 



Chairman (or member) of the Priorities Committee. 

(2) PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 2. 

September 21, 1917. 

Applications for Priority Certificates. 

Attention is invited to the provisions of Circular No. 1, of this date, issued by 
the undersigned and approved by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the 
Navy, and the Council of National Defense ; and particularly to paragraph 7 of 
said circular making provision for the issuance of both principal and subsidiary 
priority certificates upon application therefor. Such application should be 
made only where the need is urgent and the applicant is able to promptly 
procure the needed materials, supplies, or articles only by being accorded 
priority, and when made will be governed by the rules and regulations following : 

applications for principal class a certificates. 

(a) Applications (Form PCI) for principal certificates covering contracts 
classified as Class A in paragraph 3 of said Circular No. 1 ^vill be made to the 
1 riiirities committee by the contracting officer or agency of the United States 
or by the contracting officer or agency of the nations associated with the United 
States in the war in which it is now engaged, by or through whom such contracts 
shall be placed. 

application for subsidiary class a certificates. 

ib) Applications (Form PCS) for subsidiary certificates covering materials, 
articles, or work required in the manufacture of articles or in the prosecution 
of work in connection with which a principal Class A certificate shall have 
issued will be made to the priorities committee by the contractor to whom said 
principal Class A certificate has been addressed. 

applications for subsidiary class a certificates under existing ordess. 

(c) Applications (Form P C 5) for subsidiary certificates covering materials, 
articles, or work required in the manufacture of articles or In the prosecution 
of work designated in paragraph 8 of said Circular No. 1 as Class Al or Class 
A2, will be made directly to the priorities committee by the contractor for the 
expedition of those contract the priority order is desired. 

applications for PBINCrPAL CLASS B CERTIFICATES. 

id) Applications (Form PC 7) for principal certificates covering contracts 
classified as Class B in paragraph 4 of said Circular No. 1, will be made directly 
to the priorities committee by the individual, firm, as.soclation, or corporation 
for the expedition of whose contract the priority order is desired. 



328 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

APPLICATION FOK SUKSIDIAUY CLASS B CERTIFICATES. 

(e) Applications (Form PC 9) for subsidiary certificates covering materials, 
articles, or work required in the manufacture of articles or in the prosecution 
of work in connection with which a principal Class B certificate shall have 
issued will be made to the priorities committee by the contractor to whom said 
principal Class B certificate has been addressed. 

While the use of these prescribed forms will greatly facilitate prompt action 
on applications and reduce the risk of misunderstandings and delays, still their 
use is not an absolute condition to a consideration of the application. If blanks 
are not available, applications by letter will suffice, but such letters must give 
concisiely yet fully substantially the information called for by these forms. 

Forms of application for both principal and subsidiary certificates are in- 
closed herewith, and an additional supply will be furnished by this committee 
upon request therefor. 

R. S. LOVETT, 

Chairman of the Priorities Committee. 



Forms of Application fob Principal and Subsidiary Certificate. 

[Form PC 1.] 

Name of contractor 

Contracting officer _ 



application fob principal class a priority certificate. 

, 191_-. 

Priorities Committee, Wab Industries Board, 

Council of National Defense, 

Washington, D. C. 
Gentlemen : You are hereby requested to Issue a principal Class A priority 

certificate to (insert name of contractor) with whom the 

undersigned has placed an order or entered into a contract No. dated 

, 191 , covering for de- 
livery . 

I recommend that a certificate Class A issue for the reasons following: 

Yours, truly, 

Contracting offlcer or agent for — 



[Form PC 3.] 

Principal certificate No. A is held by , who re- 

que.sts that subsidiary certificate issue to 

application for subsidiary class a priority certificate. 

, 191—. 

Priobities Committee, Wab Industeies Boabd, 

Council of National Defense, 

Washington, D. C. 
Gentlemen : You are hereby requested to issue a Class A priority certificate 

subsidiary to your principal priority certificate No. A , the requested 

subsidiary priority certificate to cover an order or contract dated , 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 329 

91-_, for , placed with by 

, for delivery 

J, Tlie execution of this order is necessary for the completion of the contract 
fwti(, indertaken by this applicant, for which the al)ove-mentioned principal priority 
''^^1 «rtificate was issued, for the reasons following: 



Tours truly, 

(Coni factor named in principal priority certificate No. A ) 

[Form PC 5.] 



iffpf. 



Contract on which no principal priority certificate has issued, entered into 
prior to September 21, 1917, by , who requests tliat sub- 
sidiary certificate issue to 

APPLICATION FOK SUBSIDIARY CLASS A PRIORITY CERTIFICATE LWDER ORDERS EXIST- 
ING SEPTEMBER 21, 1917, WHERE NO PRINCIPAL CERTIFICATE HAS ISSUKD. 



E»BiORiTiKS Committee, War Industries Board, 

Council of National Defense, 

Washington, D. C. 
Gentlemen : You are hereby requested to issue a subsidiary Class A priority 

— sertificate to cover an order or contract dated , for 

, placed with by , 

for delivery , being for material, articles, and work neces- 
sary for the prosecution of an order placed prior to September 21, 1917, by and 

Dn behalf of 

The execution of this order is necessary for the completion of the contract 
undertaken by this applicant for the reasons following : 



Yours truly. 

Applicant. 
[Form rC 7.] 
Application of that certificate Issued to 



APPLICATION FOR PRINCIPAL CLASS B PRIORITY CERTIFICATE. 

, 191__. 

Pbiorittes Committee, War Industries Board, 
vho r^ CouNcn- of National Defense, 

Washington, D. C. 
Gentlemen: You are liereby requested to issue a principal class B priority 

certificate to (insert name of contractor), with whom the 

undersigned has placed an order or entered into contract, dated 

, covering , for delivery 

We request that a certificate class B issue for the reasons following: 



Yours truly, 

Applicant. 



330 AMEKICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

[Form PC 9.] 

Principal certificate No. B is lield by , wlio re- 
quests that subsidiary certificate issue to 

APPLICATION FOE SUBSIDIARY CLASS B PBIOKITY CEETIFICATE. 

, 191-_. 

Peiokities Committee, War Industries Board, 
Council of National Defense, 

Washington, D. C. 

Gentlemen : You are hereby requested to issue a class B priority certificate, 

subsidiary to your principal priority certificate No. B , the requested 

subsidiary priority certificate to cover an order or contract, dated 

, for , placed with , by 

for delivery 

The execution of this order is necessary for the completion of the contract 
undertaken by this applicant for which the above-mentioned principal priority 
certificate was issued for the reasons following : 

Yours truly, 

(Contractor holding principal priority certificate No. B ) 



Appendix X. 

PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 4. 

(July 1, 1918.) 
rules and regulations governing priority in PRODUCTION, 

These rules and regulations governing priority in production will supersede i 
all directions, rules, and regulations heretofore promulgated by this committee. 
All priority certificates heretofore issued and now outstanding shall remain in 
full force and effect according to their original terms. 

During the war in which the United States is now engaged all individuals, 
firms, associations, and corporations engaged in the production of raw mate-' 
rials and manufactured products (save foods, feeds, and fuels) are requested: 
to observe the following regulations respecting priority, namely : 

CLASSIFICATIONS. 

1. Classes prescribed. — All orders and work are divided into five general 
classes : Class AA, class A, class B, class C, and class D, with subdivisions of ) 
class AA, class A, and class B, indicated by suffix number, thus : Class AA-1, 
class AA-2, etc. ; class A-1, class A-2, etc. ; and class B-1, class B-2, etc. 

2. Class AA defined. — Class AA comprises only emergency war work of an 
exceptional and urgent nature. 

3. Class A defined. — Class A comprises all other war work; that is to say, 
orders and work necessary to carry on the war, such as arms, ammunitions, 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 331 

(iestroyers, submarines, battleships, transports, merchant ships, and other water 
tiaft, airplanes, locomotives, etc., and the materials or commodities required 
in the production or manufacture of same. 

4. Class B defined. — Class B comprises orders and work which, while not 
primarily designed for the prosecution of the war, yet are of public interest 
and essential to the national welfare or otherwise of exceptional Importance. 

5. Class C defined. — Class C comprises all orders and work not covered by 
priority certificates issued by the priorities committee or not taking an auto- 
matic rating, in accordance with the provisions of sections 7, 8, and 9 hereof, 
which orders and work are to be utilized in furtherance of one or more of the 
purposes embraced within the " General classification of purposes demanding 
preference treatment " promulgated by the priorities board, appearing on page 
17 of this circular, as same may be from time to time amended or substituted ; 
or which orders and work are placed by or are to be utilized in connection with 
an industry or plant appearing on Preference List No. 1, promulgated and pub- 
lished by the priorities board under date of April 6, 1918 (as set forth on pp. 
lS-19 of this circular), and all amendments or substitutes therefor. No Class 
C certificates shall be issued. 

6. Class D defined. — Class D comprises all orders and work not embraced in 
Class AA, Class A, Class B, or Class C, and no certificates will be issued there- 
for. All orders for work or materials not covered by priority certificates or not 
taking an automatic classification in accordance with the provisions of sections 
8 and 9 hereof, and not taking a Class C classification under the provisions of 
section 5 hereof, will fall within Class D. 

7. Automatic classifications. — Each order placed after June 30, 1918, by a 
duly authorized officer of the War Department or of the Navy Department of 
the United States, or of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet 
Corporation, which falls within Class A as defined in section 3 hereof, shall by 
virtue of this rule, upon the placing of the order, automatically be classified as 
A-5. provided said order carries an indorsement personally signed by the officer 
placing the order, reading: 

" Unless rerated by express order in writing by the priorities committee of 
the War Industries Board this order is by authority of said priorities committee 
rated as Class A-5, and its execution shall take precedence over all your orders 
and work of a lower classification to the extent necessary to insure delivery 
according to the date specified lierein, as prescribed by Circular No. 4, Issued 
Ijy the priorities division of the War Industries Board, of date July 1, 1918. and 
all amendments thereto." 

8. Each order for materials, equipment, or supplies for the purposes or uses 
hereinafter in this section mentioned shall, by virtue of this rule, automatically 
rake a classification as herein prescribed, namely : 

(a) For the manufacture of turbines (all cla.sses) A-4 

(b) For the repair or construction of steam railroad locomotives for use 

on the railroads under the jurisdiction of the United States Hall- 
road Administration A-4 

(c) For the production of electrodes A-6 

(d) For the manufacture of rope wire and of wire rope A-5 

(e) For the building of ships or other water craft for and under direct 

contracts with the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet 
Corporation A-5 

(f) For the building of all cargo water craft (but not pleasure craft) 

save .such as are under construction by or for the United States 
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation A-6 



332 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

(fir) For the manufacture of machine tools for working botli metal and 
wood; of machinists' tools, of small tools, of hand tools, and of 

mining tools, machinery, and equipment A-6 

(h) For the manufacture of steam railroad materials, equipment, and 
supplies (other than locomotives) for use on the railroads under 

the jurisdiction of the United States Railroad Administration B-1 

(i) For the manufacture of locomotive cranes and traveling cranes B-1 

(;■) For the manufacture of electrical equipment other than turbines (but 

not electrical supplies as distinguished from equipment) B-2 

(fc) For the manufacture of farm implements B-2 

(I) For the manufacture of textile machinery B-2 

(m) For the manufacture of tools, implements, machinery, and equipment 
required for the production, harvesting, distribution, milling, can- 
ning, and refining of foods and feeds B-2 

(n) For the manufacture of binder twine and rope B-2 

(o) For the manufacture of oil-well supplies or equipment — by which is 
meant supplies for the production of petroleum and natural gas — 
but not including pipe lines, storage tanks of 1,000 barrels capacity 
or over, tank cars, or refineries B-2 

No order shall take an automatic classification under the provisions of this 
section 8 save where the person intending to use the materials, equipment, or 
supplies ordered states under oath in writing that they are to be used for one 
or more of the purposes mentioned in this section and for no other purpose; 
which affidavit shall be indorsed on or attached to the order and shall be in 
the form following: 

" Unless rerated by express order in writing by the priorities committee of 
the War Industries Board, this order is by authority of said priorities com- 
mittee rated as Class — under and by virtue of subdivision — of section 8 of 
Circular No. 4 issued by the priorities division of the War Industries Board of 
date July 1, 1918, and all amendments thereto. 

" For the purpose of securing the said rating I do solemnly swear — 

"(1) That I have taken and filed whatever pledge is required by the War 
Industries Board from the industry of which I am a member ; and 

"(2) That the materials, equipment, or supplies covered by this order are 
intended for use, and will be used, for the purpose or purposes mentioned in 
the said subdivision or subdivisions of said section 8, and for no other purpose." 

9. Each order for materials, equipment, or supplies for such purposes or uses 
as fall within Class C, as defined in section 5 hereof, will automatically be 
classed as Class C ; provided the person intending to use the materials, equip- 
ment, or supplies ordered shall file with and as a part of said order an affidavit 
in writing in the form following: 

" Unless rerated by express order in writing by the priorities committee of 
the War Industries Board, this order is by authority of said priorities commit- 
tee rated as Class C under and by virtue of section 9 of Circular No. 4 issued 
by the priorities division of the War Industries Board of date July 1, 1918, and 
all amendments thereto. 

" For the purpose of securing the said rating I do solemnly swear — 

"(1) That I have taken and filed whatever pledge is required by the War 
Industries Board from the industry of which I am a member; and 

"(2) That the materials, equipment, or supplies covered by this order are 
intended for use, and will be used, for the purpose or purposes mentioned and 
referred to in section 5 of said circular, and for no other purpose." 






AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 883 

10. Where the party placinc: nn order under sections 7. 8. or hereof con- 
■oives it to be in the puhlie interest thnt the order should take a lii>,'her ehissl- 
licatioTi than the automatic classification prescribed herein, then in such event 
an application for such hicher classification settins forth the reasons therefor 
may be filed and same will be considered by and promptly acted upon by tlje 
: liorities committee. No such application should he made, however, save in 
rases where the automatic rating will not secure delivery on or near the date 
required, and such application must disclose facts evidencing that the public 
interest requires an earlier delivery of the order than can be secured under 
the existing automatic rating. The application must be made on the regular 
niiorities committee application Form P C 15. 

11. Class D orders. — All orders sa^e such as are automatically classed under 
the provisions of sections 7. S. and fl hereof shall l)e automatically classed as 
Class D unless covered by certificates or other written directions issued in ac- 
cordance with the rules and regulations embodied in this circular or amend- 
ments thereto. 

PRECEDENCE OF CLASSES. 

12. Rules of precedence. — Orders and work in Class AA shall take precedence 
of orders and work in aU other classes : those in Class A shall take precedence 
of those in Classes B, C, and D; those in Class B shall take precedence of those 
in Classes C and D; those in Class C shall take precedence of those in Class D; 
all irrespective of the dates the orders were placed. 

Orders and woi-k in Class AA-1 shall take precedence of orders and work 
in Class AA-2 and all lower classes; those in Class A-1 shall take precedence of 
those in Class A-2 and all lower classes ; those in Class B-1 shall take prece- 
dence of those in Class B-2 ; etc., etc. 

Where work is in progress on several classified orders the rules of iirecedence 
set forth in sections 13 and 14 hereof will be observed. 

13. Orders in different classes. — The classification of an order simply means 
that it shall be given such precedence over orders of a lower classification as 
may be necessary (and only such as may be necessary) to insure delivery on 
the date specified in the order. It does not mean that work should cease on 
orders of a lower classification or that the order should be completed and 
ilelivery made in advance of orders taking a lower classification if this is not 
necessary to effect delivery within the time specified. The one to whom a 
priority certificate is directed or with whom an order taking an automatic 

■lassificatlon is placed should make his own production plans, s(» as to get the 
maximum of efliciency out of his operations, making all deliveries at the times 
< ontracte<^l for, if possible, and where this is not possible, giving prei-etlence to 
the orders taking the highest classification. 

14. Orders in same class. — As between orders in the same subdivision of a 
'lass fas A-1), save where otherwi.se specifically requested by the committee, 
'lie date of delivery contracted for will control unless this will operate to delay 
the delivery required by an earlier order of the same class, in which event the 
'iirlicr order will have precedence in delivery. For example: Two orders. 
Order X and Order Y, are both cover(>d by A-1 certificates. Order X is dated 
<^)ctober 1, 1918, and calls for delivery February 1, 1019. Order Y is dated 
November 1, 1918, but calls for delivery .January 1, 1919. As between these two 
orders preference will ordinarily lie given to Order Y, because It calls for an 
earlier delivery date. If, however, such delivery will delay the comph'tl(»n of 
Order X, then preference shoifid be given Order X. becan<" H i< ilu- earlier 



334 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, 

order. If possible, both orders will be completed on the delivery dates called 
for. The dates of the certificates are not controlling. 

15. Doubtful cases. — In case of doubt as to which certificate or order should 
have precedence, the matter should be laid before the committee by correspond- 
ence or in conference, so that the committee may give specific instructions. 

APPLICATIONS. 

16. Form of application.— Applications for priority certificates must be made 
on the form of application prescribed by this committee. (See form set out 
at pages 14 and 15 of this circular.) 

17. Who may apply. — As a general rule, where an application is necessary it 
should be made by the one intending to use the materials, equipment, and 
supplies. 

18. United States Government. — If the order has been placed by some pur- 
chasing officer of the United States Army, Navy, Shipping Board Emergency 
Fleet Corporation, or any other branch or department of the Government, the 
application should be made by and in the name of the department or official for 
whose account the order has been placed. 

19. Allied Governments. — If the order has been placed for export to the terri- 
tory of an allie<l Government or for delivery to an allied Gvernment or to some 
person for account thereof, the application must be made to this committee 
through and with the written approval of the War Mission which is representing 
said Government in the United States and also with the written approval of the 
Allied Purchasing Commission. 

20. A Government contractor. — One who has a contract with the Government 
or with the Allies, and who needs priority assistance to obtain the materials, 
commodities, or work to fill such contract may make application direct to this 
committee. In some instances the committee will have already issued a priority 
certificate against such contractor directing him to give priority to the fiUing 
of his Government contract or contracts. In other instances such cerificates will 
not have been issued. In either event, however, one who is working on Govern- 
ment contracts may make application direct if he needs priority assistance. 
While it is not necessary for such applications to be made through or with the 
approval of the Government official placing the contract, it is desirable that this 
course should be pursued where it will not involve substantial delay. Where 
this course is not pursued, such applicant's connection with the Government 
work and the correctness of his representations will be verified and checked by 
the committee. 

21. Govei-nment subcontractors. — Those who may be one or more times re- 
moved from a direct contractor with the Government or with the Allies, but who 
are furnishing materials, supplies, or commodities to be used in connection with 
the fulfillment of such direct contract, may make application direct to the com- 
mittee for such assistance as they may need to obtain such materials, commodi- 
ties, or supplies. Such applications need not be approved by either the principal 
contractor or by the agency of the Government or the Allies placing the original 
order, but the representations of the applicant will be verified by the committee. 

22. Applicants not engaged directly or remotely on Government contracts. — 
One who has placed an order for any material, commodities, or supplies which 
fall within class B, as defined in section 4 hereof, and who requires priority 
assistance to procure reasonably prompt delivery thereof, may make application 
direct to the committee. In such cases the paragraphs in the application seeking 
to elicit information with respect to the applicant's connection with the Govern- 
ment or allied contracts maj be disregarded. 



m 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 335 

23. Agaitist whom applications may be made. — Applications for priority sliould 
le made against the actual producer or manufacturer. Tlie committee will 
lot — save in exceptional cases, where the issuance of a certificate will clearly 
ixpedite the filling of an important order — administer priority against jobbers, 
>rokers, or middlemen. When an order is placed through a third person, his 
lame should appear in paragraph 4 of Application Form PC 15 (see pp. 14 and 
.5 of this order). 

24. Premature deliveries. — In placing orders care should be exercised in de- 
ermining the date that delivery will actually be required. The contractor 
ihould not ask to have delivery made before he will be prepared to use the 
irticles. A rigid adherence to this rule will greatly facilitate timely deliveries 
•f urgent orders and prevent needless interference. The application must state 
he date of delivery promised by the producer. 

PRIORITY CEETiriCATES. 

25. Form and effect of certificates. — When the committee shall approve an 
ipplication and give it a rating, it will issue a priority certificate in the form 
:et forth on page 16 of this circular. The one to whom the certificate shall be 
lirected will, in fulfilling the contract or order mentioned in the certificate, give 
it sucli precedence or priority as it may be entitled to under the classification 
pecified in the certificate and the rules of this circular. 

26. Priority classifications supersede other instructions. — Priority classlfica- 
ions, whether evidenced by certificates or automatic ratings as prescribed in 
ections 7, 8, and 9 hereof, shall supersede any and all previous instructions, by 
whomsoever issued, with respect to priority in production and delivery of the 
infract or order covered thereby, except commandeering orders and special 
iriority directions issued in pursuance of section 28 hereof. 

27. Execution of certificates. — Certificates or other documents signed by order 
f the priorities committee (printed) and countersigned in person by any person 
whose name appears thereon as one of the persons authorized to countersign 
hall be deemed to have been authorized by said committee, the priorities com- 
Qissioner, and the War Industries Board. 

28. Special priority directions.— ThQ.t unusual emergencies may be promptly 
Det and cases of great urgency provided for, the priorities committee may, by 
in order in the form of a letter, a special certificate, or otherwise, signed per- 
:onally by the priorities commissioner, direct that a particular contract or 
rder shall have priority over other contracts or orders covered by existing 
ertificates or automatic ratings, or may in the same manner reclassify or 
egrade existing contracts or orders covered by outstanding certificates or auto- 
oatic ratings. 

29. Delivery of certificates. — Unless requested to the contrary, the priorities 
lommittee will forward direct to the applicant the original and one copy of the 
«rtificate, if issued, that the applicant may send the original to the one to 
whom it is directed, retaining the copy for his files. If the applicant desires, 
ind so expressly .states, the certificates, if issued, will be forwarded to the one 
whom directed. Should the committee decline to approve the application, 
)rompt notification of such action will be sent direct to the applicant. 

SCOPE OF WORK. 

80. The committee undertakes where nece.ssary to administer priority In the 
•reduction of all raw materials and finished products save foods, feeds, and 
nels. 



336 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

31. Fuel. — The production, supply, and distribution of fuel is under the supe) 
vision of the United States Fuel Administrator, who, in the distribution of fu( 
to industries and plants, is guided by the preference list, in so far as it classifie 
such industries and plants according to their relative importance. The prefei 
ence list is compiled and promulgated by the priorities board, of which th 
priorities commissioner is chairman and H. G. Phillipps is secretary. While th 
priorities committee does not administer priority in the production of fue 
should those engaged on orders covered by priority certificates, automati 
classifications, or special priority directions experience difficulty in securin 
a fuel supply to the extent of interfering with the production covered by sue 
priority, they may apply for a place on the preference list on applicatio: 
form PL-1, which will be furnished to them by H. G. Phillipps, secretary, o 
request. Such applications will be investigated and appropriate recommends; 
tions will be made to I lie Fuel Administrator, to the end that all orders t 
which this committee has accorded priority in production may not be unneces 
sarily delayed for lack of fuel. 

The committee will also consider applications by fuel producers for priorlt: 
assistance to procure materials, tools, equipment, or supplies required for th' 
production of fuel. 

32. Foods and feeds excluded. — The committee does not distribute foods o; 
feeds, over the production, supply, and distribution of which tlie United State? 
Food Administrator has supervision. Requests for assistance in purchasinj 
foods and feeds or in expediting deliveries thereof should be addressed to tht 
United States Food Administrator, Washington, D. C. 

The committee, however, will consider applications from producers of food; 
and feeds for priority assistance to procure materials, tools, equipment, o: 
supplies required for their production. 

33. Transportation. — This committee does not administer priority in trans 
portation. The United States Railroad Administration in furnishing transpor 
tation service is guided by the preference list mentioned in section 31 hereof 
defining the relative importance of industries and plants. Should those en 
gaged on orders covered by priority certificates, automatic classifications, oi 
special priority directions experience difficulty in arranging for the transpor 
tation of materials, equipment, or supplies to the extent of interfering with th< 
production of said orders, representations to this effect addressed to the j\Ian 
ager of Inland Traffic, War Industries Board, Washington, D. C, setting fortl 
such facts in detail, duly verified by affidavit, will be carefully considered anc 
in proper cases certified to the United States Railroad Administration to th( 
end that all orders to which this committee has accorded priority in productior 
may not be unnecessarily delayed for lack of transportation. Special applica 
tion forms for this purpose may be secured from the manager of inland traffic 
War Industries Board. 

This committee will also consider applications of transportation companies 
for priority assistance to procure materials, equipment, or supplies reqnirec 
in their operations. 

34. Export and import licenses excluded. — The committee does not issut 
export or import licenses. All applications for such licenses should be ad 
dressed to the War Trade Board, Washington, D. C. 

35. Prices and purchases excluded. — The committee does not fix or assist ir 
fixing prices. Neither does it make or assist in making purchases. 

36. Regrading of schedidcs. — When it appears that a large per cent of th( 
capacity of any plant is covered by certificates or automatic ratings of th( 
same subdivision of a class, the priorities committee will, when it appears de 



T prio' 
'd for tl 



on to 
irodiictii 
1 applia 
nd traffi 

:ooipaK 
reqiiit 

oot i^^ 
Id tie! 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 337 

^% jirable so to do, arrange, through conference between It, the authorized rep- 
"''^^ 'esentatives of such plant, and those phicing the orders covered by such cer- 
m\i jflcates or automatic ratings, for the reclassification thereof or the rearrange- 
nent and regrading of the schedules within each subdivision of a class, so as 
;o Insure the most urgent orders having precedence without unnecessarily In- 
''N :erfering with the efficient management and operation of such plant. 

autoniaf instances whebe applications should not be made. 

settirii 

Ibysiil 37. Orders not icithin class AA, class A, or class B. — No application should 
pplifjti, ^ made for priority in any case which does not fall within Class AA, Class A, 
letary, j }^ Class B, as defined in sections 2, 3, and 4 hereof. 

88. Before order is placed. — Applications should not, save In very exceptional 
orders Instances, be made for priority assistance unless an order is actually placed for 
jBjp(^ he materials, commodities, or work. 

89. Where no shortage exists. — Save in very exceptional cases priority as- 
Istance is only required where the demand exceeds the supply. 

40. Where no delay is expected. — Although there may be a general shortage 
n a given product, the particular producer or manufacturer with whom the 
fjd^jj )rder is placed may be prepared to make delivery on sclieduled time. Inquiry 
pjjjjd ihould first be made of him to ascertain if there will be a delay. In all cases 
„|.{,]jjji, he application should state when delivery is needed and when delivery 
;edtotf«>mlsed. 

THE TEST. 

jjjpu, I 41. The paramount purpose of priorities is the selective mobilization of the 

ffoducts of the soil, the mines, and the factories for direct and Indirect war 

jjijju leeds in such a way as will most effectually contribute toward winning the 

. rar. In requesting priority the petitioner should join with the committee in 

Urn applying the test: To what extent, if at all, will the granting of this appllca- 

lon contribute, directly or indirectly, toward winning the war; and if at all, 

low urgent Is the need? 

Conclusion. — The sole object of this division is to render a very real service 
o the Government and to the Nation, within the scope of its activities, and to 
I '^j. hat end invites and confidently hopes to receive the wholehearted cooperation 
if every department of the Government and of all others with whom It has 
o deal. Careful and painstaking consideration will be given all application? 
'or priority, and decisions will be promptly rendered thereon. 

Edwin B. Parker, Priorities Commissioner. 



Washington, D. C, July 1, 1918. 
Approved : 

Bernard M. Babuch, Chairman War Industries Board. 
Ne\vton D. Bakeb, Secretary of War. 
JosEPHUS Daniels, Secretary of the Navy. 
U. S. Shipping Board, 
By Edward N. Hurley, Chairman. 

U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 
By Edward N. Hurley, President. 
105826—21 22 



338 AMERICAX INDUSTRY I:N' THE WAR. 
[P. C. Form No. 15.] 
Routing: To Date 



APPLICATION FOB PBIOP.ITY CEETIFICATE. 

[Read Circular No. 4 and instructions before filling in application.] 

Use typewriter. 

"Applicant " must be the concern which is to use the material or equipmer 
A separate application blank must be filled in for each case presented ; sever 
orders on one concern may be covered in one application. 
Applications made by the Government need not be attested. 

To the Peiobities Committee, 

Washington, D. C. 

1918. 

The undersigned hereby requests issuance of a priority certificate for tl 
reasons stated below : 

1. Insert here name and address of concern which is to produce the materi; 

or equipment or perform the work described in paragraph 5. Name 

Address 

2. Insert here name and address of applicant. Name 

Address 

3. State here number and date of order placed with concern named in par; 

graph 1. Number of order Date of order Da 

delivery needed Date delivery promised 

4. If order was placed through an agent, insert here his name and addres 
Name Address 

5. State here only the quantity and description of material or equipment f( 
which priority is being asked. If material is metal, give tonnage. 

6. Enter here only the priority number (s) and rating (s), if any, for whic 
the material described under paragraph 5 is required. 

7. If materials or equipment mentioned in paragraph 5 are for use in fiUic 
a Government order given directly to applicant, insert here name of Governmei 
department, number, date of order, quantity, and full particulars of such orde 
and dates of delivery required. 

8. If materials or equipment mentioned in paragraph 5 are being applied fc 
by a subcontractor, such subcontractor will state the name of original contractc 
and give an exact description of what he (subcontractor) is to furnish, wit 
quantities and deliveries required. 

9. If materials or equipment be required for purposes other than mentioned 1 
paragraphs 7 and 8, state fully the purpose for which they are to be usee 



10. State whether or not applicant has in stock any of the materials (an 
how much ) which may be used, in whole or in part, in the filling of such order 



11. How much of the material (s) mentioned in paragraph 5 has (have) bee 
shipped? 

12. Has person named in paragraph 2 the plant and equipment now availabl 
to execute all orders on which he is now engaged? 

13. What per cent of applicant's plant output is now devoted to war needa 



14. Any additional information the applicant may wish to present. 

Each question bearing on this application must be fully answered upon th 
form itself, and not by letter. Do not send letters of transmittal. 

The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on oath says that the statement 
contained in the foregoing application are full, true, and correct ; that the quan 
tities are accurately stated, and that all articles, material, and work describe 
in paragraph 5 hereof are intended for use in and necessary for the completio) 
of the order (s) concerning which this application is made. 



(To be signed by applicant) 
By 

(Name of oflScer legally empowered to 
act for applicant.) 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , 1916 



(Notary Public.) 
in and for 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR, 339 

[Form P. C. 16.] 

[Address communications Priorities Committee, Washington, D. C] 

y[Bdwln B. Parker, priorities commislsonor. Committee : Charles K. Foster (vice chalr- 
) man), Maj. Gen. J. B. Aleshire, George Armsby, H. n. Barbour, Lieut. Col. C. A. 
1 McKenney, F. H. Macpherson, Rear Admiral N. E. Mason, Everett Moras, Lucius P. 
Ordway, T. C. Powell, Rear Admiral A. V. Zane, Maurice Hirsch (secretary).] 

War Industries Board, 
l;seTei| Priorities Dfv'ision, 

Washington. 
priority certificate no. p. 

To of. 

%n application No. by 

for 



: 



jijy This is to certify that Order No. , dated , 191__, placed 

^th you by , and covering: 

which applicant aslvS delivery (as per contract) 



iipj, s hereby given priority as Class A , and the execution of this order 

ill take precedence over all your orders and work of a lower classification to 

le extent necessary to insure delivery according to the date specified next 

**»'bove, as prescribed by Circular No. 4, issued by this committee, dated July 1, 

This certificate will not be valid unless countersigned — 
3r ivliH^y w. J. Ormsby, C. S. Abell, L. Pierpont, or Geo. R. Dickson. 

Executed at "Washington, D. C, on this the day of , A. D. 19—. 

By order of — 

PRIORITIES COMMITTEE. 
Jountersigned : 



Notes. — 1. Unless otherwise requested, the original and a duplicate of this 
ertiflcate will be forwarded to applicant, who should reforward the original to 
person on whom the certificate is issued, retaining the duplicate. The 
lerson on whom the certificate is issued will have no notice of its issuance until 

ceived by him. 

2. Prompt report must be made to this committee by the person on whom the 
ertiflcate is issued when the order covered hereby has been completed, and in 
aaking such report the number of this certificate must be given. 

3. This certificate is not assignable. The materials secured hereunder mu.st 
! used for the purpose stated in the application unless otherwise directed by 

jm he priorities committee. 



itenif 



.escri 
apleS 



ipoa: Appendix XI. 



(1) GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF PURPOSES DEMANDING 
PREFERENCE TREATMENT. 



For the guidance of all governmental agencies in the production, supply, and 
Istribution of raw materials, finished products, electrical energy, fuel, and 
ransportation by rail, water, pipe lines, and otherwise, the priorities board 
as adopted the following general classification of purposes demanding prefer- 
Qce treatment : 

Ships. — Including destroyers and submarine chasers. Including all necessary 
iw materials, partially manufactured parts, and .supplies for completion of 
-"" roducts. 



340 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Aircraft. — Munitions, military and naval supplies' and operations. — Buildii 
construction for Government needs. Equipment for same. Including all nece 
sary raw materials, partially manufactured parts, and supplies for completU 
of products. 

Fuel. — Domestic consumption. Manufacturing necessities named herein, i| 
eluding all necessary raw materials, partially manufactured parts, and sui 
plies for completion of products. 

Food and collateral industries. — Foodstuffs for human consumption and plani 
handling same. Feeding stuffs for domestic fowls and animals, and plan 
handling same. All tools, utensils, implements, machinery, and equipme) 
required for production, harvesting, and distribution, milling, preparing, cai 
ning, and refining foods and feeds such as seeds of foods and feeds, bind( 
twine, etc. Products of collateral industries, such as fertilizers, fertilizer i; 
gredients, insecticides, and fungicides. Containers for foods and feeds, cc 
lateral products. Materials and equipment for preservation of foods and fee(| 
such as ammonia and other refrigeration supplies, including ice. Including 
necessary raw materials, partially manufactured parts, and supplies for co 
pletion of products. 

Clothing. — For civilian population. Including all necessary raw materij 
partially manufactured parts and supplies for completion of products. 

Railroads. — Or other necessary transportation equipment, including wat 
transportation. Including all necessary raw materials, partially manufacture 
parts and supplies for completion of products. 

Public utilities. — Serving war industries. Army, Navy, and civilian populi 
tion. Including all necessary raw materials, partially manufactured pari 
and supplies for completion of products. 

Edwin B. Parker, 
Chairman, Priorities Boards 

Washington, D. C, March 27, 1918. 



(2) PREFERENCE LIST NO. 1. 

In pursuance of a resolution unanimously adopted by the priorities boar* 
at a meeting held April 6, 1918, the following preference list of classes of induii 
tries, whose operation as a war measure is of exceptional importance, is pri 
mulgated and published for the guidance of all agencies of the United Statt 
Government in the supply and distribution of coal and coke, and in the suppl 
of transportation by rail and water for the movement of coal and coke to sal 
industries. 

The priorities commissioner shall, under the direction of and with the ai 
proval of the priorities board, certify additional classes of industries, and als 
certify individual plants whose operation as a war measure is of exceptions 
importance, which industries and plants when so certified shall be automat 
cally included in this preference list, which shall be amended or revised froi 
time to time by action of the priorities board to meet changing conditions. 

No distinction is made between any of the industries or plants which are o 
may be included in this preference list, and no significance should attach t 
the order in which the industries or plants appear in the list. 

Aircraft. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing aircraft or supplie 
and equipment therefor. 

Amnwnition. — Plants engaged in the manufacture of ammunition for th 
United States Government and the Allies. 

Army and Navy cantonments and camps. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 341 

Biiil(ij| Arms (^mall). — Plants engaged in niamilaeturhig small amis for the United 
al!ii«»Lstates Government and the Allies. 

Chemicals. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing chemicals. 

Voke plants. 
*!,■ Domestic consumers of fuel. 
8f«i ^ Electric equipment. — Plants manufacturing same. 

Electrodes. — Plants producing electrodes. 

Explosives. — Plants manufacturing explosives. 

Earm implements. — Manufacturers exclusively of agricultural implements 
ml farm-operating equipment. 

Eeed. — Plants producing feed. 

Eerro-alloys. — Plants producing. 
.. Eertilizers. — Manufacturers of fertilizers. 

Fire brick. — Plants producing exclusively. 
ffldfeeft Food. — Plants manufacturing, milling, preparing, refining, preserving, and 
iDdinfilwholesaling food for human consumption. 

forcil Food containers. — Manufacturers of tin and glass containers and manufac- 
Itnrers exclusively of other food containers. 

Gas.— Gas-producing plants. 

Gas. — Plants manufacturing exclusively gas-producing machinery. 

Guns (large). — Plants manufacturing same. 
iifactuii Bemp, jute, and cotton bags. — Plants manufacturing exclusively hemp, jute, 

id cotton bags. 
pdplU Insecticides. — Manufacturers exclusively of insecticides and fungicides. 

Iron and s^eeZ.— Blast furnaces and foundries. 

Laundries. 

Machine tools. — Plants manufacturing machine tools. 

Mines. 

Mines. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing mining tools and equip- 
ment. 

Neicspapers and periodicals. — Plants printing and publishing exclusively 
newspapers and periodicals. 

Oil. — Refineries of both mineral and vegetable oils. 

Oil production. — Plants manufacturing exclusively oil-well equipment. 

Public institutions and buildings. 

Public utilities. 

Railways. 

Raihcays. — Plants manufacturing locomotives, freight cars, and rails, and 
keto^fother plants engaged exclusively in manufacture of railway supplies. 

Refrigeration. — Refrigeration for food and exclusively ice-producing plants. 

Seeds. — Producers or wholesalers of seeds (except flower seeds). 

Ships {bunker coal). — Not including pleasure craft, 
jceptiofl S7itps.— Plants engaged exclusively in building ships (not Including pleasure 
automflcraft) or in manufacturing exclusively supplies and equipment therefor. 

Soap. — Manufacturers of soap. 

Steel. — Steel plants and rolling mills. 

Tanners. — Tanning plants, save for patent leather. 

Tanning extracts.— Vhmis manufacturing tanning extract.s. 

Tin plate. — Manufacturers of tin plate. 

Twine [binder) and /-ope— Plants producing exclusively binder twine and 
rope. 

Wire rope and rope wire. — Manufacturers of same. 

Edwin B. Pakkkr. 
Chairman, Priorities Board. 

Washington, D. C, April 6, 1918. 



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342 AMERICAN INDUSTEY IN THE WAR. 

Appendix XII. 
PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 20.— PREFERENCE LIST NO. 2. 

rOBEWOED. 

The President has placed upon the chairman of the War Industries Board th( 
responsibility for determining and administering all priorities in production anc 
delivery. The determination of the relative importance of all industries ancr 
plants for both production and delivery by a single agency renders it possible 1 
to reasonably maintain a well-balanced program -with respect to the several 
factors entering into production, which include (o) plant facilities, (b) fue 
supply or electric energy, or both, (c) supply of raw materials and finished 
products, {d) labor, and (e) transportation by rail, water, pipe lines, oi 
otherwise. Without all of these, speaking generally, production is impossible. 

In compliance with the directions of the President that plans be formulated 
whereby there may be " common, consistent, and concerted action " in carrying 
Into effect all priority policies and decisions, the chairman of the War Industries 
Board has created a Priorities Board, with the priorities commissioner of the 
War Industries Board as chairman, consisting of (1) the chairman of the War 
Industries Board, (2) the priorities commissioner, (3) a member of the Rail- 
road Administration, (4) a member of the United States Shipping Board 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, (5) a member of the War Trade Board, (6) 
a member of the Food Administration, (7) a member of the Fuel Administra- 
tion, (8) a representative of the War Department, (9) a representative of the 
Navy Department, (10) a member of the Allied Purchasing Commission, and 
(11) the chairman of the War Labor Policies Board. 

The decisions of the Priorities Board are subject to review only by the 
chairman of the War Industries Board and by the President. 

For the guidance of all governmental agencies and all others interested in 
(1) the production and supply of fuel and electric energy, (2) in the supply 
of labor, and (3) in the supply of transportation service by rail, water, pipe 
lines, or otherwise, in so far as such service contributes to pi'oduction of 
finished products, the accompanying designated Preference List No. 2 has been 
adopted by the Priorities Board superseding Preference List No. 1, adopted 
April 6, 1918, and all amendments and supplements thereto. 

Where advisable, industries, as such, have been classified and listed. In 
numerous instances individual plants have been found to be entitled to prefer- 
ence, although the industries to which they belong are not; and in other in- 
stances where an Industry, as such, has been accorded a degree of preference, 
particular plants in such industry have been placed in a higher class. This 
has necessitated classifying and listing not only industries as such but to a 
limited extent individual plants, some of which are not embraced within any 
listed industry, while others are accorded a higher rating than that accorded 
the listed industry to which they belong. 

The preference list is made up of industries and plants which in the public 
interest are deemed entitled to preferential treatment. The inclusion of these 
industries and plants on this list does not operate as an embargo against all 
others, but the effect is to defer the requirements of all other industries and 
plants until the requirements of those on the preference list shall have been 
satisfied. 

In the compilation of this list, industries and plants have been divided ac- 
cording to their relative importance into four classes, viz : Class I, Class II, 
Class III, and Class IV. In determining such relative importance consideration 



jerat! 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 343 

and weight have been given not solely to any one but to all of the following 
factors: (1) The intrinsic importance of the product itself for use during the 
war, and the urgency, as measured by time, of the demand or of the use to 
.vhich it is to be put; (2) the necessity for maintaining or stimulating and 
ncreasing the total quantity of production, which in turn depends largely upon 
iie relation of the supply to the demand for essential uses; (3) the proportion 
)f the capacity of the industry or plant which is devoted to the production of 
he essential product. 

Where it is imperative not only to maintain but to stimulate and increase 

production to satisfy abnormal demands ci'eated by war requirements, a high 

seven .ating is necessary, even though the Intrinsic importance of the product may be 

([,) fii ess than that of other products placed in a lower classification due to the fact 

fioislij hat the supply of such other products equals the demand without the stimulus 

)f high priority. Where it is necessary to speed the production of a particular 

jroduct required at a particular time to carry into effect an important program, 

Diiilati I high priority is given, although changing conditions may thereafter suggest 

md demand a reclassification. Certain plants produce commodities of great 

•elative importance, but at the same time produce other commodities of less 

•elative importance, and under such circumstances consideration and weight is 

fiven to the ratio of production between the more important and less important 

;ommodities. Instances occasionally arise where Individual plants are given 

preference so long as they are rendering, and so long as it is in the public 

ijj Ij nterest that they should render, a particular service, even though, taking the 

jjj|j(, lountry as a whole, the supply of their product is ample to meet all demands. 

No distinction has been made between any of the industries or plants within 

ny one class, and no significance attaches to the order in which industries 

nd plants are listed within any class. 

The industries and plants grouped under Class I are only such as are of 
xceptional importance in connection with the prosecution of the war. Their 
equirements must be fully satisfied in preference to those of the three remain- 
ng classes. 

Ilequirements of industries and plants grouped under Class II, Class III, and 
jlass IV shall have precedence over those not appearing on the preference list. 
lis between these three classes, however, there shall be no complete or absolute 
)reference. The division into classes is for the purpose of presenting a com- 
)0site picture of the relative importance of the industries and plants em- 
iraced within each group. It is not Intended that the requirements of Class 
I shall be fully satisfied before supplying any of the requirements of 
lass III, or that those of Class III shall be fully satisfied before supply- 
ng any of those of Class IV. The classification does, however, indicate that 
he industries and plants grouped in Class II are relatively more Important than 
hose in Class III, and that those In Class III are relatively more important than 
hose in Class IV. It will often happen that after satisfying the requirements 
>f Class I the remaining available supply will be less than the aggregate re- 
lairements of the other three classes, in which event such supply will be ra- 
ioned to the industries and plants embraced within those classes. In deternii ti- 
ng a basis for such rationing, the relative Importance of each industrj' :ind 
)lant, according to its class rating, must be considered. It has been found Im- 
>racticable to prescribe for rati< aing purposes any general and uniform rule 
)r formula, but the priorities board will, from time to time, after conference and 
n cooperation with each of the several governmental agencies charged with the 
distribution thereof, determine particular principles, values, and methods of 
P pplication which may be followed in allocating fuel, power, transportation, and 
bor, respectively, to the end that proper recognition and weight may, as far as 



344 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

practicable in each ease, be given to the relative importance of Class II, Clasi 
III, and Class lY. 

Each pla- '- listed as such shall not later than the 15th of each month file witB 
the secreta y of the priorities board, Washington, D. C, a report on P. L. Forn 
No. 3 (a supply of which will be furnished on application) covering its activitiei^ 
during the preceding month. Any plant failing to file such report will be droppec 
from the preference list. 

Priorities in the supply and distribution of raw materials, simifinishec 
products, and finished products shall be governed by Circular No. 4 issued by th( 
priorities division of the War Industres Board under date of July 1, 1918, and 
all amendments and supplements thereto or substitutes therefor. 

The term " principally " as used in listing industries shall be construed t« 
mean plants whose output is not less than 75 per cent of the products mentioned 

This preference list shall be amended or revised from time to time by aetiOD 
of the priorities board to meet changing conditions. The priorities commissionei 
shall, under the direction of and with the approval of tne priorities board, cer- 
tify additional classes of industries and also certify additional plants whos? 
operations as a war measiu-e entitle them to preference treatment, which indua* 
tries and plants when so certified shall be automatically included in the prefers 
ence list. 

Edwin B. Parker, 
Priorities Commissioner. 

Approved : 

Bernard M. Baruch, 

Chairman War Industries Board. 

Washington, D. C, September S, 1918. 

IXDUSTRIES. 

Listed alphabetically. 
[The term " principally" means 75 per cent of the products mentioned.] 

Agricultural implements. — See Farm implements. Class. 

Aircraft. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing aircraft or air- 
craft supplies and equipment T 

Ammunition. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the 
' United States Government and the Allies I 

Army and Navy. — Arsenals and navy yards I 

Army and Navy. — Cantonments and camps I 

Arms (small). — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for 

the United States Government and the Allies I 

Bags. — Hemp, jute, and cotton. — Plants engaged principally in manufac- 
turing same IV' 

Blast furnaces. — Producing pig iron I 

Boots and shoes. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing same IV 

Brass and copper. — Plants engaged principally in rolling and drawing 
copper, brass and other copper alloys in the form of sheets, rods, wire, 
and tubes II 

Buildings. — See Public institutions and buildings. 

Chain. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing iron and steel 
chain III 

Chemicals. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing chemicals for 
the production of military and naval explosives, ammunition and air- 
craft, and use in chemical warfare I 






AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 345 

Class. 

Chemicals. — Phints, not otherwise classified and listed, enjjagcd princi- 
pally in manufacturing chemicals IV 

Coke. — Plants engaged principally in producing metallurgical coke and 

by-products, including toluol I 

Coke. — Plants, not otherwise classified and listed, producing same II 

Copper and brass. — See Brass and copper. 

Cotton. — Plants engaged in the compression of cotton IV 

Cotton textiles. — See Textiles. 

Cranes. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing locomotive cranes_ II 

Cranes. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing traveling cranes__ III 

Domestic consumers. — Fuel and electric energy for residential consump- 
tion, including homes, apartment houses, residential flats, restaurants, 
and hotels I 

Domestic consumers. — Fuel and electric energy not otherwise specifically 
listed III 

Drugs. — Medicines and medical and surgical supplies. — Plants engaged 
principally in manufacturing same IV 

Electrical equipment. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing 
same III 

Explosives.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for mili- 
tary and naval purposes for the United States Goverimient and the 
Allies I 

Explosives. — Plants, not otherwise classified or listed, engaged principally 
in manufacturing same III 

Farm implement.s.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing agricul- 
tural implements and farm operating equipment IV 

Feed. — Plants engaged principally in preparing or manufacturing feed for 
live stock and poultry I 

Ferroalloys,— Plants engaged principally in producing ferrochrome, fer- 
romanganese, ferromolybdenum, ferrosilicon, ferrotungsten, ferroura- 
uium, fei-rovanadium, and ferrozircouium II 

Fertilizers.— Plants engaged principally in producing same IV 

Fire brick.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing .same IV 

Foods.— Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, refining, pre- 
serving, refrigerating, wholesaling, or storing food for human consump- 
tion embraced within the following description : All cereals and cereal 
products, meats including poultry, fish, vegetables, fruit, sugar, sirups, 
glucose, butter, eggs, cheese, milk and cream, lard, lard compounds, 
oleomargarine and other substitutes for butter or lard, vegetable oils, 
beans, salt, coffee, baking powder, soda and yeast; also ammonia for 
refrigeration I 

Foods.— Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, preparing, refin- 
ing, preserving, refrigerating, or storing food for human consumption 
not otherwise specifically listed (excepting herefrom plants producing 
confectionery, soft drinks, and chewing gum) III 

Food containers. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same IV 

Foundries (iron).— Plants engaged principally In the manufacture of 
grey iron and malleable iron castings IV 

Fungicides. — -Sec Insecticides and fungicides. 

Gas. — See Oil and gas; also Public utilities. 

Guns (large). — Plants engaged principally In manufacturing same for the 

United States Government and the Allies I 

Hospitals. — -See Public institutions and buildlng.s. 



346 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Class. 

Ice. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same III 

Insecticides and fungicides. — Plants engaged principally in manufactur- 
ing same IV 

Laundries IV 

Machine tools. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same II 

Medicines. — See Drugs and medicines. 

Mines. — Coal I 

Mines. — Producing metals and ferroalloy minerals II 

Mines. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing mining tools or 

equipment III 

Navy. — See Army and Navy. 

Navy Department. — See War and Navy Departments. 

Newspapers and periodicals. — Plants engaged principally in printing 
newspapers or periodicals which are entered at the post ofBce as second- 
class mail matter IV 

Oil and gas. — Plants engaged principally in producing oil or natural gas 
for fuel, or for mechanical purposes, including refining or manufactur- 
ing oil for fuel, or for mechanical purposes I 

Oil and gas. — Pipe lines and pumping stations engaged in transporting 
oil or natural gas . I 

Oil and gas. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment or 
supplies for producing or transporting oil or natural gas, or for refining 
and manufacturing oil for fuel or for mechanical purposes III 

Paper and pulp. — See Pulp and paper. 

Periodicals. — See Newspapers and periodicals. 

Public institutions and buildings (maintenance and operation of). — 
Used as hospitals or sanitariums I 

Public institutions and buidlings (maintenance and operation of). — 

Other than hospitals and sanitariums III 

Public utilities. — Gas plants producing toluol I 

Public utilities. — Street railways, electric lighting and power companies, 
gas plants not otherwise classified, telephone and telegraph companies, 
water-supply companies, and like general utilities II 

Public utilities. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment 
for railways or other public utilities II 

Pulp and paper. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing same IV 

Railways. — Operated by United States Railroad Administration I 

Railways. — Not operated by United States Railroad Administration (ex- 
cluding those operated as plant facilities) II 

Railways (street). — See Public utilities. 

Rope. — See Twine and rope. 

Rope wire. — See Wire rope. 

Sanitariums. — See Public institutions and buildings. 

Ships (maintenance and operation of). — Excluding pleasure craft not 
common carriers I 

Ships.- — Plants engaged principally in building ships, excluding (a) 
pleasure craft not common carriers, (6) ships not built for the United 
States Government or the Allies nor under license from United States 
Shipping Board I 

Soap. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same lY 

Steel-making furnaces. — Plants engaged solely in manufacturing ingots 
and steel castings by the open-hearth, Bessemer, crucible, or electric- 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 347 

Class, 
furnace process, including blooming mills, billet mills, and slabbing 

mills for same I 

Steel-plate mills I 

Steel-rail mills. — Rolling rails 50 or nioro pounds per yard II 

Steel. — All plants operating steel rolling and drawing mills exclusive of 
those taking higher classification III 

Surgical supplies. — See Drugs and medicines. 

Tanners. — Plants engaged principally in tanning leather IV 

Tanning. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing tanning extracts. IV 

Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in nuiuufacturing cotton textiles, 
including spinning, weaving, and finishing IV 

Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing woolen textiles, 
including spinners, top makers and weavers IV 

Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing cotton or woolen 
knit goods IV 

Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing textile ma- 
chinery IV 

Tin plates. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same III 

Tobacco. — Only for preserving, drying, curing, packing, and storing same — 
not for manufacturing and marketing IV 

Toluol. — See Coke, also Public utilities. 

Tools. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing small or hand tools 
for working wood or metal III 

Twine (binder) and rope. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing 
same IV 

War and Navy Departments. — Construction work conducted by either 
the War Department or the Navy Department of the United States in 
embarkation ports, harbors, fortified places, flood-protection operations, 
docks, locks, channels, inland waterways, and in the maintenance and 
repair of same II 

Wire rope and rope wire. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing 
same II 

Woolen textiles. — See Textiles. 

[Grouped by classes and listed alphabetically.] 



Aircraft. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing aircraft or aircraft 
supplies and equipment. 

Ammunition. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the United 
States Government and the Allies. 

Army and Navy. — Arsenals and navy yards. 

Army and Navy. — Cantonments and camps. 

Arms (small). — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the 
United States Government and the Allies. 

Blast furnaces. — Producing pig iron. 

Chemicals. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing chemicals for the pro- 
duction of military and naval explosives, amnmnition, and aircraft, and use In 
chemical warfare. 

Coke. — Plants engaged principally in producing metallurgical coke and by-prod- 
ucts, including toluol. 



348 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Domestic consumers. — Fuel and electric energy for residential consumption, 
including homes, apartment houses, residential flats, restaurants, and hotels. 

Explosives. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for military and 
naval purposes for the United States Government and the Allies. 

Feed. — Plants engaged principally in preparing or manufacturing feed for live 
stock and poultry. 

Foods. — Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, refining, preserving, 
refrigerating, wholesaling, or storing food for human consumption embraced 
within the following description : All cereals and cereal products, meats in- 
cluding poultry, fish, vegetables, fruit, sugar, sirups, glucose, butter, eggs, 
cheese, milk and cream, lard, lard compounds, oleomargarine and other sub- 
stitutes for butter or lard, vegetable oils, beans, salt, coffee, baking powder, 
soda, and yeast; also ammonia for refrigeration. 

Gas. — See oil and gas, also Public utilities. 

Guns (large). — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same for the 
United States Government and the Allies. 

Hospitals. — See Public institutions and buildings. 

Mines. — Coal. 

Navy yards. — See Army and Navy. 

Oil and gas. — Plants engaged principally in producing oil or natural gas for 
fuel, or for mechanical purposes, including refining or manufacturing oil for 
fuel, or mechanical purposes. 

Oil and gas. — Pipe lines and pumping stations engaged in transporting oil or 
natural gas. 

Public institutions and buildings (maintenance and operation of). — Used as 
hospitals or sanitariums. 

Public utilities. — Gas plants producing toluol. 

Railways. — Operated by United States Railroad Administration. 

Sanitariums. — See Public institutions and buildings. 

Ships (maintenance and operation of). — Excluding pleasure craft not common 
carriers. 

Ships. — Plants engaged principally in building ships, excluding (o) pleasure 
craft not common carriers, (&) ships not built for the United States Govern- 
ment or the Allies nor under license from the United States Shipping Board. 

Steel-making furnaces. — Plants engaged solely in manufacturing ingots and steel 
castings by the open-hearth, Bessemer, crucible, or electric-furnace process, 
including blooming mills, billet mills, and slabbing mills for same. 

Steel-plate mills. 

Toluol.— See Coke, also Public utilities. 

CLASS n. 

Brass and copper. — Plants engaged principally in rolling and drawing coppei-, 
brass and other copper alloys in the form of sheets, rods, wire, and tubes. 

Coke. — Plants, not otherwise classified or listed, producing same. 

Copper and brass. — Sec Brass and copper. 

Cranes. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing locomotive cranes. 

FeiTo-alloys. — Plants engaged principally in producing ferrochrome, ferroman- 
ganese, ferromolybdenum, ferrosilicon, ferrotungsten, ferrouranium, ferro- 
vanadium, and ferrozirconium. 

Gas. — See Oil and gas. 

Machine tools. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 

Mines. — Producing metals and ferro-alloy minerals. 

Navy Department. — See War and Navy Departments. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IX TUE WAR. 349 

Tublic utilities. — Street railways, electric lifrbtinc; niul power conipanl»>s, gas 
plants not otherwise classified, telephone and teleRrapb companies, water 
supply companies, and like general utilities. 

Public utilities. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment for 
railways and other public utilities. 

Railways. — Not operated by United States Railroad Administration fexclnding 
those operated as plant facilities). 

Rope wire. — See Wire rope. 

Steel rail mills. — Rolling rails 50 or more pouuds per yard. 

War and Navy Departments. — Construction work condncted by either the War 
Department or the Navy Department of the United States in embarkation 
ports, harbors, fortified places, flood protection operations, docks, locks, 
channels, inland waterways, and in the maintenance and repair of same. 

Wire rope and rope wire. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 



Buildings. — See Public institutions and buildings. 

Chain. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing iron and steel chain. 

Cranes. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing traveling cranes. 

Domestic consumers. — Fuel and electric energy not otherwise specifically listed. 

Electrical equipment. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 

Explosives. — Plants, not otherwise classified or listed, engaged principally in 
manufacturing same. 

Foods. — Plants engaged principally in producing, milling, preparing, refining, 
preserving, refrigerating, or storing foods for human consumption not other- 
wise specifically listed (excepting herefrom plants producing confectionery, 
soft drinks, and chewing gum). 

Gas. — See Oil and gas. 

Ice. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 

Mines. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing mining tools or equipment. 

Oil and gas. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing equipment or sup- 
plies for producing or transporting oil or natural gas, or for refining and 
manufacturing oil for fuel or for mechanical purposes. 

Public institutions and buildings (maintenance and operation of). — Other than 
hospitals and sanitariums. 

Steel. — All plants operating steel rolling and drawing mills, exclusive of those 
taking higher classification. 

Tin plates.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 

Tools. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing small or hand tools for 
working wood or metal. 



Agricultural implements. — See Farm implements. 

Bags— Hemp, jute, cotton.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 

Boots and shoes. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing same. 

Chemicals.— Plants, not otherwise classified or listed, engaged principally in 
manufacturing chemicals. 

Cotton.— Plants engaged in the compression of cotton. 

Cotton textiles.— See Textiles. 

Drugs — IMedicines and medical and .surgical supplies. — Plants engaged prin- 
cipally in manufacturing same. 

Farm implements.— Plants engaged principally in manufacturing agricultural 
implements and farm operating equipment. 



350 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Fertilizers. — Plants engaged principally in producing same. I 

Fire brick. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 

Food containers. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. j 

Foundries (iron). — Plants engaged principally in the manufacture of gray Iror 
and malleable-iron castings. 

Insecticides and fungicides. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 

Laundries. 

Newspapers and periodicals. — Plants engaged principally in printing newspapers 
or periodicals which are entered at the post office as second-class mail matter. 

Paper and pulp. — See Pulp and paper. 

Periodicals. — See Newspapers and periodicals. 

Pulp and paper. — Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing same. 

Rope. — See Twine and rope. 

Soap. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 

Surgical supplies. — See Drugs and medicines. 

Tanners. — Plants engaged principally in tanning leather. 

Tanning. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing tanning extracts. 

Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing cotton textiles, includ- 
ing spinning, weaving, and finishing. 

Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing woolen textiles, in- 
cluding spinners, top makers, and weavers. 

Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing cotton or woolen knit 
goods. 

Textiles. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing textile machinery. 

Tobacco. — Only for preserving, drying, curing, packing, and storing same — not 
manufacturing and mai'keting. 

Twine (binder) and rope. — Plants engaged principally in manufacturing same. 

Woolen textiles. — See Textiles. 



Appendix XIII. 

MINUTES OF MEETINGS OF INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS COM- 
MITTEE OF PRIORITIES BOARD. 

Early in June, 1918, the President appointed Messrs. Vance C. McCormick, 
Bernard M. Baruch, Herbert C. Hoover, and Harry A. Garfield to investigate 
industries and report which were nonessential, to the point that they should, in 
public interest, retire from business during the war. 

This committee in turn formed a committee with Mr. C. M. Woolley as chair- 
man and Messrs. Edwin B. Parker, T. F. Whitmarsh, Edward Chambers, P. B. 
Noyes, and Edwin F. Gay as members. 

This committee, after a careful investigation and consideration, made its re- 
port under date of June 22, 1918, as follows : 

" After careful study of the statistics gathered especially for the purpose, 
and upon mature consideration of the facts, your committee is unanimously of 
the opinion — 

" First, that no industry should be absolutely prohibited, and 

" vSecond, that a plan of general curtailment can and should be devised broad 
enough to remove the present conflict between the necessities of war and non- 
war industries in the matter of raw materials, fuel, transportation, and labor. 

" We do not recommend absolute prohibition, because, granting the possi- 
bility of selecting from all the products of industry those items which could 
be agreed upon as of relatively slight importance to the consuming public, the 



AMERICAX INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 351 

benefits to be derived for the war pi-ORram by the total and sudden prohibition 
of the industries producing such commodities would be trifling to tlie economic 
loss during and after the war. 

" A searching analysis of all our industries Fevealed 25 which might fairly 
be classified as producers of nonwar commodities, and therefore worthy of con- 
sideration for complete prohibition. We found that (he aggregate capital 
employed by this particular group of industries was .1:733,000,000. The aggre- 
gate number of persons employed was 283,518. The aggregate fuel consump- 
tion per annum was 1,701,000 tons. 

" The conservation of fuel, the lessening of the burden placed upon the rail- 
roads of the country, and the releasing of labor and materials being the prin- 
cipal objects to be attained in setting up a complete prohibition against these 
Industries, it will be seen that the relief thus afforded would be negligible. 
For example, while the consumption of coal for power, as estimated by the 
Fuel Administration for the current calendar year will be r),")4.000,0(X» tons, the 
coal consumed by the nonwar industries above specified is but 1,701,000 tons. 
The saving in so far as fuel is concerned would, therefore, be only three-tenths 
of 1 per cent of the year's supply. The relief to the railroads would be some- 
what greater, but not of sufficient moment to constitute an appreciable alle- 
viation of their burdens. 

"The brewing industry, considered as a possible nonwar industry, is the 
subject of a separate communication. 

" Contrasting the degree of relief afforded with the hardships necessarily 
imposed upon a part of the community, your committee has reached the con- 
clusion that it would be inadvisable to adopt direct industrial prohibition to 
accomplish the desired end. It would not only result in inequalities and thus 
engender intense dissatisfaction on the part of those affected but it would also 
create grave apprehension throughout the entire industrial community. This 
might weaken the morale of the Nation and. in the final analysis, cause actual 
harm rather than positive benefit. 

" We also invite your attention to the fact that a sudden dislocation through 
complete prohibition of any industry involves the disintegration of entire or- 
ganizations, including the workers, foremen, superintendents, and managers. 
Such organizations in most cases are the cumulative result of many years of 
constructive effort, and it is obvious that with the ending of the war the pro- 
hibited industries would be obliged to go through the pioneer process of re- 
creation. This would, in the opinion of your conmiittee, augment the em- 
barrassment of post-war industrial readjustments. 

" It should also be noted that some of the industries affected center In a 
single town, where they are the only .source of Its support. We might cite in 
Illustration the case of jewelry, the production of which centers at North 
Attleboro, Mass. Total prohibition would Inflict a heavy blow upon that town ; 
trade would be ruined; the deposits in savings banks withdrawn, and a dis- 
astrous .state of affairs precipitated throughout the entire district. 

"While jewelry is perhaps one of the most obviously nonwar products, It 
nevertheless has an economic value to a moderate extent, to establish credits in 
tho.se countries where the normal currents of trade continue to show an adverse 
balance against the United States. The conscious utilization of this and various 
other so-called nonwar industries to assist in correcting adverse trade balances 
abroad obviously will offer benefits that should not be overlooked. 

" A plan for the curtailment of nonwar industries should be prepare<l at once, 
that men and materials may be released and transportation rollevod for the more 
efficient prosecution of the war. Sufliclent notice of propo.sed curtailments of 
nonwar industries should be given, that they may anticipate such changes and 



352 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

effect the necessary reorganization of tlieir business either to engage in the pro- 
duction of war necessaries or to accept the curtailment which will follow. It is 
obvious that industries not engaged in production of direct value to the war pro- 
gram must make such sacrifices as may be necessary that essential war indus- 
tries may be in no manner impeded, but on the contrary may attain their maxi- 
mum output. 

" We beg to point out that the nonwar industries are already being restricted 
by forces which will continue to operate with increasing pressure, such as the 
Army conscription with its selective processes, the imposition of heavy taxa- 
tion, the restriction of imports, the regulations of the war administrations, such 
as fuel and food, and the priorities committee, indeed, of every agency of the 
Government. The operation of these upon industry, however, as now proceeding, 
is unduly slow and irregular. The curtailment of nonwar industries as proposed 
by the committee, based upon a scientific study, would not only hasten the 
necessary adjustment to war needs and reduce friction as among the industries, 
but would be welcomed, we believe, by business men as tending to lessen their 
present uncertainties. 

" Unless advised that your wishes lie in a contrary direction your committee 
<vill undertake the preparation of a plan for the systematic curtailment of non- 
<var industries. 
" Respectfully submitted. 

"Edward Chambebs, 

" P. B. Notes, 

" Edwin B. Pabkeb, 

•• Edwin F. Gay, 

" Theo. F. Whitmabsh, 

" Cakence M. Woolley, 

" Chairman." 

On June 24 this committee made a separate report with reference to the 
brewing industry as follows : 

" Your committee herewith makes a brief separate report on the brewing in- 
dustry, which it has considered among the possible nonwar industries for which 
complete prohibition has been proposed. 

"Although the savings in fuel and transportation, in foodstuffs and man power 
which such a prohibition would effect, are greater than for most of the other 
Industries studied, and although in many States of the Union prohibition is 
already in operation, nevertheless the general conclusion reached is similar to 
that in the main report. The policy of curtailment, rather than complete pro- 
hibition is recommended as appropriate for administrative action. 

" The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce estimates that on the 
basis of the 1914 census, the direct fuel consumption of this industry was 
3,320,000 tons, or six-tenths of 1 per cent of the total annual coal supply. By 
regulation of the Food Administration the consumption of grain for the manu- 
facture of beer, ale, and porter has been reduced, by reducing the alcohol content, 
from 72,000,000 bushels per annum to the rate of 47,000.000 bushels. At a recent 
conference with the industry, and as a result of it, the Fuel Administrator has 
given consideration to the subject of reducing by 50 per cent the coal supplied 
that industry. Such action, if taken, would result in further reduction of the 
amount of grains used and the coal consumption would be reduced to 1,662,161 
tons per annum. The carloads which will be moved by the railroads, both for 
food grains and coal, and also for the finished produce, are estimated at 21.5,984 
per annum. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 353 

The committee believes that this industry should be classed as a nonwar In- 
dustry, but, while fully recojinizinj; the savings which mluht bo made by com- 
plete suppression of the industry by administrative order, holds that this measure 
Is not to be recommended for the followinj: reasons: 

" First. As set forth in the main report, the jiain from prohibition is nmrc than 
offset by the losses and irritation caused by summary action, and 

" Second. The social habits and political prejudice associated with this trade 
are still deep-rooted, though steadily weakening, that entire prohibition .should 
be the result of deliberate legislation rather than an administrative decree 
which might savor too much of arbitrary power. 

A consi<lerable curtailment, obviously in the interest of conservation, has 
already been accepted by agreement with the industry. Your conuuittee recom- 
mends that the total output in barrelage of the brewing industry (alcoholic 
and nonalcoholic) be reduced to 50 per cent of the amount produced during 
the corresponding months of 1917. In view of the cut made by the reduction 
In alcoholic content this would reduce the grain consumed to the rate of less 
than 30.000.000 bushels per annum from the previous 72,000.000. and would 
reinforce the proposal to reduce coal by 50 per cent and effect a saving of 
1,600,000 tons of coal per annum. As the amount of malt in process is con- 
siderable, (bis v.ill be even more effective as the stocks of malt are sufficient 
to last some months without further purchases of barley. The saving on tran.s- 
portation should amount to even more than .50 per cent, as the grains used are 
in larger proportion than this owing to the reduction in alcoholic content. At 
a later date, with the progress of the war and with public approval, a further 
curtailment may be made. 

" Respectfully submitted. 

" Clarknce M. Woot.i.ky, 

" P. B. NOYES, 

" Edwin B. Parker. 

" EOWARI) ClIAMIlERS, 

" Theo. F. Whitmaksii, 
" Edwin F. Gay." 

Both of these letters were signed by the entire committee. 

On .July 3 Mr. Hoover, at the request of the committee, of which he was a 
member, addressed the President as follows: 

In accordance with your instruction that we should prepare for you a 
reconunendation in connection with the systematic curtailment of nonwar In- 
dustries, we have asked a special conunittee, comprising Messrs. Clarence M. 
WooUey of the War Trade Board, Edward Chambers of the Railway Adminis- 
tration, Edward F. Gay of the Shipping Board, P. B. Noyes of the Fuel Ad- 
ministration, Theodore F. Whitmarsh of the Food Administration, Edwin B. 
Parker of the War Industries Board, to make a detailed study as to the gen- 
eral policy to be pursued in connection witli such industries. The conclusions 
of this committee, to which we unanimously agree, excei)t in tliose relating to 
the brewing industry, upon which subject we are .seeking furtlier information, 
pending possible action by Congress, are : 

" That the approach to curtailment of nonwar industries should be made by 
way of systematic and scientific reduction in their activities rather than by total 
and initial annihilation. They do not find that there are any industries which 
should be instantly cut off, but there are many which should be reduced in 
activities at the earliest possible moment. These genriemen are all members of 

105826—21 23 



354 AMERICAIT INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 

the priorities board of tlie War Industries Board. This problem, in certair 
phases, lies outside the present conception of priorities in the use of material 

"As to further action in the matter, we recommend that the above conimittei 
be constituted a special committee of the priorities board to study each industry 
from the aspect of what can be curtailed and what is a desirable curtailment 
and to make such recommendations to the priorities board from time to time 
and that the priorities board should advise the various departments of th( 
action of the board and the departments which will effectuate the conclusion 
of the board. 

" The committee has furnished us with a recommendation that the brewinj 
industry should be curtailed to 50 per cent of the normal barrelage. A cop: 
of this report we Inclose herewith. We have asked the committee to furthe: 
consider whether, In addition to the curtailment at once of 50 per cent, thi 
industry should not be notified that no further foodstuffs are to be purchase( 
and that, with the exhaustion of their present materials in process, they are t< 
cease operation. 

" We are also asking the committee to make a further report, if possible, oi 
the reduction that we recommend in connection with other nonwar industries 
" Yours, faithfully, 

" Heebekt Hoovek. 

" O. K'd. W. W." 

This letter was presented to the President by Messrs. Hoover, Garfield, Baruchj 
and McCormick, and O. K'd by the President, and forms the charter under whicl; 
the industrial adjustments committee Is operating. ■ 



Appendix XIV. i 

I 

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S MEDIATION 
COMMISSION. 

Among the causes of unrest familiar to students of industry the followin 
stand out with special significance to the industrial needs of war : 

(c) Broadly speaking, American industry lacks a healthy basis of relatior 
ship between management and men. At bottom, this is due to the insistenc. 
by employers upon individual dealings with their men. Direct dealings wit 
employee's organizations is still the minority rule in the United States. In th 
majority of instances there is no joint dealing, and in too many instances en 
ployers are in active opposition to labor organizations. This failure to equaliz 
the parties in adjustments of inevitable industrial contests is the central cans 
of their difficulties. There is a commendable spirit throughout the country t 
correct specific evils. The leaders in industry must go further ; they must hel 
to correct the state of mind on the part of labor ; they must aim for the releas 
of normal feelings by enabling labor to take its place as a cooperator in th 
industrial enterprise. In a word, a conscious attempt must be made to genei 
ate a new spirit in industry. 

(b) Too many labor disturbances are due to the absence of disintereste 
processes to which resort may be had for peaceful settlement. Force become 
too ready an outlet. We need continuous administrative machinery by whic 
grievances inevitable in industry may be easily and quickly disposed of an 
not allowed to reach the pressure of explosion. 

(c) There is a widespread lack of knowledge on the part of capital as t 
labor's feelings and needs, and on the part of labor as to problems of manage 
iiient. This is due primarily to a lack of collective negotiation as the norms 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN TllK WAR. 355 

process of industry. In addition, tliere is but little realization on the part of 
Industry tliat the so-called "labor problem" demands not only occasional atten- 
tion, but continuous and systematic responsibility, as nuich .so as tlu' technical 
or financial aspects of industry. 

(rf) Certain specific grievances, when Ions uncorrected, not only mean defi- 
nite hardships; they serve as symbols of the attitude of employers and thus 
nffect the underlying spirit, flours and wages are. of course, mostly in issue. 
On the whole, wage increases are asked for mostly in order to meet the In- 
creaseti cost of living, and such demands should be met In the light of their 
economic causes. Again, the demand for the S-hour day is nation wide, for 
the workers regard it as expressive of an accepted national policy. 

Repi'essive dealing with manifestations of labor unrest is the source of much 
bitterness, turns radical labor leaders into martyrs and thus increases their 
following, and. worst of all, in the minds of workers tends to implicate the 
Government as a partisan in an economic conflict. The problem is a delicate 
and difficult one. There is no doubt, however, that tl.o Risbee and .Jerome 
deportations, the Everett incident, the Little hanging, and similar acts of violence 
against workers have had a very harmful effect upon labor, both in the United 
States and in some of the allied countries. Such Incidents are attempts to 
deal with symptoms rather than causes. The I. W. W. has exercised its 
strongest hold in those industries and communities where employers have 
most resisted the trade-union movement and where some form of protest against 
unjust treatment was inevitable. 

The derangement of our lalwr supply is one of the great evils of industry. 
The shockingly large amount of labor turnover and the phenomenon of migra- 
tory labor means an enormous economic waste and involves an even greater 
social cost. These are evils which flow from grievances such as those we 
have set forth; they are accentuated by uncontrolled instability of employ- 
ment. Finally, we have failed in the full use and wise direction of our labor 
supply, falsely called " labor shortage," because we have faile<l to establish 
a vigorous and competent system of labor distribution. However, means and 
added resources have been recently provided for a better grappling with tiU.s 
problem. 

It is then, to uncorrected specific evils and the absence of a healthy spirit 
between capital and labor, due partly to these evils and partly to an luisound 
industrial structure, that we must attribute industrial difl^culties which we 
have experienced during the war. Sinister influences and extremist doctrine 
may have availed themselves of these conditions; they certainly have not 
created them. 

In fact, the overwhelming mass of the laboring i>oi)ulation is in no sense 
disloyal. Before the war labor was, of coursf, tiiU-d witli pacilic hoiics shared 
by nearly the entire country. But. like other portions of the citizenshii). labor 
has adjusted itself to the new facts revealed by the Piuropean war. Its suf- 
fering and its faith are the suffering and faith of the Nation. With the ex- 
ception of the sacrifices of the men in the armed .service the greatest sacrifices 
have come from those at the lower rung of the Industrial ladder. Wage in- 
creases respond last to the needs of this class of labor, and their meager returns 
are hardly adequate, in view of the increased cost of living, to maintain even 
their meager standard of life. It is upon them the war pressure has borne most 
severely. Labor at heart is as devoted to the purposes of the Government in 
the prosecution of this war as any other part of society. If labor's enthusiasm 
is less vocal, and its feelings here and there tepid, we will find the explana- 
tion in some of the conditions of the industrial environment in which labor 



356 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

is placed and which in many instances is its nearest contact with the activities 
of the war. 

(a) Too often there is a glaring inconsistency between our democratic pur- 
poses in this war abroad and the autocratic conduct of some of those guiding 
industry at home. This inconsistency is emphasized by such episodes as the 
Bisbee deportations. 

(h) Personal bitterness and more intense industrial strife inevitably result 
when the claim of loyalty is falsely resorted to by employers and their sympa- 
thizers as a means of defeating sincere claims for social justice, even though 
such claims be asserted in time of war. 

(c) So long as profiteering is not comprehensively prevented to the full 
extent that governmental action can prevent it, just so long will a sense ot 
inequality disturb the fullest devotion of labor's contribution to the war. 

RECOMMENDATIONS. 

The causes of unrest suggest their own means of correction : 

1. The elimination to the utmost practical extent of all profiteering during 
the period of the war is a prerequisite to the best morale in industry. 

2. Modern large-scale industry has effectually destroyed the personal rela- 
tion between employer and employee — the knowledge and cooperation that 
come from personal contact. It is therefore no longer possible to conduct in- 
dustry by dealing with employees as individuals. Some form of collective 
relationship between management and men is indispensable. The recognition 
of this principle by the Government should form an accepted part of the labor 
policy of the Nation. 

3. Law, in business as elsewhere, depends for its vitality upon steady en- 
forcement. Instead of waiting for adjustment after grievances come to the 
surface there is needed the establishment of continuous administrative ma- 
chinery for the orderly disposition of industrial issues and the avoidance of an 
atmosphere of contention and the waste of disturbances. 

4. The eight-hour day is an established policy of the country; experience has 
proved justification of the principle also in war times. Provision must, of 
course, be made for longer hours in case of emergencies. Labor will readily 
meet this requirement if its mi.suse is guarded against by appropriate overtime 
payments. 

5. Unified direction of the labor administration of the United States for the 
period of the war should be established. At present there is an unrelated 
number of separate committees, boards, agencies, and departments having 
fragmentary and conflicting jurisdiction over the labor problems raised by the 
war. A single-headed administration is needed, with full power to determine 
and establish the necessary administrative structure. (Since this report was 
written the direction of the labor administration for the war was delegated 
to the Secretary of Labor.) 

6. When assured of sound labor conditions and effective means for the just 
redress of grievances that may arise, labor in its turn . should surrender all 
practices which tend to restrict maximum efticiency. 

7. Uncorrected evils are the greatest provocative to extremist propaganda, 
and their correction in itself would be the best counter propaganda. But there 
is need for more affirmative education. There has been too little publicity of 
an educative sort in regard to labor's relation to the war. The purposes of the 
Government and the methods by which it is pursuing them should be brought 
home to the fuller understanding of labor. Labor has most at stake in this 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 357 

war, and it will eagerly devote its all if only it be treated wltli confidence and 
understanding, subject neither to indulgence nor neglect, but dealt with as a 
part of the citizenship of the State. 



Appendix XV. 

PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED. 

[From Labor Conference Board Report, Mar. 20, 1918.] 
There should be no strikes or lockouts during the war. 

RIGHT TO ORGANIZE. 

1. The right of workers to organize in trade-unions and to bargain col- 
lectively through chosen representatives is recognized and aflirmed. This right 
shall not be denied, abridged, or Intorferod with l)y the enii)l(>yers in any man- 
ner whatsoever. 

2. The right of employers to organize in associations of groups and to l)ar- 
gain collectively tlirougli chosen representatives is recognized and aflirmed. 
This right shall not he denied, abridged, or interfered with by tlie workers in 
any manner whatsoever. 

3. Employers should not discharge workers for membership in trade-unions 
nor for legitimate trade-union activities. 

4. The workers, in the exercise of their riglit to organize, sliall not use co- 
ercive measures of any kind to induce persons to join tlieir organizations, nor 
to induce employers to bargain or deal therewith. 

EXISTING CONDITIONS. 

1. In establishments where tlie union shop exists the same shall continue 
and the union standards as to wages, hours of labor, and otiier conditions of 
employment shall be maintained. 

2. In establishments where union and nonunion men and women now work 
together, and the employer meets only with employees or representatives en- 
gaged in said establishments, the continuance of such condition shall not be 
deemed a grievance. This declaration, however, is not intended in any manner 
to deny the right or discourage the practice of the formation of labor unions, 
or the joining of the same by the workers in said establishments, as guaranteed 
in the last paragraph, nor to prevent the War Labor Board from iirging. or 
any umpire from granting, under the machinery herein provided, improvement 
of their situation in the matter of wages, hours of labor, or other conditions, as 
shall be found desirable from time to time. 

3. Established safeguards and regulations for the protection of the health 
and safety of workers shall not be relaxed. 

WO.MEN IN INDUSTRY. 

If it shall become necessary to employ women f»n work ordinarily performed 
by men, they must be allowed equal pay for equal work and must not be allotted 
tasks disproportionate to their strength. 

HOURS OF LABOR. 

The basic 8-hour day is recognized as applying in all rases In which existing 
law requires it. In all other cases the question of hf)urs of labor shall i»e settled 
•with due regard to governmental necessities and the welfare, health, and projier 
comfort of the workers. 



358 A.MERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

JIAXIMUJI PRODUCTION. 

The maximum production of all war industries should be maintained, and 
methods of work and operation on tlie part of employers or workers which 
operate to delay or limit production, or which have a tendency to artificially 
increase the cost thereof, should be discouraged. 

MOBILIZATION OF LABOB. 

For the pui-pose of mobilizing the labor supply with a view to its rapid and 
effective distribution, a permanent list of the number of skilled and other 
workers available in different parts of the Nation shall be kept on file by the 
Department of Labor, the information to be constantly furnished — 

1. By the trade unions. 

2. By State employment bureaus and Federal agencies of like character. 

3. By the managers and operators of industrial establishments throughout 
the country. 

These agencies should be given opportunity to aid in the distribution of labor, 
as necessity demands. 

CUSTOM OF LOCALITIES. 

In fixing wages, hours, and conditions of labor, regard should always be had to 
the labor standards, wage scales, and other conditions prevailing in the locali- 
ties affected. 

THE IJ\T:NG WAGE. 

1. The right of all workers, including conuuon laborers, to a living wage is 
hereby declared. 

2. In fixing wages, minimum rates of pay shall be established which will 
insure the subsistence of the worker and his family in health and reasonable 
comfort. 



Appendix XVI. 

LABOR PRIORITY BULLETIN NO. 1. 

To United States Employment Service nrnl all industrial advisers: 

Section SO of the Revised Selective Service Regulations among other things 
provides : 

Such industrial advisers may place before the district board at its meetings, 
or at such other time as the board may request, all facts and information in 
their possession as to the preference lists issued by the priorities division of the 
War Industries Board. Such lists shall not be regarded as binding upon the 
district board in its conclusions as to whether or not any particular industry, 
occupation, or employment, including agriculture, is a necessary industry, occu- 
pation, or employment within the meaning of the law and regulations, nor shall 
such lists prevent the district board from holding as necessary any industry, 
occupation, or employment, including agriculture, not contained therein. Such 
preference lists and other facts and information in the possession of such ad- 
visers will supplement the information in possession of the district boards and 
will also be used to assist the district boards in dealing with specific cases. 



AMERICAN IXPUSTRY IN THE WAR. 359 

The "preference lists" referred to in (ho regulation quoted nn^ those enj- 
l^raced in Circular No. 20, issued by the priorities division of tlic War Indus- 
tries Board under date of September 3. 1018, embodying "Preference List 
No. 2 " and such amendments, supplements, or substitutions therefor as may- 
from time to time issue. A careful study of the "Foreword" to Circular 
No. 20 is invited and attention is particularly directed to the concluding para- 
graph thereof, reading: 

"This preference list shall be amended or revised from time to time liy action 
of the priorities board to meet changing conditions. The priorities conmiis- 
siouer shall, under the direction of and with the approval of the priorities 
board, certify additional classes of industries and also certify additional 
plants whose operations as a war measure entitle them to preference treat- 
ment, which industries and plants when so certified shall be automatically in- 
cluded in the preference list." 

From time to time it may become necessary to certify to you additional indus- 
tries, or additional plants, entitled to preferential treatment in their supply of 
labor, and this will be accomplished through labor priorities bulletins, of 
which this is No. 1. 

Attention is particularly invited to the fact that no attempt has been made to 
embrace within the preference list all essential industries, but only such as, tak- 
ing into account the urgency of the demand and the relation of the supply to the 
demand, in the public interest as a war measure require the artificial stimulus 
of priority over other essential industries. It should be constantly borne in 
mind that there are industries and plants which, measure<l by this test, may 
not require general preferential treatment, which are, nevertheless, essential 
industries and an important part of the industrial fabric. 

THE I.L-JIBER INDUSTRY. 

It is demeil of immediate importance that information as to the essential 
character of the lumber industry and the degree of consideration which sliould 
be given the industry with respect to its labor requirements should be furnished 
to you for your guidance in the administration of the labor-recruiting program 
and to the district boards for their guidance in the matter of claims for indus- 
trial deferment. 

It will be noted that the lumber industry as such does not a[)iu'ar on the 
preference list, and the comparatively few plants whose nam(>s appear thereon 
were listed to assist them in securing fuel to operate their logging road.s. As a 
general rule it has been deemetl in the public interest that lumber manufactur- 
ing plants .should use wood as a fuel in order to conserve coal in those districts 
where the coal supply is less than the demand (although there are necessary ex- 
cepti(ms to this rule), and this is one of the reasons why it was not de(>med 
proper to accord to the industry as a whole preferential treatment for its supply 
of fuel. 

Taking into account its very heavy tonn.-ige. couitled with the necessity of 
applying special priority regiilations for the movement of Government timbers 
and lumber, as well as the necessity for placing embargoes from lime to time 
on commercial shipments into congested territory, it was not deemed itroper to 
accord to the industry as a whole preferential treatment for its transportation 
service. 

The essential nature of the industry as a whole is, however, recognized and a 
large per cent of the present lumber production of the United States is required, 
directly or indirectly, in the prosecution of the war. 



360 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



To guard against the action of the priorities board being misunderstood 
because of so important an industry being omitted from the preference list, iti 
is proper to advise you that in the opinion of the priorities board the district' 
boards may, in passing upon claims for industrial deferment made by or on 
behalf of " necessary " employees of lumber manufacturing plants supplying 
lumber " necessary to the maintenance of military establishments, or to the effec-; 
tive operation of the military forces of the United States or its allies, or to the 
maintenance of national interest during the emergency," give to such claims 
consideration substantially equivalent to that which would be given them if 
they appeared in Class IV on the preference list. The suggestion is made that 
when such claims for industrial deferment arise, the registrant or the plant 
interested be given an opportunity to present evidence in such form and manner 
as may be indicated by the district boards, that it is to some substantial extent 
supplying lumber, through direct or indirect orders, to the Government or some 
of its agencies (including railroads operated by the United States Railroad Ad» 
ministration), or supplying to others lumber of primary importance in war 
work, or in essential civilian requirements. 

Attention is particularly invited to the fact that for some time to come many 
of the lumber manufacturing plants in the district east of the Mississippi River 
and south of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers, and also in Louisiana and Texas 
and in the Pennsylvania hemlock district in eastern Pennsylvania will be 
largely engaged in filling heavy orders for the War Department and for the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, as well as for the Railroad Administration, while 
many mills in the States of Washington and Oregon will be largely engaged In 
supplying spruce and fir for aircraft production, as well as ship timbers. 

Attention is invited to the accompanying copy of Circular No. 21, issued by 
the priorities division of the War Industries Board under date of September 3, 
1918, dealing with " nonwar construction." The curtailment of all building 
operations which can and should be deferred until after the war shall have 
been won will, to a considerable extent, automatically curtail the production 
of lumber not required for essential uses. 

The request is made that this bulletin have your careful consideration, and 
that it be called to the attention of the several district boards. 
Yours truly, 

Edwin B. Parker, 
Priorities Commissioner. 

Washington, D. C, September 17, 1918. 






Appendix XVII. 

REPORT OF J. L. REPLOGLE ON THE IRON AND STEEL SITUATION, 
SEPTEMBER 14, 1917. 

In compliance with your request, I inclose herewith a memorandum show- 
ing my ideas as to prices on various iron and steel products. Whatever prices 
are determined upon should be put into effect at the earliest possible date, as 
conditions in the steel line are in an extremely chaotic condition, and I believe 
many manufacturers in anticipation of what they consider very low prices to be 
established on steel products, are giving right of way in their mill operations to 
the more profitable products, such as are purchased by the automobile manu- 
facturer, who is willing to pay the exorbitant prices asked if he can secure 
delivery, with the result that too much steel is going into non-essentials and 
entirely too little into war necessities. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 361 

Certain manufacturers ♦ ♦ • have given us every cooperation, while 
others have shown a very indifferent attitude. Despite the fact tluit the out- 
put of * * * is only about 'lO per cent of the total capacity of the country, 
they have taken approximately 70 per cent of all the orders placed by the 
United States Government and in many cases the prices were far below their 
competitors, and in all cases where asked to do so, they have taken orders sub- 
ject to the Government prices to be established, based on the FtMleral Trade 
Commission report as to cost. When prices are established and priority 
schedules are out, I believe most of the others will fall into line. 

Products most essential to nar. — The products most essential to the war and 
on which we must have the maximum production are coke, pig iron, sheared 
plates, shell steel billets and rounds. I believe on the products most needed 
that it would be well to establish a stimulating price, as in most cases a steel 
manufacturer has a finishing capacity far in excess of his ingot capacity, this 
being due to the fact that in normal times one line or another may be Inactive 
and the demands on other products will be such that he can work up through 
other lines his entire ingot production. 

The situation on the various products is about as follows : 

Coke. — The total production of coke in 1916 was approximately 54.000,000 
tons, about 35,000,000 tons or 65 per cent of which was Beehive coke and about 
19,000,000 or 35 per cent being made In by-product ovens. Owing to the insuffi- 
cient car supply and shortage of labor, the production of Beehive coke has 
fallen off in a very serious way during the past five or six months, with the 
result that the price has gone as high as $17 at the ovens, as compared to an 
average price of about .^2.20 during the past 10 years. The Connellsville ovens 
are now running at the rate of about 70 per cent capacity, and are losing about 
20 per cent of their output on account of labor shortage and 10 per cent on 
account of car service and other causes. Coke will be, I think, the llnutlng 
factor in our iron and steel production, although the shortage of iron ore may 
also be a contributing element. 

Iron ore. — On September 1, the shipment to lower lake ports was about 
3,000,000 tons less than the same time last year, this being largely due to the 
late opening of lake navigation and Insufficient vessel capacity and more par- 
ticularly, inadequate car service at lower lake points. This matter is receiving 
everj' consideration by the ore committee, but I strongly reconnnend that the 
movement to take about 86 vessels from the Great Lakes for u.<<e in ocean 
traffic be dropped, as the boats are badly needed for the ore carrying trade. In 
order to take them through the Welland Canal and make them serviceable, an 
enormous amount of labor and money would be necessary to cut them in half 
and repair them, and even after this was done they would not be suitable for 
ocean traffic. I understand that of the 86 boats under consideration, 37 of 
them are packet boats which can be spared. The ore consumption in 1910 was 
approximately 57,000.000 tons, and the annual capacity now with al)out 19 
new furnaces In blast Is about 64.000,000 tons, and If the 80 boats are taken 
from the lake trade, it would cut their tonnage to the extent of probably 
8,500,000 tons annually, which would seriou.sly cripple the industry. 

Pig iron.— The output for 1916 was approximately 39,.500.000 tons, but the 
production of iron In the first half of this year was considerably under 
the previous six months, this being largely due to the shortage of coke and 
labor. Most of the furnaces make iron, of course, only for their own use. and 
the -average monthly production for sale during the first six months of this 
year was about 940,000 gross tons. The sales ()l)ligatl<»ns of the various manu- 
facturers on July 21, 1917. were 8,233,130 tons, of which about 2.^/).000 tons 
were for export largely to Canada, Great Britain, Italy, and .Tapnn. From this 



362 AMERICAiN INDUSTRY IN THE WAE. 

y(Hj will note that the merchaut furnace production of the country is sold up 
for a little over nine months. There has been a great increase in steel making 
capacity, but the production of iron has not kept pace with it. A number of 
our Allies, particularly Italy, are in the market for very heavy tonnages, and 
I think their necessities are such that they can not be denied. 

Plates. — Supplementing my letter of the 30th ultimo, I consider plates about 
the weakest link in our chain. The total production of sheared and universal 
plates in 1916, which was a record year, was 3,687,384 tons, of which 1,224,234 
tons were universal mill plates not adaptable to any great extent for ship 
construction. As a matter of fact, the production of sheared plates one-fourth 
inch or over was 1,865,642 tons. The sales obligations of the various plate 
manufacturers as of July 21 last total about 2,300,000 tons and the require- 
ments of the Shipping Board and of the Navy and Army to the end of 1918 will 
approximate 1,750,000 tons, so that it is plain that we have fully two solid 
years' maximum operation now in sight, without taking into consideration the 
needs of our Allies, which will be very heavy. The British war mission is 
now trying to secure I'ight of way on a plate specification ; the Italian mission 
informs us that their requirements will also be quite heavy, and Japan wants 
an enormous tonnage. Of the 425,556 tons of plates for export on the books 
Df the plate manufacturers July 21 last, 292.000 or about 68 per cent were for 
shipment to Japan, and about 70,000 tons for shipment to Canada. If we con- 
tinue to permit the export of plates, it is plain that the output of our own ship 
yards will be restricted. I can not too strongly impress upon you the grave 
situation in this particular line. There was considerable new plate capacity 
under serious consideration some months ago ; in fact, some of the work on 
the mills had already been started, when for some reason construction was 
called olf at the time Government prices on plates were discussed by repre- 
sentatives of the Government and the manufacturers. 

If the demand for pipes and tubes can be reduced by discouraging building 
construction and all nonessential work of this character, these skelp mills 
could be used to very great advantage on ship plates. I think that this is one 
of the greatest possibilities we have and it must promptly be taken advantage 
of by some one in authority. 

In view of the above conditions, which I consider most serious to our war 
program. I believe a stimulating price on plates would be advisable to en- 
courage the mills in exerting every possible influence for maximum tonnage 
from their existing mills, and also to influence new construction. 

Projectile steel. — The situation in this line is equally as bad as on plates. 
The requirements of this Government for the next year will approximate 1.600,- 
000 tons. The British war mission advise us that they have approximately 
700,000 tons now- on order with various plants in this country which have not 
yet been delivered, and their requirements will be at least 1.000,000 tons addi- 
tional. Italy wants about 40,000 tons and Belgium about 28,000 tons, making 
a total of 3,368.000 tons. I have not yet been able to get the requirements of 
France and Russia, but I assume that there will be a tremendous tonnage ; 
required by them. « 

Prior to the war there was comparatively little of this tonnage rolled and 
there are practically no mills in this country adapted particularly for this 
character of product, as the ordinary bar mill is designed more particularly 
for bars of one-fo\irth inch to. say, 2-inch diameter, and the shell steel in this 
country is largely rolled on rail mills and heavy structural mills, and the roll- 
ing of this tonnage on these mills displaces a very much heavier tonnage of 
the products for which the mills were designed. 

We have had the greatest difficulty in placing a small requisition for about 
80,000 tons for the Ordnance Department, as all the mills are filled up largely J 



AMEKlt'AX IXDUSTItV IN TIIK WAIt. .'HiS 

on foreisrn orders. Tin- British, It;ili:in, aiul Boliruui missions nro all piisliiiiR 
US for deliveries on tlieir reqiiironients in tliis line, and to place additional ton- 
nages, whicli we can not sec any possibility of their petting, witliout a serious 
shortage in our own requirements. We arc giving this subject a lot of clotuiled 
^tudy, but we can not see any possible chance of meeting our requirements lu 
this line, unless something is done promptly to prevent the manufacture of the 
enormous tonnage of steel going into nonessentials. 

I believe on the larger shells we will have to go to the steel casting com- 
panies, although I understand the War Department is not very favorable to 
this. This has been done by some of the foreign governments in an emergency, 
and I believe we will have to come to it here, which will help the situation to 
«)me extent but not greatly. 

A very serious complication is the closing of shell factories in Canada, where 
they have a capacity of 400,000 shells per day, which is considerably in excess 
of the output in this country. I have talked with three of the Canadian muni- 
tion manufacturers, who state they projiose to change their factories to other 
lines of product, as they can not get additional shell orders from the British 
Government, which insists that Canada must finance their own requirements 
in this line, which they state they are unable to do, and according to the terms 
of the United States Government's loan to Great Britain, this money can only 
be used for purchases in this country, with the result that they are trying to 
divert this Canadian business to us. They have been consuming 22.5.000 tons 
of shell steel monthly in Canada, about 190,000 tons of which was supplied by 
the Canadian steel plants, and approximately 35,000 tons imported from this 
country. 

I certainly feel that some arrangement should promptly be made to continue 
the manufacture of shell steel and finished shells in Canada, and understand 
that negotiations are now on with this object in view. 

Su7n7nary. — As previously advised, coke, pig iron, plates, and projectile steel 
will be the most serious factors in the steel situation. The situation on struc- 
tural steel, pipe, and tubes, wire products, rails, merchant bars, etc., is approxi- 
mately as reported in my letter of the 30th ultimo. These lines will all have to 
be materially curtailed in order to meet the absolute war necessities. I again 
reconnnend that the leading steel manufacturers be called to Washington at the 
earliest possible date for a full discussion of the .serious condition, with the 
hope that immediate action will be taken to improve it, as we can not continue 
on the present basis without most serious results. 



AppK.N-mx XVIII (1). 
REPLY OF BARUCH TO TIVLAN. 

Si:rrKMHi;i: U. 1018. 
The lionorable the Mayor oi- j\kw Voi:k. 

JIy Dkar Mr. Mayor: Out of New York's need for school buildings, wlilcli 
you have set forth in your letter to me dated Septeml>er 0. there Hows a con- 
dition Nation wide, and which reaches to the very front (»f our buttle line. I't-r- 
haps few of us realize the close relationship between the brick that is set in 
the walls of a building and the shot that is fired at the crumbling structure of 
German world domination. Yet the association is direct and intimate, and it 
is our duty to understand this fact and, understanding, to act upon it. 

Because the case of New York is typical of the whole country; becau.se the 
rule in one case mu.st be, and is, evenly applied to ail, I am glad that you 



364 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

brought to my personal attention the matter in which you are interested, sincfr 
it affords an opportunity to malve plain the extraordinary situation we face and 
the need for a whole-hearted, unexcepted cooperation to the end of winning the- 
war. 

It is not too much to say that every unnecessary effort weakens the fighting.j 
efficiency of ourselves and our associates in the war. Every unnecessary under- 
taking of an industrial nature delimits the scope of our activities at the front. 
It ties up labor, capital, materials, facilities, transportation, and fuel — the six", 
great elements that form the base of our economic structure. There is, at any- 
given time, only limited amount of each of these bases available. At this mo- 
ment of strain all should be concentrated upon those enterprises directly con- 
I'.ected with the war. To divert them to other ends, no matter how fine those- 
ends may be in themselves, is at this period worse than a crime — it is a blunder 
that may cost us dear. 

I am a graduate of New York's grammar schools and her City College. That 
fact makes me look with kindlier interest upon your request, but it does not 
and can not blind me to the necessities of the case. 

I would not have you think, my dear Mr. Mayor, that what I say to you 
is to be taken as disdain nig the claims of our children to be educated: that 
is furthest from my thought. What I do seek is your agreement that at this 
grave time there should be first in our hearts and our minds the unity of 
sacrifice; the willingness to do without that whicli is not an unescapable neces- 
sity ; to suffer, if so be it, deprivation to escape heavier privation ; to make need" 
and not desire our law. 

Surely, under your direction. New York, for the time being, can make one- 
building do the work of two: she can devise expedients whereby none of her 
young shall be unschooled and yet no obstacle be placed in the way of the war 
program. She can and will do what other of our cities and States have done- 
in abandoning plans for new i-oads, for new structures, and kindred develop- 
ments, which widen the gap between our limited supply and the ever-increasing^ 
demand arising from our war needs. 

To postpone your enterprise in such a way as to work no hardships and do it 
cheerfully and willingly and in the spirit of the unfailing courage that animates 
our forces at the front, for whose welfare the sacrifice is made, to set an example 
tliat will be a tonic and a stimulant to the rest of the country, which will her 
no slower in responding to the civilian order of the day : He serves best wha 
saves most. 

There is still one more thought that I wish to convey to you and that is: 
Even were the War Industries Board able to see its national duty as coinciding^ 
with your request, my reply would still have to be " No," for the simple reason 
that it is not physically possible for me to release the materials you ask for 
because there are no free supplies of these materials, unless — and this is un- 
thinkable — you would expect that they be taken from the very vitals of our 
war-making machinery. And this applies with equal force to the heavy demand 
on man power, already acutely short, your proposed enterprise entails. 

Your .sympathy and support will help the Nation ; your failure to cooperate 
will add to our embarrassment. I am certain that between these two courses 
your choice will offer no difficulty. It will be that which the Nation has made : 
To win the war and to win it quickly. 

I am, with respect, 
Sincerely, 

(Signed) B, M. Baruch. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 365 

Appendix XVIII (2). 
REPLY OF BARUCH TO CALDER RESOLUTION. 



War Industuies Boakd, Washinylon. 
To tbo honorable the President and Senate oe the United States, Washington, 
I). C. 
Gentlemen: On behalf of the War Industries Board, I bog to comply with 
Senate resolution 304, passed September 13, 1918, and transmitted to me che 
same day. 

1. The only order promulgated by the War Industries Board "relative to tbe 
construction and alteration of public or private buildings " is contained in 
Circular No. 21, issued September 3, 191S, and supplemented under date of Sep- 
tember 10, 1918. Copies of the order and the supplement are attached hereto. 

2. Said orders were issued under the authority ccmferred upon the War 
Industries Board and its chairman by the President of the United States in a 
communication to the chairman dated March 4, 1918, and confirmed by Execu- 
tive order dated May 28, 1918, whereby the War Industries Board was created 
a separate administrative agency of the President, with the powers, duties, and 
functions set forth in the said communication from the President of March 1, 
1918; copies of said communication and of said Executive order are attaclunl 
hereto. 

I beg to call particular attention to tlie following powers and duties thus 
specifically conferr(Ml by the President upon the board and its chainnan: 

(a) "The studious conservation of resources and facilities by scientific, com- 
mercial, and industrial economics." 

(6) "The determination, wherever necessary, of priorities of production and 
of delivery and of the proportions of any given article to be made immediately 
accessible to the several purchasing agencies when the supply of that article 
is insufficient, either temporarily or permanently." 

(c) "The chairman's duty to guide and assist 'in obtaining access to ma- 
terials in any way preempted,' and 'to anticipate the prospective needs of the 
several supply departments of the Government and their feasible adjustment to 
the industry of the country as far in advance as possible, in order that as 
definite an outlook and opportunity for planning as possible may be afforded 
the business men of the country.' " 

I also refer to the act of Congress of August 10, 1917, known as the priority 
of shipment act. 

3. In further response to Senate resolution .304. pernut me to add : 
In carrying out the duties, with which we were thus charged by the President. 

* the War Industries Board and its chairman found the following situation to ex- 
ist with respect to building and construction facilities and snpiilies: 

* (a) Iron and steel are a necessary part of every comi)leted building. They 
""' are necessary for plumb ng, heating, ventilating, piping, hardware, and mechani- 
cal equipment. The direct and indirect war needs of this country and of our 
allies for the last six months of the current year already exceeded 21,tM)0,(KM) 
tons and the country's total output for the first six months was less than 17.(MR),- 
000 tons. The unavoidable result is that iron and steel ran not be used fr.r non- 
war or less essential purposes. 

(b) The United States Fuel Administration, finding that the profluctlon of 
building materials consumed upward of 3t),000,0('M) tons of fuel per annum, and 
that there was a shortage in the fuel necessary for our war program, cnrfailod 
very materially the fuel allowed for building materials. The contlnue<l produr- 



366 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

tion of building materials for nonwar and less essential projects would H" v 
necessarily be at the expense of products which our war program requires. 

(c) The Railroad Administration find that 25 per cent of the rotal tonmi-es 
moved by the railroads is building material. It is absolutely essential that the 
portion of this tonnage which represents materials not needed for war or essen- 
tial purposes should be displaced by tonnage which is. 

(d) The United States Employment Service finds that there is an acute short- 
age in the labor needed for war program. It is absolutely essential that labor 
which now may be idle or which may be engaged on nonwar or less essential 
work should be employed upon w^ork which will contribute toward winning the 
war. 

It is therefore evident that the building and construction field furnishes an 
Instance calling imperatively for the exercise by the War Industries Board of 
the duty with which the President charged it, of conserving the resources and 
facilities of the country for war purposes, of determining necessary priorities 
in production and in delivery, of obtaining access to materials in any way pre- 
empted, and of anticipating prospective war needs. 

It is clear that there is not enough iron, steel, transportation facilities, fuel, 
and labor to supply the direct and indirect war needs of the country and the 
nonwar needs also, and that the resources and facilities used in nonwar and ; 
less essential building projects can only be applied thereto by taking them from ' 
the war needs. ■j 

The inevitable i-esult of this would be failure to supply the war requirements ^i 
of the country as they are needed. It would mean that nonwar and less essen- J 
tial needs would be produced at the sacrifice of war needs, with the consequent | 
postponement of the day when the war will end and when American lives willl 
be freed from the hazards of battle. 

The attached orders were promulgated by the War Industries Board as a 
necessary means of avoiding this unhappj^ result. 

These orders were only issued after the nearly six months' warning given 
by the resolution of March 21, 1918, which is quoted at length in Circular 
No. 21. 

Attention is also called to the fact that before Circular No. 21 was issued 
numerous confei'ences were held between the Board and the manufacturers of 
the principal building materials. The latter appreciated fully the situation as 
briefly outlined above and heartily agreed to cooperate with the Board in 
carrying into effect the spirit of the resolution of March 21, 1918, and to that 
end to enter into the pledge set forth in Circular No. 21. 

The manufacturers, however, felt that, not having the country's war pro- 
gram before them, it was impossible for them to determine what building proj- 
ects were essential and what were less essential. They felt that the War 
Industries Board should determine this question as definitely as possible and 
should pass upon doubtful cases for them. 

Accordingly the Board did determine what were essential projects, defiiiing 
them in paragraphs numbered (1) to (5), inclusive, of circular No. 21, and pro- 
jects of this character may proceed as therein explained. Other building pro- 
jects are not prohibited but may likewise proceed if the local Council of National 
Defense, which is primarily the body best fitted to judge, finds them in the 
public interest or essential, and if this finding is approved by the War Indus- 
tries Board. Building projects which do not measure up to these standards 
must be deferred until the war program is fulfilled. If they are not, the due 
fulfillment of the war program will be impossible. 



AMKER'AX IXDUSTKV IX TIIK WAll. 367 

The orders referred to are very imieli in the interest of the puhlic, l)t'caiise 
they will prevent the public, includint: the trade, from planning or uiid(>rtakinB 
buiklinK projects and then, after plans or coniniitnients have been made, Hndin;; 
that the war prograui makes it impossible to secure the materials necessary to 
complete them. 

Moreover, the trade itself will find that because of the enormous housinj: 
and other construction work wIulIi the Government itself is undertaking: a 
large part of the trade's facilities will simply be transferred to new lines of 
building activity. 

Finally, the operation of the selective-service acts will much more than has 
already been the case directly affect the amount of labor available for the 
building trade and for other industries. Even with increased etticiency and 
female labor the natural outcome of this condition must be to curtail and re- 
duce the volume of any given business not connected with the war program. 
As far as it is possible to do so, the less essential industries are being con- 
verted to more essential activities, but there will be a certain percentage of these 
industries which can not be converted. Therefore the volume of business in 
the less essentials will be reduced, and with this reduction there will come a 
corresiJonding reduction in taxability. 

It is not only the policy, it is the clear and simple duty of the War Industires 
Board to see that the war program of the country is met, and this program 
must be met now, when its needs are upon us. This duty nmst be fulfilled, even 
if its fulfillment entails industrial loss in this coxintry as it does human loss 
abroad. 

I have the honor to remain, 

Bernard AI. Baruch, 
Chairman, IV'ar Industries Hoard. 



Appkndix XIX. 
STEEL PRICES AS FIXED OCTOBER 11, 1917. 



Blooms and billets, 4 by 4 inches and larger Pittsburgh-Youngstown i $47.50 per gross ton. 

Billets, under 4 by 4 inches do ' $51 per pross ton. 

Slabs i do '?,')() per tjross ton . 

Sheet bars do S51 per ^ross ton. 

Wire rods Pittsburgh I $57 per gross ton. 

Shell bars: '• I 

3 to 5 inches do $-{.2.5 per KX) pounds 

Over 5 to 8 inches i do $.3.50 per luo pounds. 



Over 8 to 10 inches 
Over 10 inches 
Skelp: 

irooved 



.do $.t.75per 100 pounds. 

.do ' $•» per lOOpoinids. 



.do $2.90 p(>r liHi rwunds. 

Universal > do $.3.15 per 100 pomids. 

Sheared do $.i.25 per liX» pounds. 



Al'l'liNDlX XX. 

STEEL PRICES AS FIXED NOVEMBER 11. 1917. 
Sheets : I^er 100 pounds. 

No. 2S black sheets f. o. b. Pittsburgh ^H. 00 

No. 10 blue annealed sheets f. o. b. Pittsburgh 4. 25 

No. 28 galvanized sheets f. o. b. Pittsburgh • 6. 25 



368 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

The above prices to apply to both Bessemer and open-hearth grades. 
Pipe : On f-inch to 3-inch blaclc steel pipe, discount 52 and 5 and 2i per 

cent f. 0. b. Pittsburgh. 
Cold-rolled steel : Seventeen per cent discount from March 15, 1915. 

list f. 0. b. Pittsburgh. 
Scrap (f. o. b. consuming point) : Per gross ton. 

No. 1 heavy melting $30. 00 

Cast-iron borings and machine-shop turnings 20. 00 

No. 1 railroad wrought 35. 00 

Wire, plain wire f. o. b. Pittsburgh, per 100 pounds 3.25 

Tin plate, coke base, Bessemer and open-hearth, f. o. b. Pittsburgh, per 

100-pound box 7. 75 



Appendix XXI. 
JOINT CIRCULAR— PARKER AND REPLOGLE, JULY 3, 1918. 

To all proihicers and consumers of iron and all manufacturers and coiisumers 
of iron and steel products: 

In order that misunderstandings which have apparently ari.sen in some 
quarters as to the practices to be observed in the distribution of pig iron and 
of iron and steel manufactured products may be removed, we invite careful 
consideration to the following: 

X. All pig iron and steel-manufactured products are now being shipped and 
delivered by the producer or manufacturer in accordance with the resolution 
of the War Industries Board adopted June 6, 1918, copy of which resolution, 
marked for identiflcation " Exhibit A," is hereunto attached and made a part 
hereof. 

2. Priority orders. — It will be noted that under the resolution of .Tune r> 
1918, all orders covered by priority certificates shall be first provided for 
or filled and thereafter orders embraced within the schedule of purposes en- 
titled to preferential treatment as determined by the priorities board may be 
filled without other specific priority instructions and without the further 
approval of any governmental agency. 

The purpose was to permit deliveries of pig iron and of steel-manufactured 
products under the schedule of purposes not only after orders covered by 
priority certificates shall have been filled but at any time to the extent that 
such deliveries will not interfere with the filling when and as required of 
orders covered by priority certificates. 

The priorities committee is now issuing certificates of three classes, namely. 
Class AA, Class A, and Class B. One effect of this resolution is to put all ordei-s 
not covered by priority certificates, but embraced within the schedule of pur- 
poses entitled to preference treatment, in a fourth class, which Ave will desig- 
nate Class C, and to give such orders priority and precedence over ail other 
orders not covered either by priority certificates or embraced witliiu the said 
schedule of purposes, which other orders will be designated Class D. 

If reasonably satisfactory delivery can be secured on Class C orders, no ap- 
plication for a higher priority rating need or should be made to the priorities 
committee. 

3. Class D orders — permits to ship. — Orders falling within class D may be 
filled from surplus stocks, if any remain, after orders covered by priority 
certificates or falling in class C have been provided for or filled, subject, 



AMERICAN IXDUSTPA' IX TIIH WAR. 369 

however, to the approval in writing of tlic diroclor of steel s)ii)ply lirst Iiml tuiil 
obtained. 

In order to avoid delays in the filling: of small orders intently required for 
essential civilian uses, the director of steel supply does hereby approve in writ- 
in.ir the filin.u' of such orders falling in class D on the conditions following: 

(a) That the order in the aggregate shall not exceed in quantity 5 tons; 

(6) That the manufacturer shall, on or before the 10th of each month, re- 
port to the director of steel supply all orders filled during the preceding month 
under this authority ; and shall certify that he believes that it was In the public 
interest that such orders should be filled. 

Applications for permit to manufacture or ship class D orders which can not 
be shipped under the foregoing authority must be filled out and mailed in 
duplicate to the director of steel supply on blanks which will be forwarded 
to each manufacturer; such applications must be made by the manufacturer 
only and not by the purchaser. Upon receipt of such application it will have 
prompt and careful consideration at the hands of the director of steel supply. 
who will indorse on the bottom of the application in a space providetl therefor 
the word " Granted " or the word " Declined " and return one copy to the ap- 
plicant. If gi-anted, the manufacturer may ship on such terms and under such 
conditions as may be imposed by the director of steel supply. 

4. Allocations. — The direct wnr requirements of iron and of iron and steel 
products of all departments and agencies of the United States Government and 
of its Allies will be allocated to the various manufacturers by the director of 
steel supply. 

All other orders for direct and indirect war requirements for iron and iron 
and steel products should be placed by the consumer with his regular source 
of supply. In the event a consumer is unable to find a producer or manufac- 
turer \\ho will accept his order, application for allotment should be made to 
the director of steel supply only when supported by strong evidence in writing 
that the public interest requires that such order shall be placed and filled. 

.5. Jobbers' stocks. — It is in the public interest that jobbers dealing in 
plates, sheets, bars and shapes, structural shapes, tubular products, wire and 
wire products, tin plate, heavy hardware, farm implements, mining tools, ma- 
chinery and equipment, oil-well supplies, and similar products should be per- 
mitted to maintain rea.sonable stocks from whiclw Government agencies, war 
industries, and the civilian population may draw to meet essential require- 
ments. The jobbers recognize the necessity for rigidly restricting all iron, 
steel, and tin products to essential uses and have pledged their whole-hearted 
cooperation to a program to prevent hoarding on the part either of the jobbers 
or of their customers, and to reduce to an absolute minimum both jobbing and 
retail stwks. On the faith of this pledge on the part of the jobbers a plan 
has been adopted, as follows: 

(a) Each jobber shall, not later than the .oth of each month, file with the 
director of steel supply, on forms to be furnished by him, a certified statement 
covering shipments made by the jobber during the preceding month. 

(ft) To the extent that such shipments fall within priority class A A, class 
A, class B, or class C, as hereinbefore defined, or by permits l8sue<l by the 
director of steel supply, the jobber shall be entitled to place with the nuinu- 
facturer or manufacturers con.stituting his regular source or sources of sup- 
ply, orders for the replacement of shipments so made ; provided the total ton- 
nage or quantity of each commodity ordered for replacement shall not be In 
excess of the amount of such commodity shipped by him during the previous 
montli and embraced within the priority classes mentioned. 
105826—21 24 



370 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

(c) The manufacturer will, upon receipt of such order, scrutinize it careJ 
fully in the light of the other demands made upon him and in the light of th« 
then relation of the demands to the supply generally, and the particular ve* 
quirements and demands for the products ordered in the territory served by th( 
jobber placing the order, to guard against hoarding or an inequitable distribU' 
tion of the supply available to meet all demands for essential uses. The Gov; 
ernment is depending upon the experience and patriotism of the manufacturers) 
to assist it in securing an equitable distribution of all products and their re< 
striction to essential uses. 

(d) All orders for stocks placed in accordance with the foregoing rules shall 
be and are hereby rated as Class B-4 and entitled to priority and precedence 
accordingly ; conditioned, however, upon the jobber placing the order having 
first filed with the priorities committee and also with the director of steel! 
supply a pledge in writing as follows : 

" I do hereby pledge myself not to use or, so far as lies within my power, 
permit the use of any stocks now in or which may hereafter come into my 
possession or control, save (1) for essential uses as that termed may be defined 
from time to time by the priorities division of the War Industries Board, or 
(2) under permits in writing signed by the director of steel supply; that I 
will make no sale or delivery from such stocks to any customer or retailer before 
his filing with me a similar pledge in writing; and that I will use my utmost 
endeavor to prevent the hoarding of stocks and to insure that they be dis- 
tributed solely for essential uses." 

Where such pledge has been once filed in accordance with the above para- 
graph the jobber should so certify to the manufacturer when placing his order, 
and the order shall not be accepted by the manufacturer in the absence of such! 
certification. 

G. Exports. — No application for a license to export iron or iron and steel 
products (save on direct orders of the United States and its allies) should 
made to the AVar Trade Board unless the orders are (1) covered by priority 
certificates Class AA, Class A, or Class B, or (2) covered by a permit signed 
by the Director of Steel Supply. 

All communications with respect to priority matters dealt with herein should 
be addressed to the Priorities Committee. All communications with respect tQ 
all other matters dealt with herein should be addressed to the Director oi 
Steel Supply. 'j 

Edwin B. Parker, ^ 

' Priorities Commissioner. 



J. Leonaed Replogle, 
Director of Steel Supply. 



Approved : 

B. M. Baeuch, 

Chairman War Industries Board. 
Washington, D. C, July 3, 1918. 

[Exhibit A. 



I 



The War Industries Board on June 6, 1918, adopted the following resolution: 

Be it resolved by the War Industries Board that the following agreemeut,i 
reached as a result of several conferences between a committee of this boardi 
and the American Iron & Steel Institute, be and the same is hereby, ratified,;! 
confirmed, and approved, to become effective at once. 

The agreement follows : 

Whereas a careful study of the sources of supply in connection with the 
present and rapidly increasing direct and indirect war requirements for iron 



AMERICAN IXDl'STHV IX THK WAR. 871 

and steel products has convinced the War Industries Board of the necessity for 
(1) a strict conservation <»f the available supply of iron and steel products, on 
the one hand, and (2) the expansion of existing sources and development of new 
sources of supply of iron and steel products, on the other hand; and 

Whereas the producers of iron and of iron and steel products in the main con- 
cur in this conclusion reached by the said board and have expressed (heir will- 
ingness to whole-heartedly cooperate with the said board in its efforts to provide 
for promptly meeting the direct and indirect war requirements of the I'nlted 
States and its Allies for iron and steel products. 

Now, therefore, it is understood and agreed by the connnittee on steel and 
steel products of the American Iron & Steel Institute and the War Industries 
Board that no pig iron or steel manufactured products shall be ship]ird or de- 
livered, except as follows: 

(1) By priority certificates issued by the priorities division of the War In- 
dustries Board ; or, 

(2) After orders covered by priority certificates shall have been provided 
for or filled, then producers of pig iron and of steel manufactured prodticts may 
utilize such raw materials and manufacturing capacity, if any, as they may 
have available, to fill orders of their customers not covered by priority certifi- 
cates, provided such orders are embraced within the schedule of purjioses en- 
titled to preference treatment as determined by the priorities board, as follows: 

Ships. — Including destroyers and submarine chasers. Including all neces- 
sary raw materials, partially manufactured parts and supplies for comi'leiion 
of products. 

Aircraft — Munitions, military and naval suirplies, and operations. — Building 
construction for Government needs. Equipment for same. Including all nec- 
essary raw materials, partially manufactured parts and sui»plies for comple- 
tion of products. 

Fuel. — Domestic consumption. Manufacturing necessities named herein. In- 
cluding all necessary raw materials, partially manufactured parts and sup- 
plies for completion of products. 

Food and collateral industries. — Foodstuffs for human consumption, and 
plants handling same. Feeding stuffs for domestic fowls and animal.s, and 
plants handling same. All tools, utensils, implements, machinery, and (•(piii>- 
ment required for production, harvesting, and distribution, milling, preparing, 
canning, and refining foods and feeds, such as .seeds of foods and h-viU. binder 
twine, etc. Products of collateral industries, such as fertilizers, ferli'l'-cr in- 
gredients, insecticides, and fungicides. Containers for foods and feeds, col- 
lateral products. Materials and equipment for preservation of foods and 
feeds, such as ammonia and other refrigeratifm sui)plies. including ice. In- 
cluding all nece&sary raw materials, parttialiy manufactured parts and supplies 
for completion of products. 

Clothinr/. — For civilian population. 

Railroad or other accessary tran.sportation equipment, including water trans- 
portation. 

Public utilities serving war indu.stries, .\rmy. Navy, and civilian population. 
Including all necessary raw materials, partially manufactured parts and sup- 
plies lor completion of products. 

Provided, houcvcr, That wlu'never the priorities i)oard shall have pron\uI- 
gated and certified for observance to the producers of pig Iron and steel-manu- 
factured i)roducts a revised preference list, n(» surplus material or capiHity 
after filling or providing for all orders covered by i.riorjty (••■rlifi<-ates shall be 
used to fill nonpriority orders sjive such as are jtlaced by Industries or plants 
embraced within jireference list; and 



372 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Provided further. That each producer of pig iron and of steel-manufactured 
products sliall, at the end of each week, ending witli midnight Saturday tliereof, 
prepare and forward to the director of steel supply of the War Industries 
Board a detailed statement of all shipments made during such week not covered 
by such priority certificates. 

Be it further resolved, That should any producer of pig iron or of steel-manu- 
factured products have any surplus war material or manufacturing capacity 
after tilling (o) all orders covered by priority certificates and {b) all orders 
embraced within the schedule of purposes entitled to preference treatment or 
placed by industries or plants embraced within the revised preference list, 
after it shall have been promulgated and certified by the priorities board, then, 
in such event, such surplus materials or capacity may be disposed of by such 
producer or manufacturer to other customers, subject to the approval in writ- 
ing of the director of steel supply first had and obtained. 

Be it further resolved. That the director of steel supply and a committee, 
appointed by the American Iron and Steel Institute, shall jointly make a care- 
ful study of the present and prospective iron and steel requirements of each 
and every department and agency of the Government of the United States and 
of its allies, and the capacity of the iron-producing and steel-manufacturing 
plants of the United States to meet such requirements and present to this board 
as early as practicable (1) a report of their findings, together with (2) recom- 
mendations of measures, if any. which should be taken to stimulate and increase 
the production of Iron and steel products in order to meet the direct and in- 
direct war requirements and the demands of industries of exceptional or na- 
tional importance. 



Appendix XXII (1). 
CIRCULAR NO. 28, PRIORITIES DIVISION. 

To manufacturers of metal hed>i, cots, couches, and bunks, and metal spiiniis 

for beds, cots, couches, and bunks: 

Following conferences with your representatives, the priorities division has 
reached conclusions as follows: 

I. Any of your manufacturers who desire to be placed on the preference list 
which has been prepared by this division may obtain forms therefor from and 
make application to the secretary of the priorities board. Any such applica- 
tion will receive consideration. 

The preference list is to be the guide to all governmental agencies and others 
interested in the production and supply of fuel and electrical energy, the suppl> 
of labor, and the supply of transportation service by rail, water, pipe lines, 
or otherwise, in so far as *iid service contributes to the production of finished 
products. 

Priorities in the " supply and distribution of raw materials, semifinished and 
finished products " are not governed by the preference list, but by priority 
certificates and automatic ratings described in Circular No. 4 and its supplements 
issued by this division. 

II. Your industry can supply essential needs during the last four months 
of 1918 if you can obtain certain limited quantities of materials which have 
been discussed with your representatives and if such materials are properly 
distributed among your manufacturers with a view of balancing and equalizing 
stocks. This division will issue to any of your manufacturers desiring its 
distributive portion of such quantities of materials industry priorities certifi- 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE W'Ali. 373 

cates autlioriziuL: it to puivhase its quota of such iiiatofials tuuli'i- tin- roliowint; 
conditions : 

1. Such inaiuifacturer will tile with this division its pledgo, as follows: 

" metat. beds, cots, couches, and bunks, and metal spuings f0« bicds, cots, 
couches, and bunks, manufactukehs' pledge. 

" Priorities Division. War Industries Board, 

" M'ashingtan, D. C. 

*' The undersigned hereby pledges itself, for and during tlie period from 
September 1, 191S, to December 31, 1918, (1) to use only in the manufacture of 
metal beds, cots, couches, and bunks, and metal springs for betls, cots, couches, 
and bunks, and parts therefor, the materials suitable therefor which are now 
in its possession or which may hereafter come into its possession (other than 
materials acquired or reserved for making products covered by priority certifi- 
cates for automatic ratings) ; (2) to reduce its production of metal beds, cots, 
Ci)uches, and bunks to a basis of not exceeding 50 per cent of four-twell'ths of 
its 1917 output of such products; (3) to reduce its production of metal springs 
for beds, cots, couches, and bmiks to a basis of not exceeding 50 per cent of 
four-twelfths of its 1917 output of such products; (4) to comply with the regu- 
lations of the conservation division of the War Industries Board as to economies 
and substitutions of materials; (5) to acquire no more materials for the manu- 
facture of such products than shall be sullicient, by balancing and supplementing 
stocks on hand, to enable it to manufacture the limited production above men- 
tioned ; (G) to furnish the products of its manufacture for nt) uses other than 
the following: (a) Orders placed by the United States Government or the 
Allies or direct agencies of same, (6) to industrial housing, (c) to essential 
civilian demands; (7) to furnish its products for resale to no dealer until such 
dealer shall file with undersigned its pUdge in writing similar to this pledge." 

The dealer's pledge to be given to the manufacturer will have attached to 
it a copy of the manufacturer's pledge and will be in the following form : 

" To — , 

" City of , 

" State of . 



"The undersigned hereby pledges itself (1) to cooperate with you in carrying 
out the letter and spirit of your pledge filed with the priorities division of the 
War Industries Board (copy of which is hereto attached) and to urge con- 
sumers to do likewise; (2) to reduce its stocks carried to the minimum con- 
sistent with the reasonable requirements of the trade served by it; (3) to devote 
the products of your manufacture only to the uses stated In your pledge; (4) 
to furnish your products for resale to no dealer until such dealer shall file with 
undersigned its pledge in writing similar to this pledge." 

2. Such manufacturer will tile with this division its statement uixier oath 
showing : 

(«) Quantities (by weight) of ir(jn and steel and iron and steel products 
used by it in producing its 1917 output of metal Iieds, cots, couches, and biniks, 
and metal springs for beds, cots, couches, and buidvs, and parts therefor. 

(b) Quantities (by weight) of such materials and products In stock, In storage, 
and in transit owned by such manufacturer on September 1, 1918, or held for it. 

(c) Quantities (by weight) needed to l)alance stocks, but only so far as are 
:)ceded in connection with existing stocks to nuinufacture the reduced output of 
its products mentioned in its pledge, and, In stating this quantity, due allowance 
must be made for the reduced quantities of material needed due to such manu- 
facturer complying with the regulations of the conservation division. 



374 AMERICAI^ INDUSTRY IX THE WAE. 

(d) The numbers of metal beds, cots, couches, and bunks produced during the 
calendar jear 1917. 

(e) The number of metal springs for beds, cots, couches, and bunk's produced 
during the calendar year 1917. 

3. When the pledge and affidavit mentioned have been filed and the industry- 
priority certificate issued, it will take Class C rating, and oi-ders placed accord- 
ing to its provisions and this circular may be filled. No formal application for 
industry priority certificate is required. No guaranty can be given your in- 
dustry that the materials called for in any certificate can be supplied. 

III. The materials which are used by your industry are of such importance, 
and the constantly increasing demand for them is so vast, that it is imperative 
that you should put forth every effort to avoid any unnecessary or wasteful use 
of such materials and to encourage consumers and users of your product every- 
where to utilize to the fullest extent during the period of the war stored, second- 
hand, or temporarily discarded articles rather than purchase new ones. 

Copper and brass are so urgently and immediately nettled for war purposes 
in quantities beyond the available supply that you will be expected to discontinue 
the nianufacrnre of brass beds or the use of brass or copper in any form in the 
manufacture of your products. This regulation, however, will not be construed 
as forbidding your working up such brass and copper as you may now have on 
hand unless you may be asked to release such materials for use in the war 
pi-ogram. 

If. in connection with any particular order placed with j-ou for products of 
your manufacture, you shall be entitled to priority rating for material to fill 
such order of a class higher than Class C, you may present your application 
for priority certificate for higher rating therefor, and same will receive due 
consideration. 

Yours very truly, 

Edwin B. Parkeb, 
Priorities Commissioner. 

Washington, D. C, September 21, 1U18. 



Appendix XXII (2). 
CIRCULAR NO. 33, PRIORITIES DIVISION. 

To the a gricuUural implement and farm operating equipment industry: 

The greatly enlarged war program will absorb the greater portion of the 
Iron and steel production of the Nation, and it has become necessary to re^luce 
the allotments of iron and steel to industries lest the industrial consumption 
obstruct the war program. In making these adjustments careful surveys are 
being made to the end that the most vital civilian demands may be supplied. 

Yours is clearly not only an essential but an indirect war industry, and will 
be dealt with as such. The Nation must produce a maximum of foods and 
feeds, but through rigid economies and increased efficiency of the farmers, the 
dealers, and the manufacturers this production must be accomplished with a 
reduced consumption of materials and labor required to meet the war pro- 
gram. Speaking generally, the use of modern farm implements conserves 
labor, but it must be constantly borne in mind that the time element is more 
controlling now in connection with any conservation program than ever before. 
The results must be practically immediate in order to contribute to the indus- 
trial drive needed to sustain the military drive on the battle fields of Europe. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 375 

The use of a macbiue, in the manufncture of wliich large quantities of material 
and labor are consuniod, may be eeonomieally sound, and in normal times its 
manufacture and use should be stimulated, but if its production :it this crisis 
requires more labor than will be saved in one season's use '* should, fj;enerally 
si)eakinjr, be substituted by other macfiinos or implements in order to accomplish 
the immediate conservation of labor and materials. 

Reference herein will be made to periods of 12 months each ; that from Octo- 
ber 1. 1917, to September 30, 191S, will be designated " first period." while that 
from October 1, 1918, to September 30, 1919, will be designated " second 
period." A careful survey of your Industry In connection with the urgent war 
requirements had led to the decision that in the public interest your iron and 
steel receipts for the second period should be 75 per cent of your receipts during 
the first period, when it approximated 2,000,000 tons of iron and steel. The 
effect of a release during the " second period " of 25 per cent of your " first- 
period " receipts w:il be immediately felt on the war program. It is with con- 
fidence that the War Industries Board relies upon your indispensable industry 
lending the same whole-hearted and patriotic a.ssistance in accomplishing these 
econimits that it has always rendered in response to previous appeals. While 
the importance of your industry and your place in the program for the produc- 
tion of food for this Nation and its allies can hardly be overstated, yet the 
supreme concern at this ci-itical period is that every possible contribution be 
made immediately and enthusiastically to the end that the war may be shortened 
and the victory made decisive. 

The necessity of reducing the allotments of iron and steel to your industry 
places upon you and the farm implements committee the responsibility of so 
applying the curtailment that your more essential products shall be produced 
lu suflicient qu;mtities to meet all legitimate demands for them and that your 
less essential products shall be produced in greatly diminished quantities, or 
not at all. The priorities division does not undertake to direct you in the 
fornuilation or execution of a program of such responsibility. This is your 
problem. You are equipped to solve it, and with your experience and r:i)e 
judgment you will, through teamwork, so adjust your manufacturing pro- 
gram and utilize the curtailed allotment of materials that the theoretical in- 
jury may not prove real. 

The plans for curtailment must, among other things, take account of the 
varying situation of those manufacturers who have been in production for 
considerable periods as contrasted with those whose production period has 
been relatively so short that they are still virtually in the experimental 
stage. To apply to both of such groups an arbitrary percentage tonnage allot- 
ment plan would be inequitable. 

The farm tractor situation presents one of the more striking illustrations 
of the necessity for flexibility in the plan, although It is probable that producers 
of other products may al.so require similar treatment. 

For your guidance you are advised that the priorities division has de- 
cided — 

('0 That the tractor makers who have produced less than 10 trjictors 
during the first period are in the primary exi)erimental stage, and that they ar.' 
not to produce over 10 tractors during the second period. 

(h) That the tractor makers who have produced and had in field operation 
10 or more, and le.ss th;in 50, tractors during the first period are In the sec- 
ondary developement stage, and that they are not to produce over 50 tractors 
during the second period. 



376 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

(c) That makers of products other than farm tractors whose development ^ 
stages shall be comparable to those of the tractor makers described in the 
preceding paragraphs are to produce according to the same rules. 

(d) That the tractor makers who have produced and sold 50 or more tractors 
during the first period, and all other manufacturers of farm-operating equipment 
who are past their primary and secondary development stages, w.ll receive 
during the second period not exceeding 75 per cent of their receipts of iron 
and steel during the first period. 

Each manufacturer will execute in duplicate its pledge and file both copies 
thereof with the farm implements committee (one copy to be retained by such 
committee and one copy to be forwarded to this division). The pledge will be 
In the form following: 

" FABM-OPERATING EQUIPMENT MANUFACTTJEER's PLEDGE. 

" Priorities Division, War Industries Board, 

" Washington, D. C: 
" The undersigned hereby pledges itself for and during the period from Octo- 
ber 1, 1918, to October 1, 1919, (1) to use only in the manufacture of farm- 
operating equipment and parts therefor the materials suitable therefor which 
are now in its possession or which may hereafter come into its possession 
(other than materials acquired or reserved for making other products covered 
by priority certificates or automatic ratings of higher class) ; (2) to reduce its 
tonnage receipts of iron and steel for the manufacture of such products to a 
basis of not exceeding 75 per cent of its receipts of such materials for such 
products from the 1st day of October; 1917, to the 1st day of October, 1918; 
(3) to comply with the regulations of the conservation division of the War 
Industries Board as to economies and substitutions; (4) to produce only the 
more essential farm-operating equipment and parts therefor and to distribute 
its products oidy for e.ssential uses and through such distributors only as vv^ill 
cooperate with the undersigned in carrying out the letter and spirit of this 
pledge." 

Each manufacturer will also furnish to the farm implements committee 
data as to prior years' receipts of iron and steel, stocks on hand, and such 
other information as may be required by said committee or this division from 
time to time. 

When the pledge mentioned has been filed and the required information 
furnished to the farm implements committtee, such committee will notify this 
division as to the tonnage requirements of such manufacturer, whereupon this 
division will issue to such manufacturer its industry priority certificate author- 
izing such manufacturer to place its order for materials not in excess of its 
allotted tonnage. 

Orders so placed will take Class B-2 rating and may be filled accordingly. 
When any order is placed pursuant to such certificate, the manufacturer 
placing such order shall report the tonnages involved to the farm implements 
committee on forms which will be supplied by such committee, which will in 
turn keep a record of such transactions and report to the priorities division 
from time to time the tonnages furnished and to be furnished to each manu- 
facturer. 

Your industry is so large, so varied, and so important that the priorities 
division must in the future, as in the past, avail itself of the efficient and 
patriotic assistance of your farm implements committee in administering the 
program here outlined. It will also with confidence rely upon the whole- 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN Till-: WAR. 



377 



liearted cooperation of each member of your iiuhjstry with sik-Ii ((miinitice 
and with this division In determining upon a inanufacturint,' proixrain and a 
basis for the distribution of your products whicli will result in a niaxinuini 
conservation of labor and materials nnd a n;aximuni production of foods and 
feeds during the second period. 
Yours very truly, 

EnWIN B. P.^KKKR, 

Priorities CommiKninvrr. 
Washington, D. C, Scptonhcr SO. J91S. 



Appendix XXITI. 

TEXTxVTIVE UNITED STATES LANDED POOL PRICES FOR NITRATE 
OF SODA. 





1918 


Refined, 

per 100 

; pounds. 


Ordinary, 
per 100 
pounds. 


1918 


Refuied, 

per too 

1 pounds. 


Ordinary, 
perlOO 
pounds. 


May... 
June 




Sl.lO 
I.IO 


$4. 0.5 
4.0.5 
4.10 


Peptember 

October 

November 


1 $4.50 

. ! 4. 52* 


$4.32i 
4.40 


Julv 




4 20 


4.40 


Auaist 




4. 4,5 


December 


4..5.5- 


4.42J 



Appendix XXIV. 

FINAL UNITED STATES LANDED POOL PRICES FOR NITRATE 
OF SODA. 



191S 


Refined, 
per net 
hundred- 
weight. 


Ordinary, 
per net 

hundred- 
weight. 1 


1918 


Refined, 
per net 
hundred- 
weight. 


Ordinary, 
per net 

hundred- 
weight. 


January 

February 

March 

April 

May 


SJ.W.-,S2 
l.:;i ;.!.-. 12 
4. o.-r, '.-.71 

!.lX)SI6 


X 9970.571 
3. 97271.50 
3. 93913 




J4.040.5S.5 
4. (Hi) 11 
4. 138794 
4. 1G9:<;h5 


$3. 9365S5 


July 


3.91755 




4.019934 




4.a'>0,536 







Appendix XXV. 
PRODUCTION OF ALCOHOL IN THE UNITED STATES. 

[Proof gallons.] 



Denatured. 



Year. 


Completely 
denatured. 


Specially 
denatured. 


- , Other ethyl Total 

Total ! *"=°''"'- ' ''"■°''°'- 
denatured. ; 

1 


1913 


9,000,000 
9, 300, (XX) 
12,000,000 

15,90<),0<K) 
lh,2()(l,(K)0 
18,60O,(K)O 


8,400,000 
12.300,000 
43,tKMJ,0(.H) 
73, 101), (nil 
74,000,000 
72,O(JO,0(X) 


17,400,000 1 139,100,000 ; 156,500,000 


1914 

1915 

1916 

1917 


21 600|000 ' 112,800,(XXJ 134,400,000 

5.5 000 fKK) 10.5,0(X).(XK) IfiO. 0(10,000 
S'yfXl.OlK) 1.3.5, i;(«l,iKKI l-.'l,(iOI 1,(100 
V2,2m,mt SS,7()(l,(«)') ls.),9«)().(KHl 
90,600,000 69,4(l(),(*xi l()(i,iMt,(j«0 











378 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Appendix XXVI. 

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED DYESTUFFS, 1917. 

Crudes : 

Benzol gallons— 40, 600, 000 

Toluol do 10, 200, 000 

Solvent naphtha do 3, 240, 000 

Napthalene pounds__ 36, 000, 000 

Creosote oil gallons— 52, 500, 000 

Intermediates : 

Analiue oil pounds— 28. 000, OfM) 

Beta-naphthol do 5, 9.50, OW 

Para-nitraniline do 1, 700, OOo 

Phenol do 64, 300, OOO 

Salicylic acid do 3, 480, 000 

Dyes: 

Chrysoidine Y do 190, Oi:o 

Chrysoidlne R do 58. 1'li) 

Scarlet 2R do 03?. Oco 

Orange 2 do 713, OfX) 

Bismarck brown 2R do 262, 000 

Direct black do 6, 000. 00; i 

Nigrosine (spirit soluble) do 302, Oiv.) 

Nigrosine (water soluble) do 1. 970, <Mi0 

Indigo (20 per cent paste) ,— do 1,690, 0(iu 



Appendix XXVII. 

RULING OF WAR TRADE BOARD ON DYEWOODS AND DYES, 
EFFECTIVE OCT. 10, 1918. 

Hereaftfr no licenses for the importation of dyewoods or vegetable-dye ex- 
tracts are to be issued for the remainder of the calendar year of 1918, except 
to cover the following: 

1. Shipments from Mexico or Canada by other than ocean transportation. 

2. Shipments from Europe or Mediterranean Africa when coming as a return 
cargo from convenient ports where loading can be done without delay. 

3. Shipments of the following commodities, including extracts and com- 
pounds thereof : Annatoo, roiicou, rocoa, Orleans, cudbear, archil, litmus, mad- 
der, safflower, saffron, sumac, cochineal, and indigo, natural or synthetic. 

4. Shipments of the following commodities in the amounts stated : 

a. Logwood, 22,500 tons. 

b. Fu.stic, 1,2.50 tons. 

c. Gambler, 400 tons. 

d. Cutch (used exclusively for dyeing, not to include mangrove bfirk 

extract), 1,250 tons. 

e. Nut galls, 750 tons. 

f. Mangrove-bark extract, from West Indian and South American coun- 

tries only, not to exceed 375 tons. 

g. All other dyewoods in crude state, 500 tons. 

h. Extracts and decoctions for dyeing or tanning, not otherwise pro- 
vided for, from Central and South America, 4.50 tons. 



AMHKICAX IXnrSTllV IX TU1-: WAU. 379 

The amounts of the coniiuodities p(>niiitte(l to come, forwai'd iiiuler section 
4 above are to be allocated by the bureau of imiiorts in nccordnnci' witli the 
reconiniendiitions of the tanniui,' material and natural dye section of tlie War 
Industries Board. 



APPKN-mx XXVIII. 
CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES USING ACETIC ACID. 

[Subject to revision upon presentation of suitable evidence.] 

Class A. Those concerns which are to receive their re(iuirpnients for the niontli 
in full : Cellulose acetate, insecticides, Paris green, laboratory work, synthetic 
indigo dyes, salvarsan. 

Class B. Those concerns which are to receive their requirements for the month 
in full as to specific Government orders and 50 per cent of their requirements 
for otlier purposes : Medicinal preparations, white lead, enamel ware. 

Class C. Those concerns which are to receive their requirements for the month 
in full as to specific Government orders and 25 per cent of their requirements 
for other purposes : Dye manufacturers, photograpliic materials, dye pigments, 
tanners, sugar lead; resale (exceiDt to industries classified in class D), mor- 
dants, textiles, for use in manufacture of blue for leather trade, for mixing 
with glue and paste for bindery purposes, cobalt acetate, paper mills for 
chrome yellow. 

Class D. Those concerns which are to receive their requirements for the month 
in full as to specific Government orders and no part of their requirements 
for other purposes: Laundries, toilet articles, food products, soap manufac- 
turers, miscellaneous, for rendering natural foliage and flowers permanent, for 
resale to small consumers in millinery trade. 



Appendix XXIX. 
QUESTIONNAIRE TO ELECTRODE CONSUMERS. 

1. Number and size and type of furnace you operate. 

2. What product do you produce by use of electrodes? 

3. Total weight of electrodes in stock at end of the month. 

4. Size, number, and weight of each of the electrodes on ha;id. 

5. Whether graphite or carbon electrodes. 

6. Number and weight of electrodes used during the month. 

7. Number and weight of electrodes received or en route during month. 

8. With what companies have you orders placed for electrodes? 

9. Give list of unfilled Government orders placed with you for which electrodes 
are necessary. 

10. Is any of your product being u.sed by nonessential Industries? If so, 
what percentage of your total production, and what are these nonessentials? 

n. Can your product be made by any process tli:it does not re«piire the u.se 
of electrodes? 

12. Estimate of your actual monthly requirements per month for tlie next 
three months. 



380 



AMEEICAN INDUSTRY IX THE WAR. 



Appendix XXX. 

DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICALS FOR 1917. 

[Estimated.] 



Commodity. 



Domestic 1 Total used 

production, Imports. for 

1917. medicines. 



Alcohol (nonbeverage) gallons. . 

Chloroform do 

Epsom salt poimds. . 

Ether do. . . . 

Formalin do 

Glycerin (chemically pure) do 

Sodium bicarbonate do 

Acetanilld do 

Acetphenetidin do 

Aloes do 

Antipyrine do 

Aspirin (Bayer) 

Belladonna, crude pounds.. 

Bismuth, subnitrate do 

Calomel do 

Camphor giun, refined do 

Castor oil No. 1 or AA do 

Citric acid do 

Cocaine hydrochloride ounces. . 

Cream of tartar, refined pounds. . 

Digitalis do.... 

Iodine do 

Lanolin do 

Licorice root do 

Menthol do 

Morphine sulphate ounces . . 

Nux vomica pounds . . 

Opium do 

Quinine sulphate oimces. . 

Salol 



180,000,000 
1,800,000 
12, 100, 000 



16,600,000 

70,000,000 

348,000,000 

923, 078 

72,385 



3,280 
850,217 
21,824 



99,000,000 

450,000 

4,235,000 

2,500,000 

4,150,000 

4,200,000 

10,440,000 

923, 000 

75,700 

8.50,000 

21,800 



65,000 
400,000 
300,000 
182,000 



,564,024 



4,0.32,897 

53, 904 

12,046,120 

10,000 



0,000 



164,276 
7,489 
96, 134 
12,000 



59,398,644 
204, 431 



3, 040, 283 
113,733 
720, 747 



400,000 

300,000 

3,750,000 

3,000,000 

1,6.80,000 

61,400 

121,000 

22,000 

707,000 

258,000 

3,000,000 

204,000 

513,000 

3,040,000 

114,000 

6,290,000 



Sodium bromide pounds . 

Strj'chnine sulphate ounces. 

Tartaric acid pounds. 

Thymol do. . . 



720,000 I 720,000 

36,916 428,000 

3,200,000 

4,937 I 10.600 



Appendix XXXI. 
PRODUCTION OF TOBACCO IN UNITED STATES, 1913-1918/ 

[1,000 pounds.] 





1913 


1914 


1915 


1916 


1917 


1918 


I. Cigar types: 


38,295 

37' 449 
50, 740 
5,800 


47,651 

47; 995 
54,144 
53, 808 
6,200 


38,270 
5,280 
42,390 
54,270 
36,900 
5,045 


51,285 
4, .551 
49,096 
58,200 
55, 753 
4,559 


46,200 
3,125 
58,100 
61,692 
44, 500 
5,010 




New York . . 


3 760 




64, 752 






Wisconsin 


65 170 


Georgia and Florida 


7 084 








183,350 


215, 778 


182, 155 


223,444 


218, 627 








II. Chewing, smoking, snuff, and ex- 
port types: 


176,776 
58,500 
44,000 
28,248 
80,500 
12,720 
58,384 

165, 600 

117, 150 

20, 976 
270 


224, 664 
54, 600 
67,925 
36, 864 
79,120 
9,120 
37,000 

144,000 

131,350 

20, 418 
2S0 


217,338 
67,963 
70,680 
29, 952 
89,025 
10,200 
54,600 

163,200 

148,800 

18,164 
126 


257,0.50 
78,000 
95,230 
41,760 
98, 750 
8,280 
53, 792 

136,800 

126,500 

23,400 
90 


251,520 
94, 400 
90,424 
45,000 
96,000 
8,800 
51,460 

141,000 

217, 750 

25,920 
210 






76,000 
85,002 
45,000 
77,000 
11,220 
57 05' 


Henderson or stemming 


Clarksville and HopkinsviUe . . . 
Virginia sun cured 

Virginia dark 


Old Belt Virginia and North 




New Belt Virginia and South 
Carolina . 


248,500 

28,718 
126 


Maryland and eastern Ohio 

export 

Ferique, Louisiana 


Total chewing, smoking, etc. . 


763, 124. 


805, 341 


870,048 


919,652 


1,022,484 


1,069,526 


III. Another 


7,260 


13, 560 


8,384 


10, 182 


8,165 


9,901 




Total production 


953, 734 


1,034,679 


1,060,587 


1,153,278 


1,249,276 


1 340 019 







1 Source: Compiled from the Yearbooks of the Department of Agriculture. 



AMERICAN IXni'STRY IX THK WAR 



381 



AppiiNOiX XXXII. 

UNITED STATES EXPORTS OF TOBACCO, BY CALENDAR YEARS 
1913-1918.' 



Commodity. 



\.i.:A 1,000 pounds. . 441, 080 

Steins and trimmings do ; 3,292 

Cigars and cheroots 1,000. .1 1 , 796 

Ciparettos do. ... I 2. 318. 802 

SnioVins 1,000 pounds. . 1. 332 

Plug do 6. 209 

Another dollars., i 217,755 



345,922 
1,374 
1,846 
2,407,226 
1,481 
6,097 

179,846 



1915 


428,297 
5.376 
1,606 
2,076,178 
2.006 
4,805 

370,100 



477.408 
6,547 
1,792 
4,258.664 
2,226 
5,127 

477.290 



251.292 

571 

2.491 

7,019.723 

2,505 

4.472 

395.380 



401,292 

537 

23.429 

12.145.539 

5.340 

5.564 

483.926 



1 Source: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. 
APPENDIX XXXIII.> 

LUMBER CUT OF THE UNITED STATES. 

[M feet l)oar;l measure.) 



il,«ll 


H Kind of wood. 


1913 


1914 


1915 


1916 


1917 


1918 




■Total . ... 


2 38,387,009 


2 37,346.023 


3 37,011,656 


'39,807,251 


'35,831,000 1 


< 32,925,000 


(|W 


Yellow pine . . 




■iii 


14,839,363 

5,556,096 

3,211,718 

2,568,636 

2,319,982 

1,258,528 

1,046.816 

1,097,247 

901,487 

772, 514 

620, 176 

505.802 

510,271 

395,273 

378.7.39 

358, 444 

365,501 

120,420 

257, 102 

214.532 

207,816 

208,938 

88,109 

149.926 

162.980 

93,752 

40, .565 

30.804 

20, 106 

85,366 


14,472,804 

4,763,693 

3,278.908 

2.632.587 

2,165,728 

1,327,335 

1,245,614 

1,013.013 

909,743 

675,380 

519,221 

540,591" 

.5.35, 199 

358.561 

430,667 

499,903 

376,464 

124,480 

264.656 

214,294 

189,499 

195,198 

112,627 

136,159 

116,113 

125.212 

25,573 

22.773 

18.374 

55,624 


14,700,000 

4.431.249 

2,970,000 

2,700,000 

2.275,000 

1,293,985 

1,400,000 

1,100,000 

900,000 

655,000 

464,000 

490,000 

420,294 

375,000 

415,000 

420,000 

360,000 

170,000 

160,000 

210.000 

190,000 

180.000 

125,048 

117.701 

100,000 

100.000 

90,000 

25,000 

26, 486 

47,893 


15,055.000 

5.416,000 

3.300,000 

2.700,000 

2.350,000 

1,690,000 

1.250,000 

1,000,0IX) 

975.000 

800,000 

560.000 

535.000 

490,850 

455,000 

450,000 

410,000 

360,000 

275,000 

275,000 

240,000 

210, (KH) 

200,000 

190,000 

169.230 

125, (KK) 

125.000 

90,000 

40,000 

30,800 

40,351 


13,539,000 ' 

5.595,000 ; 

2,2.tO,(K10 

2,2.50,000 

2,200,000 , 

1,960,(XK» 

1,125,000 

950, (KKl 

360, CKK) 

788,000 

350,000 

415,000 

487,000 

360,000 

415.0(K) 

205,000 

296,000 1 

265,000 

203,000 

205,000 

175, (MK) 

190,000 

21S,(KK) 

132, (KH) 
95,0(K) 
00,0(K) 
62,000 I 
32.000 1 
11,000 
56,000 


12,500,000 


i (Wi 




,1.300,000 


m 


Oak 

White pine 

Hemlock 

Western yellow pine 

Spruce . . 


2,(KK).0(K) 
2, (KKl, 000 
2.0<K).(KK) 
1.2.Vt.rKK) 
l.f.(«).(KK) 


M 


Cypress 

Maple 

Gum, red and sap 

Yellow poplar 


3,50, 0(X) 
800,000 
750,000 
325.000 


— 




390.000 




Redwood 

Larch 

Birch 

Cedar 

Beech 


425.000 

220,000 
400,000 
225,000 
2.50,000 


V 


Tupelo 

Ba- swood 

Elm 


200, (KK) 
200, OIK) 
195,000 


_ 


Ash 


175, IKK) 






175 0(K1 




White fir 


1S.^.(KK) 


M 


Supar pine 


12.'), 000 






05,000 


I)! 


Balsam" fir! 


80.000 


& 


Walnut 


120.000 






30.000 


U 




10,000 


— 


All other kinds 


60,000 









I From data compiled by the United States Forest Service. 
J Reiiortod total prodiiciion by kinds of wood. 
' Computed total production by kinds ol wood. 
< Estimated total production by kinds of wood. 

Appendix XXXIV. 
PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 21. 

[Issued Sept. 3. 1018.) 

Structures, roads, nr otlicr construction projects falliiiK within tlic fi.llowing 
classifications are hereby approved, and no permit.s or licenses will be re<iulred 
therefor : 

1. After having first been cleared and npprovetl by the War Industries P.onrd. 
those undertaken directly by or under contract with the War Department or 
the Navy Department of the United States or the United States Shipping 



382 AMERU'AX INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, the Bureau of Industrial Housing and 
Transportation of the United States Department of Labor, or the United States 
Housing Corporation. 

2. Repairs of or extensions to existing buildings involving in the aggregate 
a cost not exceeding $2,500. 

3. Roadways, buildings, and other structures undertaken by or under con- 
tract with the United States Railroad Administration or a railroad operated 
by such administration. 

4. Those directly connected with mines producing coal, metals, and ferro- 
alloy minerals ; and 

5. Public highway improvements and street pavements when expressly ap- 
proved in writing by the United States Highways Council. 

No building project not falling within one of the foregoing classes shall be 
undertaken without a permit in writing issued by or under the authority of 
the chief of the nonwar construction section of the priorities division of the 
War Industries Board. 

Should one contemplating building conceive his proposetl project to be in 
the public interest or of such essentiality that under existing conditions it 
should not be deferred, then he will make a full statement of the facts in 
writing, under oath, and present same to the local representative of the Council 
of National Defense, applying to such representative for his approval of the 
proposed construction. Should such local representative approve the con- 
struction project, he will promptly transmit the application, stating clearly 
and fully his reason for approving same, to the chairman of the State council 
of defense, for his consideration. If approved by the latter, he will transmit 
it to the chief of the nonwar construction section of the priorities division of 
the War Industries Board, Washington, D. C, for consideration, if need be 
for further investigation, and final decision. Should the appl'cation be finally 
approved by the priorities division a- construction permit will issue wh'ch will 
constitute a warrant to manufacturers and dealers who have taken the pledges 
of cooperation al>ove mentioned to sell and deliver building materials required 
in the construction of the licensed building project. 

While it is not the policy of the Government to unnecessarily interfere with 
any legitimate business, industry, or construction project, it must be borne 
in mind that there is an imperative and constantly Increasing demand for 
labor, material, and capital for the production and distribution of direct and 
indirect war needs, to satisfy which much nonwar construction mu?t be de- 
ferred. A full realization of this fact by all loyal and patriotic citizens, in- 
cluding State and municipal authorities, is all that is required to postpone 
such construction activities as interfere with the war program. The State 
and local representatives of the Council of National Defense are with con- 
fidence depended upon to fully acquaint the whole people of these United States 
with the pressing need for the most rigid economy, measured not only in terms 
of dollars, but in terms of labor, materials, and transportation service. The 
construction projects which must now be deferred may be undertaken when 
we shall have won the war and will then furnish employment to the returning 
artisans now on the battle front as well as those who will then be released 
by strictly war industries. 

Note.- -On September 27. 3 018.^ Circular No. 21 v>-as amended. To subdivision 2 
was added the following clause : " And new construction for farm purposes 
only, involving in the aggregate a cost not exceeding $1,0CH1."' To suhdivis'on 
4 was added the following clause: "And production (but not refining) of 
mineral oil and natural gas." 

1 Date of publication in the Official Bulletin. 



AMERICAN INDUSTKV IX THK WAl!. 

Ai'PicNDix XXXV. 
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF FINISHED PAPERS, 1917. 



383 



Kind of paper. 


Short tons. 


Per 
cent of 
total. 






2,001,376 
l,4S3.34rt 
1,107,891 
994,761 
382,879 
348, 355 
153,880 
.';6,992 
39,870 
13.77.5 
12.492 


30.34 


N'ews print 


22 50 




16.80 




15 08 


Writing; . 


.5.81 




5.28 




2.33 




.86 




.00 


Hlottinc . . . 


.21 




.19 









Total 


6, Sg.'i, G37 


100.00 







Appendix XXXVI. 
MAXIMUM PRICES FOR COTTON GOODS. 

[Fixed July 8, 1918.] 

3G incbe.^, 48 by 48, 3 yards per pound sheeting, 60 cents per pound. 
36 inches, 56 by 60, 4 yards per pound slieeting. 70 cents per pound. 
38^ inches, 64 by 60, 5.35 yards per pound print cloth, S3 cents per pound. 
38^ inches, SO by 80, 4 yards per pound print cloth, 84 cents per pound. 
Standard wide and sail duck. 37^ per cent and 5 per cent from list. 
Standard Army duck, 33 per cent from list. 



Appendix XXXVIJ. 
GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS FOR HANDLING WOOL CLIP OF 1918. 

The War Industries Board has fixed the prices of the 1918 clip of wool as 
established by valuation committees and approved by the Government as those 
established on July 30, 1917, at Atlantic seaboard markets. Those values are 
figured on scoured basis. (See table on p. 7.) 

Rights of the Government. — The Government shall have a prior right to 
acquire all of the 1918 wool clip, or any portion thereof which it may require, 
at the prices fixed by the War Industries Hoard. The remaindt-r will be 
subject to allocation for civilian purposes under the direction of the War 
Industries Board. 

A very large portion of the wool-manufacturing machinery working on Gov- 
ernment contracts is located close to the Atlantic seaboard, and In order to 
avoid the possibility of railroad delay and congestion late in the season when 
tlie crops are moving, it is desirable and necessary that the wool clip shall be 
collected as .soon as po.sslble at points near the manufacturing ccMUers. For 
the.se reasons it has been considered advisable to designate as distril)uting cen- 
ters those centers which are close to points (d" consumption and wliidi liave the 
neces.sary facilities for handling wool. 

Necessity for concentration.— The necessities of the Government at this time 
are such as to refpiire tlie use of all existing agencies for concentrat iig the 
wool near the centers' of consumption. Therefore all the wool of the 1918 



384 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

clip must be distributed through approved dealers in approved centers of 
distribution. 

"Approved dealers " <7e/?»ecZ.— "Approved dealers " shall be those dealers 
authorized by the War Industries Board to handle wool who are located in 
the distributing centers and who buy from growers direct, through agents, or 
from country merchants; and also those dealers authorized by the War Indus- 
tries Board who are located in wool-growing districts, and who buy direct 
from growers and resell or consign to the dealers in distributing centers. 

Approved distributing centers are the usual well-recognized points of dis- 
tribution. 

Classes of wool. — In a general way, the clip may be divided into fleece wool 
and territory wool. 

Fleece wool shall be considered as that which is grown in the States east 
of the Mississippi River, and also the States of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, 
Arkansas, and Louisiana, and also those parts of Kansas, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota, and other localities where the same general condi- 
tions prevail. All wool not listed as fleece wool shall be considered territory 
wool. 

In order that the collection of the clip may proceed in a rapid and orderly 
manner, the following regulations are promulgated by the wool division of the 
War Industries Board : 

FLEECE WOOL REGULATIONS. 

Compensation of grower and dealer. — Approved dealers shall be entitled to 
a gross profit in no case to exceed li cents per pound on the total season's 
business, this profit to cover all expenses from grower to loading wool on 
board cars. 

The grower shall receive fair prices for his wool based on the Atlantic sea- 
board price as established on July 30, 1917, less the profit to the dealer, as 
stated above, and less freight to seaboard, moisture shrinkage, and interest. 

In no case shall this be construed to mean that there shall be more than 1^ 
cents gross profits made from time wool leaves growers' hands until it arrives 
at the distributing center. 

On consignments forwarded to distributing centers the prices to be paid 
for the wool to the approved dealers therein shall be those established by the 
valuation committee on Atlantic seaboard values of July 30, 1917, to which 
shall be added a commission of 4 per cent to be paid by the Government, if 
bought by the Government, or by the manufacturer to whom the wool is al- 
lotted for other than Government purposes. This commission is to include 
grading and other expenses of handling. The consignor shall be charged with 
the freight on his shipment and interest on all advances m.ide for his account 
to the date of the arrival of his wool at a distributing center, as shown by the 
railroad receipt. 

On any lot remaining unsold In his possession for a longer period than six 
months the dealer shall be entitled to charge storage and insurance at the 
market rate, and this additional charge shall be added to the price of the wool. 

Pooling by groicers is advised. — Growers who desire to do so will be allowed 
to pool their clips in quantities of not less than minimum carloads of 16,000 
pounds and consign the wools so pooled as one account to any approved dealer 
in any approved distributing center. Growers are urged to adopt this latter 
course through county agents or others, thus eliminating tlie profits of one 
middle man. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 385 

Goveniinent prtce.— Approved donlers in approveil distrilmtliifr centers will 
be required to open and grade all their purchases or consignments as rapidly as 
possible after the arrival of wool at point of distrihiition. Prices on all wools, 
as soon as graded, will be fixed by a Government valuation committee appointed 
for that purpose in the different distributing centers. I'rices to be paid by the 
Government at distributing centers for such wool as it may require are to be 
those established as of July 30, 1917, at the Atlantic sealxtard markets. In 
addition to said prices the Government is to pay a further sum equal to 4 per 
cent of the selling prices to cover compensation or commission to approved deal- 
ers for their services in collecting and distributing wool. On wool not taken 
by the Government for its own use afid which may be allocated for other uses, 
prices will also be fixed in accordance with July 30, 1917, values at Atlantic 
seaboard markets, and on such wool approved dealers shall be entitled to a 
commission or compensation of a sum equal to 4 per cent of the selling price, 
and this commission or compensation shall be a charge against said wool and 
shall be collected from the manufacturer to whom said wool is allocated. 

Profiteering prohibited.- — As a guard against profiteering, the books of all ap- 
proved dealers in distributing centers shall be at all times open to Government 
inspection, and if it be found that their gross profits, including the aforesaid 
commission of 4 per cent, are in excess of 5 per cent on tlie season's business 
then such gross profits shall be disposed of as the Government decides. 

The books of the country dealers shall likewise be open to Government In- 
spection. If it be found that their gross profit for the season's business is in 
excess of li cents per pound, then such excess profits shall be disposed of as 
the Government may decide. 

Distrihutincj centers. — The approved distributing centers for fleece wools are: 
Boston, Mass. ; New York, N. Y. ; Philadelphia, Pa. ; Chicago, 111. ; St. Louis, 
Mo. ; Detroit, Mich. ; Louisville, Ky. ; Baltimore, Md., and Wheeling, W. Va. 

TERRITORY WOOL REGULATIONS. 

Exceptions.— In the Willamette Valley, Oreg., and the Puget Sound di-strlct 
Of the State of Washington, the regulations in regard to lleeco wools shall apply. 

Distributing centers. — For the reasons before statid, in order that the 1918 
wool clip may be promptly concentrated near the manufacturing centers and to 
make use of every available agency for .storing and grading, all territory wools 
must be consigned to one of the designated distributing centers which are as 
follows: Portland, Oreg.; Chicago, 111.; New York. N. Y. ; St. Louis, Mo.; Bos- 
ton, Mass. ; and Philadelphia, Pa. 

The only exception is that clips of under 1,000 pounds may be sold by the 
owner. In buying these small clips, the buyer must recf)gni7.e that he is entitled 
to only a small profit, which must not exceed 2 cents per pound. Gnwers, If 
they desire for any reason to consign their wool through their banker, country 
merchants, or others, may do so and said bank, country merchant, or others 
may receive a commission or compen.sation for handling said growers' wool 
(in no case to exceed one-half cent per pound) ; such connuission or compensa- 
tion to be paid by grower. Growers are, however, urged to consign their own 
wool and get the full price. 

Shipping.— As soon as possible aft<'r wool reaches the railroad, the owner 
should load it and consign it to any approved dealer he may select in one of the 
designated distributing centers, who will there deliver the wool to the Govern- 
ment or to some manufacturer to whom the Government may allot the wool. 
These approved dealers will store, insure, handle, and deliver the wool under 

105826—21 25 



386 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Government regulation. The grower should procure two copies of the shipping 
invoice and of the railroad bill of lading, and forward the original invoice and 
bill of lading to the dealer whom he has selected to handle his wool, retaining 
the duplicate in his own possession. 

Advances, interest and freight. — The grower shall be entitled to receive an 
advance up to but not exceeding 75 per cent of the fair estimated market value 
of his wool. He shall pay interest on this advance at the rate of 6 per cent 
per annum from the date he receives such advance until his wool arrives at the 
distributing center as shown by the railroad receipt. It is not intended that the 
grower shall pay interest on advances after the date of arrival as shown by the 
railroad receipt, and he shall be entitled 'to receive interest on the selling value 
of his wool after freight has been deducted from date of arrival. The Gov- 
ernment is fixing the price of the 1918 clip on a basis delivered at Atlantic sea- 
board points. It is therefore incumbent on the grower to deliver his wool at 
the designated distributing centers, and the expense of delivering the wool at 
such centers will be charged against the wool on a basis of the freight rate 
from point of origin to the Atlantic seaboard. 

Valuing and grading. — As soon as possible after the arrival of the wool at a 
distributing center, if the wool is to be taken in the original bags, it shall be 
valued by the Government valuation committee. If the wool is to be graded 
it shall be valued in the piles by the Government valuation committee as soon 
as the piles are graded and ready for delivery. All grading will be conducted 
under Government supervision. The grades out of each clip will be weighed 
separately and the books of the dealer, as far as they pertain to any grower's 
wool, shall be open to him. Tags, bucks, black, and other recognized discount 
fleeces will be paid for at prices fixed by the Government. Bags will be paid 
for in the same manner. 

Payments to groivers. — Growers shall be entitled to payment on a basis of 
the date of the arrival of the wool as shown by the railroad receipt. How- 
ever, as it would be impossible for obvious reasons to make settlement on 
each clip on the date of its arrival, in order that the grower may lose nothing 
by any delay in settlement he shall be entitled to draw interest on the selling 
price of his wool less freight from the date of the wool's arrival until the 
date of final settlement. 

Final returns will be made as promptly as possible in all cases. 

Commissions. — The grower does not pay the commission or compensation for 
handling wools in the designated distributing centers. This commission or 
compensation for handling will be added to selling price of the wool and paid 
by the buyer. 

If sold in the original bags, the commission or compensation shall be 3 
per cent of the selling price. If the wool is graded, the commission or com- 
pensation shall be 3^ per cent of the selling price. This commission or com- 
pensation includes drayage, storage, and insurance for a period not exceeding, 
on any lot, six months after arrival. On any lot remaining unsold in his 
possession for a longer period than six months the dealer shall be entitled to 
charge storage and insurance at the market rate, and this additional charge 
shall be added to the price of the wool. 

Mills located in wool-growing districts. — In order that the Government may 
have full control of the wool situation with a view^ to conserving as far as 
may be necessary the wool supply for miUtary purposes, it is considered neces- 
sary to prohibit manufacturers from buying wool except in the designated 
distributing centers, and then only with the permission and consent of the 
Government under such regulations as the Government may hereafter make. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 387 

However, mills located in wool-growing districts not near to tlu* designated 
centers of distribution, and which are working on Government orders, will 
be given permits through the wool division of the War Industries Board to 
buy certain amounts of wool in their immediate neighborhood. In making 
applications for such permits, the manufacturer applying should state the 
number of his Government order, the amount of goods yet to bo deliveretl 
against such order, the amount of his wool stock on hand, and the amount and 
class of wool required to complete said order. The manufacturer receiving such 
a permit will be required to i-eport to the wool division of the War Industries 
Board all purchases made against permit issued to him. 

Permits to dealers. — All dealers in approved centers desiring a permit to 
operate should apply to the wool division of the War Industries Board. Htating 
their capacity for storing and grading. 

All country dealers should apply for a permit to operate by writing to the 
wool division of the War Industries Board, giving name and address. 

In order to expedite movement of wool, dealers in country districts and 
distributing centers may operate immediately in accordance with the above 
regulations, pending application for and granting of permit. 

Lewis Penwell, 
Chief of Wool Division, War Industries Board. 



Appendix XXXVIII. 
PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 10. 

To all manufacturers of boots and shoes; 

Since the conference between your representatives and the undersigned with 
other representatives of the War Industrial Board, careful consideration has 
been given to the several problems then considered, and a decision has been 
reached that your industry is one of war importance as well as otherwise of 
national importance. It is, of course, essential that necessary shoes .shall be 
provided for the use of our soldiers, seamen, and our civilian population. 

The priorities division will place manufacturers of boots and shoes on the 
preference list for fuel and transportation without requiring individual manu- 
facturers to make separate applications. It will from time to time remove from 
the list such manufacturers as shall fail or refuse to .send in their pledges of 
cooperation, or fail or refuse to comply, in good faith, with the letter and .spirit 
of the following program and such other requirements as may in future appear 
to be necessary to protect and preserve leather and other materials u.sed In the 
manufacture of boots and shoes. It is most essential that the utmost economy 
be practiced in the purchase and use of shoes. 

Each manufacturer must execute and send to the War Industries Board 
its pledge of cooperation in the form following : 

Priorities Division, 

War Industries Board, 

Wa-ihington, D. C. 

The undersigned hereby pledges itself to manufacture useful products only 
and (a) to devote the products of its manufacture, as far as possible, to es- 
sential uses only, as that term has been or may he deflned or apr>lled from time 
to time bv the prioriies division of the War Industries Boiird ; ib) lo urge and 
procure, as far as lies within its power, all dealers in or iisers of its products 
to exercise all possible economy and conservation in surh pro<ijicts by limiting 
sales and purcha.ses, by intelligently repairing, and by otherwi.se protecting and 
lengthening the use of such products; (c) to cooperate with the conservation 



388 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



division and the hide, leather, and leather goods section of the War Industries 
Board; and (d) not to furnish its products for resale to any dealer who shall 
fail or refuse to cooperate with the undersigned in carrying out the letter and 
spirit of this pledge. 

In addition, each manufacturer will send each month to the hide, leather, 
and leather goods section of the War Industries Board its reports showing 
the deliveries made of its products during the preceding month, and giving 
such other information as may be required on said form. 

The pledge to be given such manufacturer by its customer who purchases 
for resale should be addressed to such manufacturer and be in the following 
form: 

To 

City of 

State of 

The undersigned hereby pledges itself (a) so far as lies within its power to 
urge and procure all dealers or users of your manufactured products to exer- 
cise all possible economy and conservation in such products by limiting their 
sales and purchases, by intelligently repairing, and by otherwise protecting 
and lengthening the service of such products; (h) to cooperate with the con- 
servation division and the hide, leather, and leather goods section of the 
War Industries Board; and (c.) not to furnish your products for resale to 
any dealer or consumer who shall fail or refuse to cooperate with the under- 
signed in carrying out the letter and spirit of this pledge. 

Through you the War Industries Board appeals to every dealer in and user 
of boots and shoes to help save leather and leather goods for war purposes. The 
absorption of such materials by the war program is reaching such large pro- 
portions that it becomes the duty of every man, woman, and child to economize 
in their use of these materials so that no shortage may exist for war require- 
ments. It will be expected that every manufacturer and dealer will reverse 
his ordinary attitude toward trade, and will bring to bear all possible in- 
fluence to curtail output and limit sales and that every consumer will exercise 
such careful restraint in his purchases as substantially to save materials. May 
we with confidence expect that all will whole-heartedly and enthusiastically 
cooperate in demonstrating to the world that this Nation can and wiU economize 
in the consumption of materials to meet the Nation's needs? 
Yours very truly, 

Edwin B. Paekee, 
Priorities Commissioner. 

Washington, D. C, August 7, 1918. 



Appendix XXXIX. 

CRUDE AND RECLAIMED RUBBER CONSUMED IN THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE PRODUCTION OF RUBBER GOODS, 1917.' 



Grade 
rubber 



Reclaimed 

rubber 
consumed. 



Per cent 
of total. 



Automobile tires and tubes 

Mechanical rubber goods 

Boots and shoes 

Druggists' and stationers' sundries 

Insulated wire and insulating compounds. 

Waterproof clothing and cloth 

Rubber cement 

Hard rubber goods 

Miscellaneous 



Total. 



Long tons. 
110,270 
21,323 
12,688 
3,732 
2,756 
2,176 
1,462 
1,166 
1,798 



70.0 
14.0 
8.0 
2.0 
1.7 
1.3 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 



Long tons. 
21,006 



15,778 



8,470 
5,667 



23.5 
38.0- 
18.0 
.2 
9.5 
6.3 



2,163 
2,266 



157,371 100.0 



1 These data were secured by the Rubber Association of America through a questionnaire sent to 503 
onsumers of rubber, 448 of whom replied. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



389 



Appendix XL. 

AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTION. 

[National Automobile Chamhor of < "omnierce.) 



Year ending Dec. 31— 


Number of 
cars made. 


Year ending Dec. 31— 


Number of 
cars made. 


1899 


3,700 

(') 

11,000 
21,700 
25,000 
34,000 
44,000 
85,000 


1909 


128,600 
187,000 
2in nm 


1900 


1910 


1901 


1911 


1902 . . 


1912 378;o66 

1913 485,000 

1914 569,054 


1903 


1904 


1905 


1915 ' 892.000 


1906 


1916. 


1,617,708 
1.S78.77S 


1907 


1917 


1908 


1918 «93.5.74« 









Not available. 



» Also 168,270 trucks. 



Appendix XLI. 
PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES IN UNITED STATES, 1911-1918. 

FOR DOMESTIC USE. 





1911 


1912 


1913 

i 


1914 


1915 


1916 


1917 


1918 


Builder. 


U.S. 
Railroad 
Adminis- 
tration.! 


Other 
domestic' 


Baldwin 


1,276 

1,190 

118 


1,162 

1,835 

141 


1,564 

2,004 

172 


464 
610 

208 


317 
125 


744 
973 
240 


518 
736 
253 


570 

347 

4 


99 


American. . 


805 


Lima 


313 






Total 


2,584 


3,138 


3,740 1 


1,282 


681 


1,957 


1,507 


921 


1,217 







FOR FOREIGN USE. 





1911 


1912 


1913 


1914 


1915 


1916 


1917 


1918 


Builder. 


United 

States 

military. 


All 
others. 


United 

States 

military. 


All 
Others." 


Baldwin 

American 

Lima 


174 
103 
36 


218 
101 
31 


226 
91 
25 


136 
74 
15 


451 
242 

4 


551 
245 
11 


830 
ISO 


874 
655 
11 


596 
85 


763 

400 

8 










Total 


313 


350 


342 


225 


697 


807 


980 


1.640 


681 


1,177 


Grand total 
Total 


2,897 ! 2,488 


4,082 


1,507 


1,378 


2,764 


2,487 1 1,540 
4,027 


1,602 ! 2,304 
3,906 





















Jan. 1, to Oct. 31,1918. 



390 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Appendix XLII. 
STORY OF THE NITRATE PROBLEM. 

The obtaining of the necessary supphes of nitrate \vas one of the most difii- 
cult of all the problems that faced the Board. There were no substitutes in suf- 
ficient quantities to take the place of the product from Chile. 

Upon the declaration of war by the United States, the demand for Chilean 
nitrate was tremendously increased and, even before the requirements of the 
Government had become known, prices in Chile advanced rapidly because it was 
recognized that the United States Government would have to bo a large pur- 
chaser. By April, 1917, there had been an advance from the prewar price of 2i 
cents per pound to about 7i cents. It was at this time that the raw materials 
division of the Council recognized that some action was urgently necessary, and 
an order was issued to all ammunition manufacturers, or others bidding on 
Government work, that inquiries or options for nitrate would be unnecessary, 
and all proposals could be made to the Government on a basis of 4^ cents a 
pound for the nitrate necessary to fulfill the contracts. It was believed that this 
would prevent contractors from bidding against one another and thus prevent a 
run-away market. 

As the actual consumption of nitrate had not yet been greatly increased, the 
raw materials division had a period of a few months in which to arrange a 
program for making good on the 4^-cent nitrate. Through the Naval Intelligence 
Division advice came of a discussion between the German Government and the 
Chilean Government regarding the national gold reserve of Chile which was on 
deposit in Berlin. When the German Government finally made the definite de- 
cision that it would not permit the Chilean Government to withdraw this gold, 
overtures were made immediately by the United States to the Chilean Govern- 
ment offering to restore the Chilean gold reserve in Chile, on condition that the 
Chilean Government would seize the German-owned nitrate there and sell it to 
the United States, the price offered being about 60 per cent of the current market 
price. There was an embargo on the shipment of gold at this time so that the 
cooperation of the Secretary of the Treasury was necessary to the transaction. 
This deal was consummated in the summer of 1917 and all mention of it was 
kept secret. 

Great numbers of speculators had entered the Chilean market in the spring 
and summer of 1917 and were bidding actively for shipments of nitrate that 
were to be delivered in October, November and December. This had caused 
a rapid rise in prices. To break the rise, arrangements were made with the 
Allies by which all allied purchasing should be curtailed for the months of 
October, November and December, it being possible to supply the urgent needs 
from the German nitrate which the United States had bought. In order to ship 
this nitrate from Chile, it was necessary to get Great Britain to waive the 
regulations against trading with the enemy and allow jute sacks to be shipped 
from Calcutta and allow British docks and ships to handle the German-owned 
nitrate. Delivery of this nitrate was started in October and caused consterna- 
tion in the Chilean market. The outside speculators who had purchased nitrate 
expecting that there would be a huge demand and that they could sell at any 
price found that there was no market for their goods. The American-owned 
German nitrate had taken its place. They had counted on this nitrate being tied 
up through inability of German subjects to sell or ship it. While this collapse of 
the nitrate speculators was being brought about and the Chilean market was 
being steadied, the Allies supported the demand market and covered all require- 
ments at a price about 60 per cent below the current prices of the previous sum- 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 391 

nier; and, as a result of all this, our Government was able to make pood on the 
price of 4i cents a pound, fixed by the raw materials division in April, 1917, when 
the market was 7 to 7* cents. The fact is, when all accounts for the whole war 
period were in. it was seen that the nitrate cost our Government about 4i cents 
per pound.^ This undertaking, originatius in March, 1917, required for Its 
fulfillment eight months of continuous effort under most trying conditions and 
involved most diflicult negotiations with the Allies and with the Government of 
Chile. 

The success of this operation, eliminating as it did the international specula- 
tors in Chilean nitrate, led to an urgent request on the part of the Allies that 
America join with them in the formation of machinery for centralizing the pur- 
cliases of nitrate for all tlie Allies and America. This was accomplished through 
the formation of the International Nitrate Executive, which so successfully func- 
tioned throughout the balance of the war period, through the support and co- 
operation of the Honorable Winston Churchill, then Minister of Munitions of 
Great Britain. 

It was apparent early in 1917 that the production of nitrate by Chile, which 
was the sole source of supply for the United States and the Allies, was insuf- 
ficient to meet the war program which would be contemplated if the United 
States was to have an Expeditionary Force in Europe. Notwithstanding the 
fact that agriculture and industry in every nation had been curtailed to the 
utmost, the production of nitrate was barely sufficient to meet the requirements 
of the Allies themselves without counting the great increase in demand occa- 
sioned by America entering the war. By the early part of 1918. it was clear 
that some effort would have to be made to produce a substitute for Chilean 
nitrate. 

Methods had been developed in Germany by which nitrates could be produced, 
by a fixation process, from the nitrogen of the air. The United States had but 
one small plant of this character ; and the Allied nations, though they had made 
the effort, were still unable to produce any appreciable quantitiy. Urgent rep- 
resentations were made to the War Department, as the largest consumer of 
nitrates, to continue its activity in the construction of fixation plants to meet 
the situation. The plant at Muscle Shoals had been authorized in the fall of 
1917 but progress on the work had been disappointing. A .special commission 
was appointed by the Secretary of War to investigate the available processes and 
to advise in regard to locations for additional plants. Two additional plants 
were eventually authorized by the War Department and construction on them 
had made considerable progress before the armistice. News in Chile of the ex- 
tensive plans and the beginnings of construction in a large way of these fixation 
plants had an undoubted effect in keeping Chilean prices down. 

When it is considered that every pound of powder and every pound of ex- 
plosive must have nitrate as its principal ingredient, it must be seen that the 
importance of this material for the nation's defense cannot be overestimated. 
The location of the original battle between the German and British fleets off the 
coast of Chile was not by chance ; it was occasioned by the necessity on the part 
of the Allies of securing shipments of Chilean nitrate. The retreat from the 
Chilean coast by the German fleet after its victory over the British fleet was 
made necessary by the arrival of the Japane.se fleet. The sinking of the German 
fleet later, left acce.'^s to the Chilean nitrate fields more open to the Allies for 
the remainder of the war. In any war an adequate supply of nitrate Is the first 
step necessary in material preparedness. 

^See p. 377. 



392 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

Appendix XLIII. 

[P. C. Form 75.] 

PRIORITIES CIRCULAR NO. 45. 

EMBODYING BULES AND BEGULATIONS GOVEBNING THE DISTBIBUTION OF ELECTBIC 
ENEBGY BY LIGHT AND POWEB COMPANIES. 

Under date of September 3, 1918, there was published by the Priorities 
Division of the War Industries Board Circular No. 20, known as Preference 
List No. 2, which furnishes a guide to all governmental agencies and all others 
interested in — 

(1) The production and supply of fuel and electric energy; 

(2) The supply of labor; and 

(3) The supply of transportation service by rail, water, pipe lines, or other- 
wise, in so far as such service contributes to production of finished products. 

Where the supply of electric energy is equal to the demand, there is ob- 
viously no occasion for use of the preference list. 

But where the demand exceeds the available supply, due to lack of generat- 
ing capacity or any other cause, then the producers and distributors of elec- 
tric energy are directed to use the said preference list as a basis for distribu- 
tion. 

Whenever an individual plant has a preference classification difEering from 
that of the industry to which it belongs, the individual plant classification 
shall govern. 

Consumers having 100 horsepower connected load or less will, save in ex- 
treme cases, be treated as in Class I, irrespective of their preference list 
classification. It has been determined that, speaking generally, the saving of 
electric energy through a curtailment of these small consumers would not 
justify the less, damage, inconvenience, and industrial disturbance that would 
follow. Where, however, it becomes absolutely necessary to do so in order to 
supply important Class I plants, even such small consumers should be cur- 
tailed. 

Industries and plants grouped under Class I are only such as are of excep- 
tional importance in connection with the prosecution of the war. Their re- 
quirements must be fully satisfied in preference to those of the three remaining 



The requirements of industries and plants grouped under Class II, Class III, 
and Class IV shall have precedence over those not appearing on the preference 
list. 

If, however, after satisfying the requirements of Class I the requirements 
of the industries and plants grouped in the remaining three classes can not be 
fully satisfied, then they shall be rationed, giving to each class a per cent of 
its requirements in the ratio of 5, 3, and 2, which represents the relative value 
or importance of each class as fixed and determined by the priorities board. 

A simple illustration of the application of this " method of weighted needs " 
as applied to the distribution of electric energy may tend to clarify this rule, 
under which there should be applied as nearly as practicable the formula 
following : 

(a) The aggregate kilowatt demands of each of the four classes of all in- 
dustries and plants shall be approximately ascertained. 

( b ) The available supply of electric energy shall be ascertained. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



393 



(c) Should the available supply equal the requirements or demands, then 
the requirements of all industries and plants on the preference list shall be 
fully satisfied. 

((f) But should the requirements or demands exceed the available supply 
of electric energy, then there shall be deducted from such supply the require- 
ments of Class I, 100 per cent of which must be delivered, and the remainder 
shall be prorated between Classes II, III. and IV, giving to each a per cent 
of its requirements in the ratio of 5, 3, and 2. 

Assume that the available supply of electric energy in a particular city or 
district is 100,000 kilowatts, while the requirements are as follows : 

Kilowatts. 
Class I. Requirements (including customers having lOO-horsepower 

connected load or less) 20,000 

Class II. Requirements 40,000 

Class III. Requirements 50,000 

Class IV. Requirements 60,000 

Total requirements 170, 000 

Available supply 100, 000 

Supply Class I in full 20,000 

Balance for distribution between Classes II, III, and IV 80, 000 

After having allotted Class I its full service, obtain the amounts of power 
to be served to the other classes as follows: Multiply the requirements of 
Classes II, III, and IV by their priority ratio of 5, 3, and 2, respectively, to 
obtain the " relative figures " as shown in the example following. The total 
available power for Classes II, III, and IV (80,000 kilowatts) is then divided 
by the total of their "relative figures" (470,000 kilowatts) giving in the 
example a decimal of 0.17021. If the " relative figure " for any class Is multi- 
plied by this decimal, the result will be the power allotted to that class. 



Class. 


Require- 
ments. 


Multiplied 

by priority 

ratio— 


Equals 
relative 
figure— 


Multiplied 

by 
decimal- 


Equals 

power 

allotted- 


Proportion 

ofrequlre- 

monu served. 


Ratio 

of 
service. 


II 


Kilow'M. 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 


3 
2 


200,000 
150,000 
120,000 


0. 17021 
. 17021 
. 17021 


Kilowati. 
34,042 
25,532 
20.426 


Per cent. 
85.10 
51.06 
34.04 


5 


iii:::;:::;:;::::::: 


3 


IV 


2 








470,000 


80,000 

















Note.— J^S^»B=0.17021. 



Under this formula it will be seen that the power allotted to each of Classes 
II, III, and IV will always fill a proportion of the demands of the classes in 
the ratio of 5, 3, and 2. 

It will, however, sometimes happen, when Class II or III, or both, have ex- 
tremely small requirements in proportion to the total requirements of the dis- 
trict, that the formula will allot to one or both of tlifso classes (II and III) 
an amount in excess of their respective requirements. In such a case, the 
overallotted c'ass or classes .should be given 100 per cent of their requirements 
and the balance of their allotment under the formula should be distributetl 
either — 



394 AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 

(a) Between the classes given incomplete service by the formula, in the ratio 
of their respective priority ratios (5, 3, or 2). .This procedure is to apply 
where two classes are left incompletely served, or 

(6) If only one class is left incompletely served by the formula, the over- 
allotments of the other two classes are to be assigned to the incompletely 
served class. 

The allotment of more than 100 per cent under the formula to a small class 
of high importance shows that the shortage in the district was primarily 
caused by the large amount of less important work in the district, and that 
the small class or classes of higher importance should not be penalized, since 
they are not responsible for the shortage. 

It is not practicable, and it is not intended, that an attempt should be made 
to apply this formula with literal and mathematical accuracy, but it will afEord 
a workable basis for rationing industries and plants embraced within Classes 
II, III, and IV, where the available supply, after satisfying Class I, is less 
than their aggregate requirements or demands. 

In case any consumer shall be dissatisfied with the applications made and 
the electric energy furnished him under these rules and regulations, such con- 
sumer may present his complaint in writing to the priorities division of the 
War Industries Board, sending a copy of such complaint to the power com- 
pany interested. Pending further directions from such priorities division the 
power company shall continue to distribute electric energy in accordance with 
these rules and regulations notwithstanding the lodging of a complaint by a 
dissatisfied consumer. 

The War Industries Board fully appreciates, and is grateful, for the support 
and whole-hearted cooperation which it has received at the hands of both the 
producers and distributors of electric energy on tlie one part, and their con- 
sumers on the other, in connection with the handling of such cases of power 
shortages as have already arisen. These rules and regulations have been 
promulgated with the view of stimulating production to meet the requirements 
of the war program, and at the same time reduce to a minimum the inevitable 
disturbance to industry due to power shortages. With confidence we bespeak 
the continued cooperation of all interested parties in our efforts to reach sound 
and just solutions of these difficult and constantly recurring problems. 

Yours very truly, 

Edwin B. Pabkeb, 
Priorities Commissioner. 
Washington, D. C, October 7, 1918. 



Appendix XLIV. 



WAR SERVICE COMMITTEES AND MEMBERS. 

WAR SERVICE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. 



Harry A. Wheeler, Chairman. 
Joseph H. Defrees, Vice 

Chairman. 
A. C. Bedford. 
William Buttcrworth. 
W. L. Clause. 
L. S. Gillette. 
John H. Fahey. -^ 
W. H. Manss. 

ACCODNTIXG. 

Edw. L. Suffern, Chairman. 
A. P. Richardson, Secretary. 
W. Sanders Davies. 
Chas. S. Ludlam. 
Robt. II. Montgomery. 
Charles II. Nau. 
Henry A. Niles. 
J. E. Sterrett. 
Arthur W. Teele. 

ASBE.STOS AND MAGNESIA. 

George D. Crabhs, Chairman. 

C. J. Stover, Secretary. 

W. A. Macan. 

Richard V. Mattlson, jr. 

C. B. Jenkins. 

S. R. Zimmerman. 

Auto .MOBILES. 

Hugh Chalmers, Chairman. 
John N. Willys. 
H. H. Rice. 
George M. Graham. 
Alfred Reeves. 

Automobile Dealebs. 

F. W. A. Vesper, Chairman. 

Earl C. Anthony. 

Chas. Collier. 

A. E. Mitzel. 

A. E. Maltby. 

F. E. Murphy. 

Dayton Keith. 

J. H. McAlman. 

Geo. D. McCutcheon. 

O. P. Tyler. 

Fred J. Caley. 

Chas. M. Browne. 

Finley L. MacFarland. 



Baby Vehicles. 

O. W. Siebert, Chairman. 
G. A. Keyworth. 
Frank Wisslg. 
Hugh Hill. 
P. C. Kendall. 
W. S. Ferris. 



Bags (Burl^vp and Cotton). 

EXECUTIVE committee. 

Albert F. Bemis, Chairman. 

Everett Ames. 

Bcnj. Elsas. 

E. K. Ludington. 

G. D. Adams. 

E. W. Mcnte. 

J. B. Morgan. 

subcommittee on cotton. 

Benjamin Elsas, Chairman. 
Geo. N. Roberts. 
Benj. D. Riegel. 
K. P. Mann. 
A. S. Bowen. 

subcommittee on boelap. 

A. V. Phillips, Chairman. 
W. N. Morice. 
J. W. Falconer. 
J. R. Dowitt. 
Everett Ames. 



Baking. 

Frank R. Shepard, Chairman. 

Jay Burns. 

Robt. L. Corby. 

Wm. Frlehofer. 

John F. lllldebrand. 

S. F. McDonald. 

Wm. M. Regan. 

Paul Schulze. 

B. Howard Smith. 

Gordon Smith. 

Geo. S. Ward. 

A. L. Taggart. 



Ball Bbakinos and Stehl 
Balls. 

W. M. Nones, Chairman. 

C. T. Treadway. 

F. M. Germane. 

H. K. Smith. 

L. J. Hoover. 

W. H. Strom. 

Isaac Andrews. 

Barbers' Supplies. 

Fred Dollc, Chairman. 
Joseph Gibson. 

A. Edlis. 
Christ Kohler. 
J. E. Miller. 
Martin Hanson. 
W. W. Page. 

J. V. Reed. 
Bernard DeVry. 

Baskets and Fruit 
Packages. 

R. G. Williams, Chairman. 

M. O. Overstreet. 

M. H. Stuart. 

J. H. Schlogel. 

J. R. Jarrell. 

J. M. Simmons. 

Buyci.es. 

B. J. Lonn, Chairman. 
Col. F. T. HufTmnn. 

J. P. Fogarty. 
W. G. Schack. 
II. S. Wise. 
Percy Pierce. 
I. Schwinn. 

Biscuits and Crackers. 

Brooks Morgan, Chairman. 
John H. Wiles. 
R. B. Tomllnson. 

BOOTS and shoes. 

John S. Kent, Chairman. 
Frank H. Brlggs. 
Fred B. Rice. 

396 



396 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



Boots and Shoes — Contd. 

Wm. S. McKenzie. 
Henry W. Cook. 
Frank C. Rand. 
John W. Craddock. 
A. S. Kreider. 
M. S. Florsheim. 
John R. Garside. 
L. H. Downs. 
Walter J. Hallahan. 
Sol Wile. 

J. Frank McElwain. 
John A. Bush. 
A. N. Blake. 
Frank X. Kelly. 
Mark W. Selby. 
F. L. Weyenberg. 

Boxes (Paper). 

A. G. Burry, Ohairman. 
H. M. Hoague. 
Frank E. Vincent. 
Ernest Spaulding. 

B. P. Franke. 
W. W. Baird. 
W. B. Dickcrson. 
Geo. E. Staebler. 
H. L. Stortz. 

C. M. Coover. 

Boxes (Wooden). 

Geo. L. Crosman, Chairman. 

B. F. Masters. 
R. W. Jordan. 

C. Fred Yegge. 
Louis Wuichet. 

Brass and Copper Rolling 
Mills. 

A. P. Swoyer, Ohairman. 

H. J. Rowland. 

L. G. Kibbe. 

A. A. Alnsworth. 

Brass and Copper Tubes 
(Small Sizes). 

Henry T. Smith, Chairman. 
F. W. French. 
CliflEord H. Wells. 
F. J. DeBishop. 
Philip Smith. 

Brass and Copper Tubes 
(Commercial Sizes). 

John P. Elton, Chairman. 
W. S. Eckhert. 
L. H. Jones. 
W. R. Webster. 
R. L. Coe. 



Brewing. 

C. W. Feigenspan, Chairman. 

E. A. Schmidt. 
Edw. Landsberg. 
Louis B. Schram. 
Wm. Hamm. 
Gustave Pab.st. 
Jas. R. Nicholson. 
Julius Liebmann. 
Hugh F. Fox. 

Buick (Building). 

George H. Clippert, Chairman. 

J. W. Robb. 

Wm. K. Hammond. 

John W. Sibley. 

Theo. A. Randall. 

Brick (Face). 

Jos. W. Moulding, Chairman. 

F. W. Butterworth. 
H. E. Stringer. 

R. D. T. Hollowell. 

Brick (Paving). 

C. C. Blair, Chairman. 
Will P. Clair, Vice Chairman. 
J. W. Sibley. 
W. G. D. Orr. 

A. L. Shulthis. 
R. T. Hutching. 

Building Industry. 

B. P. Affleck, Chairman. 
Col. J. R. Wiggins. 
John H. Kaul. 

A. M. Maddock. 
Charles Gompertz. 
John A. Kling. 
W. L. Clause. 
Walter S. Dickey. 
Rudolph P. Miller. 

Metal Ceiling. 

J. M. Gleason, Chairman. 
James P. Dolan. 

G. J. Kohler. 
Louis Kuehn. 
W. F. Norman. 

Metal Lath. 

Zenas W. Carter, Oliairman. 

W. H. Foster. 

Howard W. Foote. 

Julius Kahn. 

A. R. Yancy. 

J. A. Thomas. 

W. G. Hurlburt, 



Canned Foods and Dried 
Fruits Brokers. 

B. W. Housum, Chairman. 
Wm. H. NichoUs. 

Jos. H. Kline. 

F. A. Alpin. 
Jas. M. Hobbs. 
Jos. Keevers. 

Carriages. 

Philip Ebrenz, Chairman. 
W. H. Rominger. 

C. R. Crawford. 
Frank Delker. 
E. J. Schlamp. 
J. H. Poste. 

H. A. Crawford. 
J. D. Craft. 
W. G. Norman. 

Caskets. 

P. B. Heintz, Chairman. 

William Mauthe. 

A. R. Betts. 

A. A. Breed. 

E. L. Ewing. 

John M. Byrne. 

Cereals. 

C. T. Lee, Ch airman. 
H. C. Flint. 
H. L. Smith. 
S. H. Small. 
Arthur Dunn. 

G. G. Guernsey. 

Chain. 

C. M. Power, Chairman. 
Staunton B. Peck. 
A. B. Way. 

subcommittees. 

Welded chain. 

C. M. Power, Chairman. 
Robert J. McKay. 
Frank A. Bond. 
L. D. Cull. 

Transmission chains and 
sprockets. 

Staunton B. Peck, Chairman. 
L. M. Wainwright. 
L. C. Wilson. 
Edgar Stilley. 

Weldless and hardware. 

A. B. Way, Chairman. 
T. B. Oliver. 
John M. Rus.sell. 
Thomas A. Troy. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



'M)1 



rilEMICALS. 
CENTllAL COMillTTEE. 

Horace Bowkor, Chairman. 

Henry Howard. 

J. D. Cameron Bradley. 

Wm. Hamlin ChiUls. 

F. R. Grassolli. 

W. D. Huntington. 

D. W. .Tayne. 

A. D. Ledonx. 

F. A. Lidlniry. 

C. H. MacDowell. 

Edward Malliuckrodt, jr. 

Wm. H. Nichols. 

J. D. Pennock. 

C. L. Reese. 

John J. Riker. 

A. G. Roscugarten. 

C. G. Wilson. 



W. D. Huntington, Chairman. 

S. B. Fleming. 

J. M. Goetchius. 

C. F. Burroughs. 

J. H. D. Rodler. 

Charles M. Butterworth. 



ALKALI. 

J. D. Pennock, Chairman. 
E. H. Hooker. 
N. E. Bartlett. 

E. Sargent. 

COAL-TAR BY-PRODUCTS. 

D. W. .Tayne, Chairman. 
W. D. Addicks. 
C. J. Ramsburg. 
W. E. McKay. 
A. A. Schlesinger. 

DTESTDFFS. 

C. L. Reese, Chairman. 

H. A. M.-tz. 

M. R. Poucher. 

R. W. Hoch.stetter. 

August Merz. 

H. D. Ruhm. 

I. F. Stone. 

F. M. Fargo. 
A. R. Curtin. 

J. M. Matthews. 

ELECTRO-CHEMICALS. 

F. A. Lidbury, Chairman. 
C. D. Cohen. 
F. J. Tone. 



Chemicals — Continued. 

FEKTILI/Ell. 

C. C. Wilson, Chairman. 
C. F. P.urroughs. 
W. D. Iluutington. 
C. H. MacDowell. 
A. C. Read. 
Albert French. 
Porter Fleming. 
Wm. Prescott. 
Frederick Rayfield. 

miscbli.a.\bous chemicals. 

A. G. Rosengarten, Chairman. 
C. P. Adamson. 
Wm. Henry Bower. 

foreign pyrites. 

A. D. Ledoux, Chairman. 
C. F. Burroughs. 
P. H. Nichols. 
W. II. Mills. 

domestic pyrites and 
sulphur. 

C. H. MacDowell. Chairman. 
W. N. Wilkinson. 
II. P. Nash. 
C. G. Wil.son. 

Wood Chemicals. 

.John Troy, Chairman. 
F. E. Clawson. 
II. E. Gafifney. 

Childrex'.s Vehicles. 

.1. F. Vogel, Chairman. 
('. R. Dinkey. 
Wm. L. Dlemer. 
R. G. Ledig. 
F. E. Southard. 

Vitrified G l a z b d Sbwer 
Pipe and Ci>at Phoddcts. 

Fred L. Dickey, Chairman, 
n. S. Rhodes. 
M. P. Chumlea. 

Vitrified Glazed Sbwbr 

PlPB. 

.\. C. McCombe, Chairman. 
H. B. Manton. 
H. E. Kilgus. 

Clothing. 

Samuel Weill, Chairman. 
Wm. Goldman. 
Chas. W. Endel. 



Clotiiino -Continued. 

Herbert C. .Vnsorgc. 
Edw. Rosenberg. 
Paul L. Feiss. 
Eli Strauss. 
Geo. M. Sherman. 
Ludwlg Stein. 
A. D. Peine. 
Henry X. Strauss. 
David Klrschbauni. 

Collapsible Tciies. 

R. L. Kenah, Chairman. 
A. H. Wlrz. 
George H. Neidllnger. 
A. W. Paull. 

Confectionery. 

V. L. Price, Chairman. 
R. R. Cleeland. 
H. H. Harris. 
Frank E. Glllen. 
F. A. Chappell. 
W. C. Bidlack. 
Geo. E. Close. 
J. K. Farley, Jr. 
H. W. Hoops. 
W. II. Belcher. 
Walter C. Hughes. 
Paul F. Belch. 
A. S. Colebrook. 

Cooperage. 

Walker L. Wellford, Chair- 
man. 
V. W. Krafft. 

E. H. Defobaugh. 
A. J. Poorman. 
Charles Hudson. 

W. Palmer Clarkson. 

F. S. Chariot. 
C. L. Harrison. 
Geo. H. Martin. 
W. K. Knox. 

C. F. Meyer. 
W. F. Wolfner. 

Corn Products. 

W. (5. Irwin, Chairman. 
C. D. Edinburg. 
.T. B. Itclchmann. 

G. S. Mahanna. 

Corsets. 

J. M. Dllman, Chairman. 

Daniel Kops. 

W. A. Marble. 

R. C. Sterton. 

L. T. Warner. 

Nelson fJray. 



398 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



Cotton Mandfactdring. 
national council. 

Stuart W. Cramer, Chairman. 

Edwin F. Green, Vice Chair- 
man. 

Winston D. Adams, Secre- 
tary. 

Albert F. Bemis. 

Fuller E. Gallaway. 

D. Y. Cooper. 

Philip Y. DeNormandle. 

Arthur J. Draper. 

Albert G. Duncan. 

Frank .T. Hale. 

James D. Hammett. 

Allen F. Johnson. 

Gerrish IL Millikin. 

W. Frank Shove. 

Ellison A. Smith. 

WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE. 

Gerrish H. Millikin, Chair- 

man. 
Arthur J. Draper, Vice 

Chairman. 
J. S. Rousmanniere, Secre 

tary. 
Robert Amory. 
W. D. Anderson. 
J. Arthur Atwood. 
Howard Baetjer. 
Walter C. Bayliss. 
Harry H. Blunt. 
Bertram H. Borden. 
Arthur T. Bradlee. 
W. Irving Bullard. 
J. W. Cannon. 
B. B. Comer. 
J. W. Cone. 
Philip Dana. 
George A. DeForest. 
B. H. Bristow Draper. 
F. C. Dumaine. 
H. R. Fitzgerald. 

B. E. Geer. 

C. L. Gilliland. 
Henry S. Howe. 
George H. Lanier. 
J. p. Ledyard. 
Arthur H. Lowe. 
A. W. McLellan. 
Victor M. Montgomery. 
J. E. Osborn. 
Andrew G. Pierce, jr. 
John Skinner. 

Cotton Thread. 

J. William Clark, Chairman. 

W. H. Hall. 

H. E. Locke. 

Chas. Spicehandler. 

W. W. Orswell. 

L. B. Cranska. 

C. E. Barlow. 

W. V. Smith. 



Cotton Waste. 

Henry F. McGrady, Chair- 
man. 
Joseph F. Wallworth. 
Samuel L. Ayres. 
Michael F. Dunn. 
Jas. F. McNeel. 

Curtains. 

George J. Martin, Chairman. 
M. E. Wormser. 
D. C. Pierce. 

Pocket Knives. 

Chas. F. Rockwell, Chair- 
man. 

C. B. Butler. 

D. Divine, jr. 
Adolph Kastor. 
C. W. Silcox. 

Dental Manufacturing. 

Frank H. Taylor, Chairman. 
G. L. Grler, Secretary. 
C. O. Rother. 
J. R. Sheppard. 
H. A. Slaight. 

E. E. Smith. 
S. Rubin. 

Drugs. 

Willard Ohliger, Chairman. 
Frank G. Ryan. 
Donald McKesson. 
Frederick G. Rosengarten. 
W. A. Sailes. 
Burton T. Bush. 
Dr. H. C. Lovis. 
Milton Campbell. 
Dr. W. C. Abbott. 

Drugs (Proprietary). 

Frank A. Blair, Chairman. 
W. E. Weiss. 
A. H. Beardsley. 
Z. C. Patten, jr. 

E. K. Hyde. 
Louis Liggett. 

Drugs (Wholesale). 

F. E. Bogart, Chairman. 
Jas. W. Morrison. 
H. D. Brewer. 
Terry T. Greil. 
C. F. Michaels. 
J. M. Penland. 
H. D. Faxon. 
Roblin H. Davis. 



Drug.s (Wholesalk) — 
Continued. 

C. S. Martin. 
C. E. Bedwell. 
W. G. Noyes. 
Wm. Scott. 
R. R. Ellis. 
C. P. Walbridge. 

Drugs (Retail). 

Eugene C. Brokmeyer, Chair 

man. 
.lames F. Finneran. 
Robert J. Frick. 
James P. Crowley. 
Theo. F. Hagenow. 
Charles H. Huhn. 
Samuel C. Henry. 
Charles F. Harding. 



Dry Goods (Wholesale). 

CENTRAL committee. 

John W. Scott, Chairman. 
Calvin M. Smyth. 
James M. Easter. 
Ernest W. Stix. 
Leon Smith. 
Arthur C. Farley. 
E. B. Snydor. 
Frank S. Evans. 



subcommittee on dress 

FABRICS. 

H. Clay Miller, Chairman. 
Colby Davies. 
R. B. McKenny. 
D. W. Jarvis. 
W. F. Dalzell. 
Samuel D. French. 
Murray Brown. 
Fred T. Howard. 

subcommittee on knit 
goods. 

Chas. A. Jobes, Chairman. 
John E. McLoughlin. 
D. J. Callaghan. 
J. H. Emery. 
A. Chas. Wilson. 

subcommittee on sales- 
men's SAMPLES. 

Ward M. Burgess, Chairman^ 
Bentley P. Neflf. 
W. R. King. 
Gaylord W. Gillis. 
I. M. Parsons. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAR. 



Dry Goods (Wholesale) — 
Continued. 

SCBCOMMITTBB ON NOTIONS 
AND SMALL WARES. 

Jacob K. Lossey, Chairman. 
Ihos. C. Donovan. 
Julius Baer. 
J. Dey Conover. 
Harry Wheeler. 

DuY Goods (Retail). 

Victor W. Sincere, Chairman. 
M. L. Wilkinson. 
Oscar Webber. 
S. J. Schwartz. 
H. A. Saks. 

Sanitary Earthenware. 

J. A. Campbell, Chairman. 
A. M. Maddock. 
Philip J. Flaherty. 

Electkic Railways. 

Thos. X. McCarter, Chairman. 
Arthur W. Brady. 
Britton I. Budd. 
Philip H. Gadsden. 
Lucius S. Storre. 

Electrical Mandfacturing. 

central committee. 

Clarence L. Collins, 2d, 

Chairman. 
James C. Ilobart. 
J. H. McKee. 

William Wallace Nichols. 
Robert K. Sheppard. 
Charles A. Terry. 

ELECTRICAL APPARATUS. 

Clarence L. Collens, 2d, Chair- 
man. 
F. S. Hunting. 
T. E. Barnum. 
H. C. Petty. 
Walter J. Friedlander. 
H. G. Steele. 

ELECTRICAL SUPPLIES. 

R. K. Sheppard, Chairman. 

J. F. Kerlin. 

W. M. Stearns. 

FI. R. Holmes. 

W. W. Mumma. 

J. M. Woodward. 

H. W. Bliven. 

J. B. Adams. 

Herman Plant. 

H. G. Lewis. 



Electrical Manufactur- 
ing — Continued. 

electrical SUPPLIES — COU. 

C. B. Corrigan. 
F. W. Hall. 

H. W. McCandless. 
R. W. Seabury. 
W. H. Thornley. 
H. D. Betts. 
Chas. L. Eidlitz. 

D. H. Murphy. 
Wallace S. Clark. 
J. C. Dallam. 
Charles G. Rupert. 
W. Roy McCanne. 

Electrical Supply Job- 
bers. 

E. C. Graham, Chairman. 
J. G. Johannesen. - 

W. F. P. Mayo. 

E. W. Rockafellow. 

E. F. Smith. 

Elevators. 

Martin B. McLauthlin, Chair- 
man. 
A. B. See. 
I. B. Haughton. 
George T. Marshall. 

F. A. Hecht. 

C. H. M. Atkins. 

Enameled Ware. 

George D. Mcllvalne, Chair- 
man. 
Jas. F. Conran. 
A. H. Cline. jr. 
J. E. Murphy. 
T. R. Barnes. 

E.ngineering. 

Clemens Herschel, Chairman. 
Benj. B. Thayer. 
I. E. Moultrop. 
Calvert Townley. 

civil. 

Chas. S. Churchill. Chairman. 
Prof. Geo. F. Swain. 
Prof. F. H. Newell. 
.\l<x. C. Humphreys. 
C. F. Loweth. 

electrical. 

Harold W. Buck, Chairman. 

E. W. Rice, Jr. 

N. A. Carle. 

Prof. C. A. Adams. 

Charles E. Skinner. 



Enginebrino — Continued. 

MICHAMCAL. 

Dr. Ira N. HoIIls, Chairman. 
Chas. Whiting Baker. 
George J. Foran. 
Chas. T. Main. 
Dr. D. S. Jacobus. 

mining. 

P. N. Moore, Chairman. 
Sidney J. Jennings. 
Benjamin B. Lawrence. 
J. Parke Channlng. 
Edwin I^udlow. 

Photoengraving. 

Chas. W. Beck, Jr., Chairman. 

E. W. Houser. 
Ad. Schuetz. 

F. W. Gage. 

A. D. Sheridan. 
H. C. C. Stiles. 
S. E. Blanchard. 
J. C. Buckbee. 
Don Seitz. 
Matthew WoU. 
W. J. Lawrence. 
E. C. Miller. 

Fabricated Steel. 

John Sterling Deans, Chair- 
man. 
Lewis F. Rights. 
Geo. P. Bard. 
Thomas Earle. 
Howard A. I<1tch. 
W. A. Garrlgues. 

E. A. Gilbert. 

J. I.. Kimlirough. 
C. D. Marshall. 
Wm. S. Simpson, Jr. 
11. A. Wagner. 
Paul Willis. 
C. Edwin Michael. 

Farm Implements. 

C. S. Brantingham. Chairman. 

F. R. Todd. 

G. A. Ranney. 
II. M. Wallls. 

W. II. StackhouHe. 



Wa(;ons and Vehicles. 

I{. V. Board, Chairman. 
H. J. McCullough. 
T. A. White. 
A. B. Thielens. 



400 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



Felt. 

W. A. Forman, Chairman. 
H. M. NichoUs. 
John M. Richardson. 
J. C. Collins. 
G. M. Graves. 

FiBKR Containers. 

Frederick A. Norris, Chair- 
man. 
Chas. R. White, Secretary. 
J. P. Brunt. 
J. P. Hummel. 
Thos. W. Ross. 
J. B. Fenton. 
Geo. W. Gair. 

Flavoring Extracts. 

S. J. Sherer, Chairman. 
Frank L. Beggs. 
Chas. D. Joyce. 
W. M. McCormiek. 
T. W. Carman. 

Food Specialties. 

Wm. L. Sweet, Chairman. 

Frank H. Millard. 

R. R. Moore. 

Walter H. Lipe. 

Walter B. Cherry. 

Carl A. Lautz. 

Fred Mason. 

A. M. Alexander. 

C. M. Rich. 

C. F. Mueller, jr. 

A. C. Monagle. 

E. G. McDougall. 

C. T. Lee. 

Dr. T. B. Wagner. 
Geo. H. Carter. 
Arthur B. Williams. 
Louis Runkel. 

D. O. Everhard. 

Foundry Products. 

H. D. Miles, Chairman. 
G. H. Clamer. 
J. C. Haswell. 
Ralph H. West. 
C. E. Hoyt. 

Foundry Supplies. 

Ralph Ditty, Chairman. 
Theodore Kauflfman. 
W. F. Kaine. 

E. J. Woodison. 
H. M. Bougher. 



Samuel Ullman, Chairman. 
Charles W. Gordon. 



Fur — Continued. 

A. B. Shubert. 
P. B. Fouke. 
Antonin Chapal. 

F. N. Monjo. 
Max Cohen. 
Aaron Naumburg. 
Otto J. Piehler. 

Garments. 

Galbraith Miller, Jr., Chair- 
man. 
A. T. Davenport. 
I. L. Phillips. 
Ralph Hunter. 
John I. McDonald. 

C. C. Overton. 

Gas and Electric Service. 

John W.-Lieb, Chairman. 

Geo. W. Elliott, Secretary. 

W. H. Gartley. 

Walter R. Addicks. 

Philip P. Barton. 

H. G. Bradlee. 

John A. Britton. 

Alex. Dow. 

Chas. L. Edgar. 

A. E. Forstall. 

Jos. F. Guffey. 

Saml. Insull. 

D. C. Jackson. 
Jos. B. McCall. 
Capt. Wm. E. McKay. 
Herbert A. Wagner. 
S. S. Wyer. 

Gas Engines 

H. G. Diefendorf, Chairman. 

Rufus K. Schriber. 

Geo. W. Schwer. 

C. F. Fithian. 

C. B. Segner. 

C. Heer. 

Walter Brown. 

Geo. Hanson. 

Lester H. Keim. 

Lester S. Keilholtz. 

C. E. Bement. 

G. L. Lewis. 
Carl Velguth. 

Gears. 

F. W. Sinram, Chairman. 
Henry E. Eherhardt. 
Frank D. Hamlin. 
Milton Rupert. 
George L. Markland, jr. 
Frank Burgess. 

E. J. Frost. 
H. W. Chapin. 
William Ganschow. 



Window Glass. 

W. L. Monro, Chairman. 
C. W. Brown. 
H. J. Walter. 
H. R. Hilton. 
U. G. Baker. 



dealers and exchanges. 

C. B. Pierce, Chairman. 
G. F. Ewe. 

B. S. Westbrook. 
John O. Ballard. 
John H. MacMillan. 
Herbert Hall. 
Chas. D. Jones. 
Hiram N. Sager. 

O. M. Mitchell. 
Geo. E. Pierce. 
E. C. Elkenberry. 
Frank I. King. 
E. M. Wayne. 
E. A. Fitzgerald. 

E. W. Crouch. 
U. F. demons. 
A. E. Reynolds. 

F. C. Van Dusen. 

GR-iNiTE Paving Blocks. 

H. E. Fletcher, Chairman. 

C. Harry Rogers. 
Joseph Leopold. 
Wm. Booth. 

W. F. Shaffner. 
Alfred T. Rhodes. 

Grinding Wheels. 

Carl F. Dietz, Chairman. 

Geo. R. Rayner. 

L. T. Byers. 

E. Bertram Pike. 

Frank R. Henry. 

Groceries (Wholesale). 

Wm. L. Juhring, Chairman. 

John C. Mahlan. 

H. J. Sills. 

C. Schuster. 

George Boehm. 

Frank Depew. 

John C. Dorn. 

Metal Gauges. 

J. B. Kirkpatrick, Chair- 
man. 
J. A. Tildeu. 
T. C. Clifford. 
A. A. Ainsworth. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



40 1 



HARDWARE MANDPACTDRERS 
ORGANIZATION FOR WAR 
SERVICE. 

President. 

Charles W. Asbury. 

Assistant Executive Mana- 
ger. 

P. H. Robinson. 

S'ccretary-Treasurer. 

F. D. Mitchell. 

Executive Committee. 

Fayette R. Plumb, Chairman. 
Frank Baackes. 
A. W. Stanley. 

8ul)committee on Wire and, 
Heavy Hardicare. 

Chas. E. Sanders, Chairman. 

James FTay. 

Wm. M. Taussig. 

W. J. McCurdy. 

Warren D. Chase. 

W. H. Remmel. 

W. D. Biggera. 

John A. Moore. 

H. F. Seymour. 

Frederick Pease. 

Wm. Jennings. 

Geo. II. Kennedy. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BUILDERS 
HARDWARE AND SMALL 
CASTINGS. 

H. B. Sargent, Chairman. 
H. C. M. Thomson. 
Albert Zimmerman. 
W. P. Benson. 
F. A. Searle. 
n. B. Plumb. 
E. H. Stearns. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TOOLS FOE 
WOODWOEKINQ. 

II. B. Curtis, Chairman. 
Charles C. Ilaselton. 
II. B. Curtis. 
W. C. Kelly. 
Wm. M. Pratt. 
R. E. Maher. 
Paul E. Heller. 
Wallace L. Pond. 
Chas. F. Griffith. 
Wm. Morrill. 
Irving S. Kemp. 

105826—21 26 



Hardware — Continued. 

SDBCOMMITTBE ON TOOLS FOB 

WOODWORKING — contlDued. 

Fred Buck. 
J. B. Wilbur, Jr. 
J. L. Jennings. 
S. Horace Disston. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TOOLS FOR 
METAL WORKING. 

Frederick L. Payne, Chair- 
man. 
L. F. Fichthorn. 
A. E. WoodrufT. 
Wm. M. Pratt. 

D. Findlay. 
George Butterfleld. 
F. G. Echols. 
Frank L. Coes. 

J. II. Williams. 
J. E. Durham. 
Jas. Geddes. 

E. S. Miller. 

F. O. Wells. 
H. S. Ashmun. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGRICUL- 
TURAL TOOLS. 

J. S. Bonbright, Chairman. 
Ed. S. Burt. 
W. H. Cowdcry. 
C. S. Phillips. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUTLEBT. 

Cha.'^. p. Rockwell, Chairman. 

R. F. Chatillon. 

P. Van Alstyne. 

O. W. Edwards. 

W. W. Page. 

C. L. Gairoard. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERAL 
SUPPLIES. 

E. Bertram Pike, Chairman. 

E. C. Hough. 

A. J. Crandall. 

L. P. Smith. 

II. E. Smith. 

C. Helnrich. 

llABDWARB JOBBER.S ( SOUTn- 
ERN). 

Charles II. Ireland, Chairman. 
Oscar B. Barker. 
John Donnan. 

Men's Straw Hats. 

Charles H. Watson, Chairman. 
Dnnlcl G. Tenney. 
S. George Wolf. 



Men's Straw Hats— Con. 

Fnd O. Ph.-lpH. 
Fletcher II. Montgomery. 
Rohort J. Patterson. 

Hats (Wholbsalb). 

R. T. Langenberg, Chairman. 
W. II. Ferry. 
Robert J. Patterson. 
Charles Watson. 
Fred Berg. 

HOSIERT. 

W. B. Davis, Chairman. 

E. B. Gaylord. 
C. L. Perkins. 
P. C. Withers. 
W. H. Ziock. 
T. F. Thelme. 
H. T. Rollins. 
W. H. McLellan. 
J. L. Johnson. 
J. 0. Wells. 

F. A. Patrick. 
A. W. Sulloway. 
C. W. Kilbourn. 
F. L. Chlpman. 
Charles W. AdIer. 
Jos. S. Rambo. 
Edward Powell. 
Robert C. Blood. 
W. Park Moore. 
Gustav Oberlaender. 
George D. Ilorst. 
Chas. E. Leippe. 
Shepard Nicholson. 
Garnett Andrews. 

C. A. Plumley. 
L. B. Conway. 
R. N. Kimball. 
L. Ilellbronner. 

Underwear. 

Hewitt Coburn, Jr., Chair- 
man. 

A. ('. Dunhiin. 
L. W. Tiffany. 

B. C. Stephenson. 
J. C. Roulette. 

r. p. Baker. 

Chas. L. Mncomber. 

C. F. WInshlp. 
I). L. Galbraith. 
K. A. Clements. 
Myron H. Powell. 
F. M. Stowell. 
Nathan Hatch. 
John K. Stewart. 
Marshall Ely. 

F. B. Harder. 
S. Wricht. Jr. 
Uodney W. Jones. 
Andrew Frey. 



402 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



Underwear — Continued. 

F. W. Kavanaugh. 
W. C. Ruffln. 
P. H. Hanes, jr. 
L. F. Flesh. 

F. M. Shipley. 
J. L. Black. 

Joseph Feldenheimer. 

Benj. Gibbs. 

Roy W. Lotspeich. 

H. S. Cooper. 

S. D. Bausher. 

Sweater Coats. 

William H. Wye, Chairman. 

A. W. Spalding. 

Isaac Rofif. 

C. T. Hays. 

H. Friedman. 

H. T. Ballard. 

Fredericl£ Mayer. 

G. H. Packard. 
W. B. Tyrell. 
Otto A. Flnck. 

Hospitals. 

Dr. S. S. Goldwater, Chair- 
man. 
Richard P. Borden, Secretary. 
Daniel T. Test. 
A. A. Warner. 
Dr. Wm. A. White. 

ICK. 

Harry Hammond, Chairman. 

Wm. E. Zieber. 

J. C. Kent. 

M. J. O'Connell. 

Printing Ink. 

C. F. Bower, Chairman. 
L. A. Ault. 
James A. Ullman. 
K. W. Harden. 
L. A. Ault. 
Philip Ruxton. 

Iron and Steel. 

central committee. 

Elbert H. Gary, Chairman. 
James A. Farrell, Vice Chair 

man. 
James A. Burden. 
Alva C. Dinkey. 
Willis L. King. 
E. J. Grace. 
Charles M. Schwab. 
John A. Topping. 
H. D. Dalton. 
A. F. Houston. 



Ikon and Steel — Con. 

central committee — con. 

J. A. Campbell. 
L. E. Block. 
E. A. S. Clarke. 
W. H. Cook. 

steel distribution. 

J. A. Farrell, Chairman. 

J. B. Bonner, Vice Chairman. 

E. A. S. Clarke. 
John A. Topping. 

F. J. Hall. 

W. L. Hoffman. 
O. P. Blake. 
H. F. Holloway. 

ALLOYS. 

James A. Farrell, Chairman. 
E. A. S. Clarke. 
E. G. Grade. 
E. J. Lavino. 
A. A. Fowler. 

SHEET STEEL. 

W. S. Horner, Chairman. 
Walter C. Carroll. 
Charles O. Hadley. 

PIG TIN. 

John Hughes. Chairman. 
E. R. Crawford. 
John A. Frye. 
A. B. Hall. 
Theodore Pratt. 

scrap iron and STEEL. 

W. Vernon Phillips, Chair- 
man. 

Scrap dealers. 

Charles Driefus. 
Joseph Michaels. 
Eli Joseph. 
C. A. Barnes. 
H. B. Spackman. 
W. M. Tobias. 
Charles E. McKillips. 

Iron bar manufacturers. 

John C. Brown. 
Walter C. Eiy. 

Rail reroUers. 



D. C. Schonthals. 
Arthur S. Hook. 



Iron and Steel — Con. 

scrap iron and steel — con. 

Steel foundries and electric 
furnaces. 

Theodore B. Morritz. 
Rodney Thayer. 

Crucible steel makers. 

J. S. Pendleton. 

Oray iron and malleable 
foundries. 

Benjamin D. Fuller. 

PIG iron orb and lakh 
transportation. 

H. G. Dalton, Chairman. 

D. Billings. 
H. Coulby. 
C. D. Dyer. 
Leonard Peckitt. 
F. B. Richards. 
W. T. Sheppard. 
A. H. Woodward. 
Amaza S. Mather. 

TIN plate. 

J. I. Andrews, Chairman. 

E. R. Crawford. 

E. T. Weir. 

MALLEABLE CASTINGS. 

Frank J. Lanahan, Chair- 
man. 
H. F. Pope. 
J. C. Haswell. 

F. L. Sivyer. 
Frederick Eraser. 

WIRE ROPE. 

Karl G. Roebling, Chairma/n. 
John J. Broderick. 
Frank Baackes. 

WIRE products. 

F. Baackes, Chairman. 

George A. Mason. 

John C. Neale. 

J. B. Frederick. 

H. Sandborn Smith. 

cold rolled and DRAWN 
STEEL. 

P. N. Beegle, Chairman. 
E. L. Parker. 
Roland Gerry. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



403 



Iron and Steel — Con. 

TUBULAR PRODUCTS. 

Jas. A. Campbell, Chairman. 

Anson Mark. 

George Matheson. 

W. H. Rowe. 

E. Wircester. 

H. A. Beale, jr. 

L. M. Johnson. 

Iron, Steel< and Heavy 
Hardware (Jobbers). 

Samuel L. Orr, Chairman. 
Chas. M. Roehm. 
Jas. A. Coe. 



Jewelers. 

Robert B. Steele, Chairman. 

George H. Wilcox. 

George E. Fahys. 

David Belais. 

Col. Harry L,. Brown. 

John S. Ilolbrook. 

W. F. Juergens. 

Herbert L. Farrow. 

Rolland G. Monroe. 

Wilson A. Streeter. 

Harold E. Sweet. 

Fred G. Thearle. 

J. S. Van Wezel. 

Henry Wolcott. 



Jewelers (Nhw England). 

Louis Lyons, Chairman. 
Maurice J. Baer. 
Harry Fulford. 
Stephen H. Garner. 
Geo. H. Holmes. 
Frederick A. Howard. 
Harold W. Ostby. 
Harold E. Sweet. 
Henry B. Thresher. 
Cha.s. A. Whiting. 
Henry Wolcott. 
Woodward Booth. 

Sterling Silver and Silver 
Plat* Wabb. 

Geo. H. Wilcox, Chairman. 

H. B. Domlnlck. 

F. A. Wallace. 

J. Wayland Smith. 

Frederick Webster. 

John S. Holbrook. 

H. H. Tredwell. 

W. A. Kinsman. 

Andrew Snow, jr. 

Cleveland A. Dunn. 



Jewelers' Vigilance Com- 
mittee. 

Harry C. Larter, Chairman. 
Geo. E. Wilcox, Vice Chair- 
man. 
Geo. E. Fahys. 
Daviil Belais. 
Col. Harry L. Brown. 
O. G. Fossenden. 
John S. Holbrook. 
W. F. Juergens. 
Herbert L. Farrow. 
Ralland G. Monroe. 
Wilson .\. Streeter. 
Harold E. Sweet. 
Fred. G. Thearle. 
J. S. Van Wezel. 
Henry Wolcott. 



Limb. 

Chas. C. Bye, Chairman. 
J. K. Barbour. 
E. R. Stapleton. 
J. L. Durnell. 
Charles R. Loo. 
Henry Angel. 
A. II. Lauman. 

Employing Lithographers. 

Wm. S. Forbes, Chairman. 
Herbert H. Bigelow. 
Walter Clothier. 
Joseph Deutsch. 
Charles R. Frederickson. 
W. A. Livingstone. 
Earl II. Macey. 
George R. Meyercord. 
William Monasch. 
Alfred B. Rode. 
Maurice Saunders. 
Harry C. Stevenson. 
Jacob A. Voice. 



GEORGIA-FLORIDA YELLOW 
PINE. 

M. L. Fleishel, Chairman. 

J. E. Graves. 

E. V. Dnnlevle. 

R. M. Bond. 

R. H. Paul. 

D. G. Golt. 

II. 11. Swartz. 



MI.SSISSIPPI AND ALABAMA. 

N. S. Curtis, Chairman. 
M. C. Lumloy. 
S. S. Stuckey. 



Lumber — Continued. 

north CAROLINA PlNl. 

A. M. Cooke, Chairman. 
R. J. Clifford. 
Gill)ert L. Hume. 
J. W. Foreman. 
Nathan O'Berry. 
Claude Riser. 

NORTHERN FIND. 

George F. Lindsay, Chairman. 
R. E. McLean. 
R. R. Bailey. 

SOUTHERN PINB. 



W 


H 


Sullivan, Chairman 


F. 


W 


Stevens. 


John L. Kaul. 


C. 


A. 


Buchner. 


R. 


M 


II a Howell. 


V. 


M 


Scanlon. 


M 


B 


Nelson. 


D 


V. 


Dierks. 


T. 


L. 


L. Temple. 


W 


M 


. Cady. 


W 


.B 


Patterson. 


F. 


L. 


Sanford. 



Lumber (Wholesale). 

Edward Filer, Chairman. 

E. H. Stoner. 

Max Myers. 

Thomas K. Coale. 

H. W. McDonough. 

R. K. Sizer. 

B. H. Ellington. 

Machine Tools. 

C. Wood Walter, Chairman. 
Chas. E. Hlldreth. 

A. E. N«'Wton. 



O. W. Hales. Chairman. 
Oscar J. Ruh. 
Fred Vullmahn. 
Albert Zinn. 
Phil. A. Grau. 



Marble (Dealers). 

Charles L. HllKartner. Chair- 
man. 
Capt. Ed. B. Moreo. 
Col. Sam. Tatf. 
J. J. McClymont. 



404 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAE. 



Surgical Instruments and 
Medical Trade Supplies 
(Retailers) . 

Wm. Gibson, Chairman. 
J. F. Hartz. 
E. F. Mahady. 

Mill and Mine Supplibs 
AND Machinery (Deal- 
ers). 

Ernest Howell, Chairman. 

J. G. Belding. 

J. H. Haslam. 

W. Marshall Turner. 

Milling. 

Jns. F. Bell, Chairman. 
Fred J. Lingham. 

E. M. Kelly. 
Mark Mennel. 
Bernard A. Eckhart 
Saml. L. Plant. 

A. J. Hunt. 
Theodore B. Wilcox. 
A. C. lioring. 

Rich Milling. 

J. R. Leguenec, Chairman. 
J. E. Broussard. 

F. A. Godchaax. 
J. A. Foster. 
W. S. Davis. 
Oak H. Rhodes. 

Optical Goods. 

Dr. Frederick Willson, Oftolr- 

man. 
H. S. Wherrett. 
Beverly Chew. 
Wm. A. D. Drescher. 
Channing M. Wells. 
Frederick Willson. 
Carl M. Bernegau. 

Opticians (Wholbsaud). 

A. Reed Mclntire, Chairman. 
George S. Johnston. 

B. W. King. 

R. C. Thompson. 
Max Zadek. 

Paint. 

Thomas Neal, Chairman. 

E. T. Trigg. 

W. H. Phillips. 

Greorge A. Martin. 

E, W. Heath. 

Charles S. Kennedy. 



Paint, Oil, and Varnish. 

E. J. Cornish, Chairman. 
W. H. Corringham. 
James B. Lord. 
Chas. J. Caspar. 
Arthur S. Somers. 
W. D. Foss. 
Howard Kellogg. 

Varnish. 

Arthur Davis, Chadrman. 

J. H. McNulty. 

Adrian D. Joyce. 

J. B. Lord. 

J. J. Nicholson. 

A. C. Morgan. 

Orriu S. Goan. 

Carl J. Schuman. 

P. H. Callahan. 



LiTHOPHONE. 

A. S. Krebs, Chairman. 
P. S. Tilden. 
F. S. Havens. 



Master House Painters 
AND Decorators. 

A. H. McGhan, Chairman. 
Chas. Macnichol. 
John Dewar. 
P. J. Collins. 
Jacob Layendecker. 



Paper and Pulp. 

A. B. Daniels, Chairman. 
A. D. Naylor, Secretary. 
F. L. Stevens. 

A. W. Esleeck. 

C. W. Lyman. 
M. E. Marcuse. 
L. E. Nash. 

F. S. Harrison. 
W. J. Eisner. 
Phillips Kimball. 
Allison Dodd. 

G. F. Merriam. 
R. B. Harbison. 

B. A. Van Winkle. 

D. A. Smith. 
W. A. Forman. 



Paper Bags. 

M. B. Wallace, Chairman. 

H. E. Westervelt. 

C. D. Adams. 

H. Elsas. 

A. A. Mcllvain. 



Rope Paper and Ropb 
Paper Sacks. 

L. K. Southard, Chairman. 
E. B. Allen. 
John A. Manning. 
R. T. Spencer. 
M. A. Thomas. 

Petroleum. 

[National Petroleum War 
Service Committee.] 

A. C. Bedford, ChaArman. 

E. C. Lufkin Vice Chairman. 

E. L. Doheny. 

Geo. S. Davison. 

H. F. Sinclair. 

J. W. Van Dyke. 

J. H. Markham, jr. 

Dr. Van H. Manning. 

W. C. Teagle. 

S. Messer. 

J. S. Cosden. 

Frank Haskell. 

W. S. Farlsh. 

E. W. Clark. 

R. D. Benson. 

J. H. Barr. 

M. J. Byrne. 

A. G. Maquire. 
Edward Prizer. 
J. Howard Pew. 
Martin Carey. 

B. G. Dawes. 
H. L. Doherty. 
A. P. Coombe. 
W. P. Cowan. 
H. E. Felton. 
J. F. GufEey. 
J. E. O'Neil. 
J. C. Donnell. 
H. M. Blackmer. 
Geo. W. Crawford. 
R. L. Welch. 

J. A. Mofifett, jr. 

C. C. Smith. 

pacific coast. 

E. W. Clark, Chairman. 
H. R. Gallagher. 
John Barneson. 

F. B. Henderson. 
K. R. Kingsbury. 
L. P. St. Clair. 
J. K. Firth. 

rocky mountain division. 

H. M. Blackmer, Chairman. 
F. W. Freeman, Vice Chair- 
man. 
F. E. Hurley. 
F. L. Wilson. 
E. T. Clark. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



405 



Petroleum — Continued. 

ROCKY MOUNTAIN DIVI- 
SION — continued. 

Martin McGrath. 
B. B. Brooks. 
E. T. Wilson. 
A. H. Richardsou. 
John C. Howard. 
Albert Kline. 

MIDCONTINBNT PRODUCTION. 

Frank Haskell, Chahinan. 

Art Walker. 

P. C. Ding. 

J. H. Evans. 

J. F. Darby. 

D. F. Connolly. 

Frank Breene. 

Judge J. J. Shea. 

A. J. Diescher. 

John Landon. 

Deering J. Marshall. 

J. Edgar Pew. 

Dana H. Kelsey. 

Henry McGraw. 

R. M. McFarland. 

James A. Veasey. 



GULF PRODUCTION. 

W. S. Farlsh, Chairman. 

J. C. Wilson. 

M. Guiterman. 

J. M. West. 

C. O. Noble. 

W. C. Woolf. 

R. E. Brooks. 

M. B. Sweeney. 

C. K. Clarke. 

T. P. Lee. 

Underwood Nazro. 

H. K. Arnold. 



WESTERN APPALACHIAN PRO- 
DUCTION. 

J. C. Donnell, Chairman. 

John A. Beck. 

Daniel E. Jones. 

C. L. Casterline. 

John S. Abbott. 

J. D. Madding. 

L. G. Neely. 

E. R. Riggs. 

Jas. H. Snowden. 

O. F. Thompson. 

E. B. Cochran. 

Frank McNeal. 

W. L. Parmenter. 

Jas. K. Kerr. 

W. B. Filson. 



Petroleum — Continued. 

EASTERN APPALACHIAN PRO- 
DUCTION. 

Geo. W. Crawford, Chairman. 
T. W. Phillips. Jr., Vice 

Chairman. 
L. W. Young, jr. 
Thomas H. Kennedy. 
Arthur F. Corwin. 
E. P. Whitcomb. 
John Davidson. 
J. E. Trainer. 
John Mills. 
Norwood Johnston. 
R. W. Mcllvain. 
J. T. Hervey. 

MIDCONTINBNT REFINING AND 
MARKETING. 

J. S. Cosden, Chairman. 
R. L. Welch, Vice Chairman. 
K J. Drake. 
P. M. Miskell. 

E. E. Shock. 
Thos. P. Melvin. 

F. H. Thwing. 
C. A. Braley. 
Weston Atwood. 
Pat Malloy. 
Frank B. Fretter. 
W. S. Ayers. 
Geo. W. Moore. 
J. C. McDonald. 
R. C. Holmes. 

Col. R. W. Stewart. 
Dr. Wm. M. Burton. 

APPALACHIAN REFINING AND 
MARKETING. 

S. Messer, Chairman. 
Wm. J. Patterson, Vice 
Chairman. 

G. H. Stansbury. 
Chas. A. Sherwood. 
Frank B. Fretter. 
F. S. Heath. 
Harry A. Logan. 

C. B. Dallum. 
Jas. A. Berry. 
W. Y. Cartwright. 
T. J. Williams. 
R. E. Goodwin. 

DISTRIBUTION IN ATLANTIC 
DIVISION. 

E. C. Lufkin, Chairman. 

C. E. Woodbrldge. Vice 

Chairman. 
T. J. Williams. 
Henry Fisher. 
C. G. Meinken. 



Petroleum — Continued. 



DISTRIDUTION 
DIVISION— 



IN ATLANTIC 

continued. 



G. R. Nutty. 
Frederic Ewlng. 
J. L. Rake. 
W. D. Baker. 
Byron D. Benson. 
N. G. M. Luyk. 
Harry C. Carr. 
O. E. Thurber. 
N. H. Weber. 
W. D. Anderson. 
G. H. Stansbury. 

advisory COMMITTEE ON 
JOBBERS. 

Judge M. J. Byrne, Chair- 
man. 

A. G. Maguire, Vice Chair- 
man. 

G. I. Sweney. 

C. E. Mather. 

A. H. Caward. 

C. L. Maguire. 
E. C. Winters. 
H. E. Mills. 

W. H. Fehsenfeld. 
T. S. Black. 

PIPE LINES IN ATLANTIC DI- 
VISION. 

R. D. Benson, Chairman. 

D. S. Bushell, Vice Chair- 
man. 

C. H. Kountz. 
Forrest M. Towl. 
Daniel O. Towl. 
Ward A. Miller. 
A. E. Watts. 
W. J. Iliggins. 
Geo. L. Webb. 

PIPE LINES IN SOUTHERN DI- 
VISION. 

Geo. S. Davison, Chairman. 
Underwood Nazro, Vice 

Chairman. 
C. H. Kountz. 
C. K. Clarke. 

E. R. Brown. 
T. J. Donoghue. 
Allan Towl. 
Henry MeGraw. 

TANK CARH. 

H. E. Felton, Chairman. 
K. C. SIcardl. Vice Chair- 
man. 
L. H. Henner. 
W. B. MeEwen. 

F. W. Boltz. 
W. H. Miller. 



406 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



Peteoleum — Continued. 

TANK CABS — continued. 

C. B. Ellis. 
Wm. Jervis. 
David Copland. 
A. T. Stewart. 
H. W. Roe. 
L. P. Jordan. 
R. H. McElroy. 
R. W. Ostrander. 
S. G. Casad. 

E. H. Porter. 

Supervisors of Rail Trans- 
portation. 

western district. 
W. E. McEwen. 

EASTERN DIVISION. 

F. W. Boltz. 

OIL WELL SUPPLIES. 

J. H. Barr, Chairman. 

A. A. Moody, Vice Chairman. 

Louis C. Sands. 

F. D. Clark, Jr. 
William K. Hughes. 
M. L. Moore. 

J. H. McDonald. 
W. M. Patterson. 
James W. Sloan. 
John M. Wilson. 

NATURAL GAS. 

Jos. F. Guffey, Chairman. 
W. Y. Cartwright. 
J. C. McDowell. 
Geo. W. Crawford. 

G. T. Braden. 
David O. Holbrook. 
James A. Veasey. 
T. O. Sullivan. 

J. G. Peer. 

Pharmacy. 

Samuel L. Hilton, Chairman. 
A. R. L. Dohme. 
Dr. J. H. Beal. 

PHONOGRAPHS. 

H. L. Willson, Chairman. 
Ralph L. Freeman. 
Charles Edison. 
Eugene A. Widman. 
Jacob Schechter. 
W. H. Alfring. 
Arthur Cushman. 
L. Rommell. 
Julius Balke. 
Louis Mandel. 



Pickles. 

P. A. Brown, Chairman. 

C. J. Sutphen. 
P. J. Claussen. 
P. A. Vickers. 

Pipe and Supplies. 

W. E. Clow, jr., Chairman. 

W. W. Ross. 

P. M. Sheldon. 

M. G. Barkley. 

W. P. Mars. 

Marshall Turner. 

L. C. Huesmann. 

Plumbing Supplies. 

John A. Murray, Chairman. 
John McC. Chase. 

Master Plumbers. 

Walter D. Nolan, Chairman. 
John Trainer. 

D. F. Durkin. 

Semiporcelain and China. 

W. E. Wells, Chairman. 

C. C. Ashbaugh. 
Chas. L. Sebring. 
II. D. Wintringer. 

A. G. Dale. 

D. William Scammell. 

E. L. Torbert. 

Pottery. 

W. E. Wells, Chairman. 
Marcus Aaron. 
C. C. Ashbaugh. 
Chas. L. Seebring. 
Joseph Mayer. 

Pressed Metals. 

C. H. L. Fllnterman, Chair- 
man. 
James Sinyard. 

B. S. Gier. 

A. P. Schroeder. 
W. W. Galbreath. 

C. E. Hunter. 
W. H. Hill. 
J. F. Savage. 
W. H. Oakes. 

J. R. Kilbourne. 
C. L. Pierce. 
W. S. Bailey. 
H. L. Green. 

Printing Presses. 

Edgar H. Cottrell, Chairman. 
Arthur Bentley. 
S.iml. G. Goss. 
Geo. D. Kirkham. 



Pumps. 

J. W. Gardner, Chairman. 

G. R. Deming. 

L. B. Anderson. 

J. D. Cone. 

Robert E. Hall. 

E. T. Fishwick. 

R. R. Hicks. 

Railway Cars. 

W. F. M. Goss, Chairman. 

B. P. Carry. 
J. M. Hansen. 
P. N. Hoffstot. 
W. H. Woodin. 
W. C. Arthurs. 

Refractories. 

Porter S. Kier, Chairman. 
E. M. Allen. 
J. H. Cavender. 
R. D. Hatton. 
Robt. A. B. Walsh. 

A. P. Taylor. 

D. D. Davis. 
H. E. Stuhler. 

C. C. FJdmunds. 
C. W. Keller. 

C. H. Claiborne. 
Cyrus Borgner. 
J. J. Brooks, Jr. 
n. L. Tredennick. 
P. E. Robinson. 

Refrigerators. 

B. P. Hall, Chairman. 
George H. Rice. 

H. C. Leonard. 

E. E. McCray. 
E. A. McKee. 
P. L. Northey. 

Rubber. 

central committee. 

B. G. Work, Chairman. 
H. S. Firestone. 

J. N. Gunn. 
G. B. Hodgman. 
Paul W. Litchfield. 
H. T. Dunn. 

C. T. Wilson. 

aiecbapt. 

p. W. Litchfield, Chairman. 

A. E. Jury. 

V. Van der Linde. 

BOOTS and shoes. 

H. E. Sawyer, Chairman. 
Francis S. Dane. 
J. A. Rishel. 
J. N. Gunn. 
Wm. G. Hill. 



AMERICAN^ INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



407 



Robber — Continued. 

CLOTHING. 

N. Lincoln Greene, Chairman. 
S. T. Hodgman. 
C. Kenyon, jr. 
G. B. Hodgman. 
L. C. Himebaugb. 

CRUDE RCBBER AND KINDRED 
PRODUCTS. 

C. T. Wilson, Chairman. 

B. G. Work. 

G. B. Hodgman. 

Henry Spadone. 

W. E. Bruyn. 

W. J. Kelly. 

H. S. Hotchkiss. 

E. H. Huxley. 

II. T. Dunn. 

FOREIGN TRADE. 

E. II. Huxley, Chairman. 
Henry G. Tyler. 

Wm. B. Leighton. 
R. J. Owens. 
A. S. Hardy. 
R. H. Daniels. 

F. E. Titus. 

G. B. Hodgman. 

GAS DEFENSE. 

Dr. W. C. Geerm, Chairman. 
William Stephens. 
Dr. Theo. Whittelsey. 

HARD RUBBER. 

II. Weida, Chairma7i. 
John .To.seph. 
Bruce Bedford. 
Philip H. Campbell. 
Samuel H. Dodd. 
.1. N. Gunn. 

INSULATED WIRE AND CABLES. 

Wallace S. Clark, Chairman. 
George B. North. 
Fred K. Dunbar. 
Edward Sawyer. 
J. N. Gunn. 

MECHANICAL GOODS (COM- 
MERCIAL). 

E. S. Williams, Chairman. 
W. O. Rutherford. 
Arthur F. Townsend. 
C. G. Garretson. 
Guy E. Norwood. 
.Tohn A. Lambert. 
John J. Voorhees. 
P. W. Litchfield. 



Rubber — Continued. 

MECHANIC.VL GOODS (TECH- 
NICAL). 

Dr. W. C. Goer, Chairman. 

N. S. Noble. 

J. W. Follows. 

Chas. T. Young. 

S. R. Clark. 

Dr. A. A. Somerville. 

W. H. Cobb. 

P. W. Litchfield. 

MEDICAL AND SUNDRIES. 

A. W. Warren, Chairman. 
W. S. Davison. 
W. O. Rutherford. 
Chas. J. Da vol. 
.T. Russell Parker. 
G. B. Hodgman. 

PNEUMATIC TIRES (COMMER 
CIAL). 

G. M. Stadelman, Chairman. 

T. C. Weston. 

W. O. Rutherford. 

E. PI. Broadwell. 
R. J. Firestone. 
Seneca G. Lewis. 
John S. Broughton. 
P. W. Litchfield. 

PNEUMATIC TIRES (TECH- 
NICAL). 

P. W. Litchfield, Chairman. 

Wm. McMahan. 

R. J. Stokes. 

J. C. Tuttle. 

J. D. Tew. 

liouis T. Vance. 

J. D. Anderson. 

RAILWAY SUPPLY. 

ir. E. Raymond, Chairman, 

J. H. Cobb. 

J. S. Broughton. 

Guy E. Norwood. 

J. H. Kelly. 

G. E. Hall. 

J. N. Gunn. 

RECLAIMED KI'DBER. 

F. II. .\pploton. Chairman. 
E. A. Anderson. 

John S. Clapp. 
Rudolph .\. Low. 
John S. Lowmnn. 
Joseph F. McLean. 
J. N. Gunn. 



Rubber— Continued. 

SOLID TIRES. 

H. S. Firestone, Chairman. 

P. W. Litchfield. 

C. J. Welch. 

Thomas F. Walsh. 

W. H. Allen. 

II. T. Dunn. 

Ohio Sandstone Inkustrt. 

W. A. C. Smith, Chairman. 

R. F. Mussey. 

George R. Murray. 

F. M. Waller. 

F. C. O'Connor. 

George O. McKelvey. 

C. W. Walters. 

Stacey Miller. 

R. C. Blum. 

A. C. Hall. 

L. Taylor. 

Seeds. 

J. L. Hunt, Chairman. 
Frank W. Bolgiano. 
Kirby White. 
W. G. Scarlett. 
C. C. Massie. 
H. M. Earl. 

Sheet Metal. 

Sidney Dotmers, Chairman. 

W. H. Abbott. 

Edward M. Blake. 

II. B. Fawcett. 

Wm. H. Matthal. 

James H. Sandors. 

J. H. Walbridiro. 

Geo. P. Benjamin. 

SheetMetal Contractors. 

W. A. Fingle.<>, Chairman. 

E. L. Seabrook. 

J. H. Hussie. 

A. B. Lewllss. 

John .\. Plerpont. 

II. C. Knl.sely. 

Geo. Thosmndier. 

T. P. Walsh. 

Otto GouHsenhelnier. 

John Bogenberger. 

Silk. 

Charles Cheney, Chairman. 

II. Schnledwlnd, Jr. 

Loui.s St<'nrns. 

M. W. DIppel. 

R. J. F. Schwarzenbacb. 

advertising SPBCIALTIia. 

Carroll 11. Sudler, Chairman. 
C. S. Sultzor. 
Theo. E. Gerlach. 



408 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR. 



Stationeet. 

Wm. Pitt, Chairman. 
Eberhard Faber. 
Chas. C. Davis. 
Chas. S. Brewer. 
Carl J. Weissbrod. 
Wm. H. Rodington. 
Henry S. Dennison. 
Wm. O. Day. 
Geo. E. Parmenter. 
Edwin C. Ryals. 

Envelopes. 

C. R. Scudder, Chairman. 
R. O. Brigham. 
Lawrence B. Smith. 
H. W. Stuart. 
A. B. Whiting. 

Steam and Hot Watbe Pit- 
tings. 

Wm. H. Oakes, Chairman. 
N. Loring Danforth. 
J. B. Rutzler. 
Juan A. Almirall. 
Henry B. Gombers. 

Steel Baeeels. 

R. H. Hackney, Chairman. 

S. B. Cochrane. 

George A. Moore. 

W. Manning Kerr. 

G. De F. Kinney. 

B. J. Allen. 

Steel Tanks. 

M. P. Moore, Chairman. 
T. B. O'Brien. 
P. C. Keller. 
A. M. Morrison. 

Stoves. 

Frederick Will, Chairman. 

George H. Barbour. 

Arthur W. Walker. 

H. J. Karges. 

Lewis Moore. 

John D. Green. 

Robert A. Patton. 

L. H. Booch. 

George Mitchell. 

John J. Fisher. 

Waem Aie Hbatees. 

Edward Norris, Chairman. 
George D. Wilkinson. 
John A. Howard. 
W. L. Dawbarn. 
W. C. Williamson. 
Alfred B. Moran. 
Allan W. Williams. 



Gas Ranges. 

William M. Crane, Chairman. 

Joseph E. Nason. 

H. D. Schall. 

G. D. Roper. 

H. M. Leach. 

A. A. Ainsworth. 

Sugar. 

W. L. Petrikin, Chairman. 

H. A. Douglas. 

W. H. Hannam. 

E. C. Howe. 

S. H. Love. 

S. W. Sinsheimer. 

W. P. Turner. 

SuEGicAL Dressings. 

H. C. Lovis, Chairman. 
H. P. Kendall. 
Frank R. Jones. 
G. T. Bauer. 

E. T. Sawtell. 

F. R. Davis. 

Dr. L. L. Walters. 

Surgical Insteumbnts. 

Chas. J. Pilling, Chairman. 
Richard Kny. 
J. A. Pfarre. 
Edward Sovatkin. 
Ernest Stratmanu. 

Tanning. 

central committee. 

T. Edward Wilder. 
J. Clinton Smoot. 

BAG AND STRAP. 

J. C. Byron, Chairman. 
Mahlon R. Bryan. 
Ed. McKown. 
E. C. Thiers. 
B. V. Harrison. 



calf AND KIP. 

August H. Vogel, Chairman. 

Albert P. Gallun. 

Morris S. Barnet. 

C. P. Hall. 

W. B. Eisendrath. 

FANCY LEATHER. 

Louis J. Robertson, Chair- 
man. 
W. H. Barrett. 
Charles Druedlng. 
G. B. Bernheim. 
J. W. Helburn. 



TANNING — Continued. 

GLAZED KID. 

Charles Reynolds, Chairman. 
Charles Vaughan. 
Percival E. Poerderer. 
John Blatz. 
James I. Ford. 

GLOVE LEATHER. 

Richard M. Evans, Chair- 
man. 
Henry Greenebaum. 
Maurice S. Miller. 
Joseph W. Mendel. 
Arthur White. 

HARNESS. 

F. C. Hoffman, Chairman. 

D. M. Hart. 

E. C. Thiers. 

F. A. Krehl. 
P. Carlisle. 

PATENT UPPER. 

C. Q. Adams, Chairman. 
Albert F. Gordon. 
Elisha W. Cobb. 
C. P. Hall. 
Maxwell J. Lowry. 

SHEBP AND LAMB. 

W. R. Fisher, Chairman. 
Prank G. Allen. 
Richard Young. 
E. L. Macdonald. 
Hans Schmidt. 

SIDE UPPER. 

T. S. Haight, Chairman. 
Fred Rueping. 
E. H. Foot. 
M. C. Weimer. 
T. S. Keirnan. 

sole and BELTING. 

H. Frederick Lesh, Chair- 
man. 
J. T. P. McGarry. 
Henry W. Boyd. 
T. Edward Wilder. 
Walter S. Hoyt. 

UPHOLSTEET. 

R. C. Good, Chairman. 
William Hatton. 
H. N. Hill. 
Edward L. Neilson. 
H. C. McBriar. 



AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THK WAIt. 



•109 



Tile. 

F. W. Walker, Chainnaii. 
H. D. Lillibridge. 

L. S. Jones. 
Hamilton Ilazelhurst. 

Tobacco. 

Edward Wise, Chairman. 
Chas. J. Eiscnlohr. 
Alf. S. Rossin. 
Jesse A. Bloch. 
J. L. Graham. 
Walter 11. O'Brien. 
Geo. H. Hummel. 
A. L. S.vlvester. 
William T. Reed. 
I. C. Rosenthal. 
Maximilian Stern. 

Toys. 

Alfred C. Gilbert. Chairmun. 

G. S. Parker. 
H. C. Ives. 

C. H. Bennett. 

A. T. Scharps. 

Leo Schlesinger. 

A. D. Converse. 

F. D. Dodge. 

Bernard E. Fleischaker. 

Trunks and Teavelixg 
Goods. 

Nathan Goldsmith, Chair- 
man. 
n. W. Ra.vmond. 
Stanle.v Klein. 
John Meisel. 
Wm. V. Schnur. 
Henry Ljkly. 
Aaron Belber. 
J. W. Seward. 
Geo. W. Wheary. 

E. H. Davis. 

VACnUM Cr-EANERS. 

H. W. Hoover, Chairman. 
A. J. Stecker. 
Julius Tutour. 

F. S. Hunting. 
F. H. Jones. 

Wall Paper. 

Henry Burn, Chairman. 
A. E. Lyons. 
Frank Pago. 
W. D. Uptegraff. 
W. A. Huppuch. 
W. F. Bay Stewart. 
George Tait. 
I. Baumgartl. 
Howard M. Heston. 
George H. Keim. 



Washing Machines. 

II. W. Eden, Chairman. 
Sam T. White. 
L. E. Dietz. 
W. L. Rodgors. 
J. D. A. Johnson. 
Raymond Marsh. 

Waste Material (Deal 

KRS.) 

Louis Birkenstein, Chairman 
F. W. Reidenliach. 
E. A. Salomon. 
Paul Lowenthal. 
Maurice Goldstein. 
Newell J. Lewis. 
Wm. Lewin. 
Ivan Reitler. 

Wheels. 

Thos. A. White, Chairman. 

E. H. Archibald. 
O. B. Bannister. 
H. F. Harper. 
O. W. Mott. 

H. A. Long. 

Woodworking. 

F. E. Shearman. 
C. F. Tomlinson. 

Fdrnitdee and Fixtdhes. 

Robt. W. Irwin, Chairman. 
E. V. Hawkins. 
A. H. Stringe. 
Benj. J. Bosse. 
W. A. Brolin. 

E. H. McQuinn. 

F. E. Shearman. 
C. F. Luce. 

C. H. Burt. 

E. W. Schultz. 

C. F. Tomlinson. 

A. W. Das.sler. 

A. H. Hall. 

P. B. Schravensandc. 

C. A. O'Connor. 

G.M. Hillenbrand. 

Jos. Peters, jr. 

H. A. Barnard. 

A. G. Steinman. 

Commercial Fixtcbes. 

J. H. Servatlus, Chairman. 

G. W. Johnson. 

S. D. Young. 

C. F. E. Luce. 

^oda Fountainn: A. R. Lud- 
low. 

RcfrigeratorH.- F. L. Northey. 

Laboratory Equipment: C. G. 
Campbell. 



Commercial Fixtubes — Con- 
tinued. 

Drafting Room Equipment: 

T. A. Dahn. 
Cooling Boxes: W. 11. Du- 

Ross. 
Dutchcru' Supplies: A. D. 

Daemlcke. 

Lumber Millwork. 

G. L. Curtis, Chairmun. 
George J. Osgood. 
L. J. Bardwell. 
Frank Stevens. 
P. F. Conway. 
W. M. Otis. 
E. R. Jones. 
M. B. Copeland. 
Chas. V. Bossert. 
Wm. H. Morris. 
S. S. King. 
Harry A. Gregg. 
G. E. Morgan. 

E. C. Noelke. 

F. J. Moss. 
Herman T. Rediske. 
A. J. Siegel. 

J. C. Owens. 

executive committee. 

G. L. Curtis, Chairman. 
Harry A. Gregg. 

E. R. Jones. 
L. J. Bardwell. 
W. M. Otis. 

Wool Mancfactubino. 

Frederick S. Clark, Chair- 
man. 
Wm. M. Wood. 
Franklin W. Hobbs. 
Geo. H. Hodgson. 
Nathanli'l Stevens. 
Geo. B. Sanford. 
Robt.T. Francis. 
John P. Stevens. 
A. L. GilTord. 
Herbert E. Penbody. 
Wlnthrop L. Marvin. 
J. J. Nevins. 



Wool Stock Grading. 

Edward A. Stone, Chairman. 
Edward N. Myers. 
Oscar GunililiiHky. 
Nathan Knivln. 
Mark Shcrwin. 
Charles Frniikfl. 
Alliert D. Ullinan. 
Winsor H. Watson. 
Herman Rawltser. 



INDEX. 



Page. 

Abrasives 199 

Emery 199 

Optical glass 199 

Acetate of lime 191 

Acetic acid 191, 379 

Acetic anhydride 192 

Acetone 190, 191 

Acetylene 185 

Acids and heavy chemicals 163-166 

Nitric acid 163, 165, 166 

Price fixing 163, 164, 166 

Sulphuric acid 163-165 

Adams, H. J 201 

Advisory Commission 20 

Advisory Committee on Plants 

and Munitions 43 

Agi-icultural implements 67 

Airplane lumber 215 

Alcohol 171 

Production of 377 

Aleshire, Gen. J. B 48 

Alkali and chlorine 166-170 

Allied Purchasing Commission- 33, 262 
Allied Silk Trading Corporation- 241 

Aluminum 148-150 

Control of 149, 150 

Prices 149 

Production 148 

War uses 149 

Aluminum Co 148,149,150 

Amatol 178 

American Federation of Labor— 85, 90 
American Iron and Steel Insti- 
tute 142, 143, 147 

American Vanadium Co 144 

Ammonium nitrate 176, 179 

Ammonium sulphate 93,94 

Analine 181, 182 

Anderson, Chandler 92 

Antimony 153, 154 

Appeals to Chairman 104 

Armsby, George N 48, 92, 147 

Army appropriation act 287 



Page. 
Artificial dyes and intermedi- 
ates 181-184 

Analine 181, 182 

Domestic production 182 

German manufacturing __ 181, 182 

German patents 183 

Phenol 182 

Substitutes 183 

War shortage 181, 182 

Asbestos and magnesia 200, 201 

Aspirin 206, 207 

Associated Fire Underwriters.- 39 

Atwood, L. R 188 

Australian wool 232,233 

Automatic classifications 54 

Automatic priorities 54, 123 

Automatic ratings . 54, 55 

Automobile industry 69,128 

Production 389 

Automotive products 270-273 

Curtailment 271, 272 

Growth 271 

Motor trucks 273 

Pledge 271 

Section 270 

War work 270 

Auxiliary mineral products— 190-203 

Aycock, T. J 210 

Ayres. Dr. Leonard 43 

Badges for workers 90 

Baker, U. S 126 

Bakers' conservation 62 

Barbour, H. H 48 

Barclay, .7. Searle HI 

Baruch, B. M 20,22, 

25, 26, 27, 33. 55, 58, 78, 110, 154 

Bass, R. D 80 

Belting — .254 

P.iiinchard, L W 222 

Bogart, Dr. Ernest L 46 

Bogart. Dr. M. T 104 

Boilers, conden.sers, etc 283,284 

P.olton, Lieut. Col. C. C 35 

411 



412 



INDEX. 



Page. 
Books, see pulp and paper. 

Boots and shoes 252-254 

Classification 253 

Conservation 252, 253 

Prices 253 

Priorities Circular No. 10— 253 

Retail stores 254 

Boyd, Henry W 92, 248 

Brass 139-141 

Cartridge cases 140 

Forms of 139, 140 

Outpost wire 140 

Permit system 141 

Production of 140. 141 

Tubing 140 

War uses 140 

Bristles 246 

Britisti— 

" Civil issues prices " 93 

Commodity committees 92, 93 

Cooperation 94 

" Military issues prices " — 93 

Bromine 193 

Brookings, Robert S 22, 27, 33, 78 

Brown, Alexander C 266 

Brunker, A. R 163 

Building materials 219-221 

Conservation 221 

Curtailment 220 

Division 219 

Kinds of 219 

Nonwar construction 220 

Prices 220, 221 

Standardization 221 

Bulkley, R. J 278 

Burlap 243-245 

Bush. S. P 42,262 

■' Buy-a-bale " 230 

Calder resolution, reply to 57, 365 

Camphor 193 

Carbon tetrachloride 170 

Carboys, glass 199,200 

Carr, James A 33 

Carroll, H. G 166 

Cartridge-bag silk 241,242 

Catgut 205 

Catlett, Charles 197 

Caustic soda 166,167 

Celluloid 193 

Centralized authority 27 

Ceramics 197 



Page. 

Chains 267, 268 

Chamber of Commerce of United 

States 23 

Chamberlain, Austen 93 

Chambers, Edward 55, 58 

Cliase, M. F 175 

Chemical glass and stoneware- 199-200 

Carboys 199 

Chemical stoneware 200 

Scientific glass 200 

Chemicals division 157-202 

Chemicals for munitions 157-180 

Chiefs of sections 104, 105, 106 

Chilean nitrate 157-161, 390-391 

Chlorine 169, 170 

Christie, G. I 86 

Chromite 14.5, 146 

Churchill, Winston 93 

Clapp, A. W 58,89 

Clark, Le Roy 280 

Clarkson, Grosvenor B 20 

Classification of commodities— 31 

Classification of purposes, etc_- 52, 

55, 339 

" Clearance " 34-37, 107 

Clearance committee 34 

Clearance list 34,316,319 

Clearance office 35 

Clinical thermometers 205 

Clothing, conservation 65 

Coffin, Howard E 20 

Coke 112 

Colver, W. B 78, 222 

Commandeer, right to 51, 73, 74 

Commercial Economy Board 61 

" Committees of the industries "_ 20-22 
Commodity sections : 

Conversion activities 39 

Expanded 27 

Form of 104 

Function of 3-5, 103 

Nature of 103,104 

Organization of 100 

Origin of 23, 104 

Treatment of 109 

Varied activities of 106, 107 

Work of 104,105 

Commodity statistics section — 45 

" Community labor boards " 89 

Competition in Government buy- 
ing 21. 32-33, 36, 93 



Page. 

Conclusion 96-100 

Condensers. (See boilers, con- 
densers, etc.) 

Conner, C. H 190 

Conservation (see also all of 

Part II) 61-69,108 

Agreements 63 

Agricultural implements — 67 

Automobiles 69 

Automobile tires 67 

Bakers 62 

Boots and shoes 66 

Clothing 65 

Commodity sections 63 

Delivery methods 62 

Distribution 61 

Division 61 

Electrical industry 68 

Experience abroad 61 

Hardware 68 

Industries affected by 68 

Knit goods 66 

Lessons from work in 69 

Plan and purpose 61, 63, 64 

Pledges 65 

Publicity 61 

Regulations 64 

Return of goods 62 

Sanctions for 65 

Sentiment of industry 64, 69 

Spools 66 

Styles and types 63 

Tin in silk 68 

War service commissions 63 

Wool 234, 235 

Conservation Division of Army_ 91 

" Conspectus of progress " 45 

Construction : 

Emergency 219 

Nonwar 217, 220 

Control, method of 18 

Conversion section 40, 41 

Conversions 38, 39, 41, 42 

Conveying apparatus 284 

Coonley, Howard 86 

Cooperation in industry: 

Benefits of 99 

Dangers of 99 

Effect of war on 98,99 

Government's attitude 98, 100 

Cooperative delivery 62 



>EX. 413 

Page. 

Copper 130-137 

Conferences on price flxing_ 133 
Control of distribution.. 135, 130 

European demand 132 

Labor problem 131, 133 

Maxinmm production 130 

Output for 1917 130 

Price — 

Advance 135 

Comparisons 130 

Control 130 

Fixed 134 

Producers' pledge 134 

Purchases for allies 132 

Regulations 135 

Sales on memorandum 131 

Spirit of industry 137 

Study of costs 133 

Technique 130 

Voluntary price to Govern- 
ment 130 

Wages 131 

Copper and brass 130-141 

Cordage. (See Jute, hemp, and 
cordage. ) 

Cork 246 

Cornell, Irwin H 151 

Cost of production 75, 76 

Cotton : 

Goods 228-231, 383 

Linters 172-174 

Raw 220-231 

Prices 230,231 

Special committee on 231 

Council of National Defense: 

Law creating 19 

Relation to War Industries 

Board 21 

Staff of 20 

Cover, T 248 

Crane, Mr 150 

Cranes 266-267 

Creosote 185-180 

Cromwell, Lincoln 236 

Cross-hauls 122 

Crowder. Gen. Enoch 90 

Curtailment 05, 108 

Darling. Ira C 185.180 

Darlington, Fred 278 

Davis. Mr 149 

Declaration of war 49, 73, 74 



414 



INDEX. 



Page. 

Delivery methods 62 

Dental instruments 205 

Devastated regions 94,95 

Dillon, Clarence 27 

Donnelly, T. E 222 

Downman, R. H 219 

Draper, F. W 154 

Drugs : 

Prices 207 

Production 204, 380 

Du Bois, Henry C 198 

Dunn, H. T 255 

Dyes: 

Artificial. (See Artificial 

dyes, etc.) 
Natural. (See Tanning ma- 
terials, etc.) 

Dyestuffs, production 378 

Dyewoods, regulations 378 

Economizers 284 

Edgar, Chas 219 

Editorial section 45 

Electrical apparatus and sup- 
plies 280-282 

Electrical power and equip- 
ment 280-284 

Boilers, condensers, etc 283 

Steam turbines 282 

Electrodes 198, 379 

Electrodes and abrasives 198-199 

Emergency Construction Com- 
mittee 219 

Emery 199 

Engineering and Mining Jour- 
nal 151 

Esberg, E. I 208 

Ethyl alcohol 171 

European demands, effect of 71 

Excess profits taxes 72 

Executive order. May 28, 1918— 25, 26 

Explosives 174-180 

Amatol ^ 178 

American expansion 174 

Ammonium nitrate 178 

Chemicals for 180 

Control 174,175 

Facilities amortized 176 

Nitrocellulose powder 177 

Picric acid 179 

Program 175 

Requirements 175 

Shipping 174, 176, 179 

T. N. T 178 



Facilities Division 42, 43 

Fact finding 46, 104, 105 

Farm implements, rationing of_ 128 

Federal Trade Commission 76 

Felt 238-241 

Conservation 239 

Cutting 240 

Hats 240 

Lithographic 241 

Paper makers' 240 

Permit system 239 

Rabbit fur 240 

Raw materials 238 

Section 238 

Textile felt 239. 

Trade secrets 239 

Ferroalloys 142-146 

Ferromanganese 142, 143 

Ferrosilicon 145 

Ferrovanadium 144 

Finch, Mr 46 

Fir Production Board 216 

Fire extinguishers 170, 265 

Fire prevention 277, 278 

Fixed prices. (/See Price fixing.) 

Flannery, J. R 273 

Flax 242, 243 

Fletcher, Admiral F. F 22, 27, 35, 55 

Food Administration 21 

Food and fuel act 73 

Foreign Mission 92-95, 202 

Membership 92 

Forestry products and building 

materials 211-227 

Forgings, ordnance, small arms, 

etc 262-264 

Foster, Charles K 48. 278 

Frankfurter, Felix ___ 55,58,85,86,88 

Frayne, Hugh A 22, 27, 78, 86, 90 

Freight cars 43, 275, 276 

Fritts, Frank 10 

Fuel Administration 21 

Functional divisions 23 

Garfield, H. A 58, 78 

Gas products. (See Industrial 
gases, etc.) 

Gay, Dean Edwin F 43, 45, 58 

General Munitions Board 21, 32 

Gibbs, Sir Herbert 158 

Gifford, A. L 235 

Gifford, W. S 20 

Glove leather 252 

Gloves and leather clothing 254 



INDEX. 



416 



Page. 
Godfrey. Hollis 20 

Goethals, Gen. G. W 27, 55 

Gonipers, Samuel 20,82,83 

Guggenheim, Daniel 131 

Haley, E. J 187 

Hamilton, C. D. P 248 

Hannnurabi, Code of 23 

Hanch, C. C 270 

Hancock, Commander J. M 78 

Hardware 68, 264 

Hardware and hand tools 264-266 

Builders' hardware 266 

Fire extinguishers 265 

Horseshoes 265 

Hydrants and valves 265 

Metal beds 265 

Priority 265,266 

Saddlery hardware 264 

Section 264 

Ships' hardware 265 

Textile needles 264 

Harness and personal equip- 
ment 254 

Harness, bag, and strap leather- 252 

Hatfield, Dr. Henry R 44, 46 

Hayes, Frank J 85 

Heidrich, E. C, jr 243 

Hemp. (See Jute, hemp, and 

cordage. ) 
Hides, leather, and leather 

goods 247-254 

Belting 254 

Boots and shoes 252-254 

Division 248 

Gloves and leather clothing. 254 
Harness, bag, and strap 

leather 252 

Harness and personal equip- 

4nent 254 

Hides and skins 248-250 

Output of United States— 247 

Problem 248 

Sheepskin ^nd glove leather 252 
Sole and belting leather.. 250, 251 

Upper leather 251 

Hides and skins... 248-250 

Country hides 250 

Cowhide, prices 249 

Sheepskins 248, 249 

History of prices during the 

war 44,46,324 

Hoover, Herbert 58 

Horning, H. L 270 



Page. 

Horses and mules, shortage 93,04 

Hosiery, woolen 237 

Hospital furniture 206 

Howe, O. C 248 

Howland, C. P 48 

Hubbard, Russell S 163, 188 

Hughes. John 93 

Humphrey, R. L 219 

Hutcheson, William L 85 

Hutchinson, Lincoln 92, 147 

Hylan, reply to 57, 363 

Iron and steel., 110-129 

Conference on price fixing 118, 119 

Comparative prices 120 

Control of distribution.. _ 124, 125 

" Cost plus profit " 116, 117 

Differentials, price 121 

European demand 113, 114 

Excess profits 117 

Imixjrtance of control 129 

Intermediates, prices of 121 

Joint circular 124,368 

Markets 113 

Middle men 118 

Pooling idea 117 

President's declaration 115 

Prices alike for all 116, 117 

Price-control sentiment .. 115, 116 

Prices fixed 117,120 

Price-fixing agreement 120 

Price schedules 367 

Priority, control 122, 123 

Production in 1918 122 

Products, prices 121 

Rationing procedure 124, 125 

Report on price fixing 119 

Report of Replogle 118, 360 

Technical features— 111, 112. 113 

Use in war HO 

Isinglass. (See Mica.) 

Indian Government silver 94 

Industrial Adjustments Com- 
mission 58, 59, 127. 350 

Industrial chemicals 181-195 

Industrial cooperation service.. 91 
Industrial gn.ses and gas prod- 
ucts 184-185 

Acetylene 1^5 

Oxygen 1^5 

Saccharine 186 

Toluol 184.185 

Industrial Inventory 19,38-41 

Iudu.strial preparedness 



96 



416 



INDEX. 



Page. 

Industries, classification of 89, 90 

Ingels, H. P 27 

Inland traffic section 58 

Interallied Munitions Council-- 93 

Interlocking directorates 103 

International control 92 

International executives 92, 

147, 158, 390 

International Nickel Co 152 

Interstate commerce act. May 

29, 1917 50 

Introductory 103-109 

Iron Age, on steel 115 

I. W. W 83 

Jackling, Mr 175 

James, George R 172 

Joint circular, iron and steel 124, 

125, 368 

"Just compensation " 73, 74 

"Just compensation" legal mean- 
ing 75, 76 

Jute, hemp, and cordage 243-246 

Bristles 240 

British control 244 

Cork 245 

Hemp 245 

Henequen or sisal 243, 245 

Importation 244 

Prices 94, 244 

Keller, Gen. Charles 278 

Kernan Boai-d 19,38 

King, Stanley 86 

King, V. L 183 

Knit goods 236-238 

Conservation 66, 237 

Labor bureaus 84 

Labor committee of Council of 

National Defense 82,83 

Labor, competition for 84 

Labor conditions 46, 86 

Labor conference, February 28, 

1917 83 

Labor Conference Board 85, 357 

Labor disputes 86 

Labor division 90, 91 

Labor policy 83,84,357 

Labor priorities bulletin- 1,89,90,358 

Labor priorities section 58, 89 

Labor problems 82-91 

Labor program 83, 84, 85 

Labor turnover 83, 84, 87, 89 

Lanoline 188 

Lauck, W. Jett 86 



Page. 

Lead 150-151 

Leather. {See Hides, leather, 
and leather goods.) 

Leather clothing 254 

Leather and rubber 247-259 

Legal basis of price fixing 72-74 

Legal basis of priorities 49-51 

Legal status of board 24, 25, 27, 28 

Legge, Alex 27,33,35,55,93 

Leith, C. K 201 

" Lessons " 96 

Lewis, H. J 248 

"Liberty shoe" 253 

Lind, John 85 

Linoleum 245, 246 

Linters. {See Cotton linters.) 

Lithographic felt 241 

Llewelyn, Sir Leonard 147 

Locomotives 43, 274, 275 

Production 389 

Logwood 187 

Loree, L. P 85 

Lovett, Robert S 33, 48 

Lumber 211-219 

Airplane 215 

Black walnut 213 

Committee 211 

Conservation 217 

Construction, nonwar 217 

Costs of production 212. 214 

Domestic production 214 

Emergency Construction 

Committee 219 

Fir 214 

Government purchases 213 

Mahogany 215, 216 

Price agreements : 212-215 

Price fixing 214,215 

Prices 212-215 

Priority administration-- 216-218 
Priority Circular No. 54„ 218, 219 

Production ^ 213, 381 

Regional administrators — 216 

Requirements 211 

Ship lumber 215 

Softwood 216, 217 

Lumber emergency bureaus 212 

Lumber and labor 90 

MacDowell, Charles H 157, 

159, 168, 175 

Machine tools 259-262 

Machinery and tools 259-269 

Mackall, Paul 92, 9':, 111 



1ND1-:X. 



417 



Page. 
MaclMiemm. F. H 4S 

Mag:nesi!i. (See Asbestos and 
magnesia. ) 

Magnesium, metallic 193, 194 

Manganese 142-144 

"Market value" 74,7") 

Martin, Dr. Franklin H 20 

Mason. Admiral N. E 48 

May. George 58 

McCormick, Vance C 58 

McCutcheon, Prof. T. P 194 

McKenney, Col. C. A 48 

McKinstry, Gen 95 

McLauehlan, Jay C 111 

McLennen, D. R 57 

Mediation Commission S3, 354 

Mediation and Conciliation, 

United States Board of S.^ 

" Mediation service " 8.^ 

Medicinals 207 

Medical industry section 204 

Medical .supplies 204-207 

Mellon Institute 194 

Merrill, W. H 278 

Merryweather, G. E 259 

Metals, miscellaneous 142-15G 

Methods of control 18 

Mexican sisal 243,245 

Meyer. Eugene, jr 131, 136 

Mica 201-203 

Michael, C. Edwin 85 

Middlemen 118 

Military optical glass 268-269 

Miscellaneous chemicals 192-194 

Bromine 193,194 

Camphor 193 

Celluloid 193 

Metallic magnesium 193, 194 

AVhite arsenic 193 

Mitchell, Prof. W. C 44 

Montgomery, Lieut. Col. Robert 

H 78 

Moody, Prof. H. R 194 

Morehead, J. M 184 

Morey, Dr 269 

Morss, Everett 48, 140 

Motor trucks 273 

Munitions. (See Forgings, ord- 
nance, etc.) 

Munitions, chemicals for 157-180 

Munitions, report of special 
board on 114 

105826—21 27 



Page. 

.Munitions Standards Honrd 21 

Mustard gas 188 

National defense act 49 

National Indu.strlal Conference 

Board 85 

National War Labor Board 85,86 

National Waste Reclamation 

Section 91 

Naval appropriations act 50, 73 

Naval Consulting Board 19 

New plants 42 

New York public school 57, 363 

Nichols, H. W 222 

Nickel 152 

Nitrate of soda 157-161, 377. 390 

American importers 1.58. 159 

Essentiality of 97, 1.57, 390 

German stocks 1.58 

International executive 92, 

158-160 

Pool prices 159. 160, 377 

Pooling arrangement 158-161 

Prices 1.5S 

Purchases 158 

Sales at 4i cents 159 

Story of 390 

Supplies in Chile 160 

Uses of 161 

Nitric acid 16.5-166 

Nitrocellulose powder 176. 177 

Nitrogen fixation. 97,157,178,179,391 

Nitro Powder Plant 177 

" Nonessential industries " 58, 59 

Nonferrous metals division 150 

Nonwar construction section — 57 

Noyes, P. B 55,58 

Nutgalls 184 

Official Bulletin 88 

Olander, Victor 85 

Old Hickory Plant 177 

Oleum 163-165 

" One-delivery-a-day " 62 

Optical glas.s. (-SVe Military 
optical glass, etc.) 

Ordway, Lucius P 48,93 

Origin of War Indu.strles Board. 17 

Osborne, Loyall A 85 

Otis, Charles A 40 

Overman Act 25.290 

r)\vens bottle machine 200 

Oxygen ^85 

Page, Thomas Walker 231 



418 



INDEX. 



Page. 
Paige, H. Ray 159 

Faints and pigments 188-190 

Conservation 189-190 

Kauri gums 189,190 

Sliellac 190 

Tin cans 189, 190 

Trade conference 190 

Vanish industry 189 

Waxes 189 

Palmer, Edgar 137 

Palmer, G. J 222 

Paper. (See Pulp and paper.) 

Paper, production 383 

Paper makers' felt 240 

Parker, Edwin B_ 10, 27, 48. 55, 58, 12G 

Parsonage, E. E 222 

I'atterson. Albert M 92 

Paxton, J. W 201 

Peabody, H. E 234 

Peace Conference 95 

Peace-time W. I. B 96 

Peek, George N 27, 104, 228 

Pennock, J. D 166 

Pemvell, Lewis 234 

Perkins, Thomas Nelson 48 

Personnel of W. I. B 291 

Personnel, fitness of 28 

I'harmaceuticals 206-207 

Phelps, W. W 78 

Phenol 179, 182 

Phillips, W. Vernon 111 

Physicians, committee of 204 

Picric acid 176, 179 

Pierce, E. A 92 

Pierce, Gen. Palmer E 22 

Piez, Charles 55, 86 

Pine, southern yellow 211,214 

Planning bureau, suggested— 37, 46, 92 
Planning and Statistics Divi- 
sion 43 

Platinum 154-156 

Domestic uses 154 

Conservation 156 

Licensing system 155 

Prices .' 156 

Russian supply 154 

War uses 154 

Post offices and labor 83 

Potash 168-169 

Powell, T. C 48, 58 

Power 278-280 

I'reference lists Nos. 1 and 2___ 52, 
56, 57, 89, 340, 342 



Page. 

Preferential Shipments Act 50 

Preservation of war industries 97 

President's authority as Com- 
mander in Chief 74 

President's letter, Mar. 4, 1918 

(25 et seq.). 
President's Mediation Commis- 

sion__ 83-85 

President's powers in price fix- 
ing 72-74 

President's powers in priority— 49, 50 

Press cloth 174 

Price advances 71 

Price bulletins. War Industries 

Board 44, 46, 324 

Price control 79, 80 

Fuel, transportation, and la- 
bor 118 

Price fixing 70-81, 108, 109 

Agencies for 76 

Basic commodities 74 

By agreement 74 

Coal 74,75 

Confusion of trade 70 

Corollary agreements 77 

Cost of production 1 75, 76 

Early efforts 74 

Effect on business 81 

Effect on contracts 77,117 

Extent of 80 

Government purchases 80 

Hearings 76, 77 

Law of supply and demand- 80 

Legal basis of 72-74 

" Margins of profit " 75 

Maximum prices 77 

Method of "72 

" Negotiated " "J"! 

Novelty of 70 

President's announcement- 72, 115 

President's part in 72 

Reasons for 70, 71 

Short periods 77 

Price Fixing Committee : 

Members of 78 

Procedure of 78, 79 

Quasi-judicial character — 77, 78 

Separate from board 78 

Type of membership 78 

Price statistics section 44 

Price studies 44, 46 

Priorities 47-60, 108 

Priorities Board, members 55 



IKDEX. 



419 



Page. 

Priority certificates 48 

Classifications for 52, 53 

Number used 54 

Procedure 53 

"The test" 54 

Priorities Circular — 

No. 1 48,51,123,325 

No. 2 51,123,327 

No. 4 52,123,330 

No. 5 123,125,126 

No. 10 253,387 

No. 20 342 

No. 21 57,381 

No, 24 257 

No. 28 372 

No. 35 374 

No. 45 279,392 

No. 54 218,219 

No. 60 52 

Labor No. 1 358 

Priority classifications 52, .53 

Automatic 54 

Steel 123, 124 

Priorities Commissioner 48 

Priorities Committee 34 

Members 48 

Priority : 

Centralized power of 50 

Effect on prices 47 

Legal basis of 49-51 

Priority ratings, defined 51-55 

Priority rulings : 

Finality of 49 

Sanction of 50, 51 

Priority system-: 

Studies abroad 48 

Technique of 51-56 

" Prohibition of industries " 58. 59 

Publications. (See Pulp and 
paper. ) 

Pulp and paper 222-227 

Conservation 224 

Curtailment 223-226 

Fiber Board Section 222 

Manufacturing Section 222 

Newspaper Section 225 

Paper as a .substitute 223 

Paper Economies Section — 227 

Periodicals 225 

Production 222 

Publications 225, 226 

Paiw materials for 222, 223 

Text books 226 

Wall paper 226 



Pagv. 

Puriiell. Frank 111 

Purpose of board 29 

Purpose of people 18 

Quasi-judicial 28 

Queiiracho extract 187, 188 

Questionnaires 39, 40 

Questionnaries Section 44, 45 

Quicksilver 15;i 

Rabbit fur 240 

Rag administrator 23.5 

Railroad Administration 21 

Railway equipment and sup- 
plies 273-277 

Freight cars 275-277 

Locomotives 274-27.5 

Rationing: 

Agreements 58,59,127 

Automobile industry 128 

Circulars 128 

Enforcement 127 

Farm implements 128 

Industries 123, 125, 126, 127 

Recommendation 96 

Refractories 196-197 

Regional advisors 40.41 

Replogle, J. Leonard-. 27, 110, 118, 14ir 

Reports from trades 105 

Requirements: 

Bill of 30 

Division 35, 106, 107, 320 

Procedure 30. 106, 107 

Program of 30-37 

" Requisition," right of 73, 74 

Resources and Conversion Sec- 
tion 40. 41 

Resources, study of 38-4<J 

" Return-of-goods " <J2 

Ricket, T. A 85 

Ritchie. Albert C -" 

Robbin.s, Walter 280 

Roger.s, C. A 248 

Roosevelt, Franklin D «« 

Rosengarten, A. G l^*-^ 

Rosenwald, Julius 20 

Rowbolham. C. B 248 

Rul)ber. (See also Leather and 
rubber.) 

Rui)bfr iin.l rui)i)er goods 255-258 

Conservation 257 

Prices 255 

Priorities Circular No. 24.- 257 
Production in Unitetl States. 255 

Products of ^^ 

Section 255 



420 



INDEX. 



Page. 
Rubber and rubber goods — Con. 

Shipping 2.jf5 

Source of 255, 25r: 

Special circular 257,2.58 

Tires 255 

War uses 25G 

Ilyan, John D 131 

Saccaharine 185 

Sargent, Murray 261 

Sanford, Hugh W 142 

Savage, Thomas J 85 

Sawyer, D. E 11] 

Schmidt, John C 2G7 

Schollkoff, J. F is;? 

Scientific glassware 20U 

Scott, Frank A 21, 22, 35 

Scott, John W 228 

Sentiment of people 18 

Shaw, A. W 61 

Shell, structure of 30,31 

Shellac 190 

Sheepskin and glove leather 252 

Ship lumber 215 

Shipping Board 21 

Shoes. (See Boots and shoes.) 

Shortages 19, 23 

Commodities 92 

Man power . 82 

War essentials 97 

Shotwell, T. C 248 

Silk 241, 242 

Simp.son, Col. F. F 204 

Skinner, Robert P 158 

Skinner, William 242 

Sliding wage scale, copper 131 

Smith, Adam 75 

Smokeless powder 176, 177 

Soda ash 167, 168 

Sodium silicate 195 

Sole and belting leather 250,251 

Sowers, W. J 21G 

Spelter 137-139 

Spiegeleisen 142 

Spirit of industries 64, 69 

Spirit of people 18 

StafC of War Industries Board— 291 

Standardization 68, 69 

Stanley, H. F 197 

Starrett, Col. W. A 219 

Steam turbines 282-283 

Steel. (See Iron and steel.) 

St. Joseph Lead Co 150 



Page. 

Stokers, automatic 284 

Stored materials 277 

Storrs, Lieut. C. P 201, 202 

Stout, C. F. C 248 

Straw hats 240 

Stroock, Sylvan I 238 

Stuart, Henry C 78 

Styles and types 63 

Suggestions 96 

Sulphur and pyrites 161-163 

Sulphur monochloride 170 

Sulphuric acid 16.3-165 

Summary 29 

Summers, L. L 27, 92, 104, 142, 

145, 147, 154, 157, 175, 184 

Sunday, Rev. William 57 

Superheaters 284 

Supplies, classification of 31 

Surface, Dr. Frank M 46 

Surgical instruments 204-205 

Surgical rubber goods 205-206 

Suture material 205 

Swopp, Herbert Bayard 27 

Synthetic drugs 206 

Taft, William Howard 85 

" Taft-Walsh Board " 85, 86. 87 

Tanning materials and natural 

dyes 186-188 

Tau.ssig, F. W 78 

Technical and consulting staff- 194-195 

Textiles 228-246 

Division 228 

Cotton goods 228-231 

Felt 238-241 

Flax 242,243 

Jute, hemp, and cordage_ 243-246 

Knit goods 236-238 

Silk 241-242 

Wool 231-236 

Textile needles 264 

Thompson, Frank E 111 

" Thrift " campaign 46 

Tin 68, 146-148 

Tin executive 92, 147 

Tires, conservation 67 

T. N. T 178,178 

T. N. T. and tobacco 210 

Tobacco 208-210, 380, 381 

Toluol 178, 184, 185 

Tools. (See Machinery and 

tools. ) 
Torrance, R. M 199 



INDKX. 



421 



Page 
Trade secrets lOn 

Transportation and power 270-2S4 

Automotive products 270-273 

Electrical power and equip- 
ment 280-284 

Fire prevention 277 

Power 278-280 

Railway equipment 273-277 

Stored materials 277 

Tucker. Prof. S. A 194.198 

Tunprsten 144-145 

Turner, Spencer 228 

United States Board of Media- 
tion and Conciliation 83 

United States Chamber of Com- 
merce 39 

United States Employment Serv- 
ice 83, 88, 89, 90 

United Typotheta? of America— 226 

Unity of organization 103 

Upper leather 251 

Vanadium 144 

Van Dervoort, W. H 85 

Vauclain, Samuel M 43,262 

Vogel, F. A 248 

Wage standardization 88 

Wages 84, 87, 131 

Walsh, Frank P 85 

War Contracts Section 44 

" War demand," nature of a 70, 

71, 114, 115 

War industries abroad 44 

AVar Industries Board : 

Creation of 22 

Final form of 27 

Reorganization of 25 

AVar Labor Conference Board— 85, 86 

War Labor Policies Board—— 86, 

87, 88, 90, 91 

War Prison Labor Section 91 

War Service Commissions 23, 

24, 103, 105, 288, 395 

War Trade Board 21 

Watches, purchase of 45 

Weaver. Herbert H 111 

Weidlein, E. R 194 

Wells, A. E 104 



Page. 

Wheeler, Harry A 24 

Wiiite. .John P 86 

White arsenic 193 

Whiteside. Arthur D 92 

Whitniarsh, T. F 55,58 

Wilkins, .L F 277 

Willard, Daniel 20 

William.s, H 27 

Wilson, S. L 222 

Wilson. W. B 84,85 

Withy, Percy K 111 

Wolman, Leo 46 

Wood chemicals 190-192 

Acetate of lime 191 

Acetic acid 190-192 

Acetic anhydride 192 

Acetone 190. 191 

Wood alcohol 192 

Wood products 221-222 

Wool 231-2.36 

Australian 232, 233 

Conservation 234, 235 

Consumption 232 

Control of use 233, 234 

Government purchases 233, 234 

Imports 231 

Knitting 2.34 

Price control 232,233 

Quartermaster 233 

Rag administrator 235 

South American Syndicate _ 234 

Speculation 235 

Surplus stocks 235 

Wool clip of 1918. regs 234. 3S3 

Woolfolk, William G 162. 171 

Wool grease 188 

Woolley, Clarence M 55.58 

Worden, B. L 85 

"Work or fight" 90 

Wright, Col. Fred E 269 

X ray 200 

Yeatman, Pope 130, 150, 153 

Zane, Admiral A. V 48 

Zinc 137-130 

OlTer to Government 137 

Price fixing of 138 

Zirconium 1 '•"' 



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